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Introduction 
When I began this study I had two aims. My first aim was to contribute to a 
better understanding of political elite formation in an African context through 
an empirically rich and detailed study of the realisation, accumulation and 
exercise of political power. Whereas ethnicity and social class are ever present 
in the political life of the state they are not the key to understanding the 
institutional life of politics (cf. Bayart 1993). In this book I use the framework 
of political elite formation to aid an understanding of power. This project is a 
study of the agents that construct, define and bring about change through the 
exercise of institutionalized political power. Thus, the following questions are 
considered. How are political elites formed? Does the process of political elite 
formation affect the way political elites exercise power in KwaZulu-Natal? In 
what ways and with what implications do attitudes and value systems held by 
the political elite impact upon political institutions in KwaZulu-Natal? In what 
ways do parties and institutions constrain their behaviour? 
Second, I wanted to find out what happened to the prolific writing on the 
state and political parties in what is now the Province of KwaZulu-Natal in 
South Africa. In the 1980s and early 1990s politics between the Inkatha Free-
dom Party and the African National Congress gripped political scientists, 
sociologists, historians and social anthropologists alike. Politics was primarily 
reduced to the frameworks of “ethnic conflict” and/or “class struggle” and de-
scribed as youthful comrades pitted against a bureaucratic bourgeoisie and 
removed from any institutional context. Yet in 1994, after the first multi-party 
elections, this prolific writing stopped. Yes, there are some remnants of the 
earlier period with politics described as ethnic nationalist in normative termi-
nology, but for the most part academics have turned elsewhere. Why is this? Is 
it because all the questions about politics in the province have now been ans-
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wered? I do not think so. Rather, the frameworks which were used to describe 
politics often provided little understanding. In the post-1994 period the concepts 
of ethnicity and social class have even less relevance than before in aiding an 
understanding of institutionalized political power. Instead, I draw together and 
expand fragmented approaches to the study of political elites. 
I redefine the study of political elites in two key ways. Firstly, an under-
standing of agency in institutionalized political power must draw together the 
elements of social and political composition, recruitment, circulation, value 
systems and attitudes and institutional capacity of political elites in a new 
framework. Political elite formation encompasses all of these factors, these 
factors influence each other and cannot be studied independently of one another. 
Secondly, any interrogation into political elite formation must exist within the 
context of the way in which those elites negotiate, exercise and accumulate 
power, that is, within the confines of institutionalized power – within the insti-
tutions of power in which they are located. Hence the character and constraints 
of parties and political institutions and their relationship to political elites is a 
key component in political elite formation and thus in understanding agency and 
institutions, including why post-colonial democracies in transition suceed and 
fail.  
Political science is fundamentally about power. Investigations into the exer-
cise of power in a variety of micro-settings are a primary way through which 
political scientists recognise and define power. Thus power is not independent 
of its object. Instead, studies of the way in which power is exercised, accu-
mulated and tempered by a multiplicity of actors in a variety of institutional 
settings provides the substance from which political scientists can define and 
recognise the very nature of power. Central to these investigations of power are 
agents that define and bring about change. Without agents, power does not 
exist. These agents are individuals or groups who exercise their power within 
the context of their environment, often empowered to act within it but con-
strained by its framework. The most important of these – in a democracy at least 
– are the members of the power elite that exist within political institutions and 
whom the public have mandated to act. These agents are the political elite. 
The term political elite is, for the purposes of this book, defined as a group 
of individuals whose legitimate relationship to the institutions of power enables 
them to possess the key political influence or take the most important political 
decisions about that environment. There are many types of political elite and 
political elites coexist (and overlap) with other elites. However the approach of 
this book is limited to an analysis of the political elite that is made up of the 
elected members of the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal over two 
terms of office from 1994-2004. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, they are 
identifiable and accessible. Secondly, they occupy the key institutional positions 
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and therefore legitimately exercise political power, and make choices and de-
cisions that effect change in the province and reflect the perspectives of their 
political parties in their interactions with each other. Furthermore, such elites, 
while exercising power, are constrained by the actual and potential power of 
political institutions (national and provincial), political parties and one another. 
Hence, this book is a study of legislative political elites and the analysis of 
political elites within political parties focuses upon parliamentary parties and 
not the “party in the county” which falls outside of its remit.  
A powerful and influential “elite theory hypothesis” holds that political 
power is concentrated in the hands of a few. In this book, this is taken as a given 
but uninteresting factor. From this hypothesis there are two distinct approaches 
to the study of political elites. The first is a normative approach in which two 
distinct trends are evident. The first trend combines the capacity of political 
elites with the operation of power. As such, the special talents that political 
elites possess are viewed as a justification for their domination, with the public 
playing a subordinate role. In the second trend, the operation of power is 
measured against the desirability of a democratically based polity. As such, the 
key egalitarian aspiration is the creation of an elite group that is responsive to 
the public and shares power with them. These two trends are rejected for the 
purposes of this book, for two reasons. Firstly, by focusing on what should be 
rather than what is, they contradict the central elite theory hypothesis upon 
which they are based – that some level of elite domination is inevitable. 
Secondly, in seeking primarily to evaluate and either justify or improve the 
relationship of elites to society, the approach does not sufficiently recognise that 
the character of the elite group within the context of the particular institutional 
arrangement may be the primary factor in shaping the form of power. 
The second approach to the study of political elites, and the one adopted for 
the purposes of this book, is an empirical approach. In this approach, theorists 
maintain that in any political dispensation, despite the relative desirability of the 
form and character of it, political power is concentrated in the hands of a 
political elite. Such studies of political elites have a long, but fragmented, his-
tory in political science. In this empirical approach, the key elements in political 
analysis are the recruitment, behaviour or ideology of the political elite group, 
with very few studies linking these three criteria into a comprehensive analysis 
(Baker 1997: 59-66). Moreover, research on the political recruitment of elites 
has tended to be narrowly focused, examining their social background, drawn 
predominantly from a range of documentary sources and in the context of 
questions which evaluate the level of political representation by elites. Further-
more, studies that consider the behaviour of elites focus upon the membership 
of committees by elites, voting records and the visible minutes of parliaments. 
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Finally, research on political ideology has tended to focus upon the attitudes and 
values that political elites possess. 
In this book I examine, through extensive empirical fieldwork research, poli-
tical elite formation in the Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal over a ten-
year period from 1994-2004. The period of this study covers two successive 
provincial government elections and two terms of office. The first election was 
the founding election of South Africa’s new democracy. The time period of this 
book is deliberate. The first 10 years following the founding election in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal represent the most substantial period in which patterns and trends 
are established. The “two turnover test” in transition theory provides time peri-
od markers in which to measure the prospects for democracy of any given 
country (Huntington 1991). Hence, the patterns and trends established during 
this period set the path for the future. 
I adopt an empirical approach to the study of political elites based on ex-
tensive fieldwork research. This approach expands and redefines the study of 
elites in three ways. Firstly, my investigation draws together the elements of 
recruitment, behaviour and ideology in a new methodological analysis of poli-
tical elite formation. Secondly, I interrogate the relationship of political elite 
formation to the various ways in which those same political elites, negotiate, 
exercise and accumulate power. Thirdly, I contend that an understanding of the 
agency of political elites requires contextualisation within and through the dyna-
mics in which political parties co-exist and within the institutions of power 
within which they are located. Hence, the character and constraints of parties 
and political institutions and their relationship to political elites is a central 
component in political elite formation.  
KwaZulu-Natal is one of nine provinces in South Africa, established on the 
eve of the first multi-racial democratic elections in 1994.1 The province consists 
of the territories of the former KwaZulu homeland and the former province of 
Natal, each with former separate administrative structures. In 1994, provincial 
political institutions were established in KwaZulu-Natal, the middle sphere of 
government juxtaposed between national and local government in South Afri-
ca’s, at best quasi-federal, three-sphere system of government.  
The powers and functions of the provincial parliament are divided into legis-
lative (parliament) and executive (government) authority. Executive authority to 
prepare and initiate provincial policy and legislation and to implement national 
legislation in the province is vested in the Premier and Executive Council com-
                                                            
1  The new South Africa was created by the final act of the Tricameral Parliament 
through the instrument of the Republic of South Africa (1993) Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (Act No.200 of 1993) which was assented to on 25 January 
1994 and came into effect on 24 April 1994. 
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prising the Members of the Executive Council (MECs). Legislative authority to 
maintain oversight and monitoring of provincial executive authority and to 
ensure that executive organs are accountable to the provincial parliament re-
mains with the Members of the Provincial Parliament (MPPs). A provincial 
parliament may prepare such mechanisms as is deemed necessary to perform its 
functions. In the province of KwaZulu-Natal these oversight and accountability 
mechanisms comprise of parliamentary portfolio and standing committees for 
each functional and policy area and of legislative sittings of parliament. 
Constitutionally, the province has exclusive powers of provincial compe-
tence in functional areas listed in Schedule 5 of the constitution and shares 
competence with the national sphere of government in functional areas listed in 
Schedule 4 of the constitution. However, there are further institutional links 
between national and provincial spheres. In terms of executive functions, the 
Intergovernmental Relations Committee of Ministers and Members of Provin-
cial Councils (MINMEC) gives effect to the principles of cooperative govern-
ment and the intergovernmental nature of the South African policy environ-
ment. The national minister for a policy sector and the nine corresponding 
provincial MECs in that policy area meet on a regular basis in this sectoral 
forum to discuss policy and legislation within that particular policy sector. In 
terms of legislative links between the national and provincial spheres, The 
National Council of Provinces (the second legislative house in the national 
parliament) is comprised a ten member delegation from each province to ensure 
that provincial interests are considered in the national sphere. The NCOP pro-
vides scrutiny of national policy and legislation and provides a forum through 
which provinces can initiate national policy recommendations.  
However, the clearest links between the national and provincial spheres lies 
not in the institutional arrangements, but rather in political parties. The main 
parties in KwaZulu-Natal – the African National Congress, the Inkatha Freedom 
Party and the Democratic Alliance (formerly Democratic Party) – are also re-
presented in the national government, albeit with a national overwhelming ANC 
majority. 
The provincial legislature of KwaZulu-Natal is one of only two provincial 
administrative structures in which the African National Congress (ANC) has not 
held an overwhelming majority of seats, and is the only provincial legislature in 
which the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) remains a significant political contender 
for political power. 
My examination of the key issues of this book, within this political and 
institutional framework, is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter 1, I locate the 
study in the main debates on political elites and explicate the various ways in 
which research on political elites has been previously problematised. I further 
consider the literature pertaining to the study of political parties in this political 
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context and explain why it does not adequately capture the realities of power 
accumulation. 
In the second chapter I locate political elite formation within the historical 
contexts of contested political ideas and shifting institutional spaces. Through 
these concepts I discuss the roots of political elite formation in early political 
movements, political elite formation during the struggle period and political 
elite formation during the democratic transition. I make a series of claims. 
Firstly, the political elite was ideologically fractured2 in increasingly entrenched 
camps of contradictory and internally fragmented alliances. At different points 
in time, particular ideological discourses were stronger than others. Despite this, 
both the IFP and ANC contained particular forms of Africanist political ideas 
that competed with other discourses. Secondly, the political parties represented 
in the legislature that is the focus of this study had prior experience of insti-
tutionalized power through one of three parallel systems of legitimate authority. 
These included formal political institutions, informal institutions created 
through the merging of struggle components and the institution of traditional 
leadership. In the course of this experience, spaces were claimed by parties as 
elites personalised their positions and came to be seen as the institution. Third-
ly, as a consequence of the autonomy of provincial political elites located in the 
territory that made up KwaZulu and Natal, provincial political discourses from 
this province came to influence disproportionately national political dynamics.  
In Chapter 3, I explore, through empirical data, the social composition of the 
political elite and categorise the elite by race, gender, age, regional identifi-
cation, family and lineage ties, religion, education, professional occupation and 
community related activities. My account depicts a political elite which despite 
its diversity has become, in many of its characteristics, increasingly homoge-
nous. I claim that this indicates that social bias is present in elite formation. 
Although heterogeneous, the political elite is unrepresentative of the provincial 
population and in many cases, political elites already possessed elite status prior 
to their political involvement. In comparing the political elite by political party, 
I illustrate that discernible clusters of elites are apparent within and across 
parties. Within and across parties, social capital exists and serves to provide an 
additional guarantee to political elites. Syncretic affiliations further serve to in-
tegrate elites into a series of discernible clusters and to knit those clusters 
together. The key element in most political parties is an elite that has become, in 
the post-1994 period, both fluid and fragile. 
In Chapter 4, I turn to an examination, again through empirical data, of the 
political institutional and organisational composition of the political elite. I 
                                                            
2  The term fractured refers to divisions on the basis of attitudes, values and ideologies 
as well as organisational and institutional divisions. 
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explore the reasons for, circumstances of, extent and types of former political 
involvement by the political elite and divide the elite into specific political 
categories based upon these experiences. I demonstrate a measure of continuity 
with elite actors of the past and explicate the types of political experiences that 
different clusters of elites possess. I claim that specific political experiences 
have guaranteed clusters of the political elite a place within the provincial 
legislature. Despite this, I further claim that political elite affiliations were, for 
the most part, initially based upon local contexts and personal circumstances 
rather then the grand political context. In some cases, limited choice and a 
desire for political involvement led individuals into political affiliations which 
further injected a multiform dimension to political parties. This to some extent 
explains the formation of particular political clusters within parties. For many, 
the reasons for their particular affiliations were not pertinent in the post 1994 
period. While some have become assimilated within party structures to such an 
extent that an alternative political home would be inconceivable to them, in 
other cases political elites have little present day affinity to their political party. 
I contend that the consequence of this is twofold. Firstly, in some cases, poli-
tical elites have come to identify their interests with the legislature. Secondly, 
the potential for increased fluidity within the legislature is present as some 
political elites struggle to redefine their affiliations. 
In Chapter 5, I explore recruitment and circulation within the provincial 
legislature through the intra-party dynamics that exist in the IFP and ANC. I 
explain the institutional context and the relevance of political parties that 
operate within the legislature which provide boundaries and opportunities for 
elite movement. I explore the party list processes in 1994 and 1999 and the floor 
crossing processes and events that occurred, locating these within political party 
political culture and social and political capital as it has emerged within political 
parties in the legislature. I make a series of claims, in relation to the character 
and composition of the elite. Firstly, the character of the political elite that has 
come to occupy key institutional positions has changed markedly since 1994. 
Secondly, the fluidity of the political elite has increased, in part, as a conse-
quence of this changing composition and as a consequence of internal party 
political culture. These political cultures are fractured and fragmented, with 
clear differences within and between political elites in both the ANC and IFP. 
Thirdly, circulation of the political elite in the legislature is not a democratic 
indicator. Instead it is the result of an increasing volatility due to non-democ-
ratic behaviour by the political elite. 
In Chapter 6, inter-party elite bonding is explored in the context of the post-
1994 institutional dynamics. I examine the roots and character of the IFP-ANC 
coalition formed in 1999 and the impact of this upon parties and institutions in 
the legislature. I then turn to an exploration of the breakdown of this coalition 
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and the emergence of an IFP-DA alliance. I make a series of claims. First, I 
contend that the coalition brought together a series of value and belief systems 
that was not congruent with the new institutions and, in fact, began to under-
mine them. In addition, I show how one of the signatories to the coalition was 
undermined by it through a disruption of organisational ties, the subordination 
of the party to the state and a changing relationship with core constituencies. I 
then claim that conflict between the IFP and ANC in the use of prevailing rules 
of political etiquette (as a part of political culture) was the key reason for the 
coalition breakdown, despite it being manifested through political issues. I 
further claim that the alliance between the IFP and DA formed in November 
2003 was reflective of a shift in the character and composition of the political 
elite in the DA and that unlike the unity project of the IFP-ANC coalition, this 
alliance is reflective of shared values and policy orientations. 
In Chapter 7, I interrogate the developing institutional capacity of the poli-
tical elite as it is relevant to political elite formation. I explore the level of active 
participation of elites, types of issues that elites prioritise and dominate the 
parliamentary context, support systems provided to the elite and availability of 
training provided, as understood by the elite. I make a series of interconnected 
claims. Firstly, I argue that the institutional capacity of political elites is in-
fluenced by their previous political experience, educational levels, occupational 
types and other forms of individual abilities. Secondly, I argue that elites are 
bounded by their understanding of the institutional environment, comprehension 
of their role within it, and ability to navigate the parliamentary environment. 
There are two further consequences of this. Firstly, the types of issues that 
dominate the legislature are a product of an undeveloped capacity among elites 
in general. These issues that are prioritised further reinforce instability in the 
legislature as they are not central to the development agenda of the province. 
Secondly, I further claim that the dominance and longevity of some elites is the 
product of their developed capacity in relation to other elites. In some cases, 
these elites become the policy representatives of their parties seeking to influ-
ence the agenda. In others, their longevity influences fluidity in the legislature 
as they are offered an “additional guarantee” across party lines. 
In the final chapter, the conclusion, I draw the sub-parts of the study together 
by focussing upon the nature of political elite formation and the characteristics 
of the emerging political elite. I claim that although political elite formation 
remains guided by the history of party fracture lines that exist in the province, 
the new institutional context has provided for greater party fluidity and in-
stability in the legislature of a political elite that came to power through frag-
mented and contradictory alliances. The political elite has become more homo-
genous, and for some, their contradictory affiliations tie their interests to the 
legislature. In addition, an emerging political culture of value systems and 
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ideology is beginning to take shape across political parties in a manner that has 
the potential to undermine the democratic institutions of government. As a 
product of this, and an underdeveloped institutional capacity, certain issues 
dominate the provincial agenda as the elite come to redefine their interests. 
Alongside this the longevity of a few is guaranteed. As such, political elite 
formation in KwaZulu-Natal has the potential to undermine the basis of insti-
tutions on which democracy in the province rests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
A theory and methodology  
for the study of elites 
The concept of a political elite is a simple one; that all societies no matter their 
ideology or social structure are in fact ruled by a small group of individuals 
designated variously as a political elite, a ruling class or a power elite. In this 
book I use the term political elite. In the context of KwaZulu-Natal, this is a 
political elite in a constitutional democracy with a violent political history of 
acute political fractures. The term political elite is most commonly used among 
elite theorists. I set aside the term ruling class because of its relationship to the 
term class. A political elite is not simply a group of people that rule politically 
but belong to an economic class. Their basis of power is not necessarily related 
to the means of production and they are not necessarily primarily driven as an 
economic class. I further set aside the term power elite because the term power 
does not designate precisely enough the essential relationship to the state, 
politics and rule. 
Elite theorists take as their starting point the causes and consequences of 
inequality in society. The key characteristics of any society are consequences of 
the characteristics of the political elite. The historical transformation of all states 
is a history of political elites. Hence, for the majority of elite theorists a class-
less society with political equality belongs to the dreams of utopia. While they 
may or may not be anti-democratic, on the whole they are sceptical of the 
possibilities of realising democracy in whichever of its forms. While the con-
cept of a political elite is relatively simple, elite theory remains a divided field 
and the operational definition of a political elite is contested and inadequate. 
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The theory of the ruling class put forward by Italian classical political 
scientist Gaetano Mosca posits that society is divided into two groups, a 
minority which rules and a majority that is ruled (Mosca 1939). For Mosca, the 
organized nature of groups within the political elite is based upon common 
material interests. But the location of that grouping is undefined. Extending 
Mosca’s argument is American classical sociologist C. Wright Mills’ famous 
study of the power elite in America in which he posits the idea that the organi-
zational basis of an elite group is the foundation upon which the elite have the 
capacity to rule. Three unified and interdependent elite structures that consist of 
the key political, corporate economic and military personnel together constitute 
the power elite. Trade unions and interest groups make up a middle level of 
power and the general public or the masses are confined to the bottom level in 
which they are effectively powerless (C. Wright-Mills 1956). Like Mosca, 
Mills’ thesis suffers from a failure to fully operationalise his own definition in 
the context of political power and political institutions. While he discusses the 
spheres in which the elite is located and through which its members coalesce, he 
does not specify at what levels within those spheres they exist or how they deny 
access to power to other groupings within those spheres. Hence, for Mills it 
would seem that the political elite is simultaneously everyone within those 
spheres, but no-one specific.  
French-Italian classical sociologist Vilfredo Pareto saw rule by elites as 
inevitable, though he emphasised their cyclical quality of rise and decline, and 
he focused closely on the institutions of government as the crucial sites of elite 
power and influence. Thus in contrast to Mosca and Mills, Pareto’s upper stra-
tum consists of a governing elite. They are political and most likely to be parlia-
mentarians (Pareto 1935). In this theory, the political elite is directly related to 
the environment and instruments through which power operates and they are 
active rather than passive entities within it. Drawing upon Pareto’s distinction, I 
define the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal as the elected members of the 
Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal, because their legitimate relationship 
to the institutions of power enables them, within constitutional and institutional 
constraints, to take the most important political decisions in the post-1994 per-
iod.  
While operational definitions of the political elite are contested, the focus of 
literature on political elites in political institutions is also fragmented with the 
key works devoted to singular studies of either the recruitment, or the behaviour 
or the ideology of elites in what is a literature that predominantly explores 
political elites in the context of Europe and America.  
In this study, I am concerned to integrate existing fragmented theoretical and 
methodological approaches to the study of political elites and then to extend 
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them in a study of the political elite in the context of KwaZulu-Natal. As such I 
explore a number of key themes. 
The first key debate of this study is the social composition of the political 
elite, which is a salient concern of classical elite theorists and contemporary 
analysts of political recruitment alike. In particular, classical elite theorists are 
concerned with the relationship between elites and classes and the social class 
of the political elite. In general, such theorists posit that there is a high degree of 
self-recruitment among elites of the same social class. Do the political elite 
share a common social background which leads to similar beliefs and attitudes 
among them? (Pareto 1935) Are these beliefs, intertwined with self-interest, 
exhibited by members who best serve their own material interests through 
collective social reproduction? Mosca would agree in that the political elite in 
his analysis is an organized group formed on the basis of common material 
interests that include social position, property or class (Mosca 1939). Such 
elites, in his view represent the social values of their own social background in 
what is a complex social tapestry of privilege, ideological conformity and com-
mon interest. Extending this argument is Mills, whose thesis of the power elite 
posits that the capacity of the three interdependent elite structures has a parti-
cular organizational basis for its rule (C. Wright-Mills 1956). While sharing 
social composition, these elites can represent divergent interests because each 
interlocking structure is able to coalesce around its components’ interests in a 
manner that perpetuates their power.  
More recent studies of the social composition of the political elite are located 
within the framework of political recruitment in the study of legislatures. A key 
question in this body of literature is how far the social composition of par-
liament is reflective of the electorate? Commonly a-typical of the electorate the 
social background of the political elite has a key influence on their attitudes and 
behaviour (Norris et al. 1997). In the United Kingdom, the political elite es-
sentially represents the ‘chattering classes’ (Norris & Lovenduski 1997) of 
professional occupations through supply side variables of political recruitment. 
That is, candidates for political recruitment demonstrate some evidence of self-
segregation. Those who make themselves available for office are primarily a-
typical in terms of social class, age, education and professional occupation.  
In the African literature there is a near total absence of studies of the social 
composition of the political elite. One notable exception, and a key influence of 
this study, is Kuper’s 1850-1930s study of the African bourgeoisie in which he 
discusses the boundaries to professional development among Africans caused 
by the racially restrictive practices of the segregationist state (Kuper 1965). 
Despite this, members of the African political elite in South Africa were an 
educated elite drawn from the professional classes. They held employment in 
the fields of teaching, law, medicine, religion and journalism that provided them 
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with the capacity and resolve to combine their profession with politics. Hence, 
Kuper’s conclusions in the context of the South African elite support studies 
that focus on Europe – that the political elite was drawn predominantly from the 
middle classes and was certainly a-typical of the broader population. 
Contemporary elite theorists discuss this emerging trend of social different-
iation among the electorate and the political elite as evidence of the increasing 
availability of careerist politicians for whom politics is certainly a professional 
career. Max Weber could assert of his own time that politicians are frequently 
living from politics as well as for politics (Weber 1958). In present day for the 
political elite, politics is now a profession (Wessels 1997). This professionali-
sation of politics is thus thought to produce parliaments that are more socially 
homogeneous and potentially less responsive to the diverse views and needs of 
the electorate.  
There are, however, a number of key weaknesses to these previous ap-
proaches to the study of the social composition of the political elite that this 
study addresses. The first is context specific. There are no previous studies of 
the social composition of the political elite in the KwaZulu-Natal context. In 
addition, with the exception of Kuper’s study, most studies of the social 
composition of the political elite have been conducted in a context where there 
is an absence of acute political fractures and take place in the context of ad-
vanced democratic institutions. That is, elite recruitment takes place in a stable 
political environment where the key questions of who holds power in those 
environments are not life and death matters. As citizens become more apathetic 
it is likely that the social composition of the elite might become similar in such 
contexts. However, this assumption in the literature is not necessarily the case 
in other contexts because it has not been tested there. 
Secondly, a key weakness of these previous studies is discipline specific. By 
and large, these studies are located within the realm of sociological theory and 
as such they focus almost entirely upon the social background of the political 
elite through an analysis of educational levels, professional occupation and 
social class. As such, there is an inability among these theorists to explain the 
success of these political elites in institutionalizing their own interests – as they 
are related to social composition. While I would agree that social composition is 
an important and essential component of any study of political elites, including 
this one, the political aspect of the political elite is largely marginalized or 
ignored. As a result, these studies of the agency of power miss the key methods 
of agency. Where it is included the focus is almost entirely upon the party 
political affiliation of the political elite and the political experience that mem-
bers of the elite possess. While these factors might provide insights into the 
behaviours and attitudes of the political elite they may not be the most im-
portant factors in assessing elite affiliations and associative patterns in a 
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political context where the choices of the political elite were restricted by an 
authoritarian and brutal political environment. Nor do they explain the reasons 
for the continued political affiliations of some elites and the fluidity of others 
when environments change. Hence, the political composition of the political 
elite needs to be studied, and within it, the political choices in terms of patterns 
of affiliation should be analysed. 
Do the political elite constitute a self-conscious political class transcending 
party political affiliations? Do they live from politics, determine their own com-
position and at times act in unity? Schumpeter, for example, rejects democracy 
as a method of public participation and asserts instead that democracy is simply 
a structured arrangement for reaching decisions among an elite through the open 
competition for the people’s vote (Schumpeter 1954). As such, he presents the 
abstract possibility that a political class is more likely in certain electoral sys-
tems. The party list system of proportional representation employed in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal means that the candidate lists are constructed by party bosses, albeit 
with some measure of grassroots support, and this factor inserts a significant 
demand side variable into the selection of the political elite. That is, the criteria 
by which the political elite are selected and recruited are determined by party 
bosses or selectors. Hence, an incumbent political elite in KwaZulu-Natal is 
provided with the possibility to choose likeminded candidates. Whether or not 
they do indeed constitute a political class is dependent upon their political 
composition and political choices. 
Closely related to the concept of a political class is the theory of elite 
circulation. Elite theorists do not provide a general theory for the rise and fall of 
the political elite, as class theorists do. Instead, political elite circulation refers 
to the replacement of an elite by another elite in its entirety or partly. It can 
imply accommodation or assimilation of individuals or groups into an existing 
political elite as well as their marginalisation. Pareto implies that political 
change only occurs in the form of elite circulation. For Pareto it does not matter 
whether a government espouses democracy or fascism because popular repre-
sentation does not exist. Rather, political change occurs when new groups are 
absorbed into the political elite as old elites become weak and lose their will. 
For Pareto, there are two kinds of political elite. The first consists of those in 
power whose aim is to protect their own positions of power and privilege by 
conserving the existing entrenched institutional format. 
The second consists of an innovatory elite who, once they replace the exist-
ing elite, become conservative like the former grouping. And the cycle conti-
nues. Hence, for Pareto, the basis of political elite circulation is competition 
predominantly between the political elite and a new emerging political elite 
from the lower strata, who may or may not have been previously excluded. 
Whether an established political elite survives is dependent upon whether or not 
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it possesses the necessary attributes to do so. The political elite may use a whole 
range of strategies to fend off challenges ranging from trickery and manipu-
lation to the use of state power. Under what circumstances in KwaZulu-Natal is 
competition not the basis of elite circulation and can competiton and the 
restriction or absence of competition co-exist across elite groups and both 
simultaneously form the basis of circulation?  
In what ways do the political elite keep order and maintain position by the 
use of ideology and political values? According to Mosca the bureaucratization 
of the state allows for a ruling elite of diverse interests to come to power since 
there is no longer the need for extraordinary individuals to rule. Although he 
does not discuss the concept of elite circulation he implies that it exists through 
new organized interests seeking power. Through competition for pre-eminence 
winners and losers are produced, the winners are ultimately the political elite.  
While Pareto links the capacity of individuals to their status as an elite, and 
Mosca discusses the elite as organized groups, a third perspective exists among 
eite theorists. This is a virtual absence of elite circulation. The power elite are 
unified in contrast to a passive and fragmented mass society (Wright-Mills 
1956). Indeed if social position is the central factor positions of power of the 
political elite may not always be open to challenge. Rather, each new generation 
of the political elite comes to perpetuate the same interests as the old. In 
explaining the reformism of European social democracy, German political 
sociologist Robert Michels shows in an interesting test case of elite circulation 
that assimilation rather than outright replacement is a mode of circulation 
(Michels 1915). This is in keeping with Dye and Zeigler’s study of contem-
porary American politics – that compromise and accommodation shields the 
political elite from the public. While the political elite make deals amongst 
themselves to further their own interests it provides the political elite with 
autonomy and shields them from losing power. It is the irony of democracy that 
the very survival of democracy depends upon the actions of the political elite 
(Dye & Zeigler 1990). 
A key weakness of both classical and more recent preceding studies of elite 
circulation is that “circulation” is rarely applied within and among the existing 
political elite. Rather, it is contextualised in discussions of a political elite and 
an excluded non-elite seeking to enter already established and consolidated 
democratic institutions. This differs in this study. First, in this book, circulation 
is examined within and between the political elite and across political parties. 
Secondly, in the context of this study, the institutions are new so there are no 
incumbents within them. A second weakness in the literature on elite theory is 
the absence of any extensive discussion about the differences and distinctions 
between political elites that result in replacement, accommodation and margin-
alisation within the political elite because the theory has not been extensively 
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applied to empirical studies. Elite theorists consider that the attributes or cap-
acity or organized nature of the elite to force or fend off circulation is the key 
factor. Hence the methods by which replacement, accommodation and margin-
alisation occur is the focus, rather than the underlying social and political char-
acteristics and attitudes and values that elites possess that lead to circulation. A 
key reason for linking the different and fragmented approaches to the study of 
political elites in this study is because the underlying characteristics of social 
and particularly political composition, and the behaviours and ideology of the 
political elite may explain elite circulation. In turn, circulation may also impact 
upon behaviour and ideology. It is my contention that they form an intrinsic link 
and should be studied together. 
Hence, a third debate that is explored in this book is the attitudes and values 
that the political elite possess. Rather than simply considering these as they 
impact upon public policy, these I extend into a discussion of the impact of 
attitudes and values upon the institutions of power. I explore this in a cross-
party manner in an examination of inter-party elite bonding and the impact of 
this upon individual political parties and the political institutions of the legis-
lature. Elite attitudes and values refer to the belief systems that the political elite 
possess. It can refer to substantive belief systems such as ideology. Sereno’s 
work places ideology at the heart of the reproduction of power. His claim that 
‘in the realm of politics, beliefs, no matter how absurd, are the common patri-
mony of rulers’ (Sereno 1962: 109) illustrates the contention that elite actions 
are governed by their ideological passions. All members of a political elite be-
lieve, however minimally, in the ideology they express. These ideological 
beliefs can be an important method through which they coalesce. Attitudes and 
values can also refer to a method of politics such as a form of political etiquette 
which is acceptable and understood among a political elite. Customary cultural 
values can transcend party politics and shape the behaviour of the political elite 
(MacGaffey 1970). The rules and procedures of customary good manners can 
be the formula through which informal political relationships operate. These 
rules can act as the basis for inter-elite interactions and draw the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion of the group (MacGaffey 1970). Hence, both types of 
value system are explored in this book as they impact upon power accumula-
tion. 
The Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal was constructed in the period 
1990-1994 out of a pacted transition at the national level of politics in South 
Africa. The new institutions of government that emerged accommodated a 
political elite of acute political fractures. Within the body of contemporary 
democratic elite theory, researchers have been concerned to construct ideal type 
models of democratic transitions. In these studies, theorists intrinsically link the 
substantive and procedural value systems of political elites to the concept of 
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democracy. Karl and Schmitter’s comparative focus upon four transition types 
and the implications of these for democracy illustrates that, through founda-
tional pacts in new democracies, the substantive policy and procedural interests 
of dominant groups are included. Through agreements the scope of interests is 
bounded (Karl & Schmitter 1991). Foundational pacts thus limit representation 
to dominance by existing pre-pact groups of power holders. In addition, they 
marginalise challengers negotiating a new basis for inclusion. Both the sub-
stantive policy and procedural agreements that emerge from such elite pacts 
result in a compromised democracy. The success of the agreements made also 
lies in the co-optation of groups. In contrast, Burton & Higley distinguish 
between substantive and procedural ideal elite types as they manifest in three 
configurations. The first of these typologies is disunified elites where politics is 
constructed in zero-sum terms, there is little cooperation and consensus, poli-
tical elites do not restrict competition to within the system and there is often 
violent confrontation. In the second ideal type, that of ideologically unified 
elites, the political system is highly centralized, elites are characterized by 
shared value systems on substantive programmes and dissent is not tolerated. 
Finally, in the third type, that of consensually unified elites, politics occurs 
through bargaining and compromise within the realm of political institutions. 
Such elites agree upon the fundamental rules and procedures even if their sub-
stantive programmes differ (Burton & Higley 1987). Contemporary democratic 
elite theorists who are concerned to construct ideal typologies focus predomi-
nantly upon the founding period of institutions. Hence, the question is what 
happens afterwards and how do the political elite change and transform while in 
power? The answer to this can only be found through a longtitudinal study such 
as this.  
Political theorists who focus primarily upon institutional democracy claim 
that the behaviour of political elites is moderated by, and within, democratic 
political institutions. Indeed the substantive test of democracy is whether the 
political elite hands over power to a set of rules. In the principle of institutional 
compromise elite groups in constant struggle submit their interests to compe-
tition, so that conflict becomes structured within institutions and procedures. As 
such, compromise becomes the main method through which conflict is pro-
cessed and uncertainty is institutionalized (Przeworski 1995, 1986). Closely 
connected is the thesis that modern democratic institutions will somewhat 
moderate the values and attitudes of the political elite. In Italy, real political 
institutional change metamorphosed the informal relationships between the po-
litical elite (Putnam 1993). 
None of the aforementioned studies so far have considered the reverse ana-
lysis – what is the impact institutionally when the attitudes and values of the 
political elite change or are not re-moulded? Can established values and atti-
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tudes re-mould political institutions? This is a key debate in this book. This ties 
in conceptually with the theory of the longue duree, that modern institutions 
sometimes show themselves to be fragile and un-entrenched in relation to other 
deeper, and not explicitly political traditions and values which may be con-
solidated among a population (Bloch 1924). If this is the case, is it possible that 
such traditions and values may penetrate political institutions and that the 
political elite may come to coalesce around them? This study seeks to answer 
this question. 
A final debate in this study concerns the development of institutional capa-
city among the political elite. There are very few existing studies of political 
elite institutional capacity yet in focusing upon what the political elite do in 
office, and whether they succeed, should be a key means to evaluate their inter-
elite relationships and longevity. For example, in Brazil, although the political 
elite were acutely sensitive to the pervasive socio-economic problems they were 
unable to institute any concerted efforts to improve the situation substantially 
(Reis & Cheribub 1995). The authors were unable to explain why this was so. 
This raises the question of what happens in terms of inter-elite relationships 
when institutional capacity is not evident? On what basis does the political elite 
operate? Does this impact on the durability of the elite or does the agenda have 
to be reformulated in order to correlate with available abilities?  
In Poland’s transition from communism to democracy the legislative pro-
gramme of the political elite failed as a consequence of political elite incapacity. 
As a consequence, it led to the collapse of one of the political parties in the 
legislature (Wesolowski 1992). Hence, in some cases incapacity may lead to 
elite circulation and replacement. Thoenes, posits that in welfare state systems 
there are no longer any real ideological discussions and policy discussions are 
reduced to the technical sphere. The political elite become beholden to those 
with technical expertise and so the system becomes a-political (Thoenes 1970). 
In cases where political parties agree on the essentials of policy what then 
differentiates the political elite from one another? How does this impact upon 
the policy agenda and inter-elite relationships in the absence of technical 
expertise? Who holds power in the absence of capacity and what does this mean 
for the institutionalization of democracy? 
Having set out the key theoretical debates that this study contributes to I now 
consider the political context of KwaZulu-Natal.  
The context of KwaZulu-Natal – methodological problems 
The contextual literature on KwaZulu-Natal is largely disconnected from poli-
tical science concepts and meanings. There are no studies of the political elite in 
KwaZulu-Natal in the post-transition period. Political scientists have largely 
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shied away from this fractured and contested political context. However in the 
period of late apartheid and during the transition there is a proliferation of 
writing on the province,some of which has serious methodological problems of 
validity. 
The main challenge faced by political scientists writing during the period of 
late-apartheid political tensions was methodological. Firstly, the authors had 
very limited access to primary information through fieldwork interviews as 
Inkatha had essentially “closed shop” to providing extensive academic and 
media interviews. In fact, there is no literature on Inkatha that bases its findings 
on empirical and/or qualitative primary sources. Authors chose to, or were 
forced to; rely upon documentary sources and/or newspaper articles and/or 
secondary sources. While such sources are valid, they are certainly not enough 
to understand the complexity of the internal dynamics of Inkatha which has an 
operational culture that is multiform. Simply, in order to write authoritatively 
about elites one must interview them. 
Some of the other literature on Inkatha in this period contains serious 
methodological problems that may be considered as visible bias. One such 
example is Mzala’s work (Mzala 1988) which is presented as an authoritative 
text on Inkatha. The book has been reviewed in at least 13 serious academic 
journals. Mzala is a pseudonym for Jabulani Nobleman Nxumalo, an ANC and 
SACP member and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldier involved in the war with 
Inkatha. He possessed knowledge about the ANC and SACP perceptions of, and 
approach to, Inkatha. Two methodological challenges remain. First, Mzala’s 
own role is not stated openly in the publication and hence the author’s broader 
influence on the findings are hidden. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
validity of much of the subject matter which required knowledge about the 
internal workings of Inkatha or Inkatha’s perceptions of the ANC and SACP is 
highly questionable. The reason for this is that the author by way of his role as 
an MK operative did not have access to the inner workings of this party so 
could not have known about this. In reality then, the control of the intellectual 
space was also part of the political war in this province and some of the texts 
must be seen as such.  
A further key area in which there are methodological problems in the liter-
ature is that of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal between the ANC-United 
Democratic Front (UDF) and the IFP. My first criticism of this body of liter-
ature is that it is heavily pro-ANC and anti-IFP. As the body of literature on 
violence has grown this trend is repeated without any interrogation of the 
previous literature. Some, but not all, of this literature is written by intellectuals 
who themselves sympathised with the ideas and aims of the UDF and were 
writing at a time when the conflict on the ground was most intense. This 
somewhat translates into the frameworks that are then employed in analysis. For 
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example, different frameworks are employed to analyse the ANC and the IFP. 
The ANC – UDF role in political violence is primarily considered in the frame-
work of a “just war” including the establishment of Self-Defence Units (SDUs) 
whereas IFP orchestrated violence including the establishment of Self-Pro-
tection Units (SPUs) is seen as within the realm of warlord1 politics. Part of the 
problem is that the predominant form of analysis was class-based analysis that 
developed out of the sub-discipline of area studies.2 Within the social sciences 
and development studies, class-based analysis became the hegemonic analytical 
framework through which colonialism, oppression and struggle politics was 
discussed. Other frameworks were sidelined and class theory overshadowed 
other frameworks (cf. Etzioni-Halevy 1993). The dominant intellectual analysis 
was thus closer to the rhetoric of the ANC during the 1980s and early 1990s 
than it was to the IFP rhetoric. Hence, the activist-type discourse employed by 
the ANC became the dominant discourse in both struggle politics and within 
intellectual analysis. Examples of this literature include John Saul’s work (Saul 
1991) and that of Robert Price (Price 1991).  
Moreover, because political violence often became diffused through other 
conflicts and because of the refusal of the IFP to participate in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, the total figure of casualties from political violence 
will never fully be known. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission failed to establish a framework of reference to consider political viol-
ence that was committed in KwaZulu-Natal by ANC-UDF perpetrators against 
IFP victims and by IFP perpetrators against ANC-UDF victims. Its mandate 
was established to hear human rights violations in the context of state and 
victim and thus failed to provide an effective framework through which “black-
on-black” violence could be considered. As a result, the IFP did not fully 
participate in the TRC investigations and no-one can say with accuracy, whether 
the ANC-UDF or the IFP fared better or worse from the political violence. 
Moreover, in tending to ascribe blame through a count of the number of human 
lives claimed in political violence, the central factor of who profited is lost. This 
can only be considered in relation to politics; that is, in measuring who fared 
better or worse one should consider the level of moral power gained from the 
violence, rather than a simple count of human lives.  
Because the majority of literature on political violence is not written from 
the discipline of political science it tends not to consider political institutions 
                                                            
1  For a detailed discussion of the term warlord and its contextualisation, see Reno 
1999. 
2  See for example, the core readings and key themes that make up area studies course 
curricula in university departments, particularly in the United Kingdom during this 
period. The curricula taught during this period at the Institute for Development 
Studies at the University of Sussex is one example. 
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and political structures. As such, it does not consider the different impact that 
these had on the mobilising strategies of the political movements. Instead, the 
prevailing contention is that political violence was in the interests of, and 
controlled by, political movements as part of a grand design. Little interest is 
taken in competing centres of power within political movements or in the way 
in which competing centres of power and their institutional location forced an 
almost inevitable conflict between the ANC-UDF and IFP.  
A further problem is source validity. Chalenges of source validity occur in 
two main ways. First, most literature relies heavily upon “independent sources” 
that witnessed violence or, who were quoted in newspaper articles as witnessing 
violence, whose own ideological preferences are not interrogated. With the 
merging of the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) with civic 
movements in KwaZulu-Natal as part of a concerted strategy, many indepen-
dent sources within the civics in the province were not ideologically inde-
pendent. A case in point is Levine’s account of violence in the Natal midlands 
where the eye-witness accounts of violence between the ANC-UDF and IFP 
were provided by people who were ANC and UDF affiliated, and so was the 
key author, none of which is stated in the publication (Levine 1999). A second 
challenge of source validity is when authors unproblematically use politically 
motivated texts without interrogating them. A case in point might be the use of 
Mzala’s conclusions on the internal workings of the IFP as fact by later authors 
without considering the relationship to the site of knowledge of the author. 
In terms of methodological validity I rely upon two authors to provide a 
partial account of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. The first is Anthea 
Jeffrey and her 900-page account of the different theories of political violence 
developed by the ANC and the IFP (Jeffrey 1997). This volume provides a 
significant contribution to understanding the wide chasms of interpretations of 
violence that were held by members of the different movements. The second 
author is Alexander Johnston who illustrates in its proper political context how 
there was more than one centre of power within the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal 
that had different approaches to the question of violence and to negotiations 
with the IFP (Johnston 1997 and 1994). These two authors provided the basis 
through which I was then able to explore political violence as it related to po-
litical elite formation in KwaZulu-Natal in my fieldwork. 
In light of the theoretical debates and questions that guide this study and the 
previous problems of methodology in this context I now turn to a discussion of 
the methodological framework employed in this study. 
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Methodology of the study 
In designing the study, I took cognisance of the various concepts of method, 
methodology and epistemology. The term “methods” has been defined as spe-
cific research practices or techniques used in the study to collect information. 
The term “methodology” has been used to refer to a broad, theoretically in-
formed, framework that guided the choice of methods and interpretation of data 
appropriate to the study. By “epistemology” I refer to the theory of knowledge 
appropriate to the consideration of questions such as, what constitutes know-
ledge, who can be a knower and what can be known? The methods used in the 
study have been guided by the questions central to the study, the particular 
methodological framework and epistemological considerations. It is to this 
framework that this chapter now turns. 
My approach to the study has been guided by the purpose behind the re-
search as well as assumptions about the nature of social science. Crucial to the 
study is an investigation into the beliefs, perceptions, relationships, and de-
cision-making patterns of political elites.I approached the study from a con-
structivist perspective of knowledge; that is, the perceptions of how things are 
or how they ought to be, as well as relationships and interpretations, are human 
and social constructs that are often formed on the basis of actions and within 
cultural and social frameworks. Thus, qualitative methods are the primary form 
of data collection because the central questions of the study indirectly explore 
individuals own beliefs.  
This study is based upon empirical research of the political elites and parties 
in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government over a ten-year period from 1994 
onwards. As such, the respondents chosen were all elected members of the 
Provincial Parliament of KwaZulu-Natal at a point or points in time between the 
years 1994 to 2004. The powers and functions of the Provincial Parliament of 
KwaZulu-Natal stem directly from the South African Constitution that sets out 
exclusive provincial competencies and concurrent competencies with the 
national legislature. In terms of these competencies a provincial legislature is 
empowered to pass, amend, reject, initiate and prepare legislation and to main-
tain oversight of executive authority in the province, and have an input into 
national legislation through the National Council of Provinces, the second 
legislative house at the national level. One of the key functions of provincial 
legislatures is policy implementation, the capacity of provinces including much 
of the delivery functions of the South African state. In addition, provincial 
legislatures are also the building blocks of party organisations. Through pro-
vincial policy implementation much of the party policy mandates become 
reality. 
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The period of this study covered two terms of office since the founding 
election in 1994. As the party-list electoral system of proportional represent-
ation is employed in KwaZulu-Natal, each interviewee was or is also a member 
of a political party. These parties are the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), African 
National Congress (ANC), Democratic Party (DP), New National Party (NNP)3, 
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), 
Minority Front (MF) and United Democratic Movement (UDM). Some inter-
viewees held government office in the provincial legislature with more than one 
party during the course of the study due to party political defections. Some held 
office in the provincial legislature with the same political party for one term of 
office or less. Others held office in the provincial legislature for the same 
political party for the full duration of the study. 
Some of the IFP interviewees were previously members of the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly or the Natal Provincial Administration (see chapter four). 
Many of the DP and NP members were members of the Natal Provincial 
Administration, the MF members were mainly former Tricameral Parliament 
members and the ANC and PAC members for the most part had no experience 
of representation in formal institutions as they were banned organisations prior 
to 1990. Although many political organisations were acknowledged, they were 
not legal in the South African political context and so individuals working for 
the party were exiled or underground individuals working in ‘struggle’ struc-
tures. The ACDP is a party formed shortly prior to the first democratic elections 
in 1994. Some respondents were entering political structures for the first time in 
1994 whereas many had previously held an active role in politics. In this light, it 
can be seen that there was both continuity with previous systems of government 
and substantial change. 
The choice of interviewees reflects a belief that this “group” constitutes 
those who legitimately exercise power and influence in the provincial govern-
ment. They are elected and are responsible for the decision-making at provincial 
government level. In addition, all the parties in the province recognise that their 
party caucus members are amongst the most senior of the party members and 
that decision-making within the parties themselves is often directed by such 
individuals, all of whom are members of the most senior decision-making 
bodies of their respective provincial parties. Hence, the perceptions, activities, 
relationships and decision-making roles of this group are of central importance 
in a study of this kind. No other group shares the same level of access to 
information about such activities, nor can the perceptions of this group be 
accessed through a choice of other respondents. It is therefore believed that any 
                                                            
3  The National Party (NP) was reconstituted at the ending of apartheid and competed 
in the first democratic multi-racial elections as the New National Party (NNP). 
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study of this kind that ignores this group or focuses upon other interviewees 
would be seriously limiting the results of the inquiry.  
The main thrust of the study was attempting to understand the perceptions of 
the individuals in the group in the belief that this would reveal valid information 
about the very nature of political relationships and go some way to explaining 
the dynamics of elite actions and political power.  
 
Methods 
Several types of documentary sources contributed to the study. Two types of 
government records were employed. The first comprised debates of parliament, 
committee minutes and reports, administrative records, ministerial records and 
policy documents produced by the Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal. 
The second type comprised records from commissions established by govern-
ment and included commission reports as well as public submissions, some by 
the interviewees themselves. Party materials were also used in the study, 
including official party records such as technical reports, party constitutions and 
rules as well as policy documents. In addition, use was made of party speeches, 
press statements, and letters. Personal documents such as biographies, autobio-
graphies, photographs and some personal papers of MPPs were also used in the 
study. Finally, media reports from wide variety of sources added to the available 
documentary sources. 
One of the obstacles in using documentary records was the lack of official 
records managed by the provincial government. Tracking individual MPPs per-
ceptions and viewpoints through documents held in parliament was extremely 
difficult. Attempts to ascertain, through parliamentary administrative structures, 
individuals’ dates of appointment and resignation, the actual committees they 
attended rather than those they could attend, and what kind of support systems 
were in place for MPPs all proved futile. Parliamentary documents detail MPPs 
only by the committees they can attend, provide no dates and are updated only 
infrequently. There are no complete set of committee minutes available for the 
public to view and they are not in a central filing system. Each individual sec-
retary who attends to a particular committee holds the minutes for that com-
mittee. As secretaries are moved from position to position, they are often lost. 
Attempts to locate documents through political parties also proved difficult. 
No party has on record a full complement of curricula vitae for all its MPPs 
although submission of a C.V. is a requirement when applying to be on a 
parliamentary list. Securing copies of such documents has been the result of the 
researcher’s own leg-work. Perhaps what this illustrates is the obstacles facing 
researchers in transitional democracies. Many of the documents readily avail-
able in a developed, consolidated democracy simply do not exist or are difficut 
to locate in KwaZulu-Natal.  
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In using these documentary sources they were assessed in term of the 
process and social and political context of their construction. In addition, they 
were considered in terms of the characterisation of events they supposedly 
reflected, including the possible exclusion of information and possibility that 
events might be presented in a particular way and according to particular 
interests. 
Interviews were the main method of research for this book. Firstly, inter-
viewing enables the researcher to discover information that cannot be directly 
observed or located in documentary sources. Such information might be both 
factual and/or contextual. Secondly, interviewing provides the only means to 
explore the meanings and actions of the interviewee. Thirdly, as no interviews 
or research of this kind has been conducted on this topic before in KwaZulu-
Natal, interviewing is essential in providing a new primary source of informa-
tion for future researchers. 
Two types of interviews were used. The first and less important type was a 
series of structured questions of a basic biographical nature, asked of every 
interviewee as a precursor to more open ended questions. It was believed that 
this would allow comparability between interviewees in terms of social and 
political composition and assist with interpretations of the information gained 
from semi-structured interviews. Such questions were not devised with the 
intention of subjecting the information gained solely to numerical manipulation, 
from which, although some comparability was attained. 
The second, and more substantial type of interview, was of a semi-structured 
nature, tailored to each individual interviewee. Semi-structured questions were 
used in order to gain an understanding of interviewees’ own perceptions, ex-
periences and actions through their own frames of meaning. These enabled a 
greater understanding of complexities by providing a more enriched interview. 
They also allowed for the minority of dissenting voices to be heard in ways that 
structured interviews do not. The use of semi-structured interviews also allowed 
me to develop new questions as they became appropriate throughout the study, 
and to omit those questions from which conclusions could easily be drawn after 
some interviews.  
In constructing the interview questions, I adopted a semi-personalised ap-
proach for each interviewee. This consisted of drawing up a list of topics, closed 
and open ended questions for all interviewees in order to enable a comparative 
approach, but tailored according to the particular MPP, his/her political party, 
government position and any special roles the individual might have fulfilled. 
The redrawing and review of the questions to be asked before each interview 
was time consuming, but enabled the most relevant questions to be asked. 
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Fieldwork and the process of interviewing 
The names, addresses and telephone numbers of most MPPs were provided to 
me by the administrative staff at the provincial parliament in Pietermaritzburg. 
These details, however, often changed with the high turnover of MPPs. Each 
MPP was contacted directly either by telephone or in person. In the case of 
those MPPs whose contact details were not provided, I attempted to contact 
them by attending the committee meetings in which they participated and 
speaking to them at the end of the sessions. Many of the interviewees who held 
executive positions had a gatekeeper in the form of an assistant through whom 
requests were channelled.  
The main difficulties interviewees appeared to face in establishing an ap-
pointment for an interview was a lack of available time. I learnt the qualities of 
patience, persistence and perseverance during this phase. Often months (in one 
case two and a half years) passed between the request for an interview and one 
being granted. Interviews were conducted over four years. On occasion, inter-
viewees did not honour the appointment once I arrived. For example, one inter-
viewee took me into a committee meeting that resulted in the need to arrange 
another appointment. Another arranged an appointment at the same time as his 
party caucus meeting thus resulting in a wait for a number of hours until the end 
of the meeting. In addition, many were unavoidably late because of government 
obligations, three did not arrive for the interview at all and one interviewee only 
permitted an interview with four other people present. Some interviewees were 
interviewed twice because the initial interview was cut short due to time 
pressure or because they were interviewed early on in the study and it was 
deemed necessary to monitor any changes that might have occurred or confirm 
information received from other respondents. An attempt was made to interview 
the least controversial interviewees first in the hope of piloting the questions 
and using those interviews to gain access to other MPPs. This approach was 
successful, with some interviewees even making personal introductions to other 
MPPs, suggesting alternative contact details for those who were difficult to con-
tact and offering assistance should such methods fail. One factor that became 
clear midway in the fieldwork was that some of the interviewees discussed the 
research with one another as some requests for interviews were not wholly 
unexpected. 
In addition to negotiating access for interviews, I also attended party con-
ferences, government committee meetings and debates in parliament in the 
opinion that it was necessary for the study to monitor the public display of 
relationships, attitudes of interviewees and even their physical positions in such 
meetings. Access to such events was not difficult to obtain. Parliamentary 
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debates are open to the public as are most committee meetings4. Attendance at 
conferences often required accreditation, which simply translated to prior regis-
tration. As a result of the sheer number of interviewees and the factors per-
taining to negotiating access, the study has not conformed to the neat typologies 
and stages presented as the idealised image of the interview in methodology 
texts. 
The level of responsiveness in elite interviews is a product both of the 
relationship which develops between the interviewer and interviewee and the 
level at which the interview is pitched. This is in turn dependent on the back-
ground knowledge of the interviewer. In addition I ensured that I had completed 
as much background research as possible on each relevant individual, party and 
issue before interviewing each MPP. This was in the hope that such knowledge 
would facilitate a good quality interview by demonstrating an informed interest 
in the interviewee and allowing the author to ask the most important and 
relevant questions which could not be answered elsewhere. This was done by 
collecting a wide range of primary and secondary materials and using them to 
prepare thoroughly for each individual interview. As all questions were tailored 
to each individual interview this proved invaluable. Interviewees were asked at 
the beginning of each interview to simply say if they did not feel comfortable 
answering a particular question, rather than offering an untruthful response. 
Some took the opportunity to do so. The interviews varied in length from 
approximately one hour to six hours in duration depending on the interviewee’s 
willingness to continue.  
The timing of the requests for the interviews appeared to impact upon the 
responsiveness of the interviewees. On a number of occasions interviews were 
requested with interviewees very shortly after they had defected from one party 
to another, or resigned or been implicated in some way in something reported 
by the mass media. The more sensitive and controversial topics were ap-
                                                            
4  This is with the exception of the Special Sitting of Parliament in 2002, where access 
was closed except for a specified number of supporters of the IFP and ANC and 
specially accredited media. I was permitted entry after making an on the spot request 
to the Secretary of the IFP who came to the security gate and facilitated entry for 
me. Public access to the political elite has become more restricted since the moving 
of the legislature to Pietermaritzburg. The public is now required to sign in to the 
legislative buildings by security guards and is escorted to their destination. Should 
the person that they wish to see not be available, they are not necessarily able to then 
see the secretary to make an appointment as used to be the case. In addition, the 
legislative buildings in Pietermaritzburg do not accommodate the opposition as there 
is not enough space. To then locate the opposition members is not a simple task. In 
terms of public interest it has remained the same since the study began, with very 
few citizens attending committee meetings and parliamentary sittings. The absence 
of the media at meetings and sittings is also apparent. 
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proached later in the interview when optimum trust was established and when 
the time felt right rather than such topics simply being slotted into the schedule 
of questions. Sometimes an unexpected opportunity simply allowed the topic to 
be introduced. For example, one interviewee had been the subject of frequent 
media reports, just prior to the interview, on the subject of military training 
camps and arms caches. During the interview he received a telephone call from 
a journalist asking him for an interview. The conversation clearly made him 
uncomfortable. At the end of the call he said ‘I have been in the media a lot 
lately’. I responded by saying, ‘yes you have. Can we talk about the camps?’ He 
said ‘Yes’and the topic was introduced without tension. It was found throughout 
the interviews that interviewees were willing to discuss even the most sensitive 
issues if the introduction into the discussion was a form of natural progression 
and if they were phrased sufficiently sensitively. Whether such openness was 
also as a result of such sensitive and controversial factors being fresh in their 
minds, wanting to provide all the details which were not reported in the media 
or somehow reflect for their own benefit as well as mine on such issues is not 
clear. 
The locations of the interviews were chosen by the interviewees which 
meant that I travelled extensively around the province to conduct the interviews. 
Frequently, I travelled to the Ulundi and Pietermaritzburg parliaments and met 
with all the interviewees in their party offices. On a number of occasions 
interviews were conducted in private residences in places such as Richards Bay, 
Newcastle, Umlazi, KwaMashu and Nongoma. With the exception of three 
interviews, all were conducted in an environment which was private.  
 
Analysis and use of data and biographical information 
A number of specific factors were taken into consideration in the analysis and 
use of information. I do not take the position that meanings can only be under-
stood in relation to the whole. I deliberately set aside the use of a standard 
computer qualitative assisted package in the analysis of the data5 because such 
packages, by coding data, decontextualises the text and leads to the high 
possibility of overlooking the form of the information so essential in term of its 
high analytical validity and explanation of means. Instead, I chose to both high-
light the form and to take it carefully into account when constructing meanings. 
I provide easily readable graphs and tables for a range of information and 
analysis, which draws upon biographical data that I collected through inter-
                                                            
5  Such as NVivo introduced in 1999. The term NVivo is a play on words, not an 
acronym. When something is carried out “in vivo” it means that it is done in a real 
life experiment as opposed to “in vitro” which is carried out in a test tube ex-
periment. NVivo is a play on the words “in vivo”. 
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views. The whole text of the study represents, in the main, the information 
gathered during interviews. In giving weight to the use of such information in 
its analysis and explanation, I have taken into account four further factors. First, 
the interviewees’ likely knowledge of a topic has been considered given his or 
her political party, position in party or government and the relationship of the 
interviewees to the topic itself. Secondly, because each interviewee has held a 
number of different positions over a period of time and because many inter-
viewees entered office in the second election, or left office after the first 
election or somewhere in-between, or had no party affiliation prior to 1994, 
consideration was given to two factors. Factor A was whether the interviewee 
could possibly have been privy to information on the topic given the period in 
question and whether he/she held office at the time. Factor B was whether it 
was possible that something had changed since the individual held power or 
was different before they came into power. The third factor that I took into 
account was whether the information obtained is consistent with any available 
documents on the topic. If such a response conflicts with available documenta-
tion, further consideration has been given to the possibility of the document 
omitting information or being written from the perspective of certain interests 
and within a certain framework, or the reasons why the interviewees’ perception 
is different to the written form. Finally, I have considered how the information 
obtained was supported by other interviews. If there are anomalies in inform-
ation, the form of the information has been considered when constructing mean-
ings.  
 
Special research challenges 
The questions of whether to offer the interviewees anonymity and/or confi-
dentiality proved to be a special research problem for a number of reasons. I 
recognised at the outset of the study that controversial or sensitive topics could 
lead to wariness amongst interviewees linked to doubt that they might have 
about providing information. This was compounded by the fact that they were 
political elites, in the public eye and dependent upon their parties for their 
parliamentary position. I was concerned that the study might be seriously af-
fected by a lack of willingness among political elites to engage on such sen-
sitive topics.  
I recognised my responsibility to prevent harm to those interviewed whilst 
also reporting accurate findings in the study (cf. Becker 1964). ‘It is important 
that interviewers convince respondents that responses to controversial questions 
cannot be traced to individuals’ (Kotze 1989). Yet, where anonymity is guar-
anteed, the recording of specific information might still lead to interviewees 
being recognisable in the public domain, even where no names have been used. 
A conflict of interest exists, not only between interviewees’ confidentiality and 
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the interpretative goals of the research, but also between confidentiality and 
public interest. This is particularly acute when participants are public figures. In 
taking cognisance of this acute conflict, I define “harm” as applicable to in-
dividuals only. It would be impossible to conduct any form of analytical work 
without drawing conclusions. Such conclusions, however, focus upon trends 
and groups and not on the activities of any named individual.  
For this purpose, three types of information have been identified, addressed 
and recorded in different ways. The first category consists of basic biographical 
information, information that is already, or should be, a matter of public record 
and information in respect of which the interviewees required no confiden-
tiality. The central question of whether informed consent was necessary for such 
information is debatable given that the interviewees are all members of the 
provincial parliament. This category of information has been treated as not 
requiring anonymity or confidentiality given that such information is either 
already in the public domain and, therefore, by definition, not confidential to 
start with. The second category is information that is given and is not in the 
public domain but concerns matters that are in the public domain. Category 
three consists of information and matters, neither of which is in the public 
domain. For categories two and three, interviewees were offered a choice of 
confidentiality or anonymity, if required. Confidentiality is defined as inform-
ation received that could only be used to further my understanding but could not 
be disclosed elsewhere or form part of the text. In contrast, in the case of 
anonymity, information received could be recorded in the study without using 
the name of the individual, such as in the form of a non-attributable quotation. 
For reasons of anonymity and confidentiality, the majority of information in 
the study has not been referenced as attributable to the specific interviewee and 
the names of interviewees have not been provided. In the case of direct quotes 
by interviewees they have been coded with a number to guarantee their ano-
nymity, in some cases the interviewees they discuss have been detailed using 
the terms “MPP X” or “MPP Y” to guarantee further anonymity, and on some 
occasions the position held by the interviewee at the time of the interview is not 
disclosed to prevent unintended disclosure. The references section of the study 
omits the complete names of interviewees.  
As anticipated, there were vastly differing perceptions of “the truth” amongst 
interviewees form different political parties. The most useful perceptions re-
vealed were those of the IFP. Much of the information gathered presented very 
different images of the organisation and reasons behind certain decisions to 
those presented in the majority of academic papers on the organisation. Inter-
viewees’ perceptions of role in the struggle between the ANC and IFP were 
difficult to reconcile amongst interviewees, particularly explanations of events 
surrounding the negotiations for a democratic South Africa. Pre-eminent in this 
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was a portrayal of the interviewees party actions as “good, just and moral” and 
those of the opposing party as “bad, unjust and immoral” even if their actions 
were remarkably similar. For example, in discussions of the ANC self-defence 
units (SDUs) and IFP self-protection units (SPUs) the response of some ANC 
MPPs was that the SDUs were legitimate, defensive and necessary to protect the 
people whereas the SPUs were somehow illegitimate, offensive and morally 
inappropriate. The same perceptions were portrayed towards factors such as 
arms caches and violent activity. This was particularly revealing in the sense 
that some respondents were unable to differentiate between “a just war” and 
“justice in war”, projecting the image that because in their particular perception 
their party had the moral high ground, all their actions were legitimate and just. 
Having discussed the questions and debates I wish to contribute to, the 
methodological challenges faced by many authors writing about KwaZulu-Natal 
politics and the methodology of this book, I now turn to an examination of 
historical contexts and political elite formation in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Historical contexts and  
political elite formation 
in KwaZulu and Natal 
‘A collection of disparate leaders’ (Tangri 1985: 28).  
Central to the patterns of elite formation in the first KwaZulu-Natal Legislature 
since 1994 have been struggles for hegemony manifested in two interrelated 
themes. These are, firstly, the development of political ideas through contest 
and time and secondly, political space and its occupation. Elite formation in 
KwaZulu Natal occurred in tandem with national scale contests over “ideas” 
and “spaces” as well as at this discrete provincial level which often contradicted 
national ambitions. This chapter traces these factors and through them the 
development of a fractured political elite in KwaZulu-Natal. The combination 
of these factors led to the emergence and entrenchment from 1994 of a number 
of elite groupings in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature. It also goes a 
long way in explaining the relationships between and within elite clusters and 
political parties in the provincial legislature in 1994 and which contributed 
greatly to the patterns of elite formation, which are explored further in this 
book. 
Indeed, this chapter is not an attempt to explain the successes and failures of 
liberation movements, their responses to the state, the transition itself or the 
varying party positions on the form of the state or the new constitution. As such, 
it is not a chronological narrative. Rather, this chapter explores elite formation 
in KwaZulu Natal through national and provincial “political ideas” and “poli-
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tical spaces” up to and during the period of transition. What is interesting for the 
purposes of this chapter is not a general history of the region and the struggles 
that shaped and were shaped by it, but rather the specific features of those 
struggles that still have an impact upon political elite formation. 
Defining political ideas and political spaces 
For the purposes of this study, political ideas are defined and understood in 
terms of the developed form of fundamental concepts, beliefs and abstractions, 
which motivated and served political action by political elites. In literature 
assessing “the liberation struggle” in South Africa only cursory references are 
provided on the debates that were internal to the development of political ideas 
inherent in the development of strategies in the struggle. Instead, the literature 
on South Africa has been structured around key campaigns and strategies as 
turning points in the struggle – such as the defiance campaign in 1952, the 
armed struggle from 1961, the Morogoro Conference in 1969, the formation of 
the UDF in 1983, the release of Mandela in 1990, the Conference for a De-
mocratic South Africa (CODESA) from 1992, and so on, as well as discussions 
and analyses of the shifting strategies of the political movements.1 Yet it is in 
the essence of the internal debates and contested political ideas that informed 
them, that the romanticism and teleology of struggle disappears, that the fluidity 
of internal politics becomes evident, and most importantly for this study, that 
the process of elite formation becomes apparent. The interplay of these 
contested national and provincial ideas fostered the emergence of a political 
elite that was fractured ideologically, institutionally and spatially. Indeed, 
KwaZulu-Natal political issues and elites were at the centre of many of the 
contested national debates, and yet at times sought to thwart the very strategies 
that emerged from them. 
I define an institution in this context as a formal or informal body, structure 
or activity with established legitimacy or recognition. Institutionalization refers 
to the process or action of becoming institutionalized. Institutionalized refers to 
                                                            
1  See Chapter 1 in this book where I have argued that some of the literature is in-
herently biased by suppressing other ‘voices in the struggle’, but also that scholars 
have frequently failed to employ and analyse documentary sources and interviews in 
the construction of their papers. Newspaper articles have become a prominent source 
of information for scholars, yet they often depend upon opinions that have been can-
vassed in a limited geographical and ideological ‘space’ which may or may not be 
dominated by supporters of a particular political persuasion, draw conclusions which 
are often without foundation, and in most cases would not stand up in court, and 
have sometimes failed to subject their ideas to the rigors of any theoretical frame-
work (cf. Jeffery 1992). 
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the acquisition of symbolic legitimacy as a formal or informal body, structure or 
activity. I have, for the purposes of this study, defined “political space” in 
several ways. Firstly, space has been defined geographically as in the territory 
in which political movements were able to act and could restrict the actions of 
others. Secondly, space has been defined as capacity or the ability to do and to 
act. Thirdly, space is defined as the extent or range over which something 
extends.2 The term “form” of politics as distinct from “substance” was often 
shaped by political space. That is, the various ways in which political elites 
interacted with one another was often defined by the political environment from 
within which they operated. This environment was shaped internally within 
political parties and factions within them, and externally by other parties, 
movements and the political climate. 
Historically, as this chapter will show, the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal 
was as internally divided (within parties and alliances) as it was externally 
(across the range of political movements). Indeed, contradictions in many of the 
alliances during the struggle and transition are still hindering scholars’ attempts 
to explain provincial politics. Scholars seeking to explain politics in KwaZulu-
Natal frequently focus upon the uniqueness of the province in terms of its 
geopolitics, rivalries for the votes of Africans, potential for ethnic mobilization, 
high level of political violence up to 1994, and rural and urban divisions. Yet, 
politics in KwaZulu-Natal in the pre-1994 period was both a part of the broader 
processes of struggle and simultaneously distinct in its own struggles. Thus, the 
political space in which politics took place was defined simultaneously as 
national, provincial and local. Individual parties and movements faced various 
challenges to their capacity to act, defined by their relationships to one another, 
to the state and by their ability to address internal crises. 
The roots of political elite formation 
Political ideas and organisation in the roots of elite formation 
Formed by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu in 1928 on foundations laid by him four 
years previously, Inkatha Ka Zulu represented the interests of the Zulu royal 
family and an African petite bourgeoisie who desired the protection of the Zulu 
royal house and greater access to land respectively. This group included rent 
paying cash crop cultivators, clerks, traders, craftsmen and qualified profes-
sionals such as teachers, preachers and lawyers. They were sons of Zulu chiefs 
and aristocrats who had been mission educated, and although scattered across 
urban and rural areas were a self-consciously distinct group connected through 
their roots of Christianity and Victorian liberalism (cf. Marks 1978: 172-194; 
                                                            
2  For heuristic purposes, all three frameworks have been employed simultaneously. 
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Cope 1990: 431-449 and Cope 1993). The kholwa3 communities viewed a 
rapprochement with the rural tribal elite as a potential route to private land 
ownership and commercial agricultural production at a time when the state’s 
growing commitment to segregationist policy dashed hopes of enfranchisement 
and middle class aspirations. The educated African elite in Natal, such as 
Reverend John Dube,4 advanced the political ideas found in international black 
political thought, including those of Booker T. Washington. Washington con-
tended that self-help and racial cooperation were the keys to socio-political 
equality. This could only be achieved through education, industry and self-
improvement. The Zulu royal house believed that educated Zulus could help to 
recreate Zulu pride and unity. In turn this “traditionalism” would resuscitate 
respect for elders and amakhosi,5 with the Zulu royal house at the centre of Zulu 
national unity. Despite Inkatha Ka Zulu ceasing to function as an effective 
organisation by 1933 because of the death of King Solomon and the defrauding 
of the financial bastion of Inkatha – the Zulu National Fund (cf. Cope 1995: 
249-271) – a “modernised” Zulu monarchy was still supported by a substantial 
section of the intelligentsia in Natal among whom Zulu ethnic identity was a 
strong force (Marks 1987: 46). Other organisations (such as the Zulu Society 
founded by Chief Albert Luthuli and in existence until 1949) were formed 
through the actions of what Marks calls ‘organic intellectuals’ (Marks: 1987: 
46). They also sought recognition of the Zulu king, the restoration of traditional 
values and their influence may account for the conservatism and absence of 
militancy amongst Africans in Natal during this period. Certainly, as Hughes 
demonstrates, the kholwa elite ‘did not … set themselves apart from an older 
order of leadership’ (Hughes 1995: 289). These circumstances in Natal may be 
seen in stark contrast to the Cape where African societies were disintegrating 
(Maylam & Meintjies 1988: 8). In Inanda, Natal the Qadi elite was an alliance 
of kholwa, individuals such as Dube, and “traditionalists” helping to sustain and 
perhaps modernise the institution of the chieftaincy by acquainting the chief 
with opportunities and resources from the wider world (cf. Hughes 1995). It is 
this pattern of elite formation, which continued in Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesi-
zwe, established in 1975 in the KwaZulu homeland by Chief Buthelezi. This 
                                                            
3  In isiZulu the term ‘kholwa’ has two interrelated meanings. It refers to a person who 
wears European clothing as well as to someone considered to be Christian. The 
opposite is ‘bhinca’ which refers to a person who is considered to be non-Christian 
and wears traditional clothing. Kholwa is also interpreted in a cultural rather than a 
religious sense (cf. Cope 1993: 127). 
4  Reverend John Dube was the first President of the South African Native National 
Congress formed in 1912, later renamed the African National Congress (cf. Hughes 
1995). 
5  Chiefs. Singular is ‘inkosi’. 
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elite sought to embrace modernity, as provided in the modern state and capi-
talist economy, but to encapsulate it in a particular form of traditional social 
structure. 
However, the amakholwa in Natal was far from a homogenous group, 
characterised as it was by internal contradictions and tensions closely related to 
post-World War One worker radicalism. Elsewhere in South Africa, particularly 
in the Transvaal, the African elite sought its fortunes in a new discourse of 
black separatism and racial pride. These Garveyist6 ideas among Natal intel-
lectuals were syncretic, constructed within a discourse of self-help and com-
peting with the language of Zulu nationalism (cf. Le Hausse de Lalouviere 
1994). Members of a new kholwa generation in the Transvaal identified 
themselves with the methods of the worker movement, abandoning the hamba 
kahle7 method of protest (cf. Bradford 1984: 295-310; Bonner 1982: 270-313). 
From 19178 the South African Native National Congress (SANNC9), later 
African National Congress (ANC), took a radically different path to the Natal 
Native Congress (NNC), reflecting a new urban-based intelligentsia ‘in touch 
with the increasingly volatile urban African population on the Rand’ (Cope 
1990: 431-449). The ambiguities, contradictions and tensions between the two 
were only resolved in the early 1950s when Chief Albert Luthuli became pre-
sident of the regional and then national movement (cf. Grest et al. 1988). 
In Natal, a fractured elite tussled for control of the Congress. Dube’s hold on 
the movement was tenuous and from 1932 was challenged by the populist 
A.W.G. Champion, who in 1929 had organised the first beer boycotts (cf. La 
Hausse 1988) in Durban under the banner of the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union (ICU). Divisions in the NNC reflected the diversities of the 
African elite in Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Dube and his Durban colleagues 
were confronted by members of the midlands NNC, who rejected the hamba 
kahle politics, were increasingly less accommodationist and espoused an in-
creasingly Africanist agenda. This group, who came to be seen as “Pieter-
maritzburg’s disrespectful Congress leadership” by their Durban colleagues, 
shared more diverse social origins than the Durban group. Increasingly, new 
members elected to the NNC Executive in the mid 1920s came to reflect this 
new activism. For example, in late 1923 Reverend Petros Lamula, whose most 
outspoken supporter was A.W.G. Champion, denounced whites as “snakes in 
                                                            
6  Marcus Garvey advocated a separatist ideology based upon black exclusiveness and 
race pride, in contrast to Washington’s prescription of racial cooperation.  
7  Translated as ‘go carefully’. 
8  Dube was ousted as president in 1917 and replaced by S.M. Makgatho, President of 
the Transvaal branch of Congress. 
9  The South African Native National Congress was formed in 1912 to coordinate 
national resistance to political exclusion and territorial separation. 
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the grass” at a meeting of the Joint Durban Council, and was elected to the NNC 
to make representations on African land purchase. The African newspaper, 
Ilanga lase Natal, refused to publish the text of his speech (cf. La Hausse de 
Lalouviere 1994: 38-42). 
Two broad and contradictory sets of Africanist political ideas were devel-
oping and becoming increasingly divergent by the late 1920s in Natal. Yet to 
use the expressions of “traditional” and “modern” to specify their variances 
would be too simplistic. One sought a regional political alliance between a 
conservative kholwa elite and tribal leaders, which embraced appeals to both 
modernity, of the modern state and capitalist economy, and tradition and es-
poused Zulu nationalism. The other sought to construct through Africanism and 
Zulu Nationalism, a form of politics which had populist legitimacy and intel-
lectual authority. This combination could embrace a modern radicalising Afri-
can urban constituency. In this construct, Zulu cultural identity was to be re-
deemed in so far as it would speak to a modernising and radical Africanism (cf. 
La Hausse de Lalouviere 1994: 40). These constructs were forged by an elite 
and their political ideas took shape across political movements in very contra-
dictory ways. It is these divergent sets of political ideas, which were moulded 
and shaped by architects of nationalism, that lie at the root of many modern 
political ideas developed further in the struggle years and which have a reson-
ance in KwaZulu-Natal today. 
Another set of political ideas flourished from 1919 onwards in Clements 
Kadalie’s populist ICU which rapidly cultivated a mass base in rural Natal (but 
not Zululand). Kadalie was a qualified teacher from Nyasaland who had been 
influenced by socialist A.F. Blatty’s Industrial Workers Union and his attempts 
to organise unskilled black workers into general workers’ unions (cf. Bradford 
1987; Wickens 1978). Under A.W.G. Champion’s leadership it was to grow 
into the leading branch nationwide (cf. Drew 2000). The ICU’s core social base 
was migrant workers, but it represented farm workers more than an industrial 
proletariat. It was a worker organisation, populist rather than socialist, and gave 
a voice to African labour tenants and sharecroppers seeking to retain possession 
of their meagre means of production during a period of intense social dis-
location (cf. Drew 2000; Lodge 1983; Mamdani 1996). This was caused by land 
alienation, labour migrancy, taxation and the expansion of indirect rule (cf. 
Mamdani 1996: chapter 3). The ICU was a militant mass movement, calling for 
open defiance and boycotts in contrast to the methods of petition of other 
movements at this time. In Natal, this militancy found a particular resonance 
among the rural and urban poor, whose grievances had not been championed by 
Congress’s political elite. As such the ICU injected a radical element into 
African discourse, populist rather than nationalist or elitist. It established a 
tradition of African worker resistance in parts of Natal, yet like traditional 
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populist movements had no logically consistent ideology and embraced the 
concept of popular equality under the direction of charismatic leadership. As 
one ICU member reasoned, ‘although the initials (ICU) stood for a fancy title, 
to us it meant basically: when you ill treat African people, I See You; when you 
kick them off the pavements …, I See You … When you kick my brother, I See 
You’ (Baskin 1991: 8; Mamdani 1996: 236). Although by 1928, factionalism 
among ICU leaders had led to the splintering of the ICU nationwide, such was 
the strength of support in Natal that Champion established the ICU yase Natal 
(Drew 2000: 84). 
The ICU also proved receptive to the political ideas of the Communist Party 
of South Africa (CPSA).10 Although these political ideas were represented in 
the CPSA in the Cape and Johannesburg, in Durban the weakness of the CPSA 
party organisation and the efforts of Johannes Nkosi11 resulted in the ICU 
becoming an obvious target for party workers. To the ICU in Natal, the CPSA 
contributed organisational skills, although conflict over political ideas led to the 
expulsion in 1926 of all CPSA members from its ranks. CPSA members’ at-
tempts to reorganise the ICU into industrial branches was strongly resented by 
its populist political elite. This elite did not view the struggle in class terms, 
particularly the struggle waged by white only CPSA members who had sup-
ported the white miners in the Rand revolt of 1922. The CPSA responded by 
claiming that the ICU was dominated by ‘boss-class instruments’ (SACP 1981: 
document 36; South African Worker 1926). 
Rejected by the ICU, the CPSA from 1927 onwards painfully confronted and 
reviewed its core political ideas. This process threatened to tear the party apart 
and remained the core debate throughout its entire history (and that of its 
successor, the SACP). This debate centred on the relationship between socialist 
struggle and national liberation struggle, and coincided in this instance with the 
influence of Garveyism in the Natal wing of the ANC. Under pressure from the 
Comintern, the CPSA adopted the Native Republic Thesis (NRT) which laid the 
path for future cooperation with African nationalist organisations. Recognising 
that South Africa was a colony and that the struggle in South Africa was 
primarily anti-imperialist in nature, the NRT offered to socialists a resolution of 
South Africa’s national question. In this way, majority African rule would be 
one stage on the route to a socialist state. Imperialism was defined not entirely 
                                                            
10  The CPSA was formed in 1921 and after disbanding in 1950 reformed in 1953 under 
the new name South African Communist Party (SACP) reflecting a nationalist influ-
ence. 
11  Johannes Nkosi was a cook and ICU organizer who joined the CPSA in 1926. He 
was the leading activist in the Durban branch of the CPSA but was murdered during 
the Dingaan’s day celebrations on 30 December 1930. By 1931 the Durban branch 
of the CPSA was in disarray (cf. Drew 2000: 125). 
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by its capitalist character, but by its colonial character – both foreign and racial. 
By promoting an ‘independent native South African republic as a stage towards 
a workers’ and peasants’ republic’, the CPSA sought to ‘combat effectively the 
efforts of the bourgeoisie … (and) … transform the embryonic nationalist 
movement into a revolutionary struggle’ (Communist International 1928; cf. 
South African Communist party 1981: 91; cf. Drew 2000: 94-108). Thus a 
nationalist democratic revolution whereby the CPSA cooperated with reformist 
African petit-bourgeoisie organisations would be the first stage of a socialist 
revolution. 
These political ideas resonated within a section of the Natal wing of the 
ANC under Josiah Gumede12 and came partly to define the relationship between 
the ANC and SACP elites in later years. Gumede, influenced by Garveyism, 
was also receptive to the CPSA’s NRT. This view was, however, not shared by 
all the amakholwa or amakhosi in the Natal wing of the ANC. These contra-
dictions and tensions are illustrated by a response to Gumede’s report back on a 
trip to Moscow at an ANC convention in 1928. On discussing the overthrow of 
the Tsar a member shouted, ‘do you intend to kill our chiefs?’ (Drew 2000: 99; 
cf. Meli 1988: 74-79). The message here is clear. To this political elite, the 
political ideas of the CPSA were anathema to their particular discourse of 
Africanism. 
These conflicts of discourse and interests show how in the early part of the 
twentieth century in Natal and Zululand a multiplicity of political ideas emer-
ged. These ideas were contradictory and in competition with each other. They 
were shaped and employed by elites in their alliances and competition during 
the later struggle for liberation, and today in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
The occupation of political space in the roots of modern political elite 
formation 
Locked into a multitude of competing centres of power, this African political 
elite in Natal and Zululand contended for political space in overlapping arenas. 
Organisational labels in Natal did not correspond to the political ideas which 
they channelled. Parties and movements were fluid, protean and multiform. This 
means that political ideas crossed party lines which had no stable political shape 
but which embraced a multiplicity of ideas and elites, and took up various 
shapes and forms as these ideas evolved and changed. At various stages certain 
ideas could be seen as more dominant for a brief period. A characteristic of the 
political elite in Natal was the tendency to remain affiliated to a particular 
                                                            
12  Josiah Gumede was born in Natal, was a co-founder of the NNC and belonged to the 
generation of founding fathers of the ANC. He was president of the Natal wing of 
the ANC from 1927. 
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organisation label – such as the ANC – even if the prevalent political ideas at 
that time were not those that the elites subscribed to. Thus, within political 
parties and movements a range of elites existed.  
Similarly, in Natal, elites straddled organisations which had internal contra-
dictions with apparent ease, indicating that such organisations were not con-
solidated and were indeed fluid. These movements operated in diverse and 
overlapping political spaces. At a regional level in the mid-1920s Inkatha, the 
CPSA, the NNC under Dube, the ANC Natal branch under Gumede and the 
ICU under Champion all co-existed. The political elite often found a home and 
a role in more than one of these movements and a small circle of leaders played 
a disproportionate role. For example, all three of the personalities mentioned 
above had voting rights in the 1930 ANC National Congress where Gumede 
was ousted in favour of Pixley ka Izka Seme (cf. Walshe 1987: 230). The ANC 
executive in 1939 included Seme, Dube and Champion (cf. Walshe 1987: 232). 
Relationships among the political elite in Natal were fragile, fluid and com-
petitive, with the provincially based organisation serving as power bases for 
their national positions. Only the Natal ANC branch worked in alliance with a 
corresponding national body and was subject to national influences. Inkatha was 
a regional alliance, Champion withdrew the ICU from affiliation with its 
national body and the purpose of the ANC Natal Branch was to provide a 
regional branch for the ANC since the NNC was opposed to this idea. Thus at 
one level, many elite relationships and movements were able to grow inde-
pendently in Natal and Zululand without being subjected to the directives and 
influences of a national body with pretensions to presence and leadership 
everywhere in the country. On another level this elite significantly influenced 
the relationships and direction taken by the national body. Thirdly, other elites 
in the national body were only able to influence relationships and the direction 
of the ANC Natal Branch. 
Consequently, elite circulation in the national ANC was relatively high in 
comparison to movements and parties in Natal because personal rivalries played 
themselves out nationally while political elites were relatively shielded from 
their rivalries back in Natal. Furthermore, rivalries among the Natal elite were 
to influence both the style and substance of politics at the national level. In 
Natal politics was not “provincialised”,13 rather, certain political ideas were 
channelled to a national level, whilst simultaneously Natal partly “opted out” of 
a reverse wave of idea flows. Accordingly, the range and scope over which the 
ANC extended and took root in Natal was limited by the political elite, political 
ideas and movements located there. 
                                                            
13  I use the term “provincialised” to refer to the process of ensuring that provincially 
based political elites and discourses do not dominate national debates. 
  HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND POLITICAL ELITE FORMATION 41 
Conflict between political elites was only partly ‘institutionalized’ (Prze-
worski 1991: 14), in the national body of the ANC. In essence, this meant that 
political action was partly governed by the limitations of rules and procedures, 
rather than by questions of personal political power, rivalries and factions. 
Consequently, elite theory that examines the type and form of elites in relation 
to their actions may be applied in this context. Whilst alliances and factions did 
form in this body, the political elite could be said to be ‘consensually unified’ 
(Field & Higley 1985: 1-44), ‘pluralistic’ (Fleron 1969), or ‘competitive coales-
cent’ (Putnam 1976). As such, despite their opposing ideological positions, the 
political elite was somewhat tacitly committed to abide by certain forms of 
conduct and shared some access to key positions of influence. In Natal, how-
ever, relationships between elites became ‘disunified’ (Field & Higley 1985: 1-
44), ‘divided’ (Beck & Malloy 1964), or ‘competitive’ (Putnam 1976). In 
essence, the character of relationships between elites was based upon distrust 
without the adherence to rules and procedures that would modify conflict. 
However, because of the fluidity of parties and movements and affiliation of 
some elites across movements in Natal, the result was partial political protection 
of the elite at the provincial level.  
Political elite formation during ‘the struggle’ 
Political ideas and organisation in elite formation during ‘the struggle’ 
Political alliances and cleavages during the struggle consisted of complex and 
contradictory political ideas. On one level divisions became increasingly com-
plex because of the fluidity of elite political consciousness and the multiform 
nature of parties. On another level, the political ideas espoused in official party 
documents became increasingly fortified within party cleavages, thus hardening 
party divisions made up of contradictory alliances. The complexity of these 
relationships is inadequately captured by contrasting the ANC with Inkatha, 
Africanism with non-racialism, collaboration with non-collaboration, armed 
struggle with non-violence, and radicalism with conservatism. Political ideas 
harnessed by struggle movements transcend these very simple contrasts. There 
is simply insufficient space to do justice to these political ideas in this book and 
thus only a brief overview will be provided. Political ideas and the political 
space developed during this period by the ANC in exile have had a significant 
impact in KwaZulu-Natal today. 
 
 
 
     • Africanism, communism, populism, workerism and traditionalism 
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Africanism as developed in the first part of the twentieth century had to 
compete and co-exist with elements of other political ideas during the struggle 
to produce an eclectic variety of broadly Africanist political ideas across poli-
tical parties. The ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Inkatha Yenkululenko 
ye Sizwe (Inkatha) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) espoused 
Africanism, but in varied forms and in various strengths within these move-
ments. 
Inkatha’s relaunch in 1975 by Mangosuthu Buthelezi and other members of 
the former KwaZulu homeland, such as Inkosi Simon Gumede, continued the 
patterns of elite formation earlier in the century. This was expressed in an al-
liance of a modernising intellectual class, an emerging African middle class in 
KwaZulu, Zulu elders and amakhosi. What helped bind these elements together 
was a project of sustaining and modernising the institution of the chieftaincy 
and forging relationships with white business interests. However, Inkatha was 
not a replica of its earlier parent movement. By the early 1980s its own ability 
to utilise the resources of the state through the homeland system, combined with 
reactions to urbanisation, influx control, the rise of trade unions and prole-
tarianisation brought into its fold the populist political ideas of a new group of 
non-unionised, peri-urban and peri-rural, neither workers nor peasants, who felt 
the full brunt of land alienation and joblessness combined with the acute 
pressures to conform to the boycotts and strikes called for by the ANC alliance. 
This class included individuals predominantly from rural areas with no long 
term formal history of employment and especially of the labour movement. As 
one interviewee contended, ‘There was that time at SARMCOL14 Rubber 
Factory in Howick when COSATU called a week long strike. When the em-
ployees left, unemployed people took a temporary job at the factory. The UDF 
killed those unemployed people who were working temporarily at SARMCOL. 
My father was murdered because he was separating people who were fighting 
on that day’ (Pers. IFP Interview 65). In providing the “scab” labour, the 
migrant labour, and utilising the services of the KwaZulu Government, this 
underclass identified with a conservative strand in Inkatha’s ideology and 
forged a new conservative yet populist alliance with the intellectual, middle 
class and hereditary elites in Inkatha. This resonance with a conservative strand 
includes an identification with Inkatha’s political stance against violence 
whether through armed struggle or emerging through individuals’ refusal to 
participate in political boycotts, as well as reactions to “the comrades” escala-
tion of political power and dispensation of “peoples justice” to individuals 
“convicted” of non-participation in strikes and boycotts. Limited in choice, this 
                                                            
14  South African Rubber Manufacturing Company Limited. Workers began strike on 1 
May 1985. 
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underclass formed an alliance with established Inkatha elites in the hope that 
this would provide an alternative method of liberation without the dislocation 
and destruction of family and community life they had experienced or feared as 
a consequence of “people’s power” mobilisation. 
There were also indications of a new form of Africanism moulded by a new 
intellectual elite, that sat uncomfortably but not in contradiction with existing 
political ideas. This new found Africanism is most evident in the aims and 
objectives of the movement which included ‘to foster the spirit of unity among 
Black people, … to help promote ... the development of Black people spiritu-
ally, economically … and politically, … to promote worthy indigenous customs 
and cultures, … to inculcate and foster a vigorous consciousness of patriotism 
… and national unity, … to cooperate with all progressive African and … 
nationalist movements, … to strive for the attainment of African unity’ (Kwa-
Zulu Government 1987). Unlike other literature on Black Consciousness that 
focuses upon the growth of the student movement, John Brewer identifies the 
staple constituency within Black Consciousness as essentially middle class 
(Brewer 1989: 190). Brewer rightly identifies the main internal support base for 
Black Consciousness in South Africa as being urban constituents. However, 
AZAPO did not take root in Natal. Brewer misses (as do authors who focus on 
Biko’s anti-Bantustan party stance) the similarity of Black Consciousness poli-
tical ideas (cf. Biko 1971; 1970) with a strand of those in Inkatha. In particular, 
the ideas of self-help, racial pride and self respect that run through the distinctly 
middle class and traditional political ideas of Inkatha during the struggle. These 
ideas found a popular outlook in Inkatha’s Ubuntu school syllabus during the 
1980s. Indeed as one IFP MPP put it, ‘I was more aligned to the ideas of Black 
Consciousness than any other party … I joined Inkatha when Steve Biko died 
… as did many of us … we were all Black Consciousness back then’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 78). Locked within the KwaZulu homeland, Inkatha elites struggled 
to reconcile broader Africanist political ideas with their targetable constituency 
in the apartheid created Zulu homeland, particularly after 1980 when the moral 
legitimacy of the movement was questioned. The questioning of the moral 
legitimacy of Inkatha took the form of highly symbolic rejections of Buthelezi 
and the Inkatha movement. For example, on March 11 1978 Buthelezi was 
forced to leave the funeral of Robert Sobukwe (former Pan-Africanist Congress 
leader) when mourners organized by the Soweto Action Committee verbally 
abused and threatened to assault him (cf. Karis & Gerhart 1997: 325). Accounts 
of Inkatha during the struggle period recognise little more than an attempt at 
political mobilisation by a middle class alliance through ethnic nationalism15. 
                                                            
15  The work on Inkatha that is most commonly cited during this period is Mare & 
Hamilton 1987; Mare 1992; Mare & Hamilton 1994: 101-113. 
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However, the primary research material of this work suggests that appeals to 
modernity and tradition as well as a broader Africanism, populism like the 
former ICU and conservatism, is evidence of a political elite that despite its 
division successfully forged an African cross-class alliance.  
Inkatha was not the only movement that was fractured ideologically. Contra-
dictions in what became the Congress Alliance are most evident in the conflict 
over competing political ideas. The breakaway of Africanists to form the PAC 
in 1959 did not strip the ANC of an exclusive form of African nationalism or an 
Africanist elite. Although Congress stood publicly for non-racialism, Kuper 
argues that in the 1950s it ‘denied these principles within its own organisation’ 
(Kuper 1965: 371), yet handled such contradictions through the establishment 
of the Congress Alliance. As Joe Matthews16 argued in 1959, ‘… the Congress 
could switch at any time. It is an illusion to think that with the Africanists out, 
… nationalist sentiment is out … (T)he Africanists (are) blunderers who have 
let the cat out of the bag too early … there is nobody (currently) in the Afri-
canist group of sufficient prestige to put it across. The extent of … nationalism 
can be seen from the fact that you cannot get support for the idea of one 
Congress, the leadership dare not do it’ (Matthews in Kuper 1965: 373). 
Colonialism of a Special Type (CST) (cf. Bundy 1989; Everatt 1991) and 
Internal Colonialism (IC), the marriage of African nationalist and class theories 
in an indigenous (and ingenious) elaboration of a two stage revolutionary 
struggle were the political ideas which gave validity to the alliance between the 
SACP17 and the ANC during the struggle. The ANC in 1969 asserted that ‘… 
our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of 
a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist 
group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace 
the oppressor in the exploitation of the masses’ (African National Congress 
1969). Since the Native Republic Thesis, many black communists had been dual 
members of both the CPSA and the ANC. The extent of this line of thinking is 
revealed as early as the 1949 ANC elections where Walter Sisulu beat the 
communist candidate for the post of General Secretary by a mere six votes. The 
ANC Youth League, however, consisted of a fiercely Africanist elite – Anton 
Lembede, Robert Sobukwe, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu among them. Since 
                                                            
16  Joe Matthews was a senior ANC strategist, one of the nine members of the ANC 
NEC elected at the Morogoro Conference in 1969 when the NEC was reduced from 
23 to 9, first Secretary of the ANC’s Revolutionary Council and a SACP member. 
17  The CPSA disbanded itself and deliberately reconstituted itself underground in 1953 
as the South African Communist Party. The name was deliberately chosen to give a 
national flavour to the party. The reconstituted communist party consisted of those 
members who supported a closer relationship with the African nationalist movement 
(cf. Bunting 1987: chapter 11). 
  HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND POLITICAL ELITE FORMATION 45 
the disbanding of the CPSA, many black communists (such as Kotane, Marks 
and Tloome) continued their work in their capacity as ANC members, as well as 
from 1953 through the secretly established SACP. The alliance forged by the 
ANC and SACP in exile represented the interests of an African elite desperate 
to recruit and harness the population, and communists who sought to transform 
the African nationalist movement into a revolutionary movement. The key 
question for a group of SACP members was how to prevent the interests of the 
working classes being abandoned by the ANC once the first stage of the 
revolution was established and an African bourgeoisie in power (cf. Everatt 
1991: 19-39). The autonomous organisation of Umkhonto we Sizwe established 
by the ANC and SACP brought both parties closer together. MK was articulated 
and established by both the ANC and SACP and directed by the Revolutionary 
Council from 1969 (cf. Ellis 1981). By 1969 a majority of the exclusively 
African ANC NEC members were also members of the SACP, as were the 
majority of members on the Revolutionary Council (cf. Karis and Gerhart 1997: 
37) that directed MK from 1969. Industrialisation, land shortages, influx con-
trols, urbanisation and proletarianization increased the potential for a class 
interpretation of ‘the struggle’. Although the ANC capitalised on the Black 
Consciousness recruits that fled into exile after 1976 and who were ideolo-
gically closer to the PAC than the ANC, this influx was not reflected in the 
upper echelons of the movement. Following the Kabwe Conference in 1985, 
only eight of the thirty-five ANC NEC members were not also members of the 
SACP (cf. Ellis 1981: 446). 
After the Morogoro Conference in 1969 where ANC membership was open-
ed to non-Africans and the doctrine of Colonialism of a Special Type was 
adopted, elite competition in the alliance centring on debates of Africanism and 
communism were clearly evident. The expulsions of outspoken Africanists dur-
ing the struggle years and the consolidation of the ANC’s symbiotic relationship 
with the SACP confirm this impression of elite competition. The strength of 
Africanism and anti-SACP sentiment among some members of the ANC is 
found in historical documents. 
‘The ANC has been hijacked by non-Africans … nationalism is pooh-poohed … 
The label of racist which the non-African clique uses against all Africans who op-
pose the control and the manipulation of the ANC by non-Africans is an anomalous 
one. It is anomalous because Africans suffer from the jack boot of white racism 
from the cradle to the grave … Now this cruel form of white racism is extended, 
albeit covertly, to the Africans’ own national organisation, … Opposition (to this) … 
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carries heavy political penalties like isolation, character assassination and alienation 
… The ANC must be redirected to its true nationalist cause’ (Makiwane 1975).18 
The complexity of the relationship between the ANC and the SACP has thus 
far remained insufficiently studied. On Robben Island ANC and SACP member 
Harry Gwala of the Natal Midlands took the position that the ANC and SACP 
were one and the same, a position contested by Mandela with confirmation from 
Lusaka (cf. Karis & Gerhart 1997: 32). One source interviewed for this study, 
an MPP from Southern Natal, who went into exile in the post-1976 wave 
disagrees with Gwala, ‘we were the young lions, yes, and we found common 
ground in exile, but we joined the ANC because we were Africans suffering 
under white oppression …’ (Pers. ANC Interview 87). This is important be-
cause although the ANC NEC following Kabwe was overwhelmingly domi-
nated by joint ANC-SACP members, the rank and file had been drawn pre-
dominantly from Black Consciousness recruits who went into exile in the post 
1976 period. The ANC was provided with not only a lifeline but a new con-
stituency in potential contradiction with its pro-communist elite. 
In 1979 the ANC reiterated its commitment to the political ideas of the two-
stage revolution. The most important expression of this and one of the most 
important ANC exile documents was the NEC-adopted Report of the Politico 
Military Strategy Commission known as the Green Book. This report states,  
‘Seizure of power by the people must be understood … by the masses as the be-
ginning of the process in which the instruments of the state will be used to … 
destroy … national and social inequality. To postpone … this perspective until the 
first stage of democratic power has been achieved is to risk domination within our 
revolution by purely nationalist forces which may see themselves as replacing the 
white exploiters at the time of the people’s victory’ (African National Congress – 
South African Communist Party 1979: part 2, point 2). 
While the fault lines of communist versus nationalist struggle remained 
blurred during the struggle years, they opened wider later in Natal during the 
transition as the narrowing legitimate institutional spaces and struggles to estab-
lish a new form of state within which to harness institutional power intensified 
already existing political cleavages. 
Interdependence and partial integration of the ANC and SACP in exile 
resulted in more than agreement on substantive policy. Indeed, the ‘form’ of 
politics became intertwined in very particular ways. The practice of democratic 
centralism pervaded decision-making. As Duverger states, the object of demo-
                                                            
18  Known as the Makiwane 8, Ambrose Makiwane and seven other members of the 
ANC (Alfred Kgokong Mqota, George Mbhele, Jonas Matlou, Tennyson Makiwane, 
O.K. Setlapelo, Pascal Ngakane and Thami Bonga) were expelled from the ANC in 
1975 when they declined to retract their criticism of the movement (cf. African 
national Congress 1975). Ambrose Makiwane was later assassinated. 
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cratic centralism is, ‘first to make known to the centre with the greatest possible 
accuracy the point of view of the rank and file, so as to allow it to make valid 
decisions; second, to ensure that the decision taken by the centre is applied at all 
levels, strictly and exactly but with understanding … Thus, the system is cen-
tralised, since decisions are made at the top; it remains democratic, since they 
are arrived at in light of opinions from below …’ (Duverger 1954: 57). This 
form of decision-making presupposes a hierarchical structure whereby inter-
mediate levels act as channels of communication upwards as well as to teach 
through directives downwards. It is premised on the assumption that discussion 
takes place at the lower levels before a decision is taken at the top, but once a 
decision is taken, lower levels unquestioningly accept and carry out this ruling. 
In practice, while the leadership was accused internally of elitism during the 
struggle, autonomous spheres of influence also developed from the late 1970s 
onwards. 
The political ideas of the UDF reflected the broad and short-term aim of 
unity against Apartheid, without unified concrete long-term aims, objectives or 
ideologies. Whilst some of the major organisations that were affiliated to the 
UDF subscribed to the Freedom Charter, by no means all Charterist organi-
sations were affiliated to the UDF and some of the more militant did not support 
it at all (cf. Seekings 2000: 25). The political language of the UDF was populist, 
and although Lodge identifies three strands of political thought within the 
movement – nationalist, socialist, and national democratic – he rightly suggests 
that the ‘nuances of … (these) theoretical expositions’ (Lodge 1989: 213) were 
not widely understood at all. Expressed in terms of idealised notions of “peo-
ple’s democracy”, “people’s power” and the “will of the people” the affiliates 
were united in opposition to capitalism and apartheid through non-cooperation 
with, and non-participation in, the state. Alongside, the affiliated groups the 
UDF also attracted a broader constituency through its simple populist anti-
apartheid stance. As an ANC MPP asserted, ‘I was a township girl in Kwa-
Mashu and so I knew about politically minded things. At the time it was the 
UDF in KwaMashu. I think it started with the civics … but I was recruited by 
my brother. We were all UDF then. There wasn’t anything else … What did it 
stand for? We were the people, we came together as the people because of the 
politics …’ (Pers. ANC Interview 71). Despite the broad based affiliation of the 
UDF, its political elite remained drawn from the intellectual and professional 
middle classes. In Natal, the Regional Executive Committee was dominated by 
an established African and Indian elite, excluding organised labour in Natal. 
The lack of attention to the black trade unionism in the UDF did not go 
unchallenged. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) forma-
tion in 1985 was the result of a long drawn-out process of populist versus work-
erist debate. The key challenger to populism’s hold in Natal was the Federation 
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of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). The key difference between popu-
lism and workerism was the relationship of the movement to the leadership of 
the liberation struggle (cf. Ritchken 1981: 40-52; Plaut 1986: 62-72; von Holdt 
1987: 94-108; Plaut 1987: 104-106). Populists sought political leadership from 
the UDF (and ANC) and, by implication, many unions of this kind were af-
filiates of the UDF. This was complicated in Natal, however, as many populists 
and pro-Charterists remained outside the UDF (particularly in the midlands). 
Workerists, some affiliated to FOSATU, sought to establish effective organisa-
tion based upon the political line directed by their members. As Foster con-
tended, ‘It is … essential that workers … build their own powerful and effective 
organisation even whilst they are part of the wider popular struggle … to ensure 
that the popular movement is not hijacked by elements who will in the end have 
no option but to turn against their worker supporters’ (Foster 1982: 67-86). This 
was not to suggest that workerists did not engage in political action as a part of 
a liberation strategy, but rather rejected a subordinate position within a broader 
popular based alliance that dictated the ideology of nationalism. Indeed, the 
ideas of the workerists were not altogether anathema to what became a core 
constituency of Inkatha in the mid 1980s. FOSATU had represented migrant 
workers, with links to rural Natal and KwaZulu, many of whom later sought the 
IFP as protection against the “ungovernability” and boycotts that pervaded the 
province. As one MPP from Southern Natal put it ‘we thought that whichever 
political movement gained power they would always be an opponent of labour’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 104). In the mid-1980s the organising strength of 
COSATU was born upon earlier FOSATU organising, and in Southern Natal 
both workerism and anti-Charterism prevailed alongside pro-UDF charterist and 
anti-UDF charterist organisations. 
The complexity and juxtaposition of contradictory political ideas within poli-
tical organisations during the struggle years were sometimes simply the result of 
sporadic circumstances resulting from locally planned collective actions that by 
chance led to the choice of one political movement over another. The African-
ist-socialist-traditionalist and workerist-charterist debates certainly shaped elite 
formation. Although elites with contradictory political ideas often found a home 
in the same political organisation, in the post-1975 period there was limited elite 
circulation from one party to another. Instead, as the next section will show, 
consolidated elite spaces, hardened the boundaries of the movements and forced 
elites into semi-permanent contradictory relationships. Within some movements 
there was increasing autonomy within political spaces from which decisions 
were made, and in others a disproportionate number of members of elites wore 
many political hats. 
The impact of political ideas during the struggle on the many political 
identities in Natal is a useful example of the juxtaposition of conflicting and 
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contradicting forces. For example, the cry of the black workers during the 
Durban strikes in 1973 was “Usuthu!” (Institute for Industrial Education 1974: 
96-7; Guy 1994: 246). As Guy notes, this was ‘a slogan which originated as a 
reference to raided cattle, in a homestead of the Zulu Prince Cetshwayo 
kaMpande more than 125 years previously’ (Guy 1994: 246). Here the identity 
of workerism is clearly combined with that of nationalism – but through the 
conscious and proud identity of the ancestry of the collective Zulu, in what 
became the anathema of the revolutionary struggle, yet part of it all the same. 
 
Political space and its occupation in modern political elite formation during 
“the struggle” 
     • Institutional spaces: A regional option for KwaZulu and Natal 
The self governing KLA19 provided the institutional affiliation necessary for 
members of Inkatha to interact on common ground with ‘white’ parties and 
elites in Natal. Through the institutional space of the KLA, Inkatha proposed a 
series of institutional initiatives for the re-engineering of administrative struc-
tures in KwaZulu and Natal that were to catapult Inkatha into a closer rela-
tionship with white business interests, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and 
New Republican Party (NRP)20 (formerly the United Party or UP), anti-Afri-
kanerdom white elites who became committed to greater regional autonomy in 
opposition to the NP’s proposed further fragmentation of the region (cf. Beall et 
al. 1986). The NRP, initially opposing political cooperation until 1984 focused 
upon economic and spatial integration of Natal and KwaZulu as a basis for 
fiscal rationalization (cf. Glaser 1986). For Inkatha’s elites, a negotiated option 
for the region was a logical extension of their concerns to avoid an armed 
solution21 and within their own ideological tradition, offered protection to a 
                                                            
19  The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was established in 1972 out of the Zululand 
Territorial Authority 1970. The specific apartheid acts which provided for home-
lands were the Republic of South Africa (1951) Black (Bantu) Authorities Act (Act 
No.68 of 1951) and the Republic of South Africa (1959) Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act (Act No.46 of 1959) in which individuals that were categorized 
under the Republic of South Africa (1950) Population Registration Act (Act No. 30 
of 1950) as ‘native’ were also classified by ‘ethnic group’ and later assigned to a 
designated homeland by way of their ethnic categorization. The Republic of South 
Africa (1961) Urban Bantu Councils Act (Act No.79 of 1961) provided for home-
land rule of community councils in the townships. 
20  When the Provincial Councils were disbanded in 1986, the NRP split and a large 
group of which joined the National Party. The other significant force in white 
politics was the PFP, later DP. 
21  See Chapter 4 in this book where 42 IFP MPPs expressed the view that opposition to 
the armed struggle in South Africa was one of the key reasons for their choice of the 
50 CHAPTER 2 
 
middle-class of traders and bureaucrats, traditionalists as well as urban and rural 
poor seeking employment and protection against boycotts and dislocation of 
family and social structures. For organised business, particularly organised agri-
culture, the benefits of fiscal and infrastructural efficiency, a mobile regional 
labour market and stable land values within a pro-capitalist economy, provided 
a significant impetus to participation in the proposals. 
The Lombard proposals were commissioned by the South African Sugar 
Association (cf. Lombard 1982). The association was concerned at the potential 
loss of sugar farming lands to the homeland consolidation needs of grand 
apartheid. The proposals advocated cooperation between KwaZulu and Natal 
rather than the consolidation of the homeland of KwaZulu and further suggested 
a constitutional dispensation to enable coordination that included separate but 
equal representation for KwaZulu, Natal and the Durban Metroploitan Area (cf. 
Lombard 1979 and Nattrass 1989: 165-183). The proposals were rejected by the 
government and this motivated the first step in a constitutional process that 
aimed for the interdependence of KwaZulu and Natal and proposed represent-
ation for KwaZulu, Natal and the Durban Metropolitan area (Nattrass 1989: 
196) in a second sphere arrangement. Nattrass contends that the who contends 
that the Durban Metropolitan Area (the incorporated townships of Umlazi and 
KwaMashu, Inanda informal settlement, the unincorporated townships of Ches-
terville and Lamontville and the ‘white’ zones in between) increasingly domi-
nated the spatial economy of the region (Nattrass 1989: 165-183). The Buthelezi 
Commission, initiated by the Central Committee of Inkatha in 1980, proposed a 
consociational model for a single provincial sphere administration (Buthelezi 
Commission 1982). However, it too was rejected by the nationalist government. 
By 1984, South Africa’s political landscape had changed. The changing land-
scape of protest embodied in the establishment of the UDF provided an impetus 
for a reconsideration of negotiated power sharing solutions by ‘white’ provin-
cial elites. The Ulundi Accord, signed by the Natal Provincial Council’s Exe-
cutive Committee (Exco) and the cabinet of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 
in November of 1984 initiated a three-phase schedule for a federal government 
in the region. Phase one of this plan established administrative, technical and 
service cooperation between KwaZulu and Natal through the Joint Action Com-
mittee and Strategic Planning Group. Phase two, implemented in 1987 after the 
passing of the Joint Authority Bill, established a Joint Executive Authority 
(JEA)22 for the region while retaining KwaZulu and Natal as separate bodies. 
                                                                                                                                                 
IFP as a political home. In most cases this information was not solicited but offered 
in response to open ended questions. 
22  The Joint Executive Authority was established following the Republic of South 
Africa (1986) Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal Act (Act No.80 of 
1986) and comprised members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Natal Pro-
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The 1985-6 KwaZulu / Natal Indaba produced a constitutional proposal for a 
regional legislative structure that would incorporate a first chamber of parties 
established on the basis of electoral competition and a second chamber on 
consociational principles of power sharing by ethnically identified groups (cf. 
Mansfield 1991). 
The Indaba proposals were rejected by Stoffel Botha, Administrator of Natal 
acting for the National Party Government. The rejection was on the basis that 
the proposals did not offer sufficient protection to groups (specifically the first 
chamber). However, the proposals were to take Inkatha elites in a radically new 
direction and to provide new impetus for the federal solution advocated by the 
IFP during the transition period (cf. Erwin 1987 and Felgate 1981). These 
institutional initiatives were also to shape the relationship between Inkatha’s 
elites and a provincially established white elite over a period of more than 
twenty years. Some such individuals later used the springboard of these former 
provincial relationships to secure a place in the 1994 provincial parliament on 
the Inkatha ticket (see chapter three). In utilising the public space provided by 
the KLA in negotiating new institutional arrangements for the region, Inkatha 
was able to institutionalize the party both as a regional power and within the 
structures of the KLA. 
 
     • Institutional spaces: Fusion of legislature and party 
The KLA provided Inkatha with much more than an institutional home. It also 
served as an essential mechanism through which the political ideas of the party 
were protected and in which individuals constituted themselves elite members. 
In effect, one may draw a comparison with the way in which SACTU provided 
protection to the SACP/ANC/MK earlier.23 During the struggle years of the late 
1970s and 1980s the political and policy perspectives in the KLA and KwaZulu 
Government did not develop independently in any significant degree from those 
of Inkatha.24 Where there is some evidence of initiatives developed by the 
KwaZulu Government is in rural and peri-urban development and then later 
through ties with white South Africa in the Joint Services Boards. But even in 
                                                                                                                                                 
vincial Legislature following the disbanding of the Provincial Councils under the 
Republic of South Africa (1986) Provincial Government Act (Act No.69 of 1986). 
For discussion of the powers and functions of the JEA and thinking of the ‘white’ 
elite see Miller 1987.  
23  The analogy is that SACTU as “the shield” provided protection to the ANC/SACP/-
MK as “the spear”. 
24  The branches of Inkatha corresponded to the political boundaries of the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly, all members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly were 
members of Inkatha and the KwaZulu cabinet sat en bloc on Inkatha’s Central Com-
mittee.  
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rural development, the party’s portfolio units – groups of individuals broadly 
tasked with policy matters in specific areas – provided the initiatives that were 
then implemented through the institution of the KLA, rather than as initiatives 
developed in the executive of the KLA itself. One of the problems facing 
Inkatha was finance, particularly after the fateful London meeting when ties 
with the ANC were severed. It was agreed by both the ANC and IFP that the 
London Meeting in 1979 would remain secret. When it was publicly revealed in 
the press that a meeting between the two parties had taken place, the IFP 
suffered a wave of recriminatory accusations from the ANC leadership. In fact, 
the meeting was accidentally discovered in a hotel lobby in London by then 
Sunday Times (Johannesburg) journalist, Suzanne Vos, not revealed to the press 
by either party. Without the ANC stamp of approval funds were not forthcoming 
(Pers. IFP Interview 46). What began as the Inkatha Development Office (IDO), 
assessing and addressing the socio-economic needs of communities, and imple-
mented through the KLA, became a transparent enterprise in the Cooperative 
Development Funding (CDO) public-private partnership in 1984 after funding 
from the conservative German foundation, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, was sec-
ured. The work of the IDO and the CDO raised the profile of Inkatha among the 
population through credit unions and co-operatives that it helped to facilitate. In 
addition, Inkatha elites dominated the political institutions of the KwaZulu 
homeland and utilised the resources of the state in the performance of their 
Inkatha work. The ideology of Inkatha was reflected through the state. In this 
way, development initiatives in the homeland became associated with Inkatha, 
as did other sectors such as education, justice and police services. 
How far the fusion of party and the KLA provides conclusive proof of In-
katha as the KLA, rather than indications of a strong party relationship (cf. 
Blondel 1995: 127-143) is open to interpretation. Inkatha has attracted some 
trenchant criticism based upon either its relationship to the state, or failure to 
institutionalize the institutions of the state. Certainly, a culture of partly using 
the resources (such as vehicles) owned by the legislature for party work is in-
dicative of an internal culture that either did not recognise a clear distinction 
between party and state or pushed the boundaries of the party-government 
relationship. There is also the normative question of whether the institutiona-
lism of KLA institutions was a desirable result given the political circumstances 
of the creation of homelands. Indeed Inkatha elites have maintained their per-
spective of “resisting and destroying apartheid from within state structures” 
(Pers. IFP Interviews), in which case the democratic ideal of a functionally 
separate party and state may not apply in the same way, since to resist apartheid, 
one may not necessarily want to ensure the institutionalization of the very insti-
tutions that are to lead to its success. Either way, the positioning of Inkatha in 
the KLA, the fusion of party and legislature, the culture of using the legislature 
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for the purposes of the party and the failure to institutionalize the institutions of 
the state, enabled the growth of a party elite that, while being restricted and 
fragmented, was facilitated and shielded by the institutional home of the KLA. 
This institutional home in turn raised the profile of the party that was partly 
restricted and partly free to operate in the open. 
In light of all this, Inkatha was far from a homogenous movement. It was 
fragmented and provided elite individuals with only a limited amount of auto-
nomy. In the political climate of the civil war of the 1980s the institutional 
shield of the KLA was sometimes extended both to protect elites with other 
sources of power in their own right and in a manner that blurred the boundaries 
of party, state, and civil society to sustain a semblance of legitimate authority 
over the homeland. This extended beyond the use of the KwaZulu police force 
in some cases, to the extension of semi-autonomous spheres of influence in a 
manner akin to Bayart’s “elite accommodation” (Bayart 1989) where informal 
arrangements are established with powerful locals that maintain the state in 
return for autonomy and legitimacy, or Reno’s “shadow state” (Reno 1989) 
whereby potential rivals are accommodated in a manner that almost replaces the 
states bureaucratic function in those areas. In the areas within such autonomous 
zones, the blurred function of autonomous elites included on occasion dispens-
ing resources and public goods for the KLA in a manner akin to a civil servant. 
As one IFP MPP who never served as a KLA employee indicated, ‘I was 
authorised to give out permits. I would give them to help anyone who needed to 
feed their family’ (Pers. IFP Interview 60). While autonomous spheres of in-
fluence were evident at the community level, this was also in the context of 
blurred party-state boundaries. 
 
     • Institutional spaces: Creation of a state outside a state 
Although it provided the focal point for the populist mass action in the 1980s 
the UDF was not the structure on which the ANC in Natal rebuilt its internal 
base. The exposition of Leninist theory was most evident in the collapse and 
merging of independent spaces of state, party, civil society and military that 
occurred from the late 1970s. For example, the focal point in Southern Natal of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s became the re-establishment of ANC groups in 
the townships by people involved in the ANC of the 1950s. Isolomuzi (Eye of 
the Township) was based upon the M-Plan25 and involved the fusion of civic 
organisations and MK (Pers. ANC Interviews). In Southern Natal, KwaMara 
(KwaMashu Resident’s Associations) and Umra (Umlazi Resident’s Associa-
tion) as well as associations in Lamontville and Chesterville became these focal 
points, and from the release of two MK Regional High Commanders Curnick 
                                                            
25  The Mandela Plan. 
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Ndlovu in 1981 and Billy Nair in 1980 the building of structures through the 
fusion of civics and MK took on a new momentum (Pers. ANC Interviews). 
This continued the principle of the “creation of a state outside of a state” 
built on the earlier principle of infiltration of legal organisations, as in the case 
of SACTU in an attempt to create a shield for the ANC. Organisation in 
SACTU was by local organisational committees. In Durban, this committee was 
led by Billy Nair and Stephen Dlamini, both textile workers, with Dlamini a 
member of the SACP and Nair a member of MK High Command (Pers. ANC 
Interviews). Chief Albert Luthuli urged all ANC members to join SACTU. By 
1959 SACTU had local committees in Pietermaritzburg, Pinetown and Lady-
smith. SACTU was a member of the Congress alliance with representation on 
its National Coordinating Committee (cf. Feit 1975). However, key differences 
by the time of the 1980s internal ANC activity was the change in external 
political organisation that allowed internal political elites significant autonomy 
under the command of Forward Areas in exile. In 1977 the Internal Recon-
struction and development Deaprtment had been created in Lusaka and the in-
ternal creation of “structures” given predominance under the command of For-
ward Areas (cf. Lodge 1983/1984: 153-180). 
At least four characteristics of internal work are evident. The first was the 
creation of structures – a permanent network of ANC clusters. The second was 
to influence, infiltrate and harness the mobilising power of legal internal organi-
sations such as civics. The third was to orchestrate the collapse of state struc-
tures. In parts of Natal, this also involved the creation of new structures along-
side a policy of ungovernability. 
However, antagonism was soon created between a new emerging internal 
political elite and those in exile, over the relationship of the movement to 
Inkatha.26 It is in this context that the historic London meeting between the 
ANC and Inkatha took place. Unwilling to become a recruiting agency for the 
armed struggle but needing official recognition from the ANC, Inkatha elites 
were placed in an ambiguous position. In Natal, ANC elites claimed that the 
ANC leadership in exile was compromising the political space of residents’ 
associations that challenged the legitimacy of the institutions in which the IFP 
was located (Pers. ANC Interview 53 and 87). Although these elites were later 
incorporated into the UDF, they retained an ambivalent relationship to the NIC 
and critical fault lines in the Charterist movement existed throughout Natal. The 
implosion of the UDF in Natal from 1986 with charterist politics shifting else-
where, led resistance politics to seek other outlets. 
 
                                                            
26  Inkatha was resurrected with the knowledge and encouragement of the ANC in 
exile. This fact was only belatedly admitted at the Kabwe Conference in 1985. 
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     • Legitimate and illegitimate spaces and political violence 
Whilst a full account of the political violence that took hold in the province is 
outside of the mandate of this book, some explanation will be offered. The mass 
violence that began in the mid-1980s in Natal and extended to the Reef, pro-
ducing the overwhelming majority of casualties in the 1990-1994 period, had 
several salient characteristics. Firstly, the sheer intensity of the violence is hor-
rifying. In the 1984-1991 period the South African Institute of International 
Affairs estimates that approximately 11,000 people were killed in the Natal 
Midlands, coastal areas of Northern and Southern Natal and the Witwatersrand 
townships (Natal Mercury, 1991) Other sources put this figure higher. Johnston 
indicates that 16,000 people dies between 1984 and 1994 (Johnston 1994). Sec-
ondly, the violence became diffused through other conflicts that made it inco-
herent (Johnston 1994: 188-189). These include conflicts over the regulation of, 
and access to, resources and services (such as minibus taxi rivalries and access 
to basic services such as water supplied through standpips), clan or tribal con-
flicts over succession rights, vendetta type local rivalries, crime and inter-
generational conflict. Minaar documents one such conflict between youth and 
their parents which escalated into a hostel versus ‘civic’ structure conflict, and 
then ANC-IFP conflict as those involved turned to political parties for assist-
ance (Minaar 1992). 
Many explanations have been proffered for the violence. Of the three most 
common, the first is that the legacy of apartheid is to blame, producing high 
unemployment, contributing to brutal and deprived conditions of existence in 
rapidly expanding informal settlements and hostels and dehumanising black 
males and leaving them powerless (cf. Morris & Hindson 1992a: 43-59 and 
Morris & Hindson 1992b: 152-170). The second explanation is that a “third 
force” of renegade security force elements was responsible for stoking conflict 
within ANC-IFP black communities by attacking one side or another until re-
tributory violence took on a momentum of its own (cf. Bennun 1995: 26-61 and 
Ajulu 1992: 67-83). The third, and most common explanation is that the viol-
ence is a product of turf rivalries between the ANC and the IFP (cf. Jeffrey 1997 
and Johnston 1997a: 78-107). Johnston argues that although the political viol-
ence is inarticulate it is located within ANC-IFP competition over territory, 
tradition and the constitutional framework (Johnston 1997a: 78-107). However, 
within this third explanation, some analysts have predominantly attributed 
“blame” to Inkatha. Methodologically some of these studies are problematic 
because authors neither acknowledge that their interviewees are politically 
aligned nor consider the implications of the information they receive as a con-
sequence of this. In some cases analysts have neither acknowledged their own 
affiliations and the affiliations of their eyewitnesses which have sometimes 
turned out to be individuals holding political positions. An example is Levine’s 
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1999 edited volume in which a substantial number of eyewitnesses to political 
violence were UDF and ANC affiliated, some had gone on to hold political 
office for the ANC and the independent scholarly contribution to the volume is 
written by a UDF supporter (cf. Levine 1999). In some other cases, analysts 
often uncritically adopt the ANC version of the violence, in class based ana-
lyses, as if the “fault” was simply self evident because of both the perceived 
middle class bias of the movement and ambiguous struggle credentials of its 
elite emanating from Inkatha’s location in the homeland. For example, without 
unpacking the conflict between the ANC and IFP, Price contends that ‘Buthe-
lezi … demonstrate(ed) that unless he is taken into account there will be no 
peace’ (Price 1991: 234). Saul, without considering the support base of the IFP, 
argues that Buthelezi is merely ‘a hired tool of the security services’ (Saul 1991: 
16). Such analyses mirror ANC versions of the conflict in the mobilisation of 
bias against the competition. Other less biased accounts have sometimes adopt-
ed uncritically the terminology that ascribes blame to Inkatha such as “powerful 
Inkatha warlords pitted against progressive youth” without providing justifica-
tion for the terms used. Again this is a problem of an uncritical methodology. 
IFP individuals were identifiable by way of their presence in the institutions of 
the homeland. Conversely, if analysts were to use the same framework and 
apply it to the non-visible institutions created internally from 1981 they would 
also consider many of the ANC leaders, SDU leaders and heads of “people’s 
committees” warlords. Despite this proliferation I contend that the term “war-
lord” is inappropriate in the South African context for two reasons. The first is 
because of the ideological and collective ties that bound individuals so des-
cribed to political parties over and above private interests. Reno, for example, 
suggests that apart from a weak state, the defining feature of warlord politics is 
the primacy of individual interests and the absence of collective interests (Reno 
1998: 2-3). In the context of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, conservatism 
was an ideological position strongly supported by segments of the community 
in which individuals so described resided. The second reason that the term 
warlord has no basis in the KwaZulu-Natal context is that individuals described 
did not necessarily rely on (or in some cases solely on) the use of force and fear 
as their basis of authority. In some cases their ability to address acute commu-
nity needs, such as housing, water and security against anarchy for the commu-
nity, provided a basis of legitimate support. This goes beyond the feudalistic 
relationship normally deemed to be characteristic of a leader-follower warlord 
relationship because, although there is evidence of patronage relationships, it is 
so in the climate of hardening ideological ties, rather than personal ones. The 
term warlord in the context of KwaZulu-Natal may best therefore be understood 
as a journalistic cliché and political slogan used sometimes to discredit rivals. 
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A more useful explanation for the political violence (one that is arguably 
supported by the interviews for this study) might be that the breakdown of 
political institutions as regulating mechanisms, enabled emerging competing 
interests in opposition politics (and other non-political areas), autonomy in the 
self regulation of force, at the same time as social and political cohesion broke 
down and new parallel structures of authority emerged. This is within the con-
text of the attempt by the ANC alliance from 1981 to “create a state outside the 
state” (discussed earlier) underscored by the G-Plan27 of ungovernability from 
1984 and Inkatha’s location in the homeland structures. The clash of “insti-
tutions” was overlaid by increasingly populist rhetoric condemning privilege of 
all types in a climate in which structures were unable to regulate competition 
and the boundaries of the legitimate were extended. To say that the violence 
was directed by any political organisation in the sense of an overall strategy is 
certainly incorrect, although political elites within both the IFP and ANC 
(through ANC and UDF structures) were party to the culture of impunity that 
took on a momentum of its own. As one MPP disclosed, ‘we all knew that MK 
was operating out of Diakonia in Durban, so Diakonia just became fair game for 
whatever. Of course such actions were never party policy and they were never 
discussed in the legislature. But there would not always be interference by the 
KwaZulu government if something untoward happened there’ (Pers. IFP Inter-
view 46). Hence, the political elite would on occasion ignore violence orches-
trated against their rivals, from individuals in their own movement, from whom 
attacks on their own supporters and structures were launched. 
Contested elite formation during the transition 
The transition period in South Africa was characterised by changing relation-
ships and interactions between political elites in shifting political spaces. In the 
closing of some spaces and opening of others, the gap between institutional and 
public spaces became narrowed and the formal institutional spaces of the old 
order become delegitimised. A smaller number of political elites came to domi-
nate these processes, locking themselves into a framework of political ideas that 
other political elites failed to penetrate. For Inkatha, decisions made by other 
political parties, such as the ANC and NP at the national level, were to restrict 
the party’s strategy in KwaZulu-Natal. For the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, the 
transition fundamentally limited the spaces in which some elites operated by 
closing off certain political ideas such as socialism, which led to the demise of 
sections of the party, as those elites advocating such political ideas were side-
lined. 
                                                            
27  Goniwe Plan. 
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Contested national moral and institutional spaces 
In the post-unbanning period, the ANC leadership came to regulate “moral” and 
“public institutional” spaces in South Africa that served to delegitimise the 
spaces in which their opposition was located. 
 
     • Contested moral spaces 
The unbanned ANC, during the negotiations, moved to capitalise on the 
“moral” space provided by their diplomatic coup in exile that led to their 
treatment abroad as a government in waiting (African National Congress – 
South African Communist Party 1986: 12). Favoured by foreign governments, 
donor organisations and the internal democratic movement the ANC had a 
powerful sense of symbolic legitimacy and ‘their own virtue’ Owen in Adam et 
al. 1997: 137). Through this internationally furnished moral space the ANC 
leadership moved quickly to close down any residual moral spaces occupied by 
the IFP and NP. This was through the denial of legitimacy to both parties. The 
residual moral space of the IFP was based upon their anti-apartheid, anti-
sanctions stance and refusal to take independence for KwaZulu, and their claims 
to represent a significant and authentic constituency. For the NP, their ending of 
apartheid and capitulation to negotiations that were to erode their political 
power provided a sense of moral legitimacy. For the IFP this erosion of legiti-
macy occurred in phases that coincided with substantive changes in the Natal 
ANC, particularly in the dominance of some political ideas over others and in 
the use of political space.  
The IFP was denied legitimacy on the basis of three interlinking factors: the 
IFP’s relationship to the institutions of the KwaZulu homeland, the support base 
of the IFP in rural and peri-urban areas and the IFP’s conception of tradition and 
status of traditional leaders. Based on a particular discourse of peasant col-
lective consciousness, the ANC sought to set aside the ‘centrality of commu-
nity’ (cf. Ranger 1988: 312-315) and shared ‘peasant discourse’ (ibid.) that 
validated traditional leadership in KwaZulu. Instead, the claim was that such 
elites derived their legitimacy purely from the apartheid state and Inkatha’s 
“manipulation of ethnicity”. In this view modernity (repackaged as democrati-
sation) would sweep aside any residual ethnic attachments (as they were de-
fined), as individuals would come to legitimise more “modern democratic” in-
stitutions whose authority was derived from “procedures” rather than “myths”. 
As such, Inkatha was treated as devoid of legitimacy, as a homeland party that 
had positioned itself to manipulate ethnicity in order to build coalitions across 
class lines, and in the process had hindered the democratisation of the state. 
Such views parallel Weberian models of the traditional / modern dichotomy and 
were articulated by the Left as well as the ANC in Natal. 
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The Inkathagate scandal in 1991 critically eroded the moral space the NP 
had gained by unbanning extra-parliamentary organisations (cf. Booysen 1992: 
64-80). There are different interpretations of this scandal. Inkatha and the NP 
claim that funding was provided to Inkatha to assist in the establishment of 
United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), a “dummy” union to coun-
teract the power of COSATU, to hire stadiums for an anti-sanctions rally, for 
advertising and for transport (cf. Weekend Argus, 20 July 1991). However, 
during the Malan Trial, from October 1995, it was further revealed that Buthe-
lezi in his capacity of Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland had approached 
the SADF with concerns that the relatively small KwaZulu police force (KZP) 
was unable to cope with increasing violence in KwaZulu. Consequently 200 
individuals were trained in the Caprivi Strip by the SADF, to be integrated into 
the KZP. The ANC, however, claim that the funding and training was to assist 
in violence against the ANC and UDF. The important consequence of this is 
that the period became a turning point whereby the ANC sought to utilise the 
NP’s embarrassment to restrict the symbolic space of the IFP. In this phase the 
ANC treated the IFP as a security problem rather than a credible party as is 
evident from the stress on the banning of traditional weapons, as if the overt 
demonstration of weaponry was the cause of covert violence rife in the prov-
ince. 
Finally, the ANC sought to project the image that they too were respectful of 
traditional leadership, the Zulu king and cultural practices. Thus, in this view, 
the IFP was symbolically redundant because the ANC could straddle “tradi-
tional cultural reverence” and “modern progressive” urban politics. The mass 
Sonke28 ANC rally in Durban in 1993 as a celebration of traditional culture 
occurred at a time when key shifts in the Natal ANC marginalised Inkatha’s 
most vociferous ANC critics, with the resultant erosion of the discourse of the 
Left in the post 1994 period. In Northern Natal the regional leadership of the 
ANC was deposed in 1993 and replaced by Deputy-Secretary General Jacob 
Zuma. Although Zuma was from the Southern Natal region, the relative weak-
ness of the ANC’s Northern Natal region was used as a justification for the 
takeover. The takeover also placed Zuma in a favourable position for the re-
gional premiership against the two candidates from the Natal Midlands (Harry 
Gwala) and Southern Natal (Jeff Radebe). In the event, Zuma’s position as 
ANC provincial leader in the post-1994 period somewhat marginalized Harry 
Gwala, outspoken SACP stalwart. The erosion of the moral space of the IFP 
ensured that the party’s capacity to respond to institutional manoeuvres by the 
ANC was significantly limited and it’s IFP federal principles were ignored. As 
Barber argues, ‘nobody even bothers to try to understand Inkatha(s) … position 
                                                            
28  Translated as ‘all of us’. 
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anymore … Safer to diagnose (Buthelezi as mad, or megalomaniac or both, and 
watch as his turf is forcibly cleared … Too bad he got in the way’ (Simon 
Barber in Adam et al. 1997: 136). 
 
     • Contested public and institutional spaces 
The regulation of moral spaces by the ANC leadership contributed to the de-
legitimisation of the institutional spaces in which the opposition was located. In 
their place, mass action became institutionalized as the public institutional space 
through which the true public mandate was deemed to be derived, and through 
which the ANC was able to accomplish regulation of the institutional spaces of 
the opposition. There were three strategic perspectives within the ANC. They 
were first, “don’t rock the boat” in which mass action was perceived as in 
conflict with negotiations. The second perspective was “turning on the tap” 
whereby it was believed that mass action could be used as a force to bring about 
changes in the oppositions negotiating stance. Third “the Leipzig way” articu-
lated the building of a dual power structure among “the masses” to lead to in-
surrection. In “turning on the tap” the ANC leadership sought to harness public 
power behind a pacted transition directed by the ANC leadership. However, in 
Natal, some of the ANC disagreed with this decision. They supported a Leipzig 
option over the turning on the tap perspective advocated by the leadership (cf. 
Cronin 1992: 41-54).  
The irony of a pacted transitional process is that a democratic outcome is 
supposedly secured through undemocratic means that restrict spaces to facilitate 
certainty. By institutionalizing procedures, extending guarantees to the few 
actors’ involved in the pact and minimising the actors’ ability to harm one an-
other they effectively reduce competition and accountability, secure interests, 
reduce the ability of other actors to participate and structure the agendas that 
follow thereafter. The key feature of a pact is an explicit agreement among an 
elite which defines rules that are secured through mutual guarantees (O’Donnell 
& Schmitter 1986: 38). Transition theorists readily accept that the defining 
moment in a democratic transition is the institutionalization of uncertainty. As 
Przeworski contends, ‘democratisation is an act of subjecting all interests to 
competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty. The decisive step towards demo-
cracy is the devolution of power to a set of rules’ (Przeworski 1991: 14). Al-
though liberalisation may occur during transitions, which extends the scope of 
participation, and the rules of the game may be institutionalized, pacted transi-
tions, as Karl demonstrates, may restrict representation and secure dominant in-
terests (cf.Karl 1990: 1-22). In this way, they do not institutionalize uncertainty 
nor equalise the competition. Perhaps the strength of the ANC’s position is that 
the institutionalization of rules was the certainty of their victory. 
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Pacts limit uncertainty and provide guarantees through accommodation and 
compromise that serve to shield elites from the public and constrain those who 
advocate greater change. The crucial pact in the South African transition was 
the Record of Understanding between the ANC and NP in September 1992 
which entrenched institutional rules and the form of the state, as well as ex-
cluding the political ideas of other players. The Record of Understanding 
emerged out of a bilateral series of ANC-NP negotiations initiated by an article 
written by Joe Slovo in the African Communist. Slovo advocated a sunset 
period whereby the ANC agreed to a period of quasi power-sharing in a govern-
ment of national unity for a limited term and that constitutional principles 
established ahead of an election would be written into a final constitution. In 
exchange, the NP agreed that the final constitution would be written by an 
elected Constitutional Assembly and government would proceed on a majority 
rule basis from the second election (Slovo 1992: 36-40).Through the Record of 
Understanding, The ANC leadership began to regulate the institutional pro-
cesses. The IFP was marginalised as were SACP-ANC elites on the Left. The 
process of exclusion and inclusion, in forcing moderation, ensured that certain 
elites came to the fore and that Left wing hopes of ushering in a socialist state 
with a more radical agenda were thwarted.29 (The impact of this in the ANC in 
Natal is discussed in Chapter 3). 
By late 1992 the ANC had secured significant control over the institutional 
process; the parameters of the final form of the state had been set, the in-
stitutional spaces in which the IFP and NP were located were delegitimised, and 
mass action was secured as the legitimate public institutional space. This was 
also to legitimise new transitional institutional spaces in which the ANC had 
made inroads. While the IFP and NP were still housed in the institutions of the 
state and KLA, and had the resources of the state at their disposal, these spaces 
were delegitimised. Instead, transitional institutional spaces in which the ANC 
dominated became the legitimate spaces. These included the Multiparty Nego-
tiating Forum (Codesa 2) and the Transitional Executive Council. In addition, 
agreements such as ‘the National Peace Accord … institutionalized centres of 
political power beyond the domain of the state’ (Booysen 1992: 73). 
 
     • Agenda setting, non-decision-making and the results of such action 
Through the regulation of moral, public and institutional spaces, the ANC 
leadership ensured a two-sided negotiating table that neutralised the power of 
other parties, prevented items from reaching the agenda and were sometimes not 
held to account for failures to submit to the terms of their own agreements. The 
                                                            
29  For a discussion of the moderating and conservative effects of pacts, see Hagopian 
1990.  
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principle of “sufficient consensus” was applied to the negotiation process to 
determine whether agreement had been reached and whether the parties could 
move on. In practice, this principle ‘was interpreted to mean consensus between 
the (NP) government and the ANC’ (cf. Johnston 1996a: 174). This effectively 
rendered the other parties in the process as irrelevant because, as Johnston 
contends, bilateral negotiations and deals between the NP government and ANC 
leadership drove the agenda of the Codesa negotiations (ibid.). However, as the 
1994 elections at the national level retrospectively made clear, the ANC could 
claim a much greater representativeness than the majority of delegates. That 
said, prior to the Record of Understanding, Jeffrey notes that ‘more than half the 
delegates at Codesa (2) voted against … (the ANC) on the key issue of feder-
alism’ (Jeffrey 1997: 392), yet the form of the state adopted in the ANC-NP 
bilaterals put paid to a federal option. The NP-IFP bilaterals that followed the 
IFP walkout after the Record of Understanding led to the production of a docu-
ment suggesting amendments. As one MPP contends, ‘the NP agreed to make a 
presentation to the ANC on the IFP’s behalf. Meyer handed the document over 
and Ramaphosa simply dropped it in the waste paper basket. It was never going 
to appear on the agenda’ (Pers. IFP Interview 46). Later attempts to bring to the 
excluded parties back into the process, ‘essentially meant their acceptance of 
what had already been agreed upon’ (Rantete 1998: 205).  
Perhaps the most important item that remained off the agenda of the nego-
tiations was MK. Although armed struggle was officially ended in 1990 and 
MK soldiers were officially confined to barracks until MK was officially demo-
bilised in December 1993 there are clear indications of MK activity in various 
forms in Natal throughout the transition phase and, in some instances, beyond 
that (see later discussion). 
Agenda setting and decision-making power relations may best be understood 
through the ‘mobilisation of bias’ (Schnattschneider 1960: 60 and cf. Bachrach 
& Baratz 1962) which serves to limit the scope of debate through non-decision-
making. Vested interests become protected though regulation so that ‘the ac-
cepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups … effect-
ively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which 
call for decisions’ (Bachrach & Baratz 1962: 642). Non-decision-making may 
occur in a number of forms which include blocking challenges through invoking 
or reshaping existing rules or procedures, or labelling demands as unpatriotic 
(cf. ibid.: 641-651). In the South African context, moral power served to create 
public institutional power that in turn created institutional power beyond the 
state which was able to mobilise bias against other interests. 
The mobilisation of bias is most evident in cases where parties were not held 
to account for failing to submit to the terms of their own agreements in arenas 
where power had been institutionalized beyond the domain of the state. The 
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National Peace Accord, signed on 14th September 1992, bound signatories to a 
code of conduct that outlawed coercion against opponents and included the 
ANC and IFP among its signatories. The National Peace Committee was the 
responsible investigating body of the National Peace Accord, tasked with in-
vestigating violations of the code of conduct for political organizations signa-
tory to the National Peace Accord. However, violations of the National Peace 
Accord by Natal ANC and SACP members were not punished, and in some 
areas the permanently established Judge Richard Goldstone Commission on 
violence failed to investigate violations brought to its attention (cf. Francis 
2010). For example, the Pietermaritzburg ANC mock trials that sentenced to 
death ten IFP leaders and one NP leader were found by the National Peace 
Committee to be in breach of the Accord, yet the response of the ANC to these 
findings was to conduct their own internal investigation rather than to accept the 
findings of the very body in which they had vested such powers (cf. Jeffrey 
1997: 363).30 
As the former institutional spaces became delegitimised, the ability of the 
IFP to influence the course of negotiations was restricted and the moral space 
the IFP claimed was withheld, the IFP increasingly retreated into an ethnic 
discourse. This served a number of purposes. Firstly, and ethnic discourse 
supported by the Zulu monarch’s claims to the ‘sovereignty of the Zulu nation’ 
(King Goodwill Zwelithini in SAPA 14 February 1994; Johnston 1996a: 187) 
differentiate the IFP from other black based political organisations, who may 
have claimed to respect traditional culture but did not have the official sanction 
of the most important cultural individual – the monarch. Secondly this differ-
entiation served to legitimate the IFP, because the ANC could then not claim to 
represent this “nation” without official sanction from the monarch, nor could it 
ignore the IFP, for that would be tantamount to “ignoring a nation” with a 
shared history, language culture and heritage. Finally, this ethnic discourse en-
abled the IFP to contest the ANC’s moral space by suggesting that the party had 
acted immorally by ignoring the viewpoint of a constituency that did not 
support it. This marginalisation was not simply the marginalisation of a party 
constructed on ethnic lines but the dismissal of an alternative perspective that 
was equally valid. 
IFP proposals for a federal state form against the ANC’s centralist structure 
were an extension of the 1980’s proposals that advocated a dispersal of power, 
but also reflected the political elites that came to dominate the IFP from 1991. 
Literature that points to ethnic manipulation of a “Zulu nation” as the dominant 
force behind regional power does not consider the elite constituencies that made 
                                                            
30  My personal Interviews have revealed that the IFP Midlands leader who Jeffery 
states ‘was singled out for immediate execution’ (p. 363) was IFP MPP Ntombela. 
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up the party’s decision-making body. From 1991, the party was flooded with 
new members from two sources in particular. The first were those from the 
crumbling white parties who were committed to a measure of regional auto-
nomy as a reflection of the good relationship forged between parties in Natal 
and the IFP in the pre-1990 period. The second were former PAC members who 
recognised black consciousness ideals in the IFP and rejected what they 
considered to be authoritarian tendencies in the ANC. The IFP federal proposals 
reflected the composite constituencies’ shared concerns, the ethnic discourse 
being the justification through differentiation. 
 
Political ideas and internal tensions in the provincial elite 
In the transition period new struggles revealed themselves in KwaZulu and 
Natal as the ability of provincial elites to frustrate national political processes 
and act autonomously was challenged, but not thwarted. National political 
imperatives for the ANC had changed. At the national level, the socialist state 
option was thwarted and there was the need to both appease yet neutralise the 
SACP. The armed struggle was abandoned and the national leadership core 
committed the movement to negotiations. Inkatha had not crumbled and threat-
ened to upset the negotiation process. These factors and the ANC’s attempts to 
establish an organisational structure in KwaZulu and Natal out of ANC, UDF, 
SACP, COSATU, workerists, charterists, communists, nationalists, ex-prison-
ers, underground and exile members, trade unionists and community activists, 
intensified already tense elite struggles in Natal. The Natal elite was already 
fractured and poor relationships existed between some members of the ANC, 
trade unions and UDF in different regions, as well as between individuals in 
various charterist movements outside the UDF. The unbanned ANC provided a 
home for diverse and fragmented UDF critics in Natal and the return of exiles 
and Robben Islanders combined with national ANC control over negotiations 
and relationships with the IFP produced clashes and rivalries locally and be-
tween the national leadership and regions. 
Although the UDF was reconstituted in other parts of South African in late 
1989, this was not so in Natal. Instead, the UDF’s roles were assumed by the 
Joint Working Committee31 which became the key decision-making structure 
for the region and increasingly independent of the UDF. In the Natal Midlands 
divisions among charterists were rife and a divided and ideologically frag-
                                                            
31  The Joint Working Committee comprised representatives from COSATU that in-
cluded John Jeffrey, Thami Mohlomi, Alec Erwin and Jayendra Naidoo, and repre-
sentatives from the UDF that included Sandy Africa, Yunus Erwin and Diliza Mji. 
As this was a provincially based structure it also included regional representatives 
Willis Mchunu from Northern Natal and Sipho Gcabashe from the Natal Midlands 
(Pers. ANC Interviews 21 and 104). 
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mented elite32 replaced the coherent sub-regional UDF leadership that was 
detained in the 1988 detentions. Along with Gwala – a former unionist, SACP 
stalwart and ANC leader released from Robben Island in 1988 who was op-
posed to the UDF – these elites attempted to build a rival charterist movement 
in the midlands. In addition, other midlands activists were involved in attempts 
to build another nation-wide charterist movement to rival the UDF nationally.33 
Gwala’s ‘unreconstructed Stalinism, populist rhetoric and straightforward 
advocacy of direct paramilitary action in the struggle against the IFP made him 
extremely popular with the youthful “comrades” in the ANC’ (Johnston 1996a: 
180) in his leadership of the Natal Midlands region. Key members of the Natal 
Midlands rejected Slovo’s Sunset Proposals upon which the Record of Under-
standing was based. Harry Gwala, the only Natal based ANC NEC member in 
1991 argued ‘the key element is the struggle itself and negotiations must be 
subjected to the struggle’ (Gwala 1992: 27). Gwala was vocal in his opposition 
to the entire negotiating process. He said, ‘ …we find agreement unacceptable, 
… We are already setting down the rule of surrender … Where do we draw the 
line?’ (Gwala cited in Mkhondo 1993: 162). 
In fact, elements in the Natal midlands did draw the line. Under Gwala’s 
leadership, four senior post-1990 ANC provincial leaders developed significant 
semi-autonomous power bases, a factor that was to lead to violent confront-
ations on Gwala’s death. This elite “Midlands Club” was not averse to forming 
temporary alliances with one another or with elites in other regions to the detri-
ment of one another. Such alliances took on new twists during the negotiations 
when the “hawks” continued with paramilitary activities, and the “doves” were 
later to reject their own leader in the region wide leadership contest. The ob-
jective of Operation Vula had been to launch a full scale armed insurrection in 
South Africa through the use of MK structures and Self-Defence Units. In 
Natal, these structures were fully formed when the operation was discovered by 
police in 1990. In the post-Operation Vula period at least two leaders within the 
midlands were to integrate MK soldiers into Transkei trained SDU’s in a 
scheme which involved gun-running, the establishment of four large hi-tech 
arms caches in the midlands, systematic assassination of IFP leaders and the 
creation of personal fiefdoms (Pers. ANC Interview 94). In addition, these 
hawks established alliances with other hawks in Northern Natal (Pers. Interview 
124). Returning exiles and Robben Islanders did not fit easily into the already 
                                                            
32  This new leadership included John Jeffrey (COSATU legal team) and Sipho Gca-
bashe (COSATU), Dennis Sithole & Cassius Lubisi (student activist) (Pers. ANC 
Interview 21).  
33  This was along with Aubrey Mokoena from the Johannesburg based Release Man-
dela Campaign. 
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established power structures in this region, and an uneasy relationship ensued, 
with some returnees more amenable to the new directives from the centre. 
In Southern Natal, older ANC leaders from the 1950s had played a part in 
the merging of MK and civic structures outside the charterist movement since 
the release of Curnick Ndlovu and Billy Nair in the early 1980s. These members 
of ‘Izingwevu’34 rejected the “cabal” leadership35 of the UDF. Street militants 
that had emerged through the civics formed an important elite constituency. Yet 
alongside this group, another emerged in the 1990s; a younger generation of 
Southern Natal leaders out of the conflict at Ngoye36 and student politics in the 
1980s. This group saw themselves as the intellectual wing of the fiercely Afri-
canist nationalist movement, based neither on the trade unions nor the armed 
struggle, that challenged Inkatha’s claims to represent Zulus. Alongside these 
groups a number of returnees from exile joined internal leadership in key 
positions. As one MPP articulated, ‘We had no Kings here. There was no senior 
ANC leadership here’ (Pers. ANC Interview 134). Another MPP contended that 
in parts of Southern Natal a leadership vacuum existed that enabled returnees to 
slot easily into local structures alongside civic and UDF leaders (Pers. ANC 
Interview 87).  
Certainly in Southern Natal, the most senior figures that emerged had strong 
links with exile and Robben Island which served to impart the imperatives of 
diplomacy to the region more easily than the midlands. This is not to say that 
paramilitary action and intransigence towards the IFP37 did not play a part in 
this region, which had the most successfully developed ANC underground 
                                                            
34  The meaning of this term may be translated in this context as ‘an older and more 
respected, higher court or assembly of leaders’. 
35  Allegations that the Natal UDF was controlled by a “cabal” consisting of members 
of the Natal Indian Congress were revealed after the ANC’s unbanning in 1990. 
These individuals were charged with corruption, inadequate leadership, and attempt-
ing to hijack the ANC leadership. Former cabal accused failed to gain significant 
positions on the provincial election lists in 1994. 
36  The conflict at Ngoye occurred in the context of an ANC/UDF national schools boy-
cott which had reached parts of KwaZulu. At the University of Zululand Ngoye 
campus in October 1983 a commemoration of Zulu King Cetshwayo in which In-
katha President Buthelezi was to speak was disrupted by students. In armed clashes 
five people died and hundreds of thousands of rands worth of property was des-
troyed. The Middleton Commission, set up to investigate the incident, rejected 
claims by students that they were protecting themselves against Inkatha impis and 
found that some students were intent upon confrontation with Inkatha. It further 
found that there was substantial coercion and intimidation from a small group of 
students to persuade others to join in. See RSA 1985: Volume 1. 
37  For example, at the funeral vigil for Chris Hani, Jeff Radebe ‘told the angry crowd 
that the ANC should not only rid itself of white supremacists, but should also focus 
on the IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi’ (Jeffrey 1997: 382). 
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structures and was essential in the implementation of the Green Book (cf. ANC-
SACP 1979: 72),38 but the political elite here acquiesced to the overall impe-
rative of negotiations. This took place alongside civic action, street militancy 
and covert paramilitary assaults. The refusal to capitulate in its entirety was a 
result of the complexities of workerism as a component of the struggle in 
Southern Natal and a result of the belief that whatever government took power, 
it would always be an opponent of organised labour (Pers. ANC Interview 35). 
Northern Natal, the largest territorial ANC region, was the least organised 
and contained the least ANC support in the province. ANC organisers here had 
to compete directly with the IFP in rural territory that was under the jurisdiction 
of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and subject to traditional leadership. A 
number of paramilitary-style SDU structures existed in Northern Natal with 
direct links to the Midlands region. The rejection by elites in Northern Natal of 
the peace process with the IFP (along with elites in the Natal Midlands) oc-
curred despite the fact that senior members had been engaged in attempts to 
conduct peace talks since as early as 1989. This was through the 5-a-side Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) team39 that included Willies Mchunu from 
Northern Natal. The Northern Natal regional leadership was replaced by the 
deployed40 senior exile leader Jacob Zuma in 1993 in an attempt to “provin-
cialise” the province (see Chapter 5 on recruitment and circulation). 
Internal IFP differences in the transition period were evident but less critical. 
They were certainly not regional, as the movement reconstituted itself as a 
viable political party. Where they did occur, was primarily at the branch level in 
urban and peri-urban areas where there was fierce competition over turf, as 
individuals competed for limited places in an environment that was often hostile 
to IFP mobilising. In contrast to the ANC, ideological tensions in the IFP sur-
faced mainly in the 1994-1996 period (see later chapters). There were four 
reasons for this delayed fracture of elite clusters. First, despite substantive 
ideological diversity, IFP elites were largely united on the preferred form of the 
state, which took precedence as the party became provincialised by national 
processes, and failed to establish a significant presence outside of KwaZulu-
Natal. Second, although the influx of new elites from the crumbling white 
parties and the PAC threatened to add new dimensions of internal difference, 
                                                            
38  See later in this chapter for a discussion of the merging of MK and civic structures 
based on the Mandela Plan. 
39  This team comprised of Mchunu, Gcabashe, Mji, Erwin and Naidoo. 
40  The ANC Northern Natal Chair was replaced by Jacob Zuma on the regional and 
national lists towards the end of 1993. This was as a direct result of intervention by 
Mandela. 
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they remained predominantly outside the National Council41 until 1994. Third, 
notwithstanding a centralised decision-making process, IFP elites were afforded 
significant autonomy in their local districts. Fourth, the strategies pursued by 
the party during the transition cut across elite clusters so that individuals 
grouped together on one strategy were not necessarily grouped on another. 
Hence the diversity of viewpoints paralleled the extent of those in the ANC, but 
without the ensuing tensions. 
Notwithstanding these points, differences existed between IFP elite clusters 
on a number of significant issues. IFP elites were divided upon whether or not 
to accept the negotiated form of the state that sidelined and provincialised the 
party, and whether or not peace with the ANC was desirable. Some elite mem-
bers were determined to campaign for an election, and others wished to boycott 
and resist incorporation of the KwaZulu homeland. Some elites desired a recon-
ciliation with the ANC as a step to greater Pan-African unity (Pers. IFP Inter-
view 118), while some warned their constituencies of the ‘detriments’ of im-
pending communist rule (Pers. IFP Interviews 43 and 16), and a further cluster 
continued simply to see the ANC as an ‘enemy’ (Pers. IFP Interviews 60 and 
119). While the IFP debated the merits of participating in the 1994 election, 
their preparation – unlike that of the ANC – did not include the selection of 
candidates. Consequently, a hurriedly drawn electoral list in the final days be-
fore the election was to create untenable internal party rivalries that contributed 
to the fracture that inevitably came (see Chapter 4).  
 
     • Professionalised political volence 
Political violence during the transition period took on a new form of profes-
sionalism that sets it apart from the violence earlier42. Jeffrey notes that more 
than 80% of post-1990 killings involved the use of firearms rather than pangas, 
knobkerries or necklacing (Jeffrey 1997). This suggests a proliferation of so-
phisticated military weaponry and “tuition” in their use.43  
                                                            
41  The National Council was the key decision-making body within the IFP replacing 
the Central Committee, paralleling the ANC’s National Executive Committee. 
42  This remains undocumented and unanalysed although specific cases can be found in 
Jeffrey 1997. 
43  It does not specifically suggest, contrary to popular wisdom, a third force, given that 
high levels of violence in Natal and on the Reef were not replicated in areas where 
the ANC contended with other political forces such as in the Eastern Cape where the 
ANC through the UDF contended with the National Forum. 
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ANC-SACP44 Operation Vula, using MK to create “the objective conditions” 
for an armed insurrection, was the basis upon which Self-Defence Units (SDUs) 
supported by, and sometimes integrated with, MK were established throughout 
KwaZulu-Natal. A number of structures that became SDUs predate the ANC 
guidelines (ANC 1991)45 for their establishment and the MK conference in 
Venda which formalised their role.46 For example, the Richmond SDU was 
formed by 1989 out of Operation Vula (Pers. ANC Interview 94). Although the 
ANC leadership distanced itself from Operation Vula, the establishment of 
internal combat groups inside KwaZulu-Natal and the large scale smuggling of 
military hardware from the Transkei and frontline states added a new dimension 
to the violence that wracked the province during the transition period. Evidence 
suggests that in Natal, arms smuggling and training continued as late as 1993. 
The Golela incident in which weapons were smuggled through the Swaziand 
border for the ANC in Natal is one example.47 According to one ANC MPP, 
‘there were three levels of SDU training. (First) … there was internal training 
under communities or training depots. There were four (of these) in the Natal 
Midlands … one under (MPP X) in Willowfontein with a proper arsenal and 
MK staff … one under (MPP Y) in Dambuza with an arsenal behind Table 
Mountain … one in the Estcourt area staffed by MK … and another in the 
Richmond area. (Second) … those who showed promise in the training depots 
were sent to the Transkei to be trained further by MK and the Transkei Defence 
Force. (The third level) … people were taken out of the country … The peak 
(of) training would have been 1992, but we got weapons even in 1993’ (Pers. 
ANC Interview 94). 
In many cases, SDUs were established under the personal control of 
charismatic anti-IFP leaders in personalised and semi-autonomous political 
                                                            
44  Although Oliver Tambo headed Operation Vula, the command structures comprised 
layers of command and operational structures. The first layer comprised the Presi-
dents Committee: Siphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils, Joe Slovo, Archie 
Abrahams & Ivan Pillay. Below that comprised the Vula Head Committee –Siphiwe 
Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Chris Hani and Janet Love – who commanded twelve re-
gional committees. When the operation was uncovered in 1990, the Durban Political 
Committee headed by Billy Nair & Pravin Gordhan was fully formed.  
45  The document discussed the establishment of a people’s militia in which armed 
SDUs would merge with MK. 
46  The MK Conference in Venda in December 1991 formalized the role of MK and 
elaborated that SDUs would be assisted by MK in arming themselves, weapon 
usage, intelligence gathering and ambushes. 
47  In the Golela incident in1993 two individuals were caught smuggling weapons 
through the Swaziland border for the ANC and the ANC Midlands and Northern 
Natal regions clashed with the ANC national leadership after the national leadership 
disowned the mission (cf. Jeffrey 1997: 378-379). 
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spaces. The SDUs, despite their name, came to be used in turf battles against 
rivals, towards the destabilisation of areas and to continue the revolutionary 
option, even when national imperatives had changed. This must also be viewed 
in the context of changing institutional power and political spaces. Approxi-
mately 14,000 individuals were trained in this way (Pers. ANC Interview 87, 
confirmed by Pers. ANC Interview 124). SDUs also became regarded in Natal 
as part of MK’s structure and while some individuals became part of the Na-
tional Peacekeeping Force, others were later integrated into the VIP Protection 
Unit and South African National Defence Force. 
Self Protection Units (SPUs) were the IFP’s parallel response to the in-
creasing violence from 1991. Individuals were sent to camps for training and 
armed with weaponry. Alongside this, the IFP also secured a military arsenal 
from freelance members of the SADF, which was the insurance against what 
was perceived as an ANC assault on the KwaZulu homeland. The IFP believed 
that the ANC through their dominance of the TEC and integration of MK into 
the National Peacekeeping Force would pursue the overthrow of the KwaZulu 
homeland in a fashion mirroring the events in Bophuthatswana (one of the few 
homelands not sympathetic to the ANC). Such IFP perceptions were based upon 
an ANC/SACP authored document ‘Prepare the Anvil for the Coming Hammer’ 
which discusses a covert plan to ensure the destruction of the KwaZulu home-
land while distancing the ANC from it (Pers. IFP Interview 28). Although this 
document was presented to the Goldstone Commission, no investigation was 
ever initiated and the reasons for lack thereof were never provided (Jeffrey 
1997: 481-484). As one IFP MPP argued, ‘there was the perception that the IFP 
was up against a highly organised, highly effective military force, operating 
with impunity. There were arms caches all over the place and there were MK 
commandos directing events … Mlaba camp was a response to both this and the 
integration of MK into the Defence Force, of a need to somehow balance out 
the ANC in military matters’ (Pers. IFP Incident 46). Another confirmed this 
perception, ‘the prototype for Mlaba Camp was initiated in the Midlands. Those 
trained were to be placed under the Amakhosi and Indunas in rural areas and 
councillors in townships … In the Midlands there had been the slaughter of the 
IFP … We needed to somehow protect communities. It was funded by the 
KwaZulu Government budget’ (Pers. IFP Interview 28). Approximately 5,000 
individuals were trained in this manner’ (Pers. IFP Interview 28 confirmed in 
Pers. IFP Interview 65).  
Each party in its own way used the available institutional spaces in the 
militarisation of units. While the KwaZulu Government budget funded the IFP’s 
SPUs and the arms were secured through state structures, the ANC’s internal 
operations took place in the context of shifting institutional control in their 
favour. Enabling individuals to act with impunity, institutional access and little 
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regulation also afforded autonomy to provincial elites in both camps to pursue 
violent action in a climate that was already fractured into hardened political 
camps with parallel structures of political authority to those of the crumbling 
state. 
Key factors and contexts in elite formation prior to 1994 
Central to patterns of elite formation in what became the province of KwaZulu-
Natal are a number of key factors that were transferred into the new post 
election political dispensation. 
Firstly, an ideologically divided and increasingly fragmented political elite 
was held together by pre-1994 discourses. Some of these discourses, such as 
Africanism and the maintenance but modernisation of the institution of tradi-
tional leadership, were evident at the turn of the twentieth century and were 
maintained throughout the struggle and the transition period in various forms 
and strengths. Other discourses, such as that of the Left were strongest during 
the struggle period, and although eroded somewhat at a national level, conti-
nued to play a part in local struggles during the transition period and beyond. 
The alliances that held elites together in hardened camps also contained some-
what contradictory discourses. In the post-1994 period some of the bonds that 
had held the political elite together in these camps became increasingly less 
relevant. Key questions of whether an armed struggle against, or negotiated 
solution to, apartheid were no longer relevant in the post transition period. De-
spite this many elites remained entrenched within the political parties that they 
had joined through conscious decisions that they had made about such quest-
ions. In the final years before the elections, both the IFP and ANC were flooded 
with new members, some of which were from the crumbling “white” parties. 
This added a further dimension to the already diverse and divided party dis-
courses. Common to both the ANC and IFP were Africanist discourses, first 
expressed at the turn of the century, though shrouded in different forms of 
ethnic, traditionalist, populist and Left wing militant ideas. By 1994, internal 
party competition between the political elite that was essentially based upon 
pre-1994 discourses was clear, and these divisions were transferred into the 
KwaZulu-Natal legislature. 
Secondly, most parties (except the PAC and ACDP) that entered the legis-
lature in 1994 had prior experience of “institutionalized” power through one or 
more of three parallel systems of legitimacy and authority; that is, formal poli-
tical institutions in the pre and post-1990 period, the institution of traditional 
leadership and the informal institutions created through the merging of struggle 
components. In some cases the personalisation of institutionalized power had 
meant that elites had come to be seen as the institution. Hardened political 
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spaces between parties and the autonomy granted in some cases to political 
elites in their own communities meant that, in some cases, territories had been 
claimed by parties and positions of power had been personalised by elites with-
in them. In addition, elites were not averse to utilising the institutions and in-
stitutional spaces, which they regulated, for ends in contradiction to the demo-
cratic process. These included using the institutions to undermine opponents or 
competitors, to keep opponents or competitors away from one’s turf, or to 
dispense patronage to ones allies. The merging of the functions of both formal 
(the IFP in the KLA) and informal institutions (state, civil society and party by 
the ANC alliance) had blurred the boundaries of political rules. In addition, 
violence to some extent became institutionalized as a resource to be used to 
advance interests. This was instead of the subjection of competing interests to a 
framework of rules and procedures. This was so, both in place of and alongside 
formal rule processes. 
The third factor, essential to the dynamics of elite formation in the post-1994 
period is the level of autonomy granted to individual elites and political parties 
within the provincial institutional framework. Whilst in the first part of the 
century, Natal was not provincialised; provincial political discourses came to 
dominate national movements, this was only partly reversed in the period up to 
1994. National political dynamics during the transition period came increas-
ingly to define provincial political spaces, but not without resistance from 
provincial political elites. While the ANC benefited from the national dynamics 
that ultimately imposed a quasi-federal political system, the political autonomy 
of a number of ANC elites in the province had become a threat to the ANC’s 
national political imperatives. The ANC, dominant at the national level and with 
clear majorities in seven out of nine provinces, was forced to contend with the 
IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, as well as a fragmented and partly autonomous provin-
cial ANC political elite. At the same time, provincial matters continued to 
dominate national politics. Political violence continued into the post-1994 per-
iod and the ANC and IFP entered the legislature in 1994 with their relationship 
at the lowest level. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
3 
Social characteristics of  
an emerging political elite 
‘The social origins of … leaders are rather similar to, instead of strikingly different 
from, the social origins of leaders of … parties with whom they clash’ (Oberschall 
1973: 391). 
Accounts of the social composition of political elites in parliamentary systems 
have traditionally prioritised the values of elites, defined and determined by 
their political party affiliation (Edinger & Searing 1967: 428-445; Schleth 1978: 
46-72; Matthews 1985: 17-55). That is, what elites stood for was considered to 
be more important than the social characteristics that they possessed. Party 
affiliation, in such accounts, was thought to be the most influential determinant 
of attitudes, behaviour and interests. In KwaZulu-Natal, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, political party affiliation does not, however, guarantee a parti-
cular set of values among the elite so affiliated. Alliances that held elites to-
gether were constructed out of sometimes contradictory discourses. Moreover, 
in other contexts where countries have emerged from a conflict in which battle 
lines are drawn territorially, or where there was little free political exchange, the 
political party is not a good indicator of values.  
More recent literature on social composition suggests, however, that social 
background does matter as a major determinant in the attitudinal differences of 
elites within political parties and, hence, in the internal prioritisation of party 
agendas (Wessels 1985; Esiasson & Holmberg 1996; Norris & Lovenduski 
1996; Thomas 1994). The emphasis in these recent debates over social back-
ground is to correlate the social composition of parties with internal attitudinal 
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differences within parties. Hence, these studies are concerned with where the 
elite come from. Like Mosca and Pareto, the social background of the elite is 
seen as crucial to an understanding of whether the elite insulate themselves from 
society and develop collective self-interests. Their common social background 
is provided as indicators of similar patterns of beliefs. Such studies frequently 
claim that the political elite is atypical of the electorate, exercises a degree of 
self-segregation (Pareto) in the form of reproduced recruitment and is construct-
ed from the chattering classes (Norris & Lovenduski 1996). 
In post-colonial African states, the origins and history of political elites – 
where they come from, their knowledge of one another, their social and eco-
nomic background – still needs to be established (Bayart 1993: 115). In Camer-
oon, Bayart demonstrates that although the post-colonial state served as the 
‘matrix’ of a ‘progressive emergence of an … alliance of different regional, 
political, economic and cultural segments of the social elite (ibid.: 150), initially 
the fusion of elites took place in civil society (ibid.: 155) and assimilation took 
place ‘in private life’ (ibid.: 157). Hence social background is a good indicator 
of the points of fusion or alliance among segments of the elite. Certainly, the 
political elite in KwaZulu-Natal does not constitute a homogenous group. The 
‘transformation (of the elite) into a social class (has) remained subordinated to 
… radical heterogeneity’ (ibid.: 179).  
In KwaZulu-Natal there are four primary consequences of social background 
in the context of elite formation. Firstly, social background influences the 
patterns of recruitment and circulation among the elite. Representivity and he-
terogeneity are demonstrable features in elite formation, as is simultaneously, 
increased homogeneity. According to Pareto, ‘society … is an aggregate of 
heterogeneity and hierarchy. Heterogeneity is the driving force of the social 
dynamic as it is the core of social change and social equilibrium’ (Zankina 
2006: 9).  
Secondly, as in many countries, social background has contributed to social 
networks and, in turn, social capital (cf. Coleman 1990; Woolcock 1998: 151-
208; Putnam 1995: 65-78). Patterns of association based upon one or more 
shared social characteristic have served to bind political elites in relationships of 
trust. Social characteristics serve as reliability markers that connect elites as 
well as structure who relates to and understands who in the legislature and why. 
This in turn has contributed to the patterns of recruitment and circulation in 
parties and in the legislature. In post-colonial Africa, Bayart identifies networks 
of factions which structures African political societies (Bayart 1993: 207-227). 
Social networks in KwaZulu-Natal are not quite factions. They result in a 
passive trust, rather than an active accumulation of power.  
The third and fourth consequences of social background (discussed in later 
chapters) derive from patterns of recruitment and from social capital. The third 
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is the various ways in which political elites relate to one another within political 
parties, the values that they possess and the internal party dynamics that result 
from this. The fourth consequence is the way in which segments of elites relate 
to and interact with similar segments of elites across parties in the legislature 
and the concerns that are prioritised in the provincial agenda. In such cases, 
political priorities, patterns of fluidity and specific forms of coalition building 
were found to be in part a result of shared background. Hence, social back-
ground is important in that it influences action inside the legislature, but not 
because the elite have common material interests (as in Mosca). 
Social characteristics among the political elite 
There is not one typical profile of the political elite in KwaZulu Natal. The 
social characteristics1 of race, gender, age, regional identification, family and 
lineage ties, religious affiliation, education, occupational background and com-
munity activities among the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal reveal clusters of 
elites that share specific characteristics. These clusters are not always specific to 
a political party.  
 
Racial composition 
Despite a diverse racial composition in the Provincial Parliament of KwaZulu-
Natal, it is not representative of the racial composition of the provincial popu-
lation. Of the total number of MPPs who served in the provincial legislature at 
any point in time from 1994-2004, my analysis of interviews show that 63.2% 
were black, 27.0% were white and 9.8% were asian2.  
In contrast to the political elite, black South Africans comprised 82.7% of 
the total population of KwaZulu-Natal in 1995, with asians the second largest 
group at 9.2% (Republic of South Africa 1997). The provincial population in 
2001 was constituted by 84.9% black South Africans, 8.5% asians and 5.1% 
whites (Republic of South Africa 2001b). Simply put, racial representivity in 
parliament is not commensurate with the racial demographics in KwaZulu-
Natal, with whites overrepresented and blacks underrepresented. These figures 
illustrate a pattern typical of pacted transitions. There is substantial continuity in 
elites from the period before transition. In this case, a large percentage of the 
white MPPs who served in the first democratic parliament had prior experience 
                                                            
1  There are no records of legislative members in KwaZulu-Natal by the social charac-
teristics discussed in this chapter. The data illustrated in this chapter is constructed 
from my analysis of personal interviews with the MPPs concerned. 
2  The category “asian” reflects a broader geographical identification to those so de-
scribed than the term “Indian” which refers to a person identifying with the nation-
state of India or racially categorised as Indian by the apartheid state. 
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as elected representatives in the apartheid period. In some instances, white 
MPPs left their apartheid-era parties and joined the newly dominant IFP and 
ANC. In addition, continuity is further evident in the presence of some black 
MPPs who formerly served in the KLA.3 One of the key features of the African 
elite in the post-colonial period is their ‘reciprocal assimilation’ (Bayart 1993: 
150-179). Plurality is often expressed through a reintegration of the elite. This is 
certainly a feature of the transformation of the state in Africa. In former Zaire, 
as Bayart shows, old politicians from the first republic were reinserted in 
government and in Ivory Coast there was the reintegration of radical nationalists 
who were previously purged (Bayart 1993: 166). 
Some continuity in elites is a feature of all countries in transition. Despite 
the dominance of the approaches to the study of elites in Eastern Europe during 
transition – as characterisiing either reproduction or circulation (cf. Szelenyi & 
Szelenyi 1995: 615-638 and 697-722; Frane & Tomsic 2002: 435-454) – there 
are features of both reproduction and circulation in all transitions. Hence we 
should rather see the political elite in transitions as transformed simultaneously 
by both continuity and change, and not continuity or change as the end product 
of a transition. Transition provides an opportunity for the synthesis of hetero-
geneity within the state.  
In the post-apartheid period, race has remained a significant organising 
factor in KwaZulu-Natal in the transformation of the political elite, not least in 
the party affiliation of elites. Graph 3.1 shows the percentage of MPPs that have 
served in parliament at any time during the first two terms of the provincial 
parliament, by race and political party. 
As illustrated in Graph 3.1, the IFP has been the most diverse of the parties 
in its racial make up, with more asian and white members than any of the 
others, and the IFP has accounted for more white MPPs than both the DP and 
NNP together.4 The prevalence of black MPPs is greatest in parties that occupy 
the most parliamentary seats. Among the smaller parties, the DP shows similar 
levels of diversity to the two dominant parties, but with representation skewed 
heavily to whites. The ACDP is equally divided between black and white. The 
other minority parties have selected MPPs from one racial group only. Indeed,  
 
                                                            
3  For a full discussion of this see Chapter 4. 
4  The Democratic Alliance was formed in mid-2000 out of the Democratic Party, the 
New National Party and the Federal Alliance to contest the December 2000 local 
government elections. Because of the anti-defection clause in the 1996 Constitution 
parties could not legally merge between elections. As a consequence, in the Kwa-
Zulu-Natal Provincial Legislature, the DP and NNP remained separate parties and 
received separate allocations, but operated as one entity in terms of voting together 
and attending one caucus. 
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Graph 3.1     Percentage of MPPs by race and party, 1994-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for the MF husband and wife team,5 race has been a defining feature of the 
public image. Referring to himself as ‘the Bengal Tiger’ (Natal Mercury, 1994), 
MF MPP Amichand Rajbansi’s6 successful candidacy has been based on his 
ability to harness asian fears of black domination and present the MF as spokes-
person for asians in the formerly “Indian” classified townships in the provincial 
metropole of Durban. Amichand Rajbansi combines this ethno-racial appeal 
with a finely calculated commitment to the overall goals of nation-building and 
transformation as well as keen tactical awareness of when to collaborate with 
the ANC. 
More than 70% of DP and NNP provincial representatives since 1994 have 
been white (see Graph 3.1). This clearly indicates significant racial continuity 
and a failure by each party to break out of its former white racial support base. 
Significantly, all of these white MPPs have had experience in politics as either 
politicians or civil servants in the pre-1994 period.7 This is not, however, where 
                                                            
5  MPP Shireen Thakur is the second wife of MPP Rajbansi and together they occupy 
the two seats for the Minority Front in the KwaZulu Natal Provincial Legislature. 
MPP Rajbansi was formerly married to Asha Devi who defected from the MF to the 
IFP. 
6  Leader of the Minority Front. 
7  For example, NNP MPP Valentino Volker was the longest serving representative in 
South Africa in 2004, having become a member of the Natal Provincial Council in 
1965 for the then National Party.  
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the racial similarity between the DP and NNP ends. Of the black and asian 
MPPs in their ranks, all had links to political structures prior to 1994. With the 
exception of DP MPP Tim Jeebodh, who was placed low on the ANC pro-
vincial list in 1994 and was not elected before switching to the DP, all asian 
MPPs served in the Tricameral Parliament.8 However, fragility in allegiance to 
the DP and NNP was demonstrated in 2002 when legislation to allow members 
of parliament to cross the floor and retain their seat9 was introduced at national 
level and applied equally to the provincial parliament. In the first floor crossing 
window period, all asian MPPs located in the minority parties crossed the floor 
to the IFP and ANC. This indicates clearly that continuity in periods of tran-
sition accompanies change. This change is in the form of transformation in the 
position of power that parties occupy in the legislature. Despite their presence, 
these parties have less power than before so that there is simultaneously accom-
modation, but a shift in power. These parties provide a conduit through which 
the political elite that might be excluded by the shift in power can jump to 
parties that have increased power.  
Black MPPs who came to parliament with the NNP and DP had prior 
political links to the IFP. Few of these MPPs, however, formerly served in the 
KLA.10 The links these MPPs had to the IFP did not afford them the requisite 
                                                            
8  The Tricameral Parliament was established by the Republic of South Africa (1983) 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No.110 of 1983) in which three 
separate Houses were constituted for people classified under the Republic of South 
Africa (1950) Population Registration Act (Act No. 30 of 1950) as white, coloured 
and Indian. They were the House of Assembly (Whites), the House of Represent-
atives (Coloureds) and the House of Delegates (Indians). Under this system the nu-
merical weight of the House of Assembly meant that under no condition could the 
House of Representatives and House of Delegates outvote the dominant white as-
sembly. In addition, the representivity of the two non-white houses was questionable 
given that voter turnout was often less than 20%. See Venter, A. (1989) ‘The Central 
Government: Legislative, Executive, Judicial and Administrative Institutions’ in 
Venter, A., ed., South African Government and Politics (Southern Book Publishers, 
Johannesburg) pp.45-98. 
9  Legislation that facilitated floor-crossing includes the Republic of South Africa 
(2002) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act (Act No.18 of 
2002); Republic of South Africa (2002) The Local Government Municipal Struc-
tures Amendment Act (Act No. 20 of 2002); Republic of South Africa (2002) Con-
stitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act (Act No. 21 of 
2002) and the Republic of South Africa (2002) Loss or Retention of Membership of 
National and Provincial Legislatures Act (Act No. 22 of 2002). The implications of 
this legislation are discussed in later chapters. 
10  For example, NNP MPP V.J. Mchunu was an aide to the Chief Minister of KwaZulu 
and organiser of the Inkatha Youth Brigade from 1975-1978. NNP MPP Sipho 
Mkhize is the nephew of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the President of the IFP. DP MPP 
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seniority and credentials to be included in those who came to be on the IFP 
provincial list in 1994. However, their racial profile (like Jeebodh in the DP) 
and their conservative political credentials combined to make them useful 
candidates for the DP and NNP searching for non-white candidates to alter their 
public images. So while the characteristics of these MPPs gave them no ad-
vantage in being chosen for a career as an IFP MPP, they were one of the main 
factors that led to their recruitment in the formerly exclusively white parties. In 
this way, plurality in racial terms among the political elite came to be seen 
during the first ten years of democracy – by these particular parties – as a 
necessary prerequisite for continued access to power.  
As shown in Graph 3.1, the racial profiles of the IFP and ANC, while diverse 
are not representative of the provincial population. In the IFP there are sig-
nificantly more white and fewer black members in comparison to the racial 
breakdown of the population. Moreover, the 19 white MPPs that have served in 
the legislature for the IFP since 1994 have been of diverse backgrounds. A 
substantial proportion of these MPPs were from the white parties whose status 
had diminished by 1994 and had a long and significant political career.11 Others 
entered politics for the first time in 1994.12 In the ANC during the same period, 
there is almost parity in the figures of black MPPs and the black population but 
numerical under-representation of asian MPPs, and overrepresentation of white 
MPPs. Hence in KwaZulu-Natal there is the simultaneous racial accommo-
dation – albeit reduced – of representatives from the apartheid order and the 
inclusion of racial heterogeneity to more properly reflect the racial make up of 
the population. This is demonstrated most clearly by examining the racial com-
position of the political elite over time (see Graph 3.2).  
While the number of asian MPPs remained relatively constant over the 
period 1994-2004, the number of white MPPs declined and black MPPs in-
creased in number. The most significant periods of change were from the first 
election in 1994 to the second election in 1999 where a 12% increase in black 
MPPs was matched by a 12% decrease in white MPPs. Since 1999, these pat-
terns continued at a slower rate. This might suggest that the most significant 
periods of elite replacement in countries undergoing transition occur within the 
first few years of the founding election – as the new state comes to reflect the 
population – as a process of rectifying the imbalances and skewed homogeneity 
among the elite that led to the demise of the old state. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(and MEC) Wilson Ngcobo served in the Mzumba regional authority for the IFP 
from 1982-1988 and then became a member of the KLA. 
11  For example, MPP Patrick Cornell previously served as mayor for Pietermaritzburg 
and MPP Charles van Eck served as mayor for Pinetown. 
12  Such as MPP Henry Combrinck, a small business owner from Louwsburg. 
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Graph 3.2     Time series of MPPs, 1994-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Black 54.32% 66.25% 71.25% 
White 35.80% 23.75% 20% 
Asian 9.88% 10% 8.75% 
 
 
A racial reconfiguration of the political elite has occurred in all political 
parties. However, in the ANC (unlike other parties) the reconfiguration was less 
accomodationist as it paralleled ideological changes within the provincial party. 
The reconfiguration was connected to the decline of MPPs who served as trade 
union representatives in the pre-1994 period and those who were located on the 
left of the political spectrum. This reconfiguration is in accordance with patterns 
in other African states in the post-independence period. As Tordoff claims, 
‘many parties … came to rest on a firmer ideological base than they had before’ 
(Tordoff 1997: 115). By definition, the nationalist movements had a broader 
ideological basis before independence.  
Graph 3.3 shows the racial composition of the political elite by political 
party over time. In the ANC, whereas the number of white and asian MPPs 
halved in the second election, black MPPs increased by almost a third. This 
racial reconfiguration of the ANC has, however, occured without a substantial 
loss of white MPPs. In any case, the white MPPs that exited parliament conti-
nued either to serve the ANC in other capacities or within state structures, indi-  
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Graph 3.3     Time series of MPPs by race, 1994-2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cating the reach of the political elite nationally and locally.13 Hence, if one 
thinks of the state in Africa (in which elite formation takes place) as encom-
passing the matrix of parties, civil service and elected representatives, there has 
been no circulation of the ANC elite based on race, as national government, 
local government and the civil service are part of the extensive matrix. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, as the ANC increased its share of the parliamentary seats in 
1999 from 26 to 32, the only new members of the political elite were black. 
This is indicative of greater accommodation of the previously dominant racial 
groups in the first few years, rather than later years, of a transition in societies 
where racial domination and discrimination has been a key feature. 
This, however, is not to say that race does not play a part in elite formation 
in the ANC. The following quotations are illustrative of the perceived salience 
of race as an organising factor by some MPPs. 
                                                            
13  For example, Roy Ainslie relocated to the national parliament in 1999. Mike Sut-
cliffe took up the position of Chairperson of the Municipal Demarcation Board in 
1999 and was required to resign from all party offices within 30 days of appoint-
ment. This attracted a brief period of controversy over the questioned independence 
of the board. He later became Municipal Manager for the distict municipality of 
eThekwini, the largest local government structure in KwaZulu-Natal. 
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‘When it comes to the inner sanctum of black politics, I don’t belong. I was very 
disappointed to hear S’bu Ndebele with his African Rennaissance, saying it was 
only for black people’ (Pers. Interview 68).  
‘The ANC is guided by a deep philosophical outlook. It is overwhelmingly 
black, so a good white comrade might be disadvantaged. Does one therefore say that 
the comrade not be included? ... The real victors are generous. The ANC finds a 
place for everyone’ (Pers. ANC Interview 134).  
‘The ANC now have only one white and one Indian. They are resented by the 
others’ (Pers. Interview 83).14  
In the ANC, it would seem that a greater accommodation of a formerly 
dominant feature (whiteness) occurred early in the transition. However, by the 
second term there was a gradual decline in this group as the newer political elite 
(predominantly black) brought greater change. Consequently, a decline in the 
salience of white representatives occurred.  
As Graph 3.3 shows, in the DP a clear attempt has been made over the first 
two terms of office to alter the racial composition of the political elite to reflect 
at least some black and asian MPPs. The percentage of white MPPs in the DP 
decreased by almost 30% during the first 10 years of democratic rule. Black and 
asian MPPs who were absent from parliament in 1994 became visible in the 
1999 period onwards and by 2003 constituted almost 15% of MPPs respec-
tively. However, these increases do not correlate with the gains in parliamentary 
seats achieved by the DP. In 1994 the DP comprised 2 parliamentary seats in 
contrast to 7 in 2003 in which five white MPPs, 1 black MPP and 1 asian MPP 
served. It would seem that it is important for political parties to also be seen to 
promote elite circulation, to populations that were previously excluded. 
Whereas the increase in parliamentary seats occupied by the DP prompted a 
racial reconfiguration of the political elite, the same reconfiguration was 
prompted in the NNP by a decrease in seats. In parties that have historically 
been identified with the old political order, it is imperative for their survival that 
they come to be seen as embracing the new order. Racial plurality is one key 
feature of the new South African order. In 1994 almost three quarters of the 
NNP were white MPPs (see Graph 3.3). In terms of race thinking in the NNP, a 
loss of two thirds of their seats in the second election from 9 to 3, led to a re-
ordering of the party list, once the election results were revealed, to return one 
black, one asian and one white MPP to parliament. This suggests that racial 
representivity in parliament was central in the thinking of a party attempting to 
shed its apartheid past. Evidently, race has played a significant part in elite 
formation in the NNP in both the first and second terms. But whereas the 
reconfiguration of elites in the NNP in terms of racial parity in parliament in 
1999 showed an attempt to present a racial transformation to the voters in terms 
                                                            
14  This interview was conducted prior to this individual defecting to the ANC. 
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of both party orientation and representivity, this was not sustained. In 2001, 
when asian NNP MPP Naicker crossed the floor to the IFP, the party re-
appointed MPP Brian Edwards, a long standing white member of the party, 
politician and parliamentarian from the first term, to fill the seat. Clearly factors 
other than racial representivity had reasserted themselves. One MPP’s perspec-
tive is illuminating. He said, ‘Indians in the party want more representation 
because Indians make up a big voting block in the party’ (Pers. NNP Interview 
112). While the racial composition of the general membership of the party in the 
post-1994 period is not in question, the incumbency of tried and tested white 
MPPs over other racial groups demonstrates that the parliamentary selectors 
have hardly changed. That is, while racial transformation may have occurred in 
general party membership, the centrality of race in parliamentary candidate 
selection may remain the same.  
The most significant racial reconfiguration of the political elite has, how-
ever, occurred in the IFP. As demonstrated by Graph 3.3, the number of asian 
MPPs remained relatively constant in the period from April 1994 to 2004, but 
the number of black MPPs increased by more than 20% and the number of 
white MPPs decreased by more than 20%. On a superficial level these figures 
might appear no more remarkable than those illustrated for other parties. How-
ever, for some IFP MPPs, these trends were as a result of tensions that existed 
in the IFP between members of different racial groups. The following state-
ments are illustrative of the centrality of race in the perceptions of these MPPs 
in their day to day interactions in the party. 
‘All I hear is blacks and whites in the party talking about apartheid. They are hold-
ing the party back...’ (Pers. IFP Interview 110).15  
‘As white members of National Council, we all had to stand up and say that we 
supported non-racial politics ... We had to stand in a line, and they went from one to 
the next ... only white members ... It was unbelievable’ (Pers. IFP Interview 83).  
Such perceptions of race might be interpreted in terms of racial suspicion 
inscribed on MPPs by 50 years of apartheid. Given the recent and collective 
memories of dispossession and disempowerment ingrained on the conscious-
ness of black MPPs, it is hardly surprising that racial tension might exist within 
the IFP, as it might in any other party. For instance, approximately 20% of 
MPPs pointed to the “overrepresentation” of white MPPs in the IFP in 1994, as 
if the increasing number of black MPPs and reduction in white MPPs was a 
normalisation or rectification of what had been an anomalous situation in 1994. 
As one MPP stated, 
                                                            
15  This interview took place prior to the defection of this individual to the ANC. 
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‘Now some left citing age or health and then there were those that were axed. There 
was some criticism that whites were overrepresented within the party. Of course, it 
was true. So some appeared very low down the electoral list (in 1999). Some were 
worse placed and lost their seat due to party losses’ (Pers. IFP Interview 16). 
Only a few white members that left parliament did so as a consequence of 
their placing on the 1999 list.16 Rather, the provincial list that was compiled in 
1994 was not representative of the party. The IFP lists were drawn up hurriedly 
in 1994 against the backdrop of a number of factors. These included the dis-
mantling of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the influx of new members into 
the party and the strong possibility that the IFP would not compete in the 
elections. For these reasons, a proper list-drawing process did not take place 
(Pers. IFP Interviews 28 and 78), and many new white party members were 
added to the list to the exclusion of many black MPPs who later took their place 
as mid-term replacements and replacements in the second election.  
However, while this might explain the high proportion of white MPPs in the 
IFP in 1994, it does not explain the later reconfiguration. Neither racial tension 
as a result of apartheid, nor the over representation of groups in parliament has 
been the central imperative. Rather, the racial reconfiguration of the elite in the 
post-1994 period was a by-product of a failure by elites to reinvent themselves 
in a party that was alien to them. The following quotation is illustrative of this 
deeper underlying cause. 
‘There were some big names among those who left – Cornell, Van Eck, Watterson, 
Wilkins, Lee, Durham – all big names. They all exited of their own accord, all said 
cheers. Few blacks exited. Those that left often spoke of the National Council meet-
ings, the meetings would go on and on ... they were held in Ulundi ... There was the 
whole question relating to the provincial capital. Now this was not just about its 
location. It was a deep underlying thing … it meant it was a Zulu centred party’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 16).  
The “big names” discussed above, were of political significance in the Natal 
Provincial Administration17 and as such were important in white political his-
tory, but not in zulu political history. The quotation implies that some MPPs 
possessed misperceptions of their own cultural dominance in their new political 
home. As such, MPPs failed to recognise that their attempts to “bring forth the 
modernisation” of a black based party, make choices and decisions on behalf of 
their black counterparts, and determine what was central to the party on the 
basis of white history was deeply flawed. 
                                                            
16  One such example is Olive Ford who indicated a desire to serve a second term of 
office. However, her low list placing by the party combined with the IFP’s loss of 
seats in the second election meant that she was not re-elected. 
17  For example, MPP Patrick Cornell previously served as mayor for Pietermaritzburg 
and MPP Charles van Eck served as mayor for Pinetown. 
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The Ulundi question,18 mentioned in the previous quotation, is something of 
a metaphor for the cultural conflict over hegemony between elites. The defeat, 
during the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879, of the Zulus at the hands of the British in 
the battle of Ulundi (Zulu King Cetshwayo’s capital) is recounted today by a 
significant proportion of black IFP MPPs through their personal oral histories. 
Likewise, so is the destruction of the capital by fire and the subsequent forced 
exile of Cetshwayo. The location of Ulundi as the capital of the KwaZulu home-
land was deeply symbolic of a perceived time of prosperity, greatness and inte-
grity of tradition within a kingdom before destruction, balkanisation and control 
by a foreign culture. The Ulundi question is thus synonymous with control. For 
many black Zulu MPPs in the IFP, retaining Ulundi as the provincial capital for 
the KwaZulu Natal Provincial Legislature is both about remembrance and the 
restoration of dignity for an elite crushed by the colonial power. Its position is 
symbolic of a zulu elite. 
The preference for Pietermaritzburg as the provincial capital on the part of 
many white IFP MPPs19 is symbolic of a failure to recognise the legacy of 
colonialism for a black elite, as if the history of oppression and dispossession 
began 50 years ago with apartheid. In this way, arguments that Pietermaritzburg 
is closer to the epicentre of urban life in the province miss the central con-
nection between dispossession and rural poverty, between colonialism and an 
elite living on the margins that the capital issue deeply symbolises.  
In interviews some black MPPs took issue with what they saw as an inability 
among some white MPPs to dispense with a paternalistic relationship with their 
black counterparts. One MPP said, 
‘Whites have been here hundreds of years and they still have not learned how to 
approach a black man! They just assume. They don’t ask’ (Pers. IFP Interview 74). 
This relationship is only partly recognised among some white IFP MPPs, 
many of whom collapse the distinction between controlling the party and their 
centrality as experienced members of a party collective. As one MEC stated, 
‘I am treated politely and respectfully so long as I am sticking to technical and 
administrative issues. But then, I have no option to do otherwise. Felgate tried to do 
                                                            
18  Since 1994 Ulundi and Pietermaritzburg have were used as provincial capitals for 
KwaZulu Natal. Legislative sittings have been held alternately at each parliamentary 
complex. Ulundi was the capital of the former KwaZulu homeland and Pietermaritz-
burg the capital of Natal. Following the 2004 elections, only the Pietermaritzburg 
complex was used for sittings. 
19  Not all white IFP MPPs supported Pietermaritzburg as the provincial capital. For 
example, IFP MPP Combrinck is a strong advocate of Ulundi as the capital, but then 
he only became politically involved in 1994. 
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it. By doing so, he stepped over the mark and then he was gone’ (Pers. IFP Interview 
128). 
MPP Walter Felgate’s former role in IFP politics is well documented (cf. 
Johnston 1996b: 1-11; Johnston & Johnson 1997: 17-20). The parallel drawn 
here, however, is between Walter Felgate’s former role as Chief Advisor to IFP 
President Buthelezi in the 1990-1994 interim during the negotiations for a new 
South Africa and the interviewee’s own role as an MEC in the post-apartheid 
provincial legislature. Notwithstanding the autonomy that the interviewee pos-
sesses as an MEC and has utilised in carrying out policy changes and ministerial 
functions, he expresses his intervention ability in negative terms. Such senti-
ments were commonly expressed amongst a segment of white IFP MPPs. As 
another stated, 
‘As whites or Indians you just slot in where you can. You are not privy to certain 
structures or issues. Whites are appendages to the party’ (Pers. IFP Interview 68).  
Notwithstanding this quotation, many white MPPs had party positions of 
significant seniority.20 Moreover, it would appear that a segment of white MPPs 
see their own parliamentary and party role differently to that which is set out for 
them. One statement is particularly illustrative of this, made in 2002 just prior to 
a series of defections. The MPP said, 
‘Whites in the party don’t do anything. Which whites do you think go out to these 
places? Not (X...). Whites are a different race. They won’t get involved, they aren’t 
playing the game, they are ducking things, they think it is beneath them. They 
should be going to Camperdown, to Impendle ... That’s the difference. What did 
they think they would be doing when they joined? Then, they don’t go to any of the 
social functions either’ (Pers. IFP Interview 110). 
This is one of the key distinctions between the role that white parliamenta-
rians and councillors would have played in the pre-1994 period and the impe-
ratives of that role in the post-1994 period. In the IFP, whose main consti-
tuencies are the rural and urban poor, it would not be sufficient for an MPP to 
focus merely upon parliamentary business. Instead one way in which the party’s 
strong local roots are maintained is through work in areas where the population 
is predominantly black, a factor that a segment of white MPPs may have been 
uncomfortable with. 
                                                            
20  For example, Peter Miller was the MEC for Finance, Alexander Hamilton is in 
charge of IFP party finances, John Aulsebrook (now deceased) was Chairperson of 
the Premier’s Portfolio Committee which addressed gaming licenses, Henry Com-
brinck is whip in the legislature, both Mike Tarr & Morris Mackenzie held the posi-
tions, in the first term, of Chairpersons of Public Accounts and Agriculture respec-
tively. 
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For some of these white MPPs that left the IFP in the 1994-1999 period, the 
prior act of physically relocating to the IFP from apartheid-era parties was not 
enough to reinvent themselves as part of the emerging elite. Many did not 
become assimilated, but instead brought with them their previous political 
interests that could not be reproduced in an established political party and new 
political dispensation. While they chose the IFP primarily because of the party’s 
federal principles, former anti-sanctions stance and a desire to belong to a black 
based political party in the new dispensation (discussed in Chapter 4), they were 
unprepared for the deeper symbolism of cultural difference they found there and 
ill-equipped to assimilate rather than to control. For many, their social back-
ground had not exposed them to the deeper symbolism of the opinions that they 
held. Most of these members left quickly and quietly in 1995, 1996 and 1997. 
Some remained until as late as 2002, by which time they had established for 
themselves social capital through their interaction with other elites in the legis-
lature which enabled them to cross to another party and attempt to reinvent 
themselves again.  
Hence, race in Kwazulu-Natal provides a feature through which the repro-
duction and circulation of an elite takes place simultaneously. The new state – 
by providing political competition for the first time – means that the elite or-
ganised around race has come to define it’s significance in elite recruitment. 
 
Gender composition 
The Provincial Parliament of KwaZulu-Natal is overwhelmingly dominated by 
men. Of the total number of MPPs that have served in the provincial legislature 
over the ten year period from 1994 to 2004, my analysis of interviews show that 
80.3% were men and 19.7% were women. This domination of male legislators 
in KwaZulu-Natal21 is in keeping with patterns in other African states. In Sene-
gal, Benin, Ghana and Kenya, more than 80% of the political elite are male 
(Barkan et al. 2004: 237-239). In Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana and 
Mozambique, ‘post-independence cabinets have continued to be male domina-
ted institutions, with only a sprinkling of women ministers’ (Tordoff 1997: 
102). In addition, the ratio of men to women in parliament also contrasts sharply 
with the gender ratio for the provincial population of KwaZulu-Natal. In 1996, 
for example, the population breakdown in KwaZulu-Natal by gender was 53.1% 
women and 46.9% men (Republic of South Africa 1996b) and in 2001 the pro-
vincial population was comprised of 53.22% women and 46.78% men (Re-
public of South Africa 2001b). 
 
                                                            
21  In the national parliament, 30% of parliamentarians in 1999 were women and 70% 
were men. 
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The overwhelming domination of men in parliament is hardly surprising for 
three reasons. First, according to Bayart, the state comes to reflect the domi-
nance of groups in society (Bayart 1993). Hence a patriarchical society will be 
replicated within the most basic processes of government – political recruit-
ment. Second, political parties are the agents that ‘replicate contested societal 
rankings of social groups … (and) … reconstruct and reproduces the structures 
of a patriarchal society in government’ (Francis 2009b: 134). Third, KwaZulu-
Natal’s party political history is a gendered history. The turf battles between the 
IFP and ANC were part of a war predominantly between men. The leadership of 
the parties that fought those battles was overwhelmingly dominated by men. 
This is not to suggest that women were not part of those struggles. Rather, in the 
course of many struggles, substantive equality between men and women was 
subsumed to the cause of nationalism (Connell 1999: 189-206). Indeed in the 
political history of KwaZulu-Natal, masculinity and women’s subordination 
became articulated through the politics of Zulu nationalism (Waetjen 2006). 
Even in the post-apartheid period, collective action for women is diffused by 
perceptions of a collective cultural identity (Francis 2009b: 134). Hence, one of 
the key characteristics of political elite formation in the post-apartheid period is 
the replication and reproduction of gendered hierarchies. This correlates with 
Bayart’s claims that ‘conflicts for influence within the nationalist movements 
before independence prepared the way for the construction of the postcolonial 
political order’ (Bayart 1993: 221).  
In KwaZulu-Natal women MPPs have overcome normative assumptions 
about their role in society and as their profiles of experience and education 
suggest, were, already an elite prior to the assumption of their parliamentary 
career. For example, women MPPs tend to be highly educated, professionally 
experienced with a range of skills, and already have performed service to a 
community in a variety of capacities before obtaining office.22 Two factors 
distinguish parliamentary women from their male counterparts. First, analysis 
from interviews shows that in isolation, each individual characteristic possessed 
by a parliamentary woman is comparable to that possessed by a man, but the 
                                                            
22  For example, MPP Usha Roopnarain (now Keerath) holds a PhD in Political Science 
and has a history of party service as a researcher. Eileen kaNkosi-Shandu possesses 
a Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree as well as a Diploma in Social Development 
from Canada, has substantial experience in grassroots development issues in co-
operatives, served as IFP Development Officer for five years and principal of a 
school. MPP Fatima Nahara grew up in exile in Mozambique after her father fled 
the country in 1963, speaks fluent Portuguese and grew up among the ANC in exile. 
MPP Faith Gasa possesses a Bachelor of Arts Degree, has worked as a high school 
principal in more than five schools, serves as Life President of the Natal African 
Teachers Union and co-convenor for teacher training on post-apartheid curriculum 
development and is secretary of the Mehlwesizwe Education Trust. 
  SOCIAL CHARACTERISTIS OF AN EMERGING POLITICAL ELITE  89 
combination of experiences that the majority of women individually possess is 
extensive. In sum, this may suggest that to become a parliamentarian, women 
must have a combination of qualities that together make them more remarkable 
than their male colleagues. This correlates with feminist studies of substantive 
and numerical representation in parliament in other parts of the world (cf. Phil-
lips 1991; Childs 2001). 
Second, almost all women MPPs have served in gender specific capacities or 
have shown concern with gender specific issues.23 These include the occupation 
of senior offices within women’s movements or in organisations that were 
formed to advance the concerns of women. To become a member of the parlia-
mentary elite, women must have been seen to have actively represented the 
interests of women in other contexts. In fact, many also discussed their position 
on the party list as a result of gender specific patterns of affiliation. As such 
women MPPs acknowledged a responsibility to the women’s sections – the IFP 
Women’s Brigade and the ANC Women’s League – of their respective parties 
that had, in some cases, directly nominated them for office, or supported their 
nominations.  
Gender in the period from 1994-2004 has remained a significant factor in 
elite formation as all political parties, with the exception of the minority parties 
(the MF and ACDP totalling a mere four MPPs) overwhelmingly recruit men to 
parliament. Graph 3.4 illustrates the percentage of MPPs by gender that have 
served in the provincial parliament at any point during the period 1994-2004. 
Although more IFP MPPs have served in parliament, the party in which most 
women have served is the ANC. Even so, this constitutes less than 30% of 
MPPs. Notwithstanding the way that patriarchy continues to structure political 
elite formation, the disparity in gender representivity between men and women 
has decreased slightly since 1994.  
 
 
                                                            
23  For example, MPP Usha Roopnarain wrote her PhD thesis on ‘Women in the 
Parliamentary Context’. MPP Faith Gasa has served as Chairperson of the IFP 
Women’s Brigade, was co-chair of an ad hoc committee whose work resulted in the 
compulsory participation of women in the multi-party negotiations and was ap-
pointed to the steering committee of the Women’s National Coalition to deliver a 
women’s charter for inclusion in the constitution. She also worked with the Young 
Women’s Christian Association and established workshops for women in assertive-
ness training and is a convenor of the Teenage Pregnancy and Child Abuse Con-
cerned Committee in Northern KwaZulu-Natal. MPP Eileen kaNkosi-Shandu has 
served in the National Women in Agri-Business Co-operation and as Director of 
Weslyan Women International. Similar examples hold true for the majority of other 
women MPPs interviewed. 
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Graph 3.4     Percentage of MPPs by gender and party, 1994-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3.5     Time series of MPPs by gender, 1994-2004 
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While almost 84% of MPPs were men in the first election in 1994, this 
decreased by 11.5% in the period immediately following the second election in 
June 1999 (see Graph 3.5). However, prior to the third term in 2004, this 
reversed slightly as the percentage of men rose to 73.75% of MPPs (see Graph 
3.6).  
The increase in women can primarily be attributed to the ANC, for three 
interlinked reasons. First, the finalisation of the South African constitution in 
December 1996 that prescribed equal rights for men and women gave renewed 
impetus to the ANC Women’s League’s (ANCWL) call for equality in the 
numerical representation of women. ANC women MPPs overwhelmingly stated 
when interviewed that the ANCWL provided support for them in their candi-
dacies and a substantial proportion attributed their placing on the ANC parlia-
mentary list to be a direct result of nominations by the ANCWL. However, we 
should be cautious about the impact of party women’s wings on securing wo-
men’s numerical representation. As Tordoff notes, ‘women’s wings were most-
ly founded as adjuncts of the main parties in the pre-independence period … In 
each section these women’s sections have become the preserve of tradition-
minded women loyal to the party leadership.’ (Tordoff 1997: 103) Indeed, in 
South Africa the ANCWL supported then Deputy President Jacob Zuma during 
his trial for an alledged rape (from which he was aquitted) and nominated him 
for President of South Africa, rather than a woman candidate. Second, the ANC 
introduced a quota system after the 1994 elections where one in every three 
positions on the party list was to be occupied by a woman, a system increased to 
every one in two women in 2004. In structuring the opportunities of recruitment 
this guaranteed that a third of the ANC candidates in the legislature would be 
women from 1994-2004, increasing to gender parity from 2004 onwards. In-
deed, the structure of opportunities is affected by the electoral system. In Africa, 
women have more chance of becoming a parliamentarian in a party list system 
of proportional representation. In his study of Benin, Senegal, Ghana and 
Kenya, Barkan et al. found that only in hybrid or proportional representation 
systems (such as Senegal) did the opportunities for the election of women in-
crease (Barkan et al. 2004: 237-239). In constituency based electoral systems, 
women – who are subjected to the impact of patriarchal identities – do not vote 
for women. Third, in the second and third elections, the ANC increased its per-
centage of the vote which in turn provided the new women on the list with seats 
in parliament. As a result ANC women MPPs increased. Hence, changes in the 
relative strength of a political party can lead to the circulation into power of a 
new constituency if the processes of competition structure elite opportunities. 
A nominal increase in the percentage of women MPPs in the IFP over the 
period in question, has not been the result of a concerted attempt to recruit more 
women. Rather, the greater percentage of women MPPs in 1999 in comparison 
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to April 1994 does not represent an increase in the actual number of women (see 
Graph 3.6). Instead, this reflects a loss of parliamentary seats in the second 
election and a subsequent reduction in the number of men MPPs from 34 to 27 
while the same number of women (n=7) remained. The IFP more than any other 
party demonstrates through gender the interlinked matrix of local, provincial 
and national government. The most important level of government for the IFP is 
local government. In local government, the most important district municipality 
for the IFP – from where they receive an overwhelming majority of votes – is 
Zululand. Herewith, the most senior position of Mayor for the district muni-
cipality is occupied by a woman – Zanele Magwaza-Msibi. Msibi, in later 
elections was a powerful election speaker and in the 2009 became the candidate 
for Premier of the province for the IFP (the first woman candidate for any 
party). This example correlates with examples from other African states where-
by ‘certain women participated in the system of power and enjoyed its privi-
leges’ (Bayart 1993: 112) by being able to overcome rigid social constructions 
about gender. Often these examples are individual. Bayart provides the example 
of the Bamileke in which mother-chiefs were biologically women who were 
constructed socially as woman and man (ibid.). Certainly to be a leader – a role 
normally afforded to men (as a social construction) – one must be strong and 
powerful (another social construction). Certainly, Msibi is seen to be a “strong” 
woman whose strength of character and leadership is in keeping with these 
expectations in a leadership role. 
 
 
Graph 3.6     Timeline of percentages of MPPs by gender, 1994-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  SOCIAL CHARACTERISTIS OF AN EMERGING POLITICAL ELITE  93 
When discussing gender-specific roles that women filled prior to entering 
parliament, women in the IFP were better able than other women interviewees 
to relate their gender-specific affiliations in tangible terms. IFP women detailed 
gender-specific developmental projects in which they were involved and roles 
they fulfilled in community, non-governmental and political settings. In con-
trast, ANC women typically described their gender-specific roles in terms of 
political mobilisation. These included, ‘organising the women … (and) … go-
ing to meet with the women’ (Pers. ANC Interview 71). In fact, ANC women’s 
ability to mobilise to secure women in office correlates with the gender-specific 
experiences of “organising women” that they shared in their pre-parliamentary 
experiences. IFP women, conversely, did not possess the same level of ability to 
mobilise women into positions of power as did their ANC counterparts. Indeed, 
those that have experience in political mobilisation were senior members of the 
party. Such patterns may suggest, when compared with the number of women in 
parliament by party, that prior experience of gender-specific mobilisation is 
more conducive to securing a position in parliament than other gender-specific 
roles. 
In contrast to other parties, the breakdown of figures by gender in the DP 
illustrates volatility in gender representivity (see Graph 3.6) although this may 
simply be a function of much smaller numbers. While the DP has attempted to 
broaden its racial profile, the gender profile of the party remains skewed. MPPs 
overwhelmingly stressed the importance of “merit” as contrasted with “re-
presentivity” and in comparison with women MPPs elsewhere, women in the 
DP appeared to be least concerned with gender as an organising factor. One 
MPP stated that she thought, ‘women have a raw deal sometimes ... (but women 
must) ... stop whining, stop saying we’re not empowered, stop saying we are 
discriminated against’ (Pers. DP Interview 8). Perhaps what this illustrates is 
that such gender-neutral conceptualisations operate to centre men and contribute 
to their recruitment. 
The most serious decline in gender representivity has occurred in the NNP 
whereby no women have served in parliament for the NNP since the June 
elections in 1999 (see Graph 3.6). Clearly, the concerns of party transformation 
did not include gender in the second election. Given the history of racial policy 
in this party it is hardly surprising that effecting a more numerically repre-
sentative racial make-up overshadowed that of gender. 
Overall, however, trends in elite circulation in parliament suggest that in all 
parties attention is paid to the numerical representation of women primarily at 
election time when the party lists are compiled. Mid-term replacements remain 
predominantly men, even in the ANC with the quota system. Of all seven mid-
94 CHAPTER 3 
 
term replacements between 1994-1999 in the ANC none were women.24 In the 
period 1999 to 2003, mid-term replacements included three replaces and five 
defectors from other parties that led to a re-ordering of the party list. Of these, 
only two were women25 which represents substantially fewer than the quota 
amount. Commitment to numerical gender representivity is not substantive. The 
process of making a mid-term replacement is a relatively low key affair in 
comparison to the highly visible list drawing process at election time. Hence, 
the cycle of elite renewal – as it pertains to gender – is only at election time. 
This may further suggest that the increase in the numerical representation of 
women has not translated into substantive representation as women have been 
unable to perform ‘critical acts’ (cf. Lovenduski 2001: 743-758; Bystydzienski 
1992: 11-23),26 that is to effect changes of further benefit to women represent-
atives, except at election time. Hence, parties are seen to be promoting gender 
representation, but as a consequence of patriarchy, these women may serve, but 
they do not “act”. 
IFP and ANC women MPPs were critical of the overwhelming domination 
of men in senior parliamentary posts. These sentiments included, ‘we are the 
other committee members not in key positions’ (Pers. IFP Interview 99), ‘in 
leadership women are not visible’ (Pers. ANC Interview 71) and ‘I told the 
Premier that the cabinet is a boys club’ (Pers. ANC Interview 113). Indeed an 
examination of the most senior parliamentary posts reveals that only two 
women – IFP MPPs Faith Gasa and Eileen kaNkosi-Shandu – have served in 
cabinet out of a total of 30 women MPPs. While a quota system resulted in 
more women in parliament, glass ceilings restrict the seniority of women once 
there. Indeed, the very party that instituted a quota system – the ANC – failed to 
provide any women with an executive position prior to 2004, the first 10 years 
of democractic rule. The ANC occupied 40% of cabinet posts that, if the logic 
of the quota system is extended to the executive, should have been occupied by 
at least one woman MPP. This failure to place women in senior positions is in 
keeping with Tordoff’s findings in Southern Africa – Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
                                                            
24  For example, mid-term replacements between 1994 and 1999 included Walter Fel-
gate, Sipho Gcabashe, Mbuso Khubeka, Mjabulise Madondo, Emmanuel Magubane, 
Senzo Mchunu and Bheki Mthembu. 
25  The three replaces were Lucky Gabela, George Sithole and Weziwe Thusi. The five 
defectors from other parties that led to a reordering of the party list were, Tim 
Jeebodh, Maurice Mackenzie, Sam Nxumalo, Belinda Scott & Mike Tarr. Of this 
total only Thusi and Scott are women. 
26  Critical mass theorists debate the potential impact of more women in parliament. 
Bystydzienski concludes that when women constitute 15% of parliamentarians they 
begin to have an impact. Lovenduski warns, however, that a critical mass may only 
begin to make a difference when women engage in critical acts. 
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Botswana, Mozambique and Angola – where democratic advances were not met 
by gender advances (Tordoff 1997: 102-105). 
Notwithstanding their criticisms, many women reluctantly challenged the 
salience of gender in the allocation of portfolios. Interview findings suggest that 
there are two plausible explanations for this. First, as Waetjen demonstrates, 
gender structured not only nationalism but also nation-building (Waetjen 2006). 
The historicity of masculinity thus provides a continuity in the new democratic 
institutions. A second reason – related to the first – is that contested racial and 
cultural conceptions of representation set limits to gender discourse. The his-
toricity of race provides a further continuity. These boundaries circumscribe the 
ability of women MPPs to conceptualise their concerns in unison and to arti-
culate a shared position on them. More than twenty percent of women in the IFP 
and ANC provided examples of how women’s concerns in parliamentary 
caucuses were overshadowed by a preoccupation among women with shared 
affinity with one’s racial or cultural group. The examples that IFP women pro-
vided are particularly illuminating. One MPP stated, 
‘There was the Gender Commission inquiry ... (A male MPP and colleague) ... said 
to the Commission that there is no such thing as gender abuse in rural areas. The 
commission ruled that there was, so he called the commission “racist” ... Half the 
women in our party supported him’ (Pers. IFP Interview 83).  
In this instance, an ethnic and racial discourse of shared interests cut across 
that of gender. Loyalty to one’s racial group was, in this instance, found to be 
salient and women MPPs were found to be less willing to criticise practices that 
may be seen as oppressive to them but that they perceive as associated with 
their own cultural or racial group. Hence, in this context, being a woman does 
not provide social capital. 
Although the majority of women MPPs in the ANC were concerned to point 
out that it was only IFP women that would not challenge reinforced societal 
constructions of gender roles, one ANC MPP stated quite openly about her own 
party, 
‘The leadership is dominated by men. Gender structures leadership in key positions. 
Women are not in key positions of political leadership in the party and in govern-
ment ... In our culture we are taught to respect men. We women form the majority of 
our membership but we elect men into leadership positions’ (Pers. ANC Interview 
71).  
ANC women may be vocal in claims that their party is more supportive of 
women’s concerns than its rivals and they may be able to organise around wo-
men’s concerns. Their position among the parliamentary elite shows however 
that gender structures the positions that they hold. In fact, striking similarities 
are shown across the party divide. As an IFP woman stated, in discussing the 
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hierarchy within her party, ‘traditional leaders come first, then ... men, then ... 
women and then the youth come last (Pers. IFP Interview 99).  
A consequence of the salience of gender in structuring relationships is that 
some women have withdrawn from parliament or transferred their party loyal-
ties elsewhere. One MPP stated that the gender stereotyping within her parlia-
mentary party was a shock to her. Of a male colleague at her first caucus meet-
ing she said,  
‘He was sat at the front and he literally pointed at me ... to get up from my seat and 
walk up to him. When I got there he picked up his glass ... and just said “water”. He 
just expected me to get him water’ (Pers. IFP Inteview 83). 
While some women have acted to change the intimidatory and discrimina-
tory circumstances in which they find themselves, the most common tactic 
among them has been by withdrawing allegiance. 
The salience of gender as a characteristic of political elite formation in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal shows that the idea that there is a founding class of elites in coun-
tries undergoing a democratic transition is flawed. This idea is suggestive of a 
rupture where all things become new. Rather, transitions provide the oppor-
tunity structures for change through new democratic institutions, but continu-
ities of hierarchies of identity and inequality often remain. 
 
The age profile of the political elite 
One of the most difficult concepts to understand in the African context is age. 
That is, the concept of age is often understood through other constructions of 
radicalism and conservatism. In the political violence between the IFP and ANC 
the participants to that conflict were often described as progressive youths pitted 
against conservative elders. Whereas in Africa the ‘heroes of the new politics 
were indeed young … the leaders of the nationalist movement, the holders of 
positions of power … were often perceived as juniors’ (Bayart 1993: 114). This 
correlates with the construction of other African organisations identifying them-
selves as youth movements in Nigeria, Senegal and Zanzibar (ibid.). Hence, the 
concept of age is both ideological and biological.  
The provincial parliament of KwaZulu-Natal reflects significant variations in 
the biological age groups of MPPs. Although the youngest MPP was from the 
ANC and the oldest from the IFP, and IFP MPPs are on average older than their 
ANC counterparts, both parties show a diversity in age with both very young 
and very old candidates.27  
                                                            
27  The youngest MPP on first entry to parliament was ANC representative Cyril Xaba, 
who entered the legislature in 1994 at age 27. The oldest was IFP representative 
Ibrahim Bawa who entered the legislature at age 79 in 1994. Although, the youngest 
candidate at first entry is from the ANC, so was one of the oldest – Ismail Meer who 
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However, in the ANC MPPs are getting younger. In the second election, 
fewer ANC MPPs were in the 50+ category and more were in the age group 30-
50. This differs from examples in other African states where the average age of 
legislators is between 40-59 (Barkan 2004: 239). In the ANC, many of the older 
MPPs have moved out of parliament leaving room for a new generation of 
younger elites to emerge.28 If, as Inglehart suggests, younger MPPs bring to 
public life a set of priorities and values that distinguishes them from their older 
counterparts (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1991; Abrahamson & Inglehart 1995), 
then a greater number of younger MPPs might result in changes in political 
style, public policy and the way in which elites interact with one another. The 
significance of this is that many of the older MPPs29 were involved extensively 
in the struggles between the IFP and ANC, and made decisions that were to 
direct such struggles whereas there was more limited and less intense involve-
ment in the decision-making of some of the younger MPPs, some of whom 
were foot soldiers.  
In contrast, parliamentary seniority in the IFP is not guided by age. Young 
and old alike occupy senior positions. In fact, a number of younger and inex-
perienced MPPs were allocated portfolios of considerable responsibility without 
congruent experience. For example, since 1999 and at age 31, IFP MPP Mandla 
Malakoana served as Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Transport. His 
counterpart in the executive branch – Sibusiso Ndebele – was the most senior 
ANC member in the province. The appointment of Malakoana to this portfolio 
would indicate that the IFP were not concerned at the disjuncture in age and 
experience between him and Ndebele. In another case, on entering parliament in 
1999, IFP MPP Nhlanhla Khubisa at age 36 was allocated the role of Chair-
person of the Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs. This had previous-
ly been a particularly contentious portfolio that saw the resignation of some 
very senior IFP members30 and political infighting within the party and the 
legislature. While both MPPs were young in comparison to others, they also 
                                                                                                                                                 
entered parliament in 1994 at age 75 and was re-elected at age 80 in 1999. Although 
the oldest candidate to enter parliament was from the IFP, so was one of the 
youngest – Usha Roopnarain who became a parliamentarian at age 29 in 1999. 
28  Those that are no longer provincial parliamentarians include, for example, Harry 
Gwala, Jacob Zuma, Felix Dlamini and Ismail Meer who were 73, 52, 56 and 75 
when they first entered office. 
29  There are some exceptions to this. For example, ANC MEC Dumisani Makhaye was 
just 39 when he first became an MPP in 1994, after a long history of party service 
for the ANC in various positions of considerable responsibility. 
30  This includes, for example, IFP MPP Arthur Konigkramer whose letter of resigna-
tion submitted to the Provincial Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs sug-
gested that the IFP had lost faith in his ability to manage the portfolio. 
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possessed a high level of education that provided them with a greater ability to 
manage the difficult role that they faced. In fact, education rather than age is the 
key to understanding the concept of youth in IFP elite formation. The concept 
of relative seniority describes the process whereby the younger generation will 
eventually become occupiers of senior roles (Bayart 1993: 113). The criteria by 
which this will come about varies from context to context. In the KwaZulu-
Natal examples, education was the catalyst for the jump to seniority. Education 
provided the ideological construct that allowed the young (without other charac-
teristics conferring status) to be seen as sufficiently advanced to become elders. 
If reformers are more likely to be young and educated and serving for the first 
time (Barkan 2004: 235) then the trend in the IFP should lead to changes in the 
operation of power in the party and the legislature and in the relationship to-
wards the ANC. 
In contrast, in the ANC, youth might mean radical, but it does not mean edu-
cated (see discussion on education in this chapter). This ties in with Barkan’s 
findings in the Senegalese parliament where the large number of younger can-
didates nominated were not overwhelmingly drawn from the highly educated. 
However, although Barkan claims this is much more likely to occur in Franco-
phone Africa rather than Anglophone Africa, the case of the ANC in KwaZulu-
Natal challenges this as age does not correlate with educational levels. Hence, 
following the analysis of Barkan to its logical conclusion, this might lead to an 
increasingly less capacitated legislature. 
 
Patterns of regional identification among the political elite 
Providing a profile of MPPs by regional identification has proved difficult, not 
least because the way in which the parties define their regions differs, but also 
because many MPPs spent significant portions of their life in various parts of 
the province, in other locations within the country and in exile abroad. In 2003, 
the province of KwaZulu-Natal was divided into the eleven district municipal-
ities of Amajuba, Sisonke, Ilembe, Ugu, Umkhanyakude, Umzinyathi, Uthu-
ngulu, Zululand, Umgungundlovu, Uthukela and Ethekwini. For heuristic pur-
poses, these district municipalities have been used in this study as units for the 
comparison of MPPs by regional identification.31 These patterns provide indi-
cations of district representivity and urban-rural patterns of representivity in the 
IFP and the ANC and in the provincial legislature. 
While MPPs come from all districts in the province, there was greater con-
centration of MPPs drawn from the two districts of eThekwini and uMgungu-
ndlovu together comprising 50% of all MPPs (see Table 3.1).  
                                                            
31  In drawing calculations, each MPP was coded twice: Birth place and major geo-
graphical influence. 
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Table 3.1     Percentage of MPPs by district municipality and political party, 1994-2004 
District  Political party  
municipality ANC   DP NNP  IFP Overall % 
Amajuba 2.0 4.6 -.-  3.8 2.9 
Sisonke -.-  -.-  -.-  3.8 1.8 
iLembe 1.0 -.-  3.6 10.6 5.4 
Ugu 4.1 9.1 14.3 6.1 6.5 
uMkhanyakude 2.0 -.-  -.-  1.5 1.8 
uMzinyathi 5.1 -.-  -.-  7.6 5.4 
uThungulu 12.2 -.-  3.6 12.1 10.5 
Zululand -.-  -.-  3.6 12.9 6.2 
eThekwini 42.9 45.4 32.1 18.9 31.9 
uMgungundlovu 22.5 18.2 35.7 12.1 18.1 
uThukela 2.0 9.1 -.-  6.1 3.6 
Other 6.1 13.6 7.1 4.6 5.8 
 
 
The district municipality of eThekwini incorporates the metropole and major 
port of Durban and the major urban African townships around Durban. Protests 
occurred there at incorporation into the KwaZulu homeland in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s and battles between the IFP and ANC were fought there in the 
1980s and 1990s. eThekwini is a part of the ANC’s former Southern Natal 
Region. In addition to these predominantly black townships, located in eThe-
kwini are expansive peri-urban informal settlements that have mushroomed 
since the 1990s, affluent suburbs along the eastern seaboard and the ridge 
around the city and a large concentration of asian and white citizens. To the 
north of the district is Inanda, the former home to John Dube, the first president 
of the ANC, and the location of the mission that was to educate many elite 
members. 
uMgungundlovu incorporates the urban centre of Pietermaritzburg, one of 
the two former provincial capitals in the province. Again the townships around 
the urban centre were the site of struggles against the apartheid state and home 
to the most radical of the ANC elite in the province, part of the ANC’s former 
Midlands Region. In addition, uMgungundlovu incorporates peri-urban and 
rural communities in which there are traditional leadership structures as well as 
commercial farming ventures. 
By comparison with the heavy concentrations of MPPs drawn from these 
two areas, the third largest concentration of MPPs comes from Uthungulu with 
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a mere 10.5% of MPPs (see Table 3.1), a district consisting of the major port of 
Richards Bay on the eastern seaboard as well as commercial farming ventures 
inland. In addition to densely populated towns in the east of the district, the 
central and western segments of Uthungulu consist of rural villages in which 
traditional leadership structures function. Uthungulu borders the Tugela River 
and includes sites of historical political importance. The territory that now 
comprises Uthungulu was formerly within the Zulu Kingdom and bordered the 
Colony of Natal from 1840. Districts such as Eshowe and Nkandla – the burial 
site of Cetshwayo (and the birth place of the now President of South Africa, 
Jacob Zuma) – are deeply symbolic within Zulu history. 
Sharing this symbolism is Zululand, an entirely rural district in northern 
central KwaZulu-Natal, from which 6.2% of MPPs have been drawn (see Table 
3.1). Encompassing Cetshwayo’s capital at Ulundi and the legislative seat of the 
former KwaZulu Government, Mahlabatini homesteads of the Buthelezi clan 
and Nongoma, the current day royal homestead, the district of Zululand is firm-
ly associated with the former Zulu Kingdom. 
Umzinyathi, from which 5.8% of MPPs have been drawn (see Table 3.1), to 
the South West of Zululand and West of Uthungulu incorporates some of the 
historic battle sites of the Anglo-Zulu War. In the peri-urban towns in the south 
of the district is the site of the first ANC SDUs in what was their Northern Natal 
region. 
ILembe district comprising 5.4% of MPPs (see Table 3.1), on the eastern 
seaboard and northern border of eThekwini, incorporates predominantly rural 
constituencies throughout the district, both subsistence and commercial farming 
and the seaside resort of Ballito. It is a site to which people from the eThekwini 
district were moved in the post-apartheid period to one of the largest low cost 
housing projects. 
Ugu, to the South of eThekwini and on the eastern seaboard is predominant-
ly rural, interspersed along the coastline with small towns. The 6.5% of MPPs 
drawn from this area (see Table 3.1) are either from deeply rural constituencies 
or the seaside resorts along the coast. 
Those districts in which the least number of MPPs were concentrated include 
Sisonke in the far South West at 1.8%, Umkhanyakude in the far North East at 
1.8%, Amajuba in the far North West at 2.9% and Uthukela in the far West at 
3.6% (see Table 3.1). These districts share the characteristic of a geographical 
location on the outskirts of the province in which there are predominantly deep-
ly rural constituencies. Umkhanyakude and the majority of the territory that is 
now Amajuba form, with Zululand and what is now Uthungulu and part of 
Umzinyathi, the land mass that was once the Zulu Kingdom. The remainder of 
the land mass that makes up the province was, from the mid 19th Century, 
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under the former control of the Colony of Natal. Hence, the core of MPPs are 
drawn from urban areas and the rural remains peripheral.  
An examination of regional identification by political party shows that three 
political parties draw their political elite overwhelmingly from only two out of 
11 districts and only the IFP is regionally heterogenous. As shown in Table 3.1, 
almost two thirds of ANC MPPs identify with the urban districts of eThekwini 
or uMgungundlovu, higher than the mean average concentration of MPPs from 
all parties.  
Ethekwini and uMgungundlovu were formerly part of the ANC Southern 
Natal Region and ANC Midlands Region respectively, demonstrating continuity 
with regional party political strength in the pre-1994 period. Of the MPPs that 
identify with these two districts, the majority identify with an urban African 
township within them.32 A high urban concentration of the elite around the 
metropolitan areas is in sharp contrast with the ANC in other provinces such as 
in the Eastern Cape such whereas the core constituents of the ANC are pre-
dominantly rural and the elite can be said to have strong rural roots. In the 
former Ciskei, the ANC’s heartland the origin of even those in East London was 
rural. These constituents were ‘strongly influenced by an indigenous rural cul-
ture and … maintained family links with the countryside’ (Lodge 1983: 55). In 
KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC is an anomaly to this, overwhelmingly drawing its 
representatives from distinctly urban areas, with little ties to the rural. Again, 
this is in contrast to other African states where individuals can be said to 
straddle urban and rural spaces. The links to rural areas is a key feature of 
African society and most urban Africans maintain close social ties with rural 
areas. That this differs for the ANC political elite in KwaZulu-Natal is a direct 
feature of political party formation. First, the history of the ANC in KwaZulu-
Natal is a history of nationalism that was distinctly urban – as in the majority of 
other African nationalist movements (Tordoff 1997). Second, the nationalist 
movement in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 1990s was opposed to the 
concept of chieftaincy, a key element in rural life. Third, the IFP with a better 
grasp of rural poverty and rural political culture were more equipped than their 
ANC counterparts to attract support and candidates. 
In contrast, no ANC MPPs have been drawn from the two districts of 
Sisonke or Zululand and only negligible numbers of MPPs identify with the 
districts of iLembe, Amajuba, Umkhanyakude, uThukela and Ugu (see Table 
3.1). Of these, they are predominantly MPPs that entered the legislature from 
                                                            
32  For example, in eThekwini, MPP Cyril Xaba’s identification is with Clermont, MPP 
Lydia Johnson with KwaMashu, now deceased MEC Dumisani Makhaye with Cato 
Manor and KwaMashu, MPP Lungi Gcabashe with KwaMashu, and MPPs Nhlanhla 
Ngidi and Meshack Radebe with Mpumulanga township. 
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1999 onwards.33 This, however, is not to suggest that the ANC has become 
more regionally representative as the majority of newcomers in 1999 were still 
primarily concentrated in eThekwini and uMgungundlovu. In addition, many of 
the MPPs elected in the first election from outside these two districts did not 
survive into the second term.34 Of the ANC MPPs drawn from outside the two 
districts of eThekwini and uMgungundlovu, most are still drawn from small 
pockets of urban locality within them.35 Although these district municipalities 
are predominantly rural, the patterns of elite association within them show a 
failure in the ANC to draw an elite from the deeply rural constituencies and 
expand their influence beyond the limitations of the urban in any significant 
way. This is even more significant given that in 2001 only 45% of the provin-
cial population lived in urban areas (Republic of South Africa 2001a: 23). 
Hence, not only is the ANC not typical or representative of the electorate in 
terms of the regions of KwaZulu-Natal there is evidence of self-segregation in 
recruitment patterns in the form of collective self-reproduction in the manner 
that Pareto suggests. 
Although ANC MPPs located in eThekwini and uMgungundlovu frequently 
discussed one another in familiar local terms they often lacked knowledge of, 
and, association with, MPPs outside of these particular districts. For example, as 
one MPP stated three years into the second term, 
‘I was here with Ndebele this morning ... of course I could just phone Zuma. We 
were all from Southern Natal. We accommodate people from other areas too. There 
is that one guy from up north, Jeff Vilane. There is representivity’ (Pers. ANC Inter-
view 57). 
Moreover, regional identification is congruent with seniority in position and 
this is where patterns of regional association become most interesting. With the 
exception of one MEC36 all senior positions in the post 1999 period are held by 
MPPs associated with the eThekwini or uMgungundlovu districts.37 However, 
there is more to seniority than this. Of the concentration of ANC MPPs with 
                                                            
33  These include, for example, Jeff Vilane from Umkhanyakude or Mbuso Khubeka 
from Amajuba. 
34  For example MPP Mjabulise Madondo from the Umzinyathi district lost his seat in 
1999 because he appeared too far down the party electoral list at position number 
58. MPP Bheki Mthembu of Uthungulu was assassinated in July 1998 while work-
ing with IFP MPP Blessed Gwala on peace initiatives in the region.  
35  For example, Mildred Buthelezi is from Empangeni in Uthungulu, Mbuso Khubeka 
is of Newcastle in Amajuba and Senzo Mchunu from Empangeni Rail in Uthungulu. 
36  Mike Mabuyakhulu from Esikhawini in Uthungulu (the ANC’s third largest geo-
graphical concentration). 
37  For example, MECs Dumisani Makhaye and Sibusiso Ndebele are associated with 
eThekwini and MEC Zweli Mkhize with uMgungundlovu. ANC Chief Whip Ina 
Cronje is also associated with uMgungundlovu.  
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patterns of association outside KwaZulu-Natal, the majority served the ANC in 
exile before returning to what became either eThekwini or uMgungundlovu.38 
All MPPs who served the ANC in exile and in prison on Robben Island have 
held positions of seniority in the legislature. One MPP articulated, in 2001, the 
divisions within the ANC on this basis. He said,  
‘The exiles are all the elite ... they are all cabinet ministers. Very few in the UDF 
were given any opportunities. They were even pressurised. Those who struggled 
inside were sidelined. People ... became a nobody all of a sudden. It was prisoners 
versus non-prisoners ... We call them the “when we weres” ... They wanted those in 
exile or in prison to take over ... The elite class ask “which prison? which country?” 
I am a nobody’ (Pers. Interview 124). 
In fact, in term of legislative appointments, popular MPPs who have limited 
exile or Robben Island affiliations, can appear to have been disadvantaged. For 
example, in 1999, ANC MPP Bheki Cele was voted in as number one candidate 
for the ANC by the ANC branches in the list drawing process. Yet in the final 
allocation of seats in 1999, Cele was allocated a role as Head of Committees in 
the legislature instead of a cabinet position. Cele’s role was that of an admini-
strative portfolio instead of a substantive one. First becoming involved in 
Lamontville student politics, Cele’s experience of exile politics and prison was 
limited to six months military training in Angola and one year on Robben Is-
land. His most active role was internally in the establishment of ANC structures 
within KwaZulu-Natal. Hence, within the ANC political elite one may draw a 
further complex social and political tapestry of privilege and self-reproduction, 
not on common material interests (as Mosca would posit), but on common 
hierarchies of political experiences that are made apparent through patterns of 
representivity. 
The significance of historical factors in regional identification in KwaZulu-
Natal must not be underestimated. Of 5239 ANC MPPs that have served in the 
legislature, only 7 have any association with the territory that made up the 
former Zulu Kingdom after the formation of the Colony of Natal in 1840. Of 
these, some have worked closely with the IFP in peace building efforts. This is 
more than geography, representivity and self-reproduction of hierarchies of ex-
periences. It connotes understanding and shared association patterns of respect. 
The most senior ANC MPP to have liased closely with the IFP was Jacob 
                                                            
38  Nhlanhla Ngidi, for example, worked in Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola and Tan-
zania before returning, in 1991, to Mpumalanga township in what became eThe-
kwini. Dumisani Makhaye was in the first group of eight MK soldiers to return to 
eThekwini in 1981 where he served as commander of the Natal Provincial Com-
mand. 
39  This figure includes the 7 MPPs who came into the legislature for other parties and 
crossed the floor to the ANC. 
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Zuma, ANC provincial leader in the first term of office and now South African 
President. Zuma’s birthplace in rural Nkandla in Uthungulu, a place of historic 
political symbolism for Zulu royalty and lineage through his cousin Inkosi 
Vusumbango Zuma to the Amakhosi combined with his later rural lifestyle in 
Maphumulo to ensure that he had the capacity to relate to the most traditional of 
the IFP and they to him. Yet his ANC struggle credentials, later urban existence 
alongside his mother whose home was a shack in Cato Manor before forced 
removals, enabled him to locate himself centrally within the ANC urban heart-
land of Southern Natal, now eThekwini. In sum, Zuma combined a “true” Zulu 
lineage and identification with what became, in the post-1994 period, the domi-
nant ANC region in KwaZulu-Natal. Since this was the province in which the 
relationships between the ANC and IFP were most acutely contested, this com-
bination of characteristics went a long way to guarantee Zuma a central role in 
the ANC elite. 
In comparison to the ANC a considerable proportion of DP MPPs are also 
drawn from eThekwini and uMgungundlovu (see Table 3.1), but are drawn 
from the more affluent white suburbs of Durban.40 Even those that are not 
drawn from the white suburbs are predominantly urban based.41  
No DP MPPs have been drawn from the six predominantly rural districts of 
Sisonke, iLembe, Umkhanyakude, Umzinyathi, Uthungulu or Zululand (see 
Table 3.1) whose land mass covers more than half the province. In fact, the only 
DP MPP with a significant rural identification is MEC Wilson Ngcobo from 
Mzumba, who is also the only black DP MPP and who was formerly employed 
by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of the IFP.  
NNP patterns of representivity are comparable with the ANC and DP (see 
Table 3.1) as most MPPs are drawn from urban uMgungundlovu and eThe-
kwini42 and those that are not are drawn predominantly from urban areas.43 
There are two differences. First, there is almost parity in the proportion of MPPs 
drawn from eThekwini and uMgungundlovu. uMgundlovu incorporates Pieter-
maritzburg the site of the former Natal Provincial Council. Second, some MPPs 
                                                            
40  For example, MPPs Belinda Scott and Margaret Ambler-Moore are drawn from the 
Berea, MPP Roger Burrows from Manor Gardens and MPP Johannes Krog from 
Durban North. 
41  For example, MPP Omie Singh was drawn from Phoenix township north of Durban 
and MPP Radley Keys from Pietermaritzburg. 
42  For example, MPPs Gordon Haygarth, Raj Morar and Cornelius Van Rooyen Botha 
are from the city of Durban. MPPs Brian Edwards, Danie Schutte and Valentino 
Volker are from the city of Pietermaritzburg 
43  For example both MPPs George Bartlett and Connie Galea from the Ugu district are 
both drawn from the town of Port Shepstone.  
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simultaneously identify with urban and rural areas.44 This demonstrates a 
pattern of dislocation among black NNP MPPs that distinguishes them from 
their party colleagues and the salience of syncretic associations in elite forma-
tion. While their distinctly urban affiliations might liken them to incumbent 
NNP MPPs, it is their rural associations with the black population that make 
them attractive to the NNP. Attempts to broaden the party, rather than to 
reproduce an existing elite are the basis of this attraction. 
The IFP is the only political party which draws its political elite from all 
eleven district municipalities demonstrating heterogeneity in regional represent-
ation and urban-rural patterns of affiliation (see Table 3.1). eThekwini and 
uMgungundlovu together account for less than a third of MPPs and more than a 
third of MPPs have been drawn from Zululand, Uthungulu and iLembe. Where 
districts account for less than 10% of MPPs, the concentration of IFP MPPs 
from them is still higher than the mean average for all political parties, except 
Ugu where it is relatively equal (see Table 3.1). Where the IFP shows less 
concentration than the mean average is in MPPs from “other” areas, illustrating 
a higher level of affiliation to the province and thus to local politics than is the 
case for other parties. 
This diversity of IFP MPPs across the districts of the provinces indicates that 
the party has managed to forge an elite from beyond the rural areas of Zululand 
and surrounding areas.45 For example, of the MPPs from eThekwini, the ma-
jority are associated with urban areas.46 In other districts, however, a greater 
number of IFP MPPs are drawn from rural rather than urban areas.47 Of the 
MPPs drawn from rural areas, they are not limited by either race, gender or 
traditional leadership status, but are themselves diverse groups of people.48  
While this predominantly rural pattern is evident across the majority of dis-
tricts, the IFP is unique among the parties in that MPPs drawn from urban and 
                                                            
44  For example, MPP Sipho Mkhize associates with both urban Pietermaritzburg in 
uMgungundlovu and KwaMashu township in eThekwini as well as rural Nongoma 
in Zululand. 
45  This suggests that research which suggests that the party is merely rurally located is 
incorrect. 
46  These include, for example, MPP Nzameni Mthiyane from Umlazi township, MPP 
Kamal Panday from Westville, MPP Alexander Hamilton from Durban, Usha Roop-
narain from Durban and MPP Mandla Malakoana from Pinetown 
47  For example, in Ugu district, MPP Inkosi Calalabakubo Khawula was from Umzum-
be, MEC Narend Singh from rural Umkomaas, and MPP Ellis Vezi from rural Har-
ding. 
48  For example, Henry Combrinck from Louwsburg in Zululand, a white Afrikaans 
speaking male, may be contrasted with Lissah Mtalane, a black, isiZulu speaking 
female from Eshowe in Uthungulu or with Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane, a traditional 
leader from Hlanganani in Sisonke. 
106 CHAPTER 3 
 
peri-urban areas declare their bonds of affiliation to rural constituencies. For 
example, one IFP MPP from the city of Durban discussed her representation 
role as to ‘represent the rural poor’ (Pers. IFP Interview 131) notwithstanding 
that her own patterns of association are distinctly urban. Moreover, many IFP 
MPPs blended their urban and rural affiliations. Such blurred distinctions were 
found to be the result of two factors. They are mobility on the part of the 
individual and associations with peri-urban and peri-rural areas. For example, 
another IFP MPP discussed his own regional identity as, ‘I represent the urban 
and rural poor, but they are not separated’ (Pers. IFP Interview 60). In this 
particular case, the patterns of affiliations within his home community revealed 
a complex matrix of rural and urban affiliations. For example, the settlement of 
Lindelani49 was created in the early 1980s on a portion of unoccupied land that 
fell under Ntuzuma, north of Durban. Most of the families that occupied Linde-
lani were tenants from KwaMashu (in which the UDF was dominant), Ntuzuma 
and Inanda, living in difficult conditions who then built informal shack homes 
on the new land with the assistance of the KwaZulu Government (dominated by 
the IFP). However, while these individuals had lived in those urban areas, many 
had been hostel dwellers in them who had been forcibly dislocated under apart-
heid laws or were in transit from rural areas in search of employment. So while 
immediate patterns of association were urban, this was supplementary to other 
affiliations and patterns of authority that were very much rural.  
The complexity of urban and rural distinctions is perhaps most apparent in 
MPPs whose personal history might indicate a closer urban than rural affiliation 
but whose value system is distinctly rural. One such example is MPP Lauretta 
Ngcobo, who is educated to degree level, writes novels and spent the majority 
of her life in the PAC underground in exile in Swaziland, Tanzania and London. 
While in London she served as a teacher and then headmistress in the London 
inner city before returning to rural Ixopo as an IFP member. Yet, notwithstand-
ing this personal history, MPP Ngcobo stressed in interviews the importance of 
traditional leadership, the centrality of rural poverty and patterns of traditional 
authority in the rural areas as being distinctly African. Further, the “African” is 
equated with the rural, and the “european” with the urban. Rural associations, in 
this case are central because of the perception that they embody the very Afri-
can being, something that is deemed to be removed from the urban. 
Regional identification in the IFP is not indicative of seniority in legislative 
position, as in the ANC. For example, all three IFP Premiers that served for 
consecutive periods in the legislature are identified with different regions, as are 
                                                            
49  Lindelani may be translated as ‘waiting for something to happen’. 
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the MPPs who fulfil senior legislative roles.50 In addition, cabinet positions 
continue to show this diversity in appointments.51 Hence, the IFP elite, in prac-
tising district heterogeneity in recruitment, representing a rural and urban base, 
acknowledging syncretic affiliations and drawing representatives from deeply 
rural spaces, is the only party in the legislature that link the periphery with the 
centre of power. This diversity means that the elite is more typical – in regional 
patterns – of the electorate than any other party and is more likely to show that 
diversity in attitudes and values. This is much more typical of an African 
political party (cf. Bayart 1993). In contrast, the ANC, DP and NNP with their 
heavy urban bias in the metropoles of the province and the dominance of two 
districts over the other nine, demonstrate more homogeneity – in regional pat-
terns – and an element of self-reproduction. This dominance, in contrast with 
the IFP, does not link the rural periphery with the centre of power in any way. 
In fact, one consequence of this is that the ANC election campaigns in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal tend to be top-down affairs with large numbers of supporters 
bused in to election rallies and might also explain why in the 15 years that the 
ANC has been in power nationally there has been very little development of 
rural areas.  
 
Family connections 
An emerging pattern among MPPs in all parties is strong family ties to politics. 
Approximately 30% of MPPs have such ties. MPPs have relatives in the pro-
vincial legislature52 and in national government.53 By far the most extensive 
family institutional ties exist between MPPs and councillors at the local govern-
ment level.54 These symbolise the integration of the three spheres of political 
                                                            
50  For example, of the Premiers, Frank Mdlalose is associated with Nqutu in Umzin-
yathi district, Ben Ngubane with Camperdown in uMgungundlovu and Lionel 
Mtshali with Utrecht in Amajuba. The chief whip in the legislature, Inksosi Gumede 
(now deceased) was from Ubombo in Umkhanyakude. The Speaker, in the first two 
terms, Blessed Gwala is from Uthungulu district. 
51  For example, Narend Singh MEC for Agriculture and then Education is from Um-
komaas in Ugu district, Prince Gideon Zulu (now deceased) former MEC for Social 
Welfare was from Nongoma in Zululand, Celani Mtetwa who served as MEC for 
Public Works is from Msinga in Umzinyathi, MEC Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane is asso-
ciated with Sisonke district and Peter Miller with eThekwini.  
52  For example, IFP MPPs Frank and Gideon Mdlalose are brothers, as are IFP MPPs 
Prince Gideon Zulu and Vincent Zulu. MF MPPs Amichand Rajbansi & Shireen 
Thakur are husband and wife. 
53  For example, former ANC MPP Jacob Zuma is the husband of Nkosazana Zuma, 
former minister of health and then minister of foreign affairs. 
54  These include MPP Walter Felgate whose wife Sue Felgate is an Ulundi councillor, 
deceased MPP Thomas Shabalala whose wife is a ward councillor in North Central 
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institutions in political parties in the province. Family connections within poli-
tical parties are as important as such institutional linkages. These are extensive 
within the legislature.55 They have also led to claims of nepotism. In 1998, a 
former council member accused MF MPP and party leader Amichand Rajbansi 
of nepotism after his 25 years of party service in council was cut short and he 
was replaced by Vimal Amichand Rajbansi, the MPPs son. He said, MPP Ami-
chand Rajbansi ‘is running a family business ... there is no democratic decision-
making’ (Bugwathie Persadh Jaglal in Seeliger 1998). 
Some MPPs spoke openly of the salience of family connections in the devel-
opment of their political career. One NNP MPP discussed his initial political in-
volvement as a result of his mother-in-laws involvement with the former United 
Party who then asked him to stand as a candidate (Pers. NNP Interview 3). An 
ANC MPP described her political involvement as a result of her brother re-
cruiting her (Pers. ANC Interview 71). An IFP MPP discussed her candidacy in 
the legislature as a gesture towards her family. She said, ‘I often think it was in 
place of my husband. My husband held a position which would not allow him to 
be a representative’ (Pers. IFP Interview 116).  
The concept of the family plays a role in political action in KwaZulu-Natal. 
A dispute over office space between two brothers within the legislature emerged 
when Speaker Gideon Mdlalose informed his brother, and Premier, Frank Mdla-
lose that he would seek legal opinion if a larger office was not allocated to him 
(Natal Mercury, 16 Jan 2003). As Frank Mdlalose was the Provincial Premier, 
the situation appeared in the media as an IFP government crisis. Rather than a 
government crisis, this is an example of part of the fabric of political life in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The expectation that the success of one person, in a chain of 
others, would lead to their success and good fortune too is a feature of life in 
Africa. Conversely, if the success of one person is not shared this could be seen 
as shameful. It is a clear example of the networks of personal relationships that 
                                                                                                                                                 
local council, former MPP Inkosi Calalabakubo Khawula whose son is the Chair-
person of Ugu Regional Council, MPP Roger Burrows whose wife Sue is a coun-
cillor in South Central local council, Wessel Nel whose wife is a councillor, MPP 
Danie Schutte whose wife Alphia is a Pietermaritzburg councillor, IFP MPP Moha-
med Rehman whose son is a councillor and MF MPP Amichand Rajbansi whose son 
is a councillor.  
55  For example, IFP MPP Inkosi Calalabakubo Khawula’s son served as Chairperson 
of the Inkatha Youth Brigade. MPP Phillip Powell’s wife Anthea served as an ad-
ministrator for the IFP. IFP MPP Senzo Mfayela’s father was a former member of 
the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. ANC MPP Ina Cronje’s husband Pierre was one 
of the former PFP members who met the ANC in exile prior to the liberation move-
ment unbanning. ANC MPP Harry Gwala’s daughter Lulu was a member of the 
ANC Women’s League. ANC MPP Albertina Luthuli is the daughter of Albert Lu-
thuli and NNP MPP Sipho Mkhize has many relatives in the IFP. 
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Bayart succinctly details in other post-colonial African states. ‘This is a fabric 
of political relations … the private order is not separate from that of the state’ 
(Bayart 1993: 160). Such personal relations and perceptions of what actions 
based upon them should comprise runs deeply. One IFP MPP was hauled over 
the coals at a National Council meeting after her husband, an IFP member who 
stood and lost in the local government elections, made remarks to the media. As 
she stated, ‘they were about the new education minister when she was talking 
about witchcraft and the stories about the high-flying Premier when he was 
flying everywhere. My husband made naughty remarks’ (Pers. IFP Interview 
68). Whereas the MPP was quick to dismiss any consequences of her husbands 
actions, another MPP stated, ‘her whip position was downgraded because of her 
husband’ (Pers. IFP Interview 110). Hence, others in the chain are expected to 
assist each other’s success. 
 
Ancestral, kinship and lineage ties  
Ancestral, kinship and lineage ties in KwaZulu-Natal provide bonds of soli-
darity among segments of the political elite and a basis upon which elites some-
times differentiated their interests from one another. 
Nineteen (8%) of MPPs that have served in parliament are members of the 
Amakhosi, 18 from the IFP and 1 from the ANC. The disparity in numbers 
across the two parties is hardly surprising given the ANC’s urban bias and that 
‘urban dwellers are de facto excluded from positions of power in the lineage’ 
(Bayart 1993: 139). Their bonds of association tie them directly to traditional 
political institutions and patterns of authority at both the local level as district 
leaders and the provincial level as members of wider traditional political units. 
Such inherited status carries weight in the provincial government. Traditional 
leaders may claim status within local communities and conversely within 
broader political institutions as representatives of the local. Most importantly, 
however, traditional status serves to create a mutual awareness of difference 
between those with such prestige and those without it and structures patterns of 
respect in the interactions between the two.  
Cutting across these recognised patterns of status are other significant 
lineage ties within the IFP. For some IFP MPPs, the significance of their lineage 
ties went beyond what appears in comparison the relative simplicity of the 
present day chieftaincy system. For them, the status of their lineage can be 
traced to the pre-1820s, to the great chieftaincies of the pre-Zulu kingdom that 
fought for the extension of political control, and out of which the Zulu chief-
taincy emerged victorious under Shaka Zulu. The chieftaincies that survived the 
wars of the century became units within the state form (Guy 1994: 28). For 
these MPPs, it could be argued that their personal oral histories are both of the 
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Zulu state form and independent of it to an existence before that of Shaka. In 
Cetshwayo’s time, 
‘the king ruled with the izikhulu – the great ones – of the kingdom ... The king with 
the izikhulu comprised the ibandla, the highest council of state, and without the 
izikhulu the king could make no decisions of national importance. The status of the 
izikhulu depended primarily on birth and they were seen as the living representatives 
of the dominant lineages of the chiefdoms of the kingdom’ (Guy 1994: 29). 
As such, political authority was vested in the collective decisions of the 
izikhulu and the political legitimacy of those decisions was based on their 
participation. The izikhulu were the descendents of the great pre-Shaka chief-
taincies. They included, among others, the chieftaincies of the Biyela, Mdletshe, 
Mthethwa, Ntombela, Mdlalose and Mbatha – all of whom have descendents in 
the IFP. For a fraction of IFP MPPs in the provincial legislature, their surname 
links them directly to the great chieftaincies of the pre-Shaka kingdoms whose 
ancestors then directly participated in the political affairs of the Zulu Kingdom 
under Cetshwayo. Moreover, MPP and Prince, Gideon Zulu, is himself a direct 
descendant of the Zulu chieftaincy and royal family that emerged out of these 
battles. 
MPPs in the IFP were found to be familiar with each others lineage ties and 
in some cases patterns of trust and recruitment were, in part, based upon these 
roots. As one MPP explained,  
‘Surnames are important ... In African politics we look to the background of a 
person. Who was his father? Who was his grandfather? If you just emerge as a 
mushroom you are not trusted. King Shaka taught us that we are all welcomed and 
accepted, but people are respected by stature’ (Pers. IFP Interview 92).  
The roles of fathers and grandfathers go beyond that of heroism to service 
for the Amakhosi. For example, although not of the Amakhosi, MPP Ziba 
Jiyane’s father was the chief councillor to the tribal court at Nseleni, and thus 
performed a role of service to the traditional leaders that afforded him great 
respect. While such symbolic capital is found to be of great significance within 
the IFP, it is not alien to the ANC either. 
Although rejecting the patterns of authority exercised by traditional leaders, 
at least 16 ANC MPPs were found to share with their IFP counterparts a mutual 
respect for kinship bonds based upon the past. And although such symbolic 
patterns of status were salient within the IFP, some ANC MPPs could relate 
significantly enough to them to re-direct the way in which cross-party elites 
began to develop relationships. As one IFP MPP stated about his ANC col-
league, ‘Mr Mthembu was a Zulu and Amazulu ... (He) is related to me. There 
is no way that I could hurt him because we are associated’ (Pers IFP Interview 
92). Such bonds were found to set boundaries around relationships. 
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In extending the notion of kinship to include indirect relationships based 
upon mutual recognition of ancestral ethnic ties, ‘kinship responsibilities ... 
extend to new settings and to new occupations’ (Chazan et al. 1988). So while, 
such ties may have been flimsy at best had MPPs not entered parliament, the 
institutional setting in which they are located provides the glue for the extension 
of such connections, and the expansion of responsibilities and obligations based 
upon them. 
Bayart speaks of conservative modernisation and social revolution. Within 
these processes he claims that in African states the development of the modern 
state has marginalised the status of elderhood. The world of salaried employ-
ment, politics and business transcend lineage. Despite this, conservative mod-
ernisation enables certain aristocrats to remain in power as they forge agree-
ments with other groups (Bayart 1993: 119-149). However, in KwaZulu-Natal, 
the key question is not whether Amakhosi are in power, but the way in which 
the patterns of culture associated with the system of traditional leadership 
permeate the relationships between elites – Amakhosi or not. First, the Ama-
khosi as a group are a-typical of the electorate, but more typically rural than 
urban MPPs. Second, one cannot point to an organised group based on common 
material interests, as Mosca might. However, the values associated with the 
political culture that sustains the hierarchy are shared in the legislature. Third, 
collective self re-production is less about collective recruitment to the legis-
lature (Pareto), and even less about organised material interests (Mosca). 
Rather, the reproduction is of the values shared by both society and elites.  
Shared value systems also explain why, as the ANC cast off its left wing, it 
received more votes in subsequent elections. Jacob Zuma, the embodiment of 
these value systems – linking both the urban and the rural through syncretic 
affiliations – is the key to the ANCs gaining ground. In 2009, many of the 
voters who chose the ANC over the IFP did so because they support the core 
values of the IFP – those values seen in the candidate for new ANC President, 
Jacob Zuma (Francis 2009a: 160). 
 
Religious affiliations 
More than 70% of MPPs claim to be religious, the majority Christian. Some 
pointed to the dignified manner in which parliamentary business is conducted 
and the use of prayer to open each parliamentary session as a testament to their 
religious convictions. MPPs are members of a wide variety of churches.56 In 
some cases, religious affiliations brought individuals into close contact with 
                                                            
56  These include the Dutch Reformed Church, Lutheran Church, Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Methodist Church, German Lutheran 
Church, Presbyterian Church and the Full Gospel Charismatic Church.  
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politicians and, later, themselves into politics. MPP Walter Felgate, for exam-
ple, balanced employment as a mining personnel manager with a role in the 
Christian Institute. The Christian Institute was a ‘radical ecumenical organiza-
tion which aimed to work for radical justice and against the NGK’s perversion 
of Christian doctrine to serve Afrikaner political goals … Throughout its decade 
and a half of existence, the CI played a vital energizing role for reform-minded 
church leaders in all denominations … (and) … increasingly took the initiative 
in putting forward a theologically based critique of government race policies’ 
(Karis & Gerhart 1997: 77-78).In attempting to improve mining conditions for 
black workers, Walter Felgate enlisted the support of IFP President, Mangosu-
thu Buthelezi. In the 1970s when the Christian Institute became a radical 
organisation, consultation between the ANC, the IFP and the Institute fostered a 
relationship that was later to lead to Walter Felgate’s own political involvement. 
Some MPPs’ (in the IFP, DP, NNP, PAC and ACDP) religious convictions 
led them to become members of the clergy, a role that involved bridging the 
gaps between the educated and uneducated. Although some of the parents of 
ANC MPPs are clergy, a noted absence is that ANC MPPs are not. This is 
partly explained by exile and underground politics that removed individuals 
from the local context and limited their public role. The commitment to com-
munism, for some, further added an atheist dimension to their social and 
political involvement. In other cases, some MPPs were found to have associated 
with religious organisations as a cover for their political work. ANC MPP Bheki 
Cele is one example. He was employed as a community worker in 1985 by 
Diakonia, an ecumenical Christian organisation with a pronounced anti-apart-
heid stance, to co-ordinate the activities of the anti-apartheid organisations in 
Lamontville. His employment was secured through the church of Reverend 
Xundu who guided the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) in the rent 
boycotts of the 1980s (cf. Daily News, 9 October 1991: 21). This case shows 
how the boundaries between the social, political and religious were deeply 
intertwined during the struggle years. While such cases in the ANC began with 
social and political involvement that led to the search for a religious cover, in 
other parties, the political was an extension of religious and social involvement. 
For some black MPPs, becoming a reverend or preacher was an extension of 
the educational background of those MPPs who had studied theology at univer-
sity, a discipline that remained unrestricted during apartheid. For others, mis-
sionary schools that practised religious and humanistic education and preached 
character building, obedience and discipline directed students into a life as a 
teacher, preacher or both.57 While salaries for ministers varied considerably, 
                                                            
57  For example, PAC MPP Joe Mkhwanazi, for example, became both a lay preacher 
and teacher after completing his education. 
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some received a house and allowances for their children (cf. Kuper 1965: 96), a 
practice that made the profession particularly attractive. A third group of in-
dividuals combined their role as a traditional leader with that of a preacher, a 
practice that involved serving the spiritual and material needs of a community.58 
The boundaries of political, social and religious institutions overlapped and 
elites served as brokers for two societies in a variety of capacities. The fulfil-
ment of dual roles was not limited to black MPPs. Some white MPPs combine 
their party political work with their religious commitments. For example, NNP 
MPP Cliff Matthee, a lay preacher in the Full Gospel Charismatic Church per-
formed baptisms out of the NNP offices in Hillcrest (Pers. Obs), a practice that 
collapses the distinction between services provided as a NNP MPP and those as 
a clergyman.  
The involvement of MPPs as preachers in the minority parties is extensive. 
Almost half of all MPPs that have served in the DP have also served as clergy59. 
In each case, their religious involvement was prior to their political involvement 
and they saw their departure into politics as an extension of the social role that 
they already fulfilled.  
In fact, some parties profess to be founded upon Christian principles. This is 
so for the majority party, the IFP, whose commitment to the practices of tra-
ditional society, and principles of Christianity shows continuity with the past 
amakholwa – amakhosi relationships (discussed in chapter two). However, the 
links between politics and Christianity are not limited to parties that have a long 
history of political involvement. The ACDP, for example, was founded just 
ahead of the 1994 elections, as a party whose political and policy principles are 
based upon christian perspectives. An ACDP MPP discussed how religious in-
volvement became political involvement, 
‘... somebody came along to our church and told us about the ACDP, so I just started 
a little group in our home and from there it just grew, you know, very quickly. They 
realised that I had a talent for public speaking so they used me in the election 
campaign a lot in 1994 and from there it just sort of grew’(Pers. Interview 31).  
Whereas religious involvement is a pre-requisite for ACDP MPPs, the 
benefits of priesthood for all individuals who desired a political career are also 
evident. Preaching provided individuals with a trusted public position of pres-
tige, that linked the educated and uneducated, and in traditional societies, tra-
                                                            
58  MPP and MEC Celani Mtetwa, for example, served his community as Deputy-
Inkosi, Reverend and member of the KLA, fulfilling at once, three positions of 
prestige. 
59  For example, MPP Margaret Ambler-Moore is a lay preacher, MPP Radley Keys 
trained in the priesthood and MPP and MEC Wilson Ngcobo is an ordained rever-
end. 
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ditional and western modes of thought. Their links to the local, directly posit-
ioned them to speak on behalf of constituents, while their position of status 
allowed their own voices to be heard in political circles. Herewith is an example 
of a political elite constructed out of multiple representation roles and responsi-
bilities. 
 
Educational background 
The educational level of members of assemblies in advanced democratic coun-
tries is generally high. Although this is recognised in the academic literature, the 
reasons and significance are tentative and contested. Some theorists claim that 
party members wish to choose their betters, whereas others suggest that 
education is one of the best predictors of activism (cf. Norris & Lovenduski 
1997: 168). Mannheim locates the importance of the intelligentsia as a socially 
independent group capable of synthesizing different arguments to draw out the 
best for society (Mannheim 1936). However, this is not always the case. Intel-
lectuals can be prejudiced and passive (Aron 1955) and in post-colonial sub-
saharan Africa, ‘intellectual dissidence has not been the rule’ (Bayart 1993: 188, 
cf. Bagayogo 1987: 107-110).  
Nevertheless, in developing countries, the most important component of the 
political elite has emerged from those that are well educated (cf. Kerstiens 
1966). In Kenya over 50% of parliamentary members are university graduates, 
and in Benin and Ghana this accounts for over 60% of parliamentary members 
(Barkan 2004: 239). As Kerstiens argues, ‘this is not surprising considering the 
fact that, given the high rate of illiteracy (in developing countries), the few with 
education are practically predestined to be looked upon as ... future leaders 
(Kerstiens 1966: 12). In KwaZulu-Natal MPPs vary by educational level – at 
one end of the spectrum there are MPPs with PhDs and at the other there are 
MPPs with little or no formal qualifications.60 Graph 3.7 shows the percentage 
of MPPs by educational qualification that have served in the provincial legis-
lature at any point during the ten year period from 1994-2004. 
 
                                                            
60  The classification, by educational background, of MPPs in KwaZulu-Natal has, 
however, proved difficult because of the reluctance of some MPPs to discuss their 
educational level and qualifications. In the case of education, 103 MPPs were 
classified out of a total of 152. These MPPs are drawn from the IFP, ANC, DP, NNP 
and UDM, although the majority are ANC. In addition, these MPPs are predomi-
nantly black, although some white MPPs are also amongst those not classified. One 
might logically assume that in many cases the level of education among those not 
classified might be substantially lower than the average. The degrees of MBA and 
MBChB have been counted as Masters level qualifications. Professional qualifica-
tions include CTA national examinations for chartered accountants. 
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Graph 3.7     Percentage of MPPs by educational qualification held 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the 16.7% of MPPs who did not matriculate from high school, the over-
whelming majority are more than 50 years of age and are located in the IFP, 
with some ANC exceptions. However, one third of MPPs were reluctant to 
discuss their precise educational qualifications. Given that most were willing to 
talk about the reasons why they did not go to university, it is reasonable to 
assume that an additional one third of MPPs have qualifications that are below 
the average. Although these MPPs were from the four largest parties, the major-
ity were ANC. Together with those MPPs who did not continue their education 
after matriculating from high school, their educational opportunities were 
limited by two factors. First, a lack of financial resources precluded some MPPs 
from finishing school. In most of these cases, the individual was the first born 
child, given the responsibility of financing the education of siblings by leaving 
school early to find employment and contributing to the household income. Of 
these MPPs, many discussed their working class background as children of 
domestic workers, farm workers or unemployed parents. The majority of these 
MPPs were IFP.  
The second factor that limited the educational aspirations of these MPPs was 
politics. This occurred in two ways. First, many MPPs discussed their involve-
ment in politics as a choice between deepening their commitment to the liber-
ation struggle and continuing with education. This was particularly so of 
veteran ANC MPPs who served in Umkhonto we Sizwe. One ANC MPP, for 
example, discussed his limited educational level in moral terms. He said,  
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‘As a member of the underground I was spreading propaganda, recruiting and con-
scientising until 1976 ... I had a choice to go to school or join MK. I had recruited so 
many for MK that to go to school would have been a betrayal. Besides, in the 
struggle you do so many heroic things because you think your freedom will come 
tomorrow ... But I could challenge anything in the movement because my back-
ground could not be challenged. You could not accuse me of betrayal’ (Pers. ANC 
Interview 134). 
While a lack of educational experience might be seen as a disadvantage in a 
parliamentary setting where practical questions of administration are the norm, 
in this case the sacrifice of education for politics has resulted in political ad-
vantage. Similarly, another ANC MPP, whose schooling was disrupted as a 
result of her parents fleeing South Africa for exile gained a footing in the move-
ment in Mozambique (Pers. ANC Interview 113). In such cases, the benefits of 
political involvement in exile outweighed the advantages of an education in 
South Africa. 
Second, a number of MPPs in their thirties and forties from both the IFP and 
ANC were the political products of educational boycotts. Expelled from educa-
tional institutions in the 1970s and 1980s, these MPPs completed their school-
ing and were later expelled from institutions of higher learning prior to attaining 
the advanced qualification for which they were admitted.61 These MPPs were 
not involved in boycotts over the normative reasons for, or quality of, the 
“bantu” education system per se, but rather the individual material conditions 
that they suffered while participating in the system. 
A significant proportion of MPPs were found to have completed part of their 
education at mission based schools where the quality of education was perhaps 
better than state schools. As such, they were already an elite of sorts.62 This is 
comparable to other African examples. In Rwanda, for example, a Catholic 
mission education provided a hutu counter-elite to the dominant Tutsi (Bayart 
1993: 122). Although parallelling the amakholwa of the 1920s, for the most 
                                                            
61  For example, ANC MPP Bheki Cele was expelled from Madadeni Teacher Training 
College for voicing his discontent at college conditions. IFP MPP Senzo Mfayela 
was expelled from Fort Hare University as a result of his involvement in boycotts 
over low quality food and lack of electricity. 
62  For example, the first IFP Premier Frank Mdlalose attended St. Francis Roman 
Catholic Mission School in Mariannhill, as did second IFP Premier, Ben Ngubane. 
IFP MPP and former Education MEC Eileen kaNkosi-Shandu attended Inanda Se-
minary. ANC Provincial leader and former MEC Sibusiso Ndebele attended the 
school at which his father was a Lutheran priest. ANC MPP Nhlanhla Ngidi at-
tended Adams, a popular mission school at which a number of ANC MPPs and the 
only PAC MPP, Joe Mkhwanazi were educated. Adams College provided students 
with an egalitarian, Christian education in a racially shared space. In 1956 Adams 
College was closed down by the Apartheid government and Amanzimtoti Zulu 
Training School, a government run institution, was created in its place. 
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part, these IFP and ANC MPPs, who were mission educated and continued with 
further education, are the children of what was South Africa’s black middle 
classes. They are the sons and daughters of clergy, civil servants, clerks, admi-
nistrators, teachers and chiefs.63 Hence pre-existing hierarchies tend to repro-
duction. While a cluster of elites have emerged from the poorest of the poor in 
South Africa, so did many whose background is distinctly middle class.  
Educational background has become more important in political elite forma-
tion over the two terms of office (but not for the same reasons in all parties) and 
is a contributing factor to both recruitment and seniority in the legislature. In a 
number of cases, MPPs were found to be completing further qualifications part-
time while acting as representatives in parliament. Moreover, in the case of 
ANC MPPs, the party is paying the university fees of such MPPs.64 In such 
cases both MPPs and the party recognise that practical questions of admini-
stration are fundamentally different to the demands of party work that neces-
sitate the mobilisation of constituencies and entail the establishment of commu-
nity rooted political loyalties. 
The significance of educational background in elite formation is most evi-
dent in the circulation of IFP MPPs (see Graph 3.8). The new MPPs in general 
were better educated than the incumbents from the first term, with more MPPs 
possessing advanced qualifications. In contrast to the first term, none of the new 
intake in the second term had attained less than a high school matriculation. In 
addition, almost all of the new intake possessed a degree or diploma, the num-
ber of postgraduate qualifications was higher and some MPPs possessed doc-
torates. In fact, this trend began in the IFP in 1996, mid-way through the first 
term of office and coincided with the racial divide discussed earlier. Many of 
these intellectuals were not part of the frontline struggles of the 1970s and 
1980s. Instead, a number were educated outside South Africa in America and 
Canada or employed during this period in education or development related 
work.65 The significance of educational background is illustrated in the follow-
ing quotation:  
                                                            
63  For example ANC MPP and MEC Sibusiso Ndebele is the son of a Lutheran priest. 
IFP MPP Faith Gasa is the adopted daughter of a Presbyterian Minister and his wife, 
both of whom are teachers. 
64  One such case is ANC MPP Cyril Xaba who is studying for a Diploma in Economic 
Principles at the University of Natal, for which the ANC is paying, while serving as 
Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Finance in the legislature. 
65  IFP MPP Ziba Jiyane, for example, departed overseas in 1978 and completed a BA 
in 1987 at the University of California, an MA in 1988, M.Phil in 1991 and doc-
torate in 1992 at Yale University in the USA. MPP Eileen kaNkosi-Shandu after 
graduating with a Diploma from the Coady Institute in Canada was employed in 
development work on Draai-on-Trust Farm in Louwsburg before working in the 
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Graph 3.8     Comparison of incumbent and new IFP MPPs in 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘We are using the elite to bring to the outside world that which they don’t under-
stand. They are not sophisticated – fifty to sixty percent rural people – but they are 
committed. ... So we (the IFP) opened up and we brought in skills. We (the new 
MPPs) were graduates only – Bhengu, Jiyane etc – a black elite who had grown up 
in the historical tradition of the Zulu and the party. There were technological things 
that we (the IFP) couldn’t do – computer skills, analysing reports etc ... So everyone 
who landed here came because of this. It was the spirit of the time ... We have 
become good at fundraising because we have been assisted. By and large they came 
with things they could sell as a commodity’ (Pers IFP Interview 99).  
Examples of this perspective can be found throughout history in other parts 
of Africa. For example in Nigeria, ‘particular attention was paid to training a 
new elite capable of competing on equal terms … in its command of Western 
bureaucratic principles’ (Bayart 1993: 127). Skills thus become a commodity in 
elite formation. While some of the highly educated IFP MPPs departed from the 
party (in the first term), they were replaced by equally qualified new MPPs in 
greater numbers, many of which had grown up within the traditions of the IFP 
and were thus organic to the party, a trajectory that continued. In 2009, for 
example, more than 20% of the IFP candidates in the top 30 places on the 
electoral list had a PhD. This is in contrast to assertions in Piper’s thesis that 
                                                                                                                                                 
IFP’s development office. MPP Nhlanhla Khubisa, who attained a doctorate, was 
lecturing as a Professor of Education at the University of Zululand prior to be-
coming an MPP in 1999. 
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‘Inkatha was struggling to attract young, ambitious and talented black people, 
relying on defectors from other parties’ (Piper 1999: 89).66 Although the new 
MPPs in the second term are highly educated, incumbent MPPs that have 
proved themselves in other areas co-exist with them in parliament. In this way, 
power has not been completely closed off from other social groups, although it 
has been re-directed to reflect the necessities of governance. The practive of 
government demands a level of education, and as such institutions contribute to 
reproduction of the educated.  
In the ANC, the concept of the intellectual elite is also found to be of sig-
nificant importance, yet does not necessarily translate into recruitment. Some 
MPPs expressed discontent at recruitment practices in the first election in what 
they saw as the exclusion of uneducated individuals from parliament. As one 
MPP argued, ‘people like S’bu Ndebele emerged after 1990, we had never 
heard of them before! A new class came in to take over.’ (Pers. Interview 124). 
Many ANC MPPs who have not had the benefits of sustained formal education 
strongly feel a sense of disqualification from opportunities for advancement. 
Notwithstanding that they possess no formal educational qualifications, some 
MPPs have successfully attempted to reinvent themselves as part of an intel-
lectual elite. With the exception of Jacob Zuma (discussed earlier), the only 
ANC cabinet minister that does not have a strong educational background is 
Dumisani Makhaye. Yet Dumisani Makhaye’s frequent public statements and 
letters to the media and within party circles on a variety of topics expressed in 
pugnacious africanist and socialist discourse provided him with access to elite 
circles of power. The ability to frame present intellectual debates within the 
language of the past, and to continue to engage with such debates gave him a 
high public and party profile. In contrast to the IFP, however, while education 
might provide the ANC access to some of the most senior posts, it does not 
seem to have an impact in overall recruitment to the legislature. While some of 
the most senior in the legislature are well educated, they co-exist with other 
senior and many less senior MPPs with no formal educational qualifications. 
Educational background has also provided a basis for social networks in 
parties and in parliament in KwaZulu-Natal. In post-colonial African countries 
there is a sense of familiarity and an intimacy among the political elite: ‘reci-
procal assimilation of the elite … occurs in educational channels’ (Bayart 1993: 
                                                            
66  Piper asserts that ‘the IFP has struggled with a lack of direction since 1994, exacer-
bated by … its inability to attract young, bright, black leadership …’ (Piper 1999: 
203). However, these assertions rely upon interviews with only 11 IFP members at a 
time when the struggle for the heart and soul of the party had taken on a racial 
discourse. Of those interviewed, the overwhelming majority were white (n=8), and 
only 2 were black. Of black members interviewed, one did not complete school and 
the other was educated and was organic to the IFP. 
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159). This is borned out in KwaZulu-Natal as a cluster of the elite members that 
have served in parliament since 1994 knew one another or individuals who 
became significant political figures at school or at university. ANC MPP Ismail 
Meer, for example, became a friend of Nelson Mandela while studying law at 
the University of Witwatersrand. The majority of individuals who knew one 
another either attended the University of Fort Hare or the University of Zulu-
land. In some cases, networks have provided a basis upon which elites have 
been provided with a first step towards a parliamentary career. For example, one 
IFP MPP discussed her move from the PAC to the IFP in these terms. She said,  
‘When we got into difficulties because of the turmoil in the PAC, we slowly drifted 
to the IFP because we had known Dr. Buthelezi for a long time, socially through my 
husband as well as at Fort Hare. Dr. Buthelezi and I were students together’ (Pers. 
IFP Interview 116). 
While such indirect networks hold true for some MPPs, others were directly 
recruited while they were students. For example, MPP Phillip Powell became 
involved in the IFP through an MPP he met as a student at the University of 
Natal. MPP Blessed Gwala, was initiated into the IFP through MPP Ziba Jiyane 
who involved him while they were school age students together. In other cases, 
it appears that the institution to which some MPPs were affiliated while students 
has provided a pattern of association that has resulted in relationships of trust. 
For example one ANC MPP discussed his educational experience at Adams as, 
‘this was the old missionary establishment where prominent people who went 
had included Joshua Nkomo, Nkosazana Zuma ...’ (Pers. ANC Interview 87). 
Of course, it was anticipated that such an establishment would produce a parti-
cular type of graduate. Trust in the institution provided the basis for advantages 
among graduates from it.  
Although the educational patterns among white MPPs differ considerably to 
other racial groups they have still provided a basis upon which political selec-
tion was made. One MPP described his choice to exclude himself from a 
candidacy within the DP. This choice was based upon his perceptions of the 
networks that functioned and were grounded in educational experiences that 
produced a particular kind of politician. He said, 
‘The DP was an elitist party from way back and I couldn’t reconcile what they were 
saying with their structures on the ground. I didn’t go to private school in Natal and 
I didn’t move with the old school boys and I found a lot of the old “progs” that way 
inclined. They had been to Hilton67 and they had a lot of ideas, but when it comes 
down to grass roots problems they were above the clouds’ (Pers. NNP Interview 25).  
                                                            
67  An expensive private school. 
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So while shared educational experiences among the political elite contri-
buted in some cases to social capital, in other cases such patterns of association 
resulted in conscious exclusion. 
In Africa, the transitional period from an authoritarian regime to a demo-
cratic one results in a ‘passive revolution’ (Bayart 1993: 181). This synthesises 
the rise of the educated into power (ibid.), a process of social upheaval in which 
the educated take over from the chiefs (ibid.: 123). In Africa, as in parts of Latin 
America and Eastern Europe compromise and accommodation has characterised 
the passive revolution between the educated and other groups, resulting in a 
Bayart’s conservative modernisation. This results ‘less in the circulation than in 
the fusion of elites, in other words an amalgam of the two elements’ (Michels 
1971: 131). In KwaZulu-Natal this is more complicated, because different forms 
of compromise and exclusion are present in the different parties that make up 
the legislature. In the IFP many groups co-exist including Amakhosi, educated, 
professional and non-educated. This is nowhere more apparent than in the 
relationships between the Amakhosi and the educated elite which is charaterised 
by both fusion (most MPPs who are chiefs are also educated) and in alliance 
(the educated act on behalf of the chieftaincy as a consequence of political 
culture) and in co-existence (chiefs and educated co-exist independently). This 
is in contrast to the ANC, which is charaterised by fracture, alliance and co-
optation. The struggle movement, as in countries with other nationalist-socialist 
struggles, attacked traditional sources of power such as the chieftaincy and then 
sidelined the institution of traditional leadership at national level through 
legislation. The first term in the province is characterised by the absorbtion of 
intellectuals into the legislature and the gradual co-optation of populist unedu-
cated elites that co-exist. So whereas the educated become ‘brokers of the 
modern state’ (Bayart 1993: 136) it is through a combination of fusion, alliance, 
co-optation and fracture that simultaneously occurs and it is not at the expense 
of other social groups. 
In office, the necessities of governance somewhat condition the educational 
choices of the political elite. This can be seen in the disciplinary specialisations 
which, over the first 10 years changed and indicate increasing homogeneity.  
As illustrated in Graph 3.9, approximately twice as many MPPs studied sub-
jects in the social and political sciences and in law than any other subject. 
Although MPPs from the DP have been varied in their educational speciali-
sations, in the NNP there has been a concentration of white MPPs in finance 
related disciplines and accountancy. However, black MPPs in the NNP have 
focused on theology and labour relations. In the IFP, there has been a con-
centration of MPPs in the specialisations of social and political sciences, medi-
cine, education and agriculture. These concentrations have remained relatively 
constant throughout the two terms of this study.  
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Graph 3.9     Number of graduate MPPs by specialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the ANC during the first term, there was a predominance of law majors 
among MPPs.68 This correlates with patterns in other transitional systems. As 
‘the functional characteristics of the practice of law ... and of legislative roles 
are generally similar: Both involve advocacy, bargaining, compromise, and a 
predisposition towards the use of established and agreed-upon procedures in 
resolving differences of opinion. It seems reasonable to suggest that legal train-
ing and legislative careers exert mutual and reciprocal attraction ...’ (Welsh 
1979: 83-84). However, this concentration in law has been on the decline in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Almost all ANC MPPs with specialisation in law exited from 
parliament at the end of the first term69 and many more ANC MPPs entered 
parliament with diplomas rather than degrees.  
In the diploma specialisations,70 there is a slightly higher concentration of 
MPPs in nursing and education than other subjects (see Graph 3.10). By and 
large, ANC MPPs are found to be concentrated in nursing, education and com-
munity development related subjects. However, over the first term of office, 
ANC MPPs that had completed diplomas were predominantly based in teach-
                                                            
68  These included, for example, MPP Ina Cronje, MPP John Jeffrey, Mjabulise Ma-
dondo, MPP Senzo Mchunu, MPP Ismail Meer and MPP Nhlanhla Ngidi. 
69  See Chapter 5 for a discussion of political elite circulation and the destination of 
MPPs who left the legislature at the end of the first term. 
70  The graph is limited by the number of ANC MPPs who chose to discuss their edu-
cational background. 
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ing. In the second term there has been a gradual shift away from teaching into 
community related subjects and nursing. This concentration of ANC MPPs in 
diploma specialisations correlates with IFP MPPs in degree specialisations. One 
might therefore argue that the elites in the two dominant parties have become 
slightly more homogenous in their educational specialisations over the two 
terms of office as their focus upon developmentally related disciplines is clearer 
in the second term and the initial ANC emphasis on procedural related disci-
plines has declined. This is hardly surprising. South Africa is a developing 
country and the practicalities of governance demands creative long-term think-
ing about a range of development alternatives and not simply an ability to make 
laws and read legislation. Hence, the necessities of public policy in developing 
countries might structure the types of specialisations that elites, interested in a 
political career, might choose prior to politics. 
 
 
Graph 3.10     MPPs by post-high school diploma specialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Occupational background 
In the contemporary African state, social fluidity ‘renders clear identification of 
classes particularly difficult’ (Forrest 1987: 69; cf. Bayart 1979). Indeed ‘the 
multi-dimensional nature of social stratification systems south of the Sahara is 
original’ (Bayart 1993: 104) and ‘the postcolonial state also lacks a clear class 
structure’ (ibid.: 59). While the heterogeneity of the political elite in KwaZulu-
Natal confirms this, occupational class may be less difficult to locate. In the 
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KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature, MPPs are drawn from a wide range of 
occupational classes which includes professionals, senior and middle man-
agement, small business owners, paraprofessionals, technical and skilled trades, 
unskilled labourers and, sales, service, administrative and clerical occupations.71  
As shown in Graph 3.11, one third of the political elite is from the profes-
sional or paraprofessional classes (doctors, attorneys, accountants, teachers, 
nurses, journalists, social workers, academics, and other forms of researchers). 
These figures are similar to those found by Barkan in Benin and Ghana (Barkan 
2004: 240) Almost one fifth of MPPs are small business owners, and the third 
largest group of MPPs consists of individuals who have no non-political occu-
pation and have been employed only as party workers, politicians, trade union-
ists, civil servants or amakhosi (Graph 3.11). MPPs drawn from skilled trades 
include farmers, mechanics and a dress designer. Of these, almost 39% exited 
from parliament after the first term which shows a narrowing of occupations  
 
 
Graph 3.11     MPPs by occupational class 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
71  The graph has been constructed primarily from information gathered during 116 of 
the personal interviews of MPPs. The 36 MPPs who are not included are not party 
specific and either primarily declined to discuss their professional background or are 
deceased. Some MPPs have been listed in more than one category due to the per-
formance of more than one occupation. 
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that, in accordance with other legislative research, legislatures are increasingly 
drawn from particular segments of society, to the exclusion of other groups. In 
administrators and clerical occupations (Graph 3.11). Of this diverse group, 
37.5% also exited parliament after the first term. This would appear to confirm 
from which elites are drawn. This is reinforced by the fact that only 15.8% of 
the elite have been drawn from the managerial classes, sales and service, elite 
theoretical perspectives, this is an indication of the professionalisation of poli-
tics (Herzog 1975). However, an increasing homogeneity in occupational class 
is offset by heterogeneity in other areas. 
There is also continuity in an elite drawn from the professional and para-
professional classes. In comparison to the choices of profession made by the 
African elite from 1850 to 1930, provincial MPPs in this study show a measure 
of continuity. Kuper notes that historically the elite members were teachers, 
lawyers, doctors, journalists and religious ministers. The black political elite is 
drawn from the professions of teaching, law, medicine, journalism, academia, 
nursing and social work, representing an expansion of the professional back-
ground of the elite (Kuper 1965: 73-80). However, it is not intended to suggest 
that this demonstrates a continuous pattern of professional choice since Kuper’s 
study. Certainly, racially restrictive policies limited the professional choices of 
the black elite. Kuper notes that ‘the combination of segregation, discrimination 
and poverty ... barred the progress of the African’ (ibid.: 78) elite. However, to 
qualify this he states that, ‘the main growth (of the African elite) coincides with 
the years after the second world war, when the policy of apartheid was being 
applied most systematically and extensively’ (ibid.: 77). Of course Kuper drew 
his conclusions in 1965 and hence the study does not examine the subsequent 
expansion of the elite members in the later years, nor removal of restrictions in 
their professional choices. By contrast, the white political elite drawn from the 
professional and paraprofessional classes are predominantly accountants and 
lawyers. This is in accordance with the predominant occupations of parliament-
arians in western democracies, drawn from the “chattering classes”, and occu-
pations which leave room for flexible careers. 
Notwithstanding that a significant proportion of MPPs are drawn from flex-
ible occupations (accountants and lawyers), which enables some to balance 
parliamentary activities with other occupations, most choose not to. Instead, for 
most MPPs parliamentary and party work takes up most of their time. Those 
MPPs that were found to balance parliamentary work with a professional occu-
pation were predominantly drawn from the minority parties,72 were white and 
                                                            
72  These MPPs were mainly interviewed at their place of non-political work. 
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male.73 Significantly, the majority were formerly councillors under the ward 
system in which demands on their time from predominantly white constituents 
in more developed areas may have been limited. Clearly, in these cases, some of 
the interpretations of the role of a councillor have been transposed within the 
provincial parliament.  
Flexibility in occupation is not limited to the professional classes. By far the 
largest cluster of MPPs with flexible occupations is formed by small business 
owners, making up 32 MPPs (see Graph 3.12). Of these, the most prolific type 
of small businesses owned by MPPs are shops and supermarkets followed by 
farms. IFP MPPs and MPPs from minority parties make up the bulk of these. 
For the most part, immediate family members continue to run these businesses 
while MPPs take care of their parliamentary duties. A notable pattern among 
some MPPs is the holding of multiple, and sometimes diverse, occupations.74 
This is congruent with the patterns of straddling that Iliffe found in parts of east 
Africa (Iliffe 1983). In addition, a significant proportion of MPPs changed  
 
 
Graph 3.12     Percentage of types of businesses owned by MPPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
73  For example, DP MPP Johannes Krog continues to work as an attorney while also a 
parliamentarian. NNP MPP Brian Edwards balances his parliamentary duties with 
his practice as a chartered accountant. 
74  For example, prior to becoming an IFP MPP, Patrick Cornell was a chartered ac-
countant, councillor and owned a small car sales business. PAC MPP Joe Mkhwa-
nazi was formerly a teacher, salesperson and owned a shop and a beerhall complex. 
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occupation at least once prior to becoming parliamentarians.75 This suggests that 
many MPPs in the IFP and minority parties are entrepreneurial. This is in 
contrast to Bayart’s schematic in other parts of Africa. Whereas these MPPs are 
‘straddling’, they acquired their business interests prior to becoming MPPs and 
not after. Hence, the state did not provide them with the means to get rich or to 
become a dominant class through a process of reciprocal assimilation. Hence, 
although as Bayart claims their heterogeneity means that they do not constitute 
a distinct class, the link Bayart makes between the accumulation of power and 
then wealth is reversed in these cases. 
That said, for some of the political elite, patterns of association gained 
during their parliamentary career have enabled them to pursue other ventures. A 
legislative career provides two important assets through parliamentary asso-
ciations. They are knowledge and connections. The ways in which these assets 
are utilised by some MPPs, however, has differed over the two terms of this 
study. In the first term some MPPs exited from parliament into business ven-
tures, their former political status providing social capital, knowledge and ex-
perience to benefit their business career. In the second term, MPPs embarking 
on other ventures have been more likely to combine them with their political 
career. For example, according to one interviewee, ANC MEC for Transport, 
Sibusiso Ndebele has a personal interest in Thokomala, formerly KZN Trans-
port which served predominantly IFP communities before it was privatised 
(Pers. Interviews 141 and 142). The daughter of Gideon Zulu, MEC for Welfare 
and Population Development consulted for Cash Paymaster Services, the com-
pany that won the tender to pay out pensions in KwaZulu-Natal.76 Hence, the 
relationship to the state (for this cluster) does provide a link between power and 
wealth, as in many other African states. But whereas the salaried job might 
provide the political elite with the capital to ‘straddle’ (Bayart 1993: 96-97), it is 
not this that is the main factor here. Rather, access to the state provides know-
ledge that enables the private accumulation of wealth, and for most (and the 
majority of IFP small business owners), the private accumulation of wealth 
began before access to the state was granted. 
                                                            
75  For example, ACDP MPP Jo-Ann Downs was employed in insurance sales, then 
PABX systems and then as a trainee health inspector prior to coming to parliament. 
The same pattern holds true for a number of MPPs. 
76  MEC Zulu was cleared of any wrongdoing by the Venter Commission of Inquiry, 
which found that he played no part in the award of the contract, and received no 
benefit from it. The commission was established when it was discovered that, on 
receipt of payment from Cash Paymaster Services, Zulu’s daughter transferred 
money into his bank account. See Ayoob, Z. ‘MEC played no role in CPS contract’, 
Natal Witness, 31 August 2000 and Ayoob, Z. ‘Zulu denies he influenced CPS 
tender’, Natal Witness, 6 July 2000. 
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A significant cluster of the elite were found to be living both from politics as 
well as for politics (cf. Weber 1958). Of the 22 MPPs illustrated in the graph as 
without a non-political occupation, a significant cluster were incumbent poli-
ticians who had first been elected in 1994 and then re-elected again in 1999. All 
those who fell into this cluster were characterised by two factors. The first was 
an occupation that was political (party worker, parliamentarian, trade unionist, 
civil servant, inkosi). The second was the absence of any other professional or 
occupational background. Of these, some were formerly civil servants others 
were amakhosi, and the remainder had focused on political party work.  
Within this category, clear distinctions were found between IFP and ANC 
MPPs. The IFP MPPs were overwhelmingly either amakhosi or former civil 
servants, occupations that provided them with a distinct range of skills to fall 
back on if their legislative chances were cut short, as well as alternative occu-
pational paths should their party political status become diminished. Moreover, 
many of the IFP MPPs that had been civil servants had a range of educational 
qualifications to support other career directions. In contrast, all ANC MPPs that 
were found to be living from politics had focused entirely on party political 
work and had little or no formal qualifications or alternative career paths im-
mediately available to them, many of which had served continuously since the 
first election.77 The same limited alternative career paths are also found among a 
number of ANC MPPs who were re-deployed from the provincial legislature to 
the national legislature in the second term. Although not provincially incum-
bent, their pattern of service remains continuous and shows the integration of 
elites across the various levels of government. In such cases, the prosperity of 
elites who fall into these clusters is dependent upon continued re-election.  
The professionalisation of politics and the cluster of MPPs living from 
politics would indicate, as Schumpeter argued, that ‘if we wish to face facts 
squarely, we must recognize that, in modern democracies of any type ... politics 
will unavoidably be a career’ (Schumpeter 1962: 285). In many parts of the 
world the pathway to parliament has become narrow as the availability of 
careerist politicians reduces the chances for greater representivity and makes the 
composition of parliament more socially homogenous (cf. Wessels 1997: 76-
97). In KwaZulu-Natal there is slightly more homogeneity over the two terms as 
a result of patterns in the ANC – the loss of MPPS from the professional classes 
and increase in MPPs with no alternative profession. Hence this reproduction 
                                                            
77  These MPPs included, for example, Cyril Xaba, Fatima Nahara, Happy Blose, 
Dumisani Makhaye and Bheki Cele, all who had served continuously since the first 
election. MPP Happy Blose’s non-political experience, for example, is limited to 
employment as a domestic worker which she balanced with a pivotal role in the 
former Natal Midlands ANC Women’s League prior to entering parliament in 1994. 
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and circulation means they might have become slightly less responsive to the 
needs of the electorate.  
Despite this, the heterogeneity demonstrated across the parties makes col-
lective self-reproduction unlikely. The political elite do not constitute one social 
class. If we need to think about the elite in KwaZulu-Natal in relation to class, it 
is not ‘the struggle of classes, but … a struggle about class’ (Przeworski 1977: 
343-401). They neither comprise one social class that gain access to the state, 
nor do they constitute a dominant class within the state. Rather, acute poverty 
and inequality produces the practice of straddling as a method of diversifying 
the safeguards to prevent poverty. In this regard, the political elite are no more 
remarkable than the African electorate.  
 
Community related activities 
Community related activities encompass voluntary participation by elites in 
activities that are not directly politically related, work in non-governmental 
organisations and participation on the boards and committees of public bodies. 
The members of the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal participate extensively in a 
diverse range of such activities. However, distinct trends, within parties, in the 
type of activities pursued by elites are evident.  
Many white MPPs from the NNP, and some from the IFP who left parlia-
ment in its first few years, share a fairly similar profile. Many are members of 
the Durban Country Club, an institution that until recently excluded women. In 
addition, a large proportion are members of Lions, a liberal philanthropic so-
ciety which dispenses bursaries. These MPPs share with their DP counterparts a 
commitment to wildlife, environmental and welfare concerns. Some sit on the 
boards of a number of organisations dedicated to conservation concerns, and are 
involved in senior citizens welfare issues. Some DP MPPs also share charac-
teristics found among IFP MPPs. Many sit on educational or health related com-
mittees. These roles include school board members, hospital board members, 
primary school trustees, societies that are dedicated to the eradication of dis-
eases such as the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the Red Cross and Rotary, a social 
and charitable club made up of business and professional persons. 
Among the parties, it is the IFP which stands out for its MPPs’ commitment 
to grassroots development activities. These include, for example, school build-
ing projects, subsistence farming projects, co-operatives, refugee assistance, 
crèche building, youth character building, housing projects, organised assistance 
to homeless people, child welfare, feeding projects, water provision and road 
construction projects. Many of these projects have only very limited financial 
resources and are directed at people living on the margins of society. A common 
thread among MPPs who are active in this way is involvement in multiple 
developmental projects within a particular district, and the overwhelming ma-
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jority of these MPPs were involved in such activites prior to becoming an 
MPP.78 
In the ANC, very few MPPs claimed involvement in community related 
activities that are not political. Of the few MPPs that could be said to have 
participated in non-party, union or civic organisations, most were involved in 
conflict resolution or peace related activities79. Only a couple of ANC MPPs 
could be said to have directly participated in community development projects. 
These were Inkosi Zibuse Mlaba and Mjabulise Madondo, who are both rurally 
located. In both cases, their development related activities have been on a 
relatively larger scale than IFP counterparts. Inkosi Zibuse Mlaba, for example, 
initiated and secured a R10 million water project in the KwaXimba area in 
which he resides before becoming a parliamentarian. Mjabulise Madondo, as 
Chairman of the MPDC, secured R3.5 million for rural development purposes 
in Msinga through Nelson Mandela, then ANC and South African President. 
These two cases illustrate the way in which provincial MPPs have secured 
extensive developmental resources through their national party machinery to 
promote local development in two rural areas. In KwaXimba the ANC branch 
was the second largest in the ANC midlands region in 1994 (Gastrow 1994: 90-
91). In Msinga, the IFP is the predominant party. While both cases are thus 
politically very distinct, the political motivations and implications of such 
massive scale developmental projects may not be so different. Although the 
politicisation of development is not a new concept in states with limited re-
sources, provincial MPPs acting as brokers for national party imperatives at the 
local level is perhaps a new way in which this has become manifested. 
 
                                                            
78  For example, IFP MPP Nomthandazo Mkhize founded Umzinyathi Development 
Association which assists 47 women’s handiwork clubs, works with youths in char-
acter building, in poverty relief for street children, sponsors two choirs and a local 
football team. The late IFP MPP Thanda Dingila was involved in the building of a 
clinic, a primary school and the construction of a road and water system in Thafa-
masi. In addition, he helped to repair classrooms destroyed by floods, established the 
KwaZulu-Natal Unemployment Crisis Committee, supervised the Ndedwe Schools 
Feeding Scheme and was involved in the Richmond Farm Housing Scheme (Pers. 
IFP Interview 18). All of these activities took place prior to him becoming an MPP 
in 1997. 
79  For example, ANC MPP Roy Ainslie worked as an unrest monitor, Meshack Radebe 
was extensively involved in the Mpumalanga Township peace structures, Mjabulise 
Madondo is involved in the Msinga Peace and Development Committee (MPDC) 
and the late Harry Gwala considered his role in the Natal Midlands to be one of 
conflict resolution. 
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Social clusters of the political elite 
The multiplicity of diverse social characteristics possessed by MPPs mean that 
it is not possible to present a typical social profile of the political elite. How-
ever, overlapping clusters of elites may be identified.  
 
Social clusters within political parties 
Within political parties, a number of clusters of elites were identified. The IFP 
possesses the most socially fractured elite of all the parties, yet simultaneously 
these clusters of elites have become more integrated since the fracture of the 
party in the mid-first term. On the one hand there is a cluster of IFP MPPs who 
are very well educated, attended mission schools, were sons and daughters of 
the former African middle classes, have a professional non-political occupation 
and were active in developmentally related community activities. In another 
cluster MPPs could be said to have little or no education but strong community 
backgrounds, through either developmentally related work or hereditary status 
and are self-employed. A third cluster of MPPs (now on the decline) consists of 
white MPPs who have a strong educational and professional background but 
limited development-related experience. However, these particular clusters of 
elites, in their totality, do not describe all elites. Instead, a significant proportion 
of elites exist that cut across these clusters and are characterised as sharing 
characteristics from a number of clusters.  
What links these different elites together are two interlinked factors. First, 
the presence of one or two overlapping characteristics among MPPs with con-
trasting backgrounds binds elites into a multiplicity of party networks. For 
example, the predominance of rural affiliations among MPPs from both the 
urban and rural environments contributes to cross-cutting networks. The second, 
but related, factor that links the political elite are syncretic politicians whose 
social characteristics lend themselves to the language of different discourses. 
For example, IFP MPP Ellis Vezi who completed a Diploma in Management 
Studies, began a B.Proc and was employed in a law firm for 25 years, a Bar-
clays Bank development officer and later self-employed insurance broker shares 
social characteristics that might lend themselves to a pattern of association with 
the well educated professionals that exist in the party. However, his experience 
of the rural context as a representative on the tribal council of the KwaMathi 
Tribal Authority also provides social capital that integrates him with those elites 
who share a strong community background through hereditary status. Together 
these factors integrate party elites in cross-cutting networks. 
In contrast, the clusters of ANC political elites are on the whole more clearly 
differentiated by social background. The majority of ANC MPPs share a few 
distinct characteristics. They are, on the whole, drawn from the urban environ-
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ment (especially the major urban locations within eThekwini and Umgungun-
dlovu), have limited religious affiliations (although some of their parents are 
clergy), and lack community related voluntary experiences of a non-political 
nature. The predominance of lawyers in the first term of office has been sur-
passed by another, younger cluster of MPPs with nursing, education and com-
munity development related educational and professional backgrounds. Many 
older MPPs remain that benefitted from mission based education. However, 
existing side by side is a third cluster of MPPs that have limited educational and 
professional backgrounds and may be said to be living from politics. 
Of the larger minority parties, DP MPPs are on the whole well educated with 
professional backgrounds, drawn from an urban background. Of these, white, 
christian MPPs are predominantly concentrated around the affluent suburbs of 
eThekwini and Umgungundlovu, are predominantly male with a liberal philan-
thropic pattern of community involvement. However, cross cutting patterns of 
association bind together a few other MPPs whose characteristics diverge from 
this dominant pattern.80 In the NNP, gender and syncretic patterns of regional 
identification among black MPPs ties them to their white, urban colleagues who 
would otherwise fall into a separate elite cluster. White MPPs educational and 
professional focus upon accountancy and finance related disciplines and mem-
bership of the Durban Country Club is distinct from the labour relations and 
theology focus of black MPPs involved in community projects. 
 
Social clusters across political parties 
The political elite in KwaZulu-Natal may be said to have become more socially 
homogenous on both sides of the aisle since 1994. On the whole, educational 
levels have risen and occupational classes have narrowed and the number of 
white MPPs has declined in favour of more black MPPs. Nevertheless, across 
parties fairly distinct clusters of elites that share similar characteristics can be 
discerned.  
One cluster consists of predominantly white MPPs who possess a well edu-
cated professional background, urban patterns of regional affiliation but limited 
lineage ties of significant status and insignificant community related experi-
ences or experiences of an administrative nature. There are MPPs like this pre-
dominantly located in all of the four main parties. Their social similarities to 
one another in the IFP and ANC are significant because racially they remain on 
the fringes of the parliamentary elite, offering services to a party to which some 
of them (particularly in the IFP) share limited ideological affiliation in the post-
                                                            
80  For example, MPP Margaret Ambler-Moore matches this pattern with the exception 
that she is female. MEC Wilson Ngcobo is drawn from the rural environment and is 
black but fits the pattern in all other ways. 
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1994 period (see Chapter 4). Thus should their bonds of party affiliation lessen, 
the social similarities with MPPs in other parties become a basis upon which 
they may change allegiances. 
Two further distinct clusters of elites may be identified. However, within 
these clusters internal differences serves to tie them more firmly to their party 
allegiances than groups across parties. One group consists predominantly of 
black MPPs with a shared conservative family upbringing, as the sons and 
daughters of former middle class groupings who attended mission based schools 
and received a good education. However, despite these similarities, this group 
tends to be divided by their particular urban and rural affiliations which paral-
lels their party distinctions. The other group may be identified among predomi-
nantly black ANC and IFP MPPs with strong local affiliations and a relatively 
limited educational background. Again, however, despite these similarities, the 
group is divided by patterns of lineage ties of status which parallel party 
patterns. Moreover, they are further divided by their extent of community devel-
opment related experience. The significance of these groupings is that while 
they might identify with MPPs across the aisle, other prominent social affilia-
tions distinguish them from counterparts in other parties. However, in this clus-
ter the shared patterns of social background across the aisle have eased a dia-
logue among groups of elites rather than provided instability as in the first 
cross-party cluster discussed above. 
Conclusion 
The political elite that emerged in 1994 and has developed over the first two 
terms of parliament is composed on the whole of individuals from diverse social 
backgrounds, indicating radical heterogeneity in elite formation. Despite this, 
there are significant similarities, by political party, between clusters of elites on 
a range of social characteristics. As the political spaces available to individuals 
narrowed in 1994, so did the range of elites that became parliamentarians. Many 
of these were already an elite of sorts, atypical of the electorate – by their social 
background – prior to their parliamentary career. In some cases, political spaces 
remained personalised, as elites were able to draw upon social networks to 
guarantee a place in the new institutions. Social capital, was in some cases, 
based on shared social background, resulting in an intimacy of familiarity. Yet, 
there is no evidence of a reproduction of a political elite based upon common 
material interests. That said, while remaining socially fractured, most notably 
(but not entirely) in the distinctions between elites from different political par-
ties, the elite has become more socially homogenous over the two terms of 
office. In some cases, elites from different political parties share very similar 
social characteristics, potentially enabling fluidity in the legislature and fragility 
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of allegiance to the political party. This complex matrix of both cross-cutting 
and distinctive patterns is indicative of the synthesis of a continuity of charac-
teristics among the elite in the new political institutions accompanied simultane-
ously by radical change.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
4 
Political, organisational and  
institutional background of  
an emerging political elite 
‘What matters is not to ascribe to this ruling class a coherence and a continuity … 
which it does not possess’ (Aron 1968 in Etzioni-Halevy 1997: 88). 
‘The operation of the state apparatus is … not adequately explained by the power of 
only one class’ (Aron 1960: 260-281).  
Studies of the characteristics of the political elite focus almost entirely upon 
their social composition. In studies where this is not the case, references to 
political background usually concentrate upon two factors. The first is the party 
political affiliation of elites, which is considered to be the most important deter-
minant of values and behaviour. The second is categories of political experience 
(length of party service, length of government service and the like) that is used 
in studies of supply and demand analyses of political recruitment to assess how 
selectors chose candidates for office and how representative the elite is. In this 
study, however, political party affiliation is not found to be the most important 
factor in attitudes and behaviours. The reasons for this are that both the his-
torical-political circumstances in which the political elite consciously chose 
their political home and in which selectors chose their candidates were not 
rooted in a democratic context in which the values of freedom of expression and 
movement enabled increased choice. As such, many elite members made 
choices based upon local political contexts, chance and personal circumstances 
that led them to become caught up in the grand politics that solidified patterns 
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of political association. Hence the values and attitudes found in political parties 
are multiform and contradictory.  
Examples of this may be found in other parts of the world. Populist move-
ments that have emerged in northern, central and eastern Europe in the 21st 
Century as a response to the crisis in the legitimacy of liberal democracy com-
prise cross-class alliances that lack one consistent ideology or coherent value 
set. The structural conditions that led to the rise of populism includes post-
industrialism, the gradual erosion of party politics, rising social inequality and 
growing unemployment (cf. Zaslove 2008; Taggart 2004). Despite emerging in 
response to a perceived crisis in democracy (and often opposing the repre-
sentative parts of liberal democracy and threatening democratic principles) the 
structural conditions by which parties can organise makes them quite different 
movements to those that emerged in sub-saharan Africa. Freedom of organisa-
tion and movement endows candidates with knowledge of a range of political 
homes and the ability to choose, according to their value systems which one to 
select. 
The case of KwaZulu-Natal is an extreme example of the structure of 
choices available to candidates and selectors in post-colonial sub-saharan Afri-
can states that have emerged from conflict and civil war. Common to each is a 
colonial experience of divide and rule, restricted freedom of movement and re-
sulting deep rooted geographical divisions based upon an oppressive system of 
control. In Angola hardened regional political movements emerged that divided 
the country into three – the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 
in the North, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 
the centre, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) in the South. In Mozambique, the Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique (FRELIMO) emerged in the centre and the north of the country while the 
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) occupied the South. In these 
cases, as in KwaZulu-Natal it was inconceivable for a candidate to select a 
political home that did not dominate the geographical area in which one was 
located, especially as civil war between the movements took root. The situation 
of KwaZulu-Natal was further compounded by the apartheid homeland system, 
of which KwaZulu was the most fragmented, and the pass laws which severely 
restricted the freedom of movement of the population. Herewith the occupation 
of territory severely curtailed the range of options for those wishing a political 
career.  
The social composition of political elites is frequently employed in studies of 
them as a means to determine whether they constitute a political class.1 A poli-
tical class may be defined as a political elite who, ‘have expressed an interest to 
                                                            
1  Other terms include ruling class. 
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live from politics … have experienced a political career which contributes to a 
common identity … actively pursue the monopolisation of chances of market 
exploitation … of their performance, and they possess political power’ (Wessels 
1997: 77, cf. Wessels 1992: 541-649 and Weber 1976) However, given the 
acute historical-political circumstances in which the political elite consciously 
chose their political home and in which selectors chose their candidates in 
KwaZulu-Natal, political background (including the experiences and circum-
stances in which the political elite chose and remained with their political home) 
might be a better indicator than social composition in KwaZulu-Natal and in 
other post-colonial African states recovering from civil war. Political back-
ground may also be a better indicator in countries that have undergone a demo-
cratic transition. A key factor is to examine the political background of the 
political elite when the structures that condition the choices, that the political 
elite can make, change. Political background explains why parties are made up 
of competing and contradictory discourses in a post-transition period. Political 
background, among the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal, has provided political 
capital. This may be defined as the resources that the elite bring to parliament 
with them which may be understood to be significant factors in their desirability 
for office among selectors. Political capital is commonly understood to include 
legislative experience, party service, political connections and the like. In turn, 
political capital has led in KwaZulu-Natal to not one political class, but to 
many.  
In this chapter I explore the political background of the political elite in the 
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature. I draw extensively on the biographical 
information collected through interviews, as in chapter three, to document the 
prevalence of specific characteristics and patterns among the political elite. I 
explore the motivations and circumstances of political involvement, the extent 
of this involvement and the various different types of involvement. I further 
interrogate the characteristics of the political choices that the political elite 
made. From this, I further claim that for many, the reasons for their particular 
political affiliations are no longer relevant. While some of the elite have very 
long and deep political affiliations with their political home and an alternative 
political home would be inconceivable to them, this is not the case for all. The 
consequences of this are, firstly, an identification among some of the elite of 
their interests with the legislature. Secondly, the potential for more fluidity is 
present within the legislature as some of the older political affiliations break 
down. Hence, on the one hand political background roots some elites to their 
older affiliations, provides political capital and defines particular ruling classes. 
On the other hand, political background is no longer relevant to present day 
affiliations.  
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These findings in KwaZulu-Natal suggest that one of the key reasons for the 
blurred distinctions between party and state that emerged as a common feature 
in many African post-colonial and post-transition states is rooted in the parti-
cular bounded format of political elite formation during the period of liberation 
struggle and in the immediate post-war period. Elites in the new democratic 
legislature who were previously unable to choose from a range of political alter-
natives follow one of two paths. First, they tie their interests to the legislature as 
older affiliations become less relevant. This increases fluidity among political 
parties (often resulting in one dominant party) and makes it less likely that some 
elites will relinquish power in the face of party defeat. As a result, for some, the 
legislature comes to be seen as the political home, supplanting the political 
party and resulting in a broader inability to entrench democracy. Secondly, they 
retain their affiliations to hardened political camps which gradually become less 
relevant as freedom of movement and expression becomes a common feature 
within the state. 
Initial political involvement 
The complexity of the political context, in the pre-1994 period and for some 
time after, including the disarray of organisational and institutional affiliations 
from which political elites emerged obscures many of the personal motivations 
and the multiplicity of associative patterns that political elites held. Seemingly, 
on the surface, many of the political choices that elites made were guided by the 
grand political context. In reality, however, many of these choices had little to 
do with it. However, while not a consequence of the grand picture, the political 
choices that political elites made prior to 1994 were to locate them within it. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the motivations and circumstances in 
which the political elite first became involved in politics. 
 
Motivations for initial political involvement 
Political motivation is a difficult factor to measure for two reasons. Firstly, it 
refers to a psychological inclination that ‘may be rooted in an individual’s 
personality and tempered by the larger political environment’ (Herrnson 1997: 
191). Hence, it may be that some people are more predisposed to seek political 
office than others and that their motivation for active involvement is often a 
product of a whole range of factors including them fielding the possibility of 
involvement with a range of actors (family, friends, trade unions, and other 
organised groups) before they make their choices. Secondly, political ‘motiva-
tion is hidden; older MPs may have forgotten their initial impetus; candidates 
may disguise naked ambition under the cloak of public service ...’ (Norris & 
Lovenduski 1997: 182) Indeed, a whole body of literature, including rational 
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choice theory, assumes that the key motivation for political involvement is 
always political ambition (cf. Fowler & McClure 1989; Ehrenhalt 1992; Kazee 
1994; Herrnson 1997: 187-208). One may then take these two factors as a given 
and instead explore the further motivations to be found among the political elite. 
Although political ambition may have played a part in the motivations of 
many of the political elite, very few claimed this as their primary reason. Only 
one MPP openly stated that this was his primary motivation. He said, ‘I wanted 
to be a big man. I wanted to lead the country’ (Pers. IFP Interview 138). Here 
the perception of a political role is interpreted as including status and respect. 
More common were personal reasons which were related to personal ambition, 
or a consequence of it. For example, one ANC MPP stated, ‘I am from a very 
poor family and looking at the way my family was struggling I felt bitterness. I 
thought, “Why should I not get what others are getting?”’ (Pers. ANC Interview 
109). In this example, a political role was associated with a better standard of 
living, and through it, better life circumstances through the variety of rewards 
that success in a political career would bring. In all cases where political am-
bition was mentioned as a key factor or as a consequence, the MPP concerned 
only became an MPP in the second term. This indicates that many of the newer 
generation of MPPs may not be caught up in some of the older fault lines and 
associative political patterns that divide others and that they are more likely to 
see their prospective careers as tied to the legislature than to any political party. 
Apart from personal political ambition, collective goals provided a key 
group of motivational reasons for political involvement. The first of these was a 
desire to change society for the better. Some MPPs, for example, talked about 
the way in which they wanted to bring their skills to bear in specific public 
policy areas. One NNP MPP, for example, specifically became involved in 
politics in 1993 to take up the local government portfolio. Prior to this he had 
served as Deputy City Treasurer and Town Clerk for the Chief Executive in 
Durban and was a local government consultant. He was well qualified with a 
B.Com and had passed the examinations for the Institute of Municipal Treas-
urers. Entering politics was a way to contribute to policy for society more 
generally.  
Another significant group of MPPs who wished to correct a deficiency in 
society, and more typical of the South African political context, described their 
political involvement as a response to the injustices of apartheid. These MPPs 
spoke broadly of the injustices of racially discriminatory legislation and the 
need for the extension of rights to all citizens. For example, an IFP MPP said, ‘I 
had a complete abhorrence to any form of individual overpowering another 
simply because they were in power. I needed to show resistance towards in-
justices’ (Pers. IFP Interview 34). Some of these MPPs, however, discussed 
their own initial political involvement in this category in the context of the local 
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and in terms of advancing the interests of certain groups. Another IFP MPP and 
traditional leader’s response was so. He said, ‘I helplessly observed the forced 
removals of my people from the places of their birth for no reason … I became 
determined as a leader of those communities to become involved in politics so 
that I could be in a position to fight for their rights’ (Pers. IFP Interview 51). 
Involvement in politics was thus a means to substantive political representation 
for a community with which he was associated and from a position in which he 
was already an elite. 
Another collective goal expressed by MPPs was to advance the interests of a 
political party. In this context MPPs were inspired by the leadership of a par-
ticular party or had sympathies for a political party and they became active 
politically as a consequence of this. For example, according to an NNP MPP, 
‘Mr. De Klerk motivated and inspired me’ (Pers. NNP Interview 37). With the 
exception of two MPPs, all MPPs who fall into this category joined the IFP (see 
later discussion on party political choice) indicating much stronger bonds of 
affiliation to politics through a political party than through a legislative structure 
than any other group. 
A final important reason for the initial political involvement of MPPs was 
the personal impact of the political context. A black NNP MPP, for example, 
became politically involved after becoming a victim of violence when ANC 
affiliated youths in KwaMashu set fire to his shop and to his home. As a result 
he moved to a flat that was attached to NP offices and became a member (Pers. 
NNP Interview 24). An ANC MPP described his initial political involvement as 
a consequence of the impact of apartheid upon his immediate family. He said, ‘I 
was born in 1955 in Cato Manor. We referred to the fifties as the fighting fifties 
… What struck me was the mass removals and especially the removal of my 
family to KwaMashu. My father resisted. They came and destroyed our house’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 134). Another MPP – in the IFP – who was directly af-
fected by political violence described the death of his father who was murdered 
during the riots that occurred during the week-long SARMCOL strike called by 
COSATU in May 1985 (Pers. IFP Interview 65). In all cases of this type, a 
particular incident or set of incidents culminated in an individual becoming po-
litically involved by approaching a political organisation that was an adversary 
to the injustice that they had suffered and that was in competition with the 
political organisation that was believed to have caused the action. 
 
Circumstances of initial political involvement 
The circumstances of initial political involvement reveal much more about the 
motivations of the political elite. There are seven typical circumstances in which 
the political elite in Kwa-Zulu Natal became actively involved in politics. 
Firstly, for the majority of white MPPs, who share a fairly long political history, 
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the circumstances of initial political involvement were guided by the possibility 
of political representation. For most, the time period between deciding to join a 
political party and active political representation as a councillor was less than 
one year. In most cases, these two events occurred simultaneously. MPP Cliff 
Matthee, for example, became a member of the Natal Provincial Council re-
presenting Durban North in 1974, the same year in which he joined the United 
Party (Pers. NNP Interview 62). Hence, MPPs became involved to become re-
presentatives. Political choice for those who took this route was primarily 
restricted to the parties that sent candidates to office in the pre-1994 period. 
In contrast, another cluster of MPPs became actively involved in politics 
through a relationship of trust that they had with traditional authorities. For 
example, an IFP MPP describing his experience said,  
‘As a young man I was invited to serve on the lowest rung of the Tribal Authority. 
The Tribal Secretary, a man known as Charles came and requested that my mother 
offer me as a young man because he thought I had great potential … From there I 
went to the Regional Authority. It was from here that I got involved. I was requested 
by the thirteen Amakhosi (who constituted the regional authority) to represent them 
on the erstwhile KwaZulu Government’ (Pers. IFP Interview 78). 
In this case, an involvement in politics developed over time as the individual 
actively came to represent the Amakhosi. In this case, a young man with a good 
education and a traditional upbringing was well placed to serve in this manner, 
like the Amakholwa decades earlier. Nor were all who became actively in-
volved in politics through tribal society black. Other examples of people who 
became involved through their proximity and association with tribal society 
include IFP MEC Narend Singh and IFP MPP Maurice Mackenzie. In these 
cases, proximity to, and/or representation of, traditional leaders on a variety of 
different levels was often a precursor to party political involvement. The route 
of political representation was firstly, within institutions and then secondly, to 
join a political party. This route of political involvement was often to define the 
party political choice as the IFP.  
A third category of MPPs became politically involved through youth and 
civic organisations that catapulted them into political protests. MPP Bheki Cele, 
for example, was a member of Masibonisane2 Youth Organisation from 1979 
onwards. Through this organisation he became actively involved in the muni-
cipal bus boycott of 1982 and then the rent boycotts of 1983. Lamontville, 
where he lived, was one of six townships that united under JORAC and the 
leadership of the ANC underground to protest at the increased service charges 
                                                            
2  Share our views. 
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in the townships3 in March 1983. By late 1983, Cele was also recruited and 
found himself ‘fighting Ulundi instead of Pretoria’ (Cele in: Daily News, 9 
October 1991: 21) when the Deputy-Minister of Co-operation and Development 
announced the incorporation of Lamontville into the KwaZulu Homeland (cf. 
Daily News, 9 October 1991). Hence the events of specific forms of protest 
politics further defined the political home after the circumstances of initial poli-
tical involvement. For elites categorised into this type, the majority associated 
with the ANC. 
Student politics was the route to political participation by a large group of 
MPPs across the political spectrum. This route applied equally to those who 
became members of the IFP as of the ANC. For example, IFP MPPs Mandla 
Malakoana and Nhlanhla Khubisa were involved in South African Democratic 
Student’s Movement (SADSM) that was affiliated to the IFP, the latter MPP 
then founded an IFP branch at the University of Zululand. MPP Blessed Gwala 
joined Inkatha after persuasion by a scholarly friend Ziba Jiyane. ANC MPP 
Cyril Xaba was recruited to the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), 
a UDF affiliate while still at school. ANC MPP then Premier Sibusiso Ndebele 
was a founder member of the Black People’s Convention and then later he, 
ANC MPP Nhlanhla Ngidi and IFP MPP Faith Gasa became South African 
Students’ Organisation (SASO) members. Faith Gasa was responsible for 
changing the student affiliations at the University of Zululand to SASO, a Black 
Consciousness affiliate. ANC MPP Roy Ainslie was recruited to the National 
Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and he and IFP MPP Ben Ngubane 
both served as Vice-President at different points in time. On the University of 
Natal campus IFP MPP Peter Miller was recruited to the SRC and Phillip 
Powell to NUSAS and then served as Vice-President.4 Many MPPs involved in 
student politics detail their initial involvement as recruitment by a friend in the 
movement. Some MPPs were also recruited as student before they went to 
university. In addition to university campuses MPPs were actively recruited into 
politics at other institutions of learning. For example, PAC MPP Joe Mkhwa-
nazi became actively involved through the influence of his peers at Adams 
College as did ANC MPP Nhlanhla Ngidi before becoming involved in SASO 
at the University of Zululand. In the cases of these individuals, particularly the 
ANC MPPs, they displayed activism from their school years and were assimi-
lated into the dominant party structures very early on in their lives.  
For a further group of MPPs, their professional work brought them into 
direct contact with political organisations or institutions. For those who came to 
                                                            
3  These leaders were Reverend Xundu, Ian Mkhise, Jabu Sithole and Richard Gume-
de. 
4  Powell also gathered covert intelligence for the police. 
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parliament with the IFP, development related work brought them into direct 
contact with politics. An IFP MPP, for example, became initially involved in 
politics while working in rural development. According to her, ‘it was a case of 
politics joining me … I was working on a farm in KwaZulu-Natal. It was then 
that I bumped against the Inkatha Liberation Movement who required someone 
to manage their development office’ (Pers. IFP Interview 127). Other examples 
of those working within rural development include IFP MPP Mzikayise Ngema 
and IFP MPP Maurice Mackenzie. Hence, through a professional development 
related role, MPPs were juxtaposed into a political role. Another group included 
those who were employed as researchers. IFP MPPs Belinda Scott, Phillip 
Powell and Usha Roopnarain were all employed as researchers at the Inkatha 
Institute5 after finishing their postgraduate studies. Their route into parliament 
was through the party that they later joined.  
Family and friends also provided a route into politics for many, particularly 
in the ANC. For example, one ANC MPP described how she grew up in ANC 
exile politics where her parents relocated. To her it just seemed like a natural 
progression to follow in their footsteps. She said, ‘I was used to being with the 
ANC home boys and girls. I did not necessarily understand why my father 
became involved. I just decided to join the ANC as I was by now above the age 
of 18’ (Pers. ANC Interview 113). Another ANC MPP echoed some of these 
sentiments. She said, ‘I was recruited by my brother. He was involved with the 
ANC in KwaMashu. At that time it was the UDF. I was a township girl so I 
became involved … through the civics, through my brother’ (Pers. ANC Inter-
view 71). Indeed other MPPs followed this same pattern. ANC MPP then MEC 
Ina Cronje became involved in politics through her husband Pierre and IFP 
MPP Lauretta Ngcobo became involved through her husband who was an 
accused in the PAC treason trial and whom she assisted in the PAC as a courier. 
Recruitment through family and friends is most common in the ANC although it 
is present in the circumstances of initial political involvement for some MPPs of 
other parties too. 
There are also some uncategorized circumstances in which MPPs initially 
became involved in politics. One MPP was putting up posters on a road when a 
current MPP stopped his car and asked him if he wished to get involved in 
politics (Pers. IFP Interview 110. In another case, an IFP MPP was threatened 
by ANC youths who told him that they would burn down his shop. He said, ‘I 
phoned the NP and … asked them to help me sort out the problem. They said, 
“God Help You”. I spoke to Jurie Mentz just after he had walked over to the 
IFP. He said, “open the shop and call a gathering. I will be there”. The day 
                                                            
5  The Inkatha Institute was a political think tank under the directorship of Professor 
Lawrence Schlemmer from the University of Natal.  
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arrived and so did Jurie and Lionel Mtshali and they had a rally. I then joined 
the IFP’ (Pers. IFP Interview 123). Another IFP MPP became involved in poli-
tics after his family, along with other land hungry migrants from Ntuzuma, 
illegally occupied land and established an informal settlement. He contacted the 
KLA and said that they needed trucks to grade the roads and services to the 
area. Through provision of basic infrastructure and services by the KLA he be-
came known and then involved in politics himself (Pers. IFP Interview 60). 
What is clear is that IFP MPPs present a much more diverse grouping than any 
other group of MPPs in terms of their wide ranging initial political experiences 
and their route into politics. 
With the exception of MPPs who clearly and actively sought a political role 
because of personal ambition, it is apparent that the majority of MPPs became 
associated with a political role very gradually. MPPs came into contact with 
organisations and institutions that were political because of non-directly poli-
tical roles that they occupied. Over time, they became more directly politically 
involved. For the majority, three factors are apparent. First, they were already 
an elite of sorts or active in some way before their initial involvement in poli-
tics. This includes professional elites, well educated elites, and those who were 
involved in a role that was enterprising or committed to better life circum-
stances for a collective of people. Some of these had already been influenced 
already by aspects of the social milieu, such as friends, parents and teachers. 
Others were drawn into politics through outside stimuli i.e. the non-overtly 
political roles that they occupied drew attention to them by already established 
political organisations that saw in them the possibility of potential. Secondly, 
for many their route into politics was almost by accident in which they came 
across an organisation through a variety of circumstances that they did not con-
sciously choose. Thirdly, (see later discussion) the type of non-overtly political 
role that elites occupied, in a politically fractured territory, then defined and 
limited the possibility of political homes that they became affiliated to. Hence, 
politics in Africa is both ‘bottom-up’ (Bayart) and hierarchical. Many members 
of the political elite of today, became affiliated by chance but simultaneously 
held a position that put them in touch with politics. 
Extent of former political involvement: Veterans and newcomers 
The overwhelming majority of the political elite had already acquired political 
experience before they came to parliament. Of these, the majority of those with 
political experience became politically involved in the 1970s and a few in the 
1980s. Most came to parliament with anywhere between 10 and 25 years of 
prior political experience. Newcomers to the political scene, account for a hand-
ful of MPPs who became politically involved in the 1990s. 
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The racial background of veteran MPPs is directly correlated to the levels of 
continuous political affiliations that they held. Perhaps this is directly related to 
the availability of political affiliations that individuals could make in the 1970s 
and 1980s given the bounded and restricted nature of politics during this period. 
Most were assimilated into the dominant local party political structure or an 
affiliation of this structure early on in their political lives, which both estab-
lished and then reinforced the patterns of political affiliations they were to hold 
and the associations they were to make. In contrast to this, the majority of 
veteran white and Asian MPPs who became politically involved in the 1970s 
and the 1980s served in a number of political homes and capacities within those 
homes. For example, IFP MPP Derek Watterson had already served as a mem-
ber of the United Party from 1958 and then the New Republic Party from 1977 
and came to parliament with the IFP in 1994. As such, white and Asian MPPs 
already represented a fluid type of political allegiance when they came to parlia-
ment in 1994 and beyond. The majority of black MPPs who became involved in 
the 1970s and 1980s maintained continuous political affiliations throughout 
their period of involvement with very few changing party or institutional alle-
giances. 
For MPPs whose political experience goes back much further than 1970 their 
level of continuous political party affiliation and associative patterns is directly 
correlated to the political party that they came to parliament with. These are 
predominantly the older members of the legislature, some of whom have since 
passed away. Of this category, MPPs who came to parliament with the ANC 
and NNP tended to maintain a continuous pattern of party affiliation. For ex-
ample, MPP Harry Gwala joined the SACP in 1942 and took co-membership 
with the ANC in 1944. His affiliations remained so as he became more deeply 
involved in struggle politics in both organisations before coming to parliament 
on an ANC list in 1994. The same applies to MPP Ismail Meer who joined the 
ANC and SACP in 1942 and to MPP Fatima Nahara who joined the ANC in the 
1960s, both of whom came to parliament on an ANC ticket. In the NNP, the 
longest serving member of a political institution, Valentino Volker joined the 
party in 1950 and remained a member when he was elected to the provincial 
parliament in 1994 and in 1999. For each of these MPPs they were exposed 
only to the philosophies and values of the political homes that they originally 
chose.  
In contrast, MPPs who came to parliament with the IFP or PAC and had 
political experience that goes back to a period before the 1970s served in more 
than one political home. This is hardly surprising given that the PAC did not 
exist until 1959 and the IFP until 1975. However, it is not that simple. These 
MPPs did not defect to new political homes because of the banning of the 
former organisations or an inability to carry out their work because of the 
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political circumstances that they faced. Instead, they defected over differences 
with the organisations they originally joined. For example, IFP MPPs Frank 
Mdlalose, Vitus Mvelase and PAC MPP Joe Mkhwanazi were ANC members 
in the 1950s. All three broke away as a consequence of ideological differences 
with the party. Mkhwanazi became a founding member of the PAC. Mdlalose, 
broke away because of the socialist leanings of the Freedom Charter of the 
ANC and later became a founding member of the IFP. Vitus Mvelase who 
served as Chair of the ANC Youth League in Lamontville and then SACTU 
member differed with the ANC leadership over strategies of liberation and later 
joined the IFP. Other longer political associations include MPP Lauretta Ngco-
bo whose husband was a founder member of the PAC and who joined the PAC 
in 1959, and MPP Ibrahim Bawa who had a long association with the NIC be-
fore coming to parliament with the IFP. These long serving politicians were 
exposed to a richer variety of political ideas than their counterparts who served 
in one political home, ideas that they brought with them and found reception for 
in their new political homes. Hence, the IFP, like other parties in Africa has 
applied ‘the logic of inclusion rather than exclusion’ (Bayart 1993: 165) incor-
porating, rather than excluding, a multiplicity of political ideas.  
The depth of political experience that MPPs possess and the capacity that 
they held to define, rather than to be assimilated into, political organisations 
also correlates with the political party that they came to power with. While the 
majority of MPPs who came to parliament with the ANC were assimilated into 
the dominant political organisation in their area, this is not the case for those 
who came to power with the IFP. At least five IFP MPPs were founding 
members of the IFP in 19756 and at least another nine MPPs7 joined within the 
first year of the organisation’s existence. As such, MPPs who came to parlia-
ment with the IFP were much more able to define the core political ideas of the 
party and the dominant strategies of the movement than MPPs were in the 
ANC. In addition, they represented a much more senior party leadership in 
parliament than the relatively speaking less senior ANC MPPs. There are of 
course exceptions to this. For example both Jacob Zuma and Sibusiso Ndebele 
both became ANC National Executive Committee Members during the period 
in which they were provincial MPPs indicating that their internal party seniority 
had grown and giving them a much greater ability to shape the internal per-
spectives of the ANC. Indeed Jacob Zuma then went on to become Deputy-
President of South Africa, President of the ANC and then President of South 
                                                            
6  These are Inkosi Gumede, Ziba Jiyane, Frank Mdlalose, Senezele Mhlungu and 
Celani Mtetwa. 
7  These are John Bhengu, Thanda Dingila, Blessed Gwala, Lionel Mtshali, Vitus 
Mvelase, Mzikayise Ngema, David Ntombela, Thomas Shabalala and Prince Gideon 
Zulu. 
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Africa in 2009, after his provincial experience. MPP Harry Gwala was, how-
ever, the only ANC MPP who was already a member of the ANC National 
Executive Committee before he became an MPP. While he demonstrated sen-
iority in this manner in the heart of the movement he was also given almost free 
rein in the 1980s and 1990s to define the ANC in the space of the midlands re-
gion. The newer ANC MPPs were less able to do so provincially and nationally.  
In addition, to the MPPs with a long political career, a handful of MPPs only 
became politically involved in the 1990s. Some of these MPPs joined a political 
party on the eve of the 1994 elections.8 In addition, IFP MPPs Eric Coleman 
and Usha Roopnarain who came to parliament in 1999 only became politically 
active in the post-1994 period. Some of these newcomers were to hold very 
prominent positions of responsibility in parliament within a few weeks of their 
election. It would appear that the pending elections offered to some newcomers 
the possibility of new spaces for involvement, but on the whole the political 
elite came into parliament having already acquired some political experience. 
Hence, while political experience clearly does not guarantee a safe space in 
parliament, it would seem that MPPs with prior political experience dominate 
the legislature. Indeed a party list system of proportional representation makes 
this more likely given that an elite determine the list of candidates. This might 
suggest that those with political experience dominate the monopolisation of 
chances in the legislature, although it is no proof. Hence the agency of political 
power is to be found in the prior political background of MPPs. If so, this would 
suggest, as Weber does, that the constuitive element of a political class is 
present. However, it is not so simple. The question is, however, what type of 
political experience dominates in the legislature. 
Types of former political involvement 
The political experiences of the majority of the political elite are very narrow, 
mostly concentrated in one or sometimes two different role types. While the 
experiences of the political elite counted together represent a rich tapestry of 
different forms of political activity, it was marked by divisions and fault lines 
with limited cross-cutting political experiences to unify those with differing 
political backgrounds. As such, the political elite may be classified by their 
predominant organisational and institutional experiences. These include partici-
pation in a former legislature or government structure, civil service experience, 
party-based organisational or mobilising experiences and trade union and civic 
                                                            
8  These include ANC MPP Ina Cronje, ACDP MPP Jo-Ann Downs, NNP MPP Gor-
don Haygarth, and IFP MPPs Maurice Mackenzie, Alexander Hamilton and Mandla 
Malakoana in 1992 and Henry Combrink in 1993. 
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movement roles. In the few cases where MPPs had a multiplicity of experiences 
they were found to be senior party members that became senior parliamenta-
rians or MECs in the post-1994 period thus solidifying, for the most part, pre-
1994 positions of status in the new provincial government. 
 
Legislative and government political experience 
At least 24 MPPs or 15% of the total number of MPPs were formerly repre-
sentatives in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and all, except one of these 
came to parliament in the post-1994 period with the IFP, having also been long 
term members of the party. The only exception is DP MPP Rev. Wilson Ngcobo 
who served as a councillor for the Mzumbe Regional Authority from 1982 to 
1988 and then a position in the KLA from 1988. Of these remaining 23 MPPs at 
least 14 held positions of seniority in the KLA.9 In most of these cases, those 
elite members had served as ordinary KLA members for a significant number of 
years before progressing to these senior policy roles. 
For the vast majority of these former KLA members only a very few had 
gained any other form of institutional experience. Frank Mdlalose, for example, 
had also served as the Mayor of Madadeni and Celani Mtetwa had served on the 
Msinga local council. But for the most part these MPPs were experienced in 
decision-making on a regional rather than a local level. In KwaZulu-Natal there 
are no IFP MPPs who have only local level institutional experience. Hence one 
may conclude that the KLA is seen as the most important previous institutional 
body in the IFP and some continuity with the past is present. The local level and 
community council experiences of others did not provide sufficient political 
capital to be an MPP for the IFP. 
In addition, those who became MPPs in the provincial legislature and had 
seniority in the KLA were, on the most part, afforded seniority in the post-1994 
period. Of the former KLA cabinet ministers, four became MECs in the new 
legislature and three served consecutively as Premier. In addition, a former 
KLA Deputy-Speaker became a Speaker, a Chief Whip became an MEC and a 
Minister a Chief Whip. As such, some individual patterns of status that had 
                                                            
9  These include John Bhengu and Vincent Zulu, both of whom served separately as 
Deputy-Minister of Education and Culture, Inkosi Simon Gumede who served as 
Minister of Works, Lissah Mtalane who served as Deputy-Minister of Health, Celani 
Mtetwa as Minister of Justice, Lionel Mtshali as Minister of Education, Velaphi 
Ndlovu as Deputy-Minister of Works, Ben Ngubane as minister of Health, Prince 
Gideon Zulu as Deputy-Minister of Welfare and pensions, Deputy-Minister of 
Agriculture and Chief Whip, Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane as Deputy-Minister of Health, 
Senzele Mhlungu as Chief Whip, Inkosi Calalabakubo Khawula as Assistant Whip, 
Gideon Mdlalose as Minister of Health and Welfare, Minister of the Interior and 
Minister of Education. 
  POLITICAL, ORGANISATIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 149 
 
been adhered to in the KLA were continued into the provincial parliament. Of 
course, as such the experiences gained in policy and legislative skills in the 
KLA were also transferred into the provincial legislature. 
At least 35 or 23% of the remainder of MPPs also had previous political 
experience in a legislative or governmental capacity. Of these, those who are 
black are located in the DP and ACDP. They gained this experience through 
roles in the former community councils. ACDP MPP Alex Fakude, for example, 
served as a community councillor for thirteen years and as a mayor for eight 
years. So while MPPs with previous institutional experience in the IFP all have 
KLA experience, black MPPs in the minority parties with previous institutional 
experience have community council experience. Such delineation in the prior 
political experiences of MPPs has helped to determine their post-1994 political 
home. In addition, while the institutional experience that provides political capi-
tal in the IFP is the KLA, in the minority parties of the DP and ACDP it would 
appear that any institutional experience combined with racial group is what 
provides political capital for black MPPs. 
Twenty-three white MPPs have previous institutional experience that ac-
counts for all white candidates who came to parliament with the DP or NNP but 
only 6 of the 19 white MPPs who came to power with the IFP. Of these, those 
that came to parliament with the IFP were either former local councillors, 
served in the Natal Provincial Council or were both. Most held senior positions 
in these bodies. Peter Miller, for example, served in the Natal Provincial Coun-
cil from 1979-1986 and was an Exco member from 1986-1993. Derek Watter-
son served as a city councillor, Deputy-Mayor of Durban, Member of the Natal 
Provincial Council and a member of Exco. Charles van Eck was both a coun-
cillor and a former Mayor of Pinetown and Patrick Cornell was both a coun-
cillor and a Mayor of Durban. The common thread among such MPPs is that 
they all served in a senior institutional position, were white and had served in a 
major urban area that was dominated by ANC and DP supporters, a factor that 
provided a very particular form of political capital to them as IFP MPPs.  
In the DP white MPPs have been drawn predominantly from local level 
institutions with two exceptions. They are Roger Burrows who served as a 
national MP from 1984 and Wessel Nel as MP for Mooi River from 1989. 
Together these two individuals constituted the DP provincial representatives 
from 1994-1999 and in the second term provincial party leader and whip. All 
other DP representatives since then have prior experience at the local govern-
ment level. This may indicate that political capital is gained, from previous 
institutional experience, and seniority is linked to former seniority. 
Similarly in the NNP, of the 10 white MPPs that have served, 7 have pre-
vious experience in national government and some held ministerial positions in 
the late 1980s. MPP George Bartlett, for example served as Deputy-Minister of 
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Economic Affairs and Technology, Minister of Transport and Minister of Min-
erals and Energy. MPP Danie Schutte formerly served as Deputy-Minister of 
Justice and Correctional Services and as Minister of Home Affairs. MPP James 
Waugh was a member of the President’s Council. The President’s Council was 
appointed by the President of Republic of South Africa and was the final arbiter 
in matters of disagreement between the three racially defined chambers of the 
Tricameral Parliament established in 1984.Of those with experience at the 
national level, five also have experience in regional or local government and 
some, such as MPP Valentino Volker and MPP Brian Edwards have experience 
of all three. Four NNP MPPs have prior experience in the former Natal 
Provincial Council and five have experiences as a local councillor. The only 
distinction between the level of previous political institutional experiences in 
the NNP and the DP concerns black MPPs. In the NNP, black MPPs have no 
former institutional experience at all. 
Provincially specific institutional experience was gained by both black and 
white MPPs in the Joint Services Boards and Joint Executive Authority.10 Seven 
IFP MPPs and four NNP MPPs have served in these areas. Both Frank Mdla-
lose and Valentino Volker served as rotating chairs of the JEA, which reinforces 
the importance of provincial institutional administrative experience for both the 
IFP and the NNP in the new parliament. MPPs that formerly served on the JSBs 
and came to parliament with the IFP were, with the exception of Frank 
Mdlalose members of the KLA but not in a senior capacity. This demonstrates a 
separation of the political capital derived from policy-making and service provi-
sion responsibilities. Elites were only located in one or the other and those in 
the policy-making arena were afforded more seniority in the provincial legis-
lature. For example, IFP MPP Ellis Vezi was an ordinary KLA member who sat 
on the Tender Board, served on the Pietermaritzburg Transporation Board and 
was Deputy-Chairperson on one of the Joint Services Boards. His combined 
experiences consist of service provision and policy monitoring, but never poli-
cy-making. In contrast, the experiences of NNP MPPs demonstrate a combi-
nation of role types. For example, MPP Gordon Haygarth served as Chairperson 
of the Port Natal-Ebodwe JSB and was then a member of Exco.  
The IFP, NNP and MF also have Asian MPPs who obtained their institu-
tional experience in the House of Delegates. This applies to six MPPs. Again, in 
some cases the positions that they held were senior ones. For example, Ami-
chand Rajbansi of the MF served on the National Liaison Committee under 
Chris Heunis (Minister for Constitutional Affairs) and on the National Con-
sultative Committee under Stoffel Botha (Administrator of Natal) as Chairman 
                                                            
10  For a discussion of the evolution and composition of these regional alternatives, see 
Chapter 2. 
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of the Ministers Council for Indian Affairs and as a member of Cabinet. He thus 
served in a semi-provincial and semi-national capacity. 
In KwaZulu-Natal prior political institutional experience would appear to be 
an important source of political capital for the 38% of MPPs with such ex-
perience in the IFP, DP, NNP, MF and ACDP. Former political institutional 
experience suggests that the view may be held that such elites are a “safe bet”, 
that they can be trusted to do the job. They may be a part of the new political 
elite because their political institutional experience means that they were a 
political elite already. However, not all political institutional experiences carry 
the same amount of status. In the IFP all those with previous political institu-
tional experience in the KLA held very senior positions in the provincial parlia-
ment. In the DP, only white MPPs with previous political institutional experi-
ence have come to hold senior posts. While a high proportion of MPPs with 
prior experience in the practical questions of administration, legislative scrutiny 
and policymaking is hardly surprising, more important is that the new institu-
tions, in part, replicated important entrenched patterns of political status within 
the parliamentary parties who survived from the previous dispensation. 
The new political institutional format also provided a second chance for 
those with previous institutional experience. For example, a handful of MPPs 
managed to reinvent themselves in the new dispensation, even if they were 
guilty of gross maladministration. MPP Amichand Rajbansi, for example, was 
previously found to be ‘unfit for any public post’ by the James Commission of 
Inquiry in 1989 (Natal Witness, 1 February 1989) and dismissed from all minis-
terial posts. Just prior to the 1989 elections he was charged with criminal de-
famation, two counts of fraud, making conflicting statements under oath and 
contravention of the Commissions Act. Prior to the 1994 elections he formed 
the Minority Front that saw him returned to parliament from where he formed 
an alliance with the ANC that secured him a position as a Committee Chair and 
a much larger salary. In the case of parliamentary alliances and floor-crossing it 
would seem that the quality of political capital from previous institutional ex-
periences is not under scrutiny. 
 
Civil service experience 
MPPs with civil service experience account for eight MPPs, six in the IFP and 
two in the NNP. Four of these MPPs also possess prior experience in a political 
institutional legislative or governmental capacity. Civil servants display a var-
iety of experience types ranging from a clerk to a development officer to a 
Director-General. Three MPPs served the KLA as an Urban Representative and 
were stationed in offices outside of the KwaZulu Homeland. One such MPP 
described his role as, 
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‘Working with people who faced forced removals and evictions … assisting people 
from KwaZulu who had been victims of violence outside the homeland … I assisted 
people with pension problems, transport problems … The bus services were owned 
by the KwaZulu Government and there were price problems …’ (Pers. IFP Inter-
view 28). 
However, this type of civil service position was multiform and the dis-
tinctive nature of the role was blurred. This particular MPP also served as a 
Political Officer in the Department of the Chief Minister which, given the 
period of the 1980s, added a distinctly political party flavour to the grassroots 
service role being articulated here. Another in this category was employed as a 
“civil servant” to do research for and to write speeches for KLA ministers (Pers. 
IFP Interview 83). The research dimension included summarising the reports 
from ANC Radio Freedom, the radio propaganda arm of the ANC and MK, 
broadcast from radio stations in Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Madagascar and 
Ethiopia These two examples constitute two white MPPs who came into the 
new legislature with the IFP having not served in any political institutional 
capacity at all. Working in a semi-political, semi-party, semi-KLA role earned 
them a place in the legislature as individuals who were party aligned. 
Not all civil service roles had a political dimension to them. For example the 
role of IFP MPP Olaf Baloyi as former Director-General of Health in the KLA 
is a simple policy role. What is clear is that of the four who also had political 
institutional legislative or governmental experience, they obtained their civil 
service experience first. Hence, civil service experience per se might not con-
stitute political capital, but simply be a natural step on the way to choosing a 
role as an MPP for a few. 
 
Political party experience 
Political party experience in any political system provides a wide-range of poli-
tical capital. Parties may simply reward loyalists who have proved themselves 
as committed to the party over a long period of time. But party service also 
provides knowledge and commitment to the party organisation, brings the 
individual into contact with a wide-range of party officials and party bosses and 
provides an entrance point into party committees and formal and informal 
decision-making spaces. It provides a point of access to networks and is a space 
in which individuals can define themselves as a leader, prove themselves and 
stand out, whether formally or informally.  
All MPPs have some form of political party experience. This is not sur-
prising given that in a party list system of proportional representation a 
candidate first has to persuade a party to select him or her for the candidate list 
and some form of demonstrable commitment to the party is necessary for a 
political party to invest in that individual. However, the type and depth of 
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political party experience varies considerably from party to party and within 
each party. These party service types are, in part, determined by two factors. 
Firstly, the political environment in which the political party operated both 
restricted the range of party activity types that was possible and directed the 
types of party service in particular directions. For example, the extra-parlia-
mentary political parties that were banned – ANC and PAC – operated in a 
climate of secrecy until 1990 so the range of party service was atypical. Formal 
party positions were often intertwined with less formal ones. In contrast, parties 
that were not banned or operated under the cover of a cultural movement (such 
as the IFP) placed more emphasis upon the formal party service types and 
legislative roles. Secondly, the type and depth of political experience is also, in 
part, determined by the particular type of party organisation (cf. Painebanco 
1988). The type of party organisation determines the type of political capital 
that is important. For example, strongly centralised parties are more likely to 
place greater emphasis upon centrally organised party experiences, whereas 
mass branch based parties will place emphasis upon both branch and centre 
activities. Branch type parties are more likely to emphasize mobilisation, re-
cruitment and propagandization of the electorate than strongly centralised 
parties that will emphasise leadership (cf. Duverger 1954).  
According to Robert Michels, all organisations are in fact oligarchies 
(Michels 1962: 365). Individuals occupying leadership positions gain expertise 
and experience and their necessity to the party becomes entrenched. Hence, an 
elite hierarchy emerges. He says, 
‘In the catechism of party duties, the strict observance of hierarchical rules 
become the first article. The hierarchy comes into existence as the outcome of 
technical conditions, and its constitution is an essential postulate of the regular 
functioning of the party machine’ (Michels 1962: 72). 
 This hierarchy sustains and reproduces itself. If this is the case, the question 
in the KwaZulu-Natal context is how many of the MPPs formed part of a party 
elite prior to coming to parliament? What roles constitute the upper echelons of 
this hierarchy and leadership and were the personnel that occupied them trans-
ferred into the legislature?  
Eighty one MPPs have occupied senior service positions within a political 
party or could be seen to have significant status as a result of their commitment, 
prior to coming to parliament. The positions range from MK soldier, Robben 
Island veteran, central committee member, chairperson of a youth league to a 
standard party branch treasurer. MPPs have been classified into eight forms of 
political party experience. The first of these is standard party office bearer. At 
least fifty MPPs have held a position as a standard party office bearer. These 
include roles such as a chairperson, secretary or treasurer of a local party 
branch. For the minority parties, the predominant pattern is that individuals 
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were not party office bearers unless they had significant institutional experience 
in either a local, regional or national setting. Hence, a legislative career is a 
route to significant party office and not the other way around. The majority of 
these individuals who were standard party office bearers are in the IFP and the 
ANC, which is indicative of their development as branch based parties. Such 
examples include IFP MPP Nomthandazo Mkhize who served as the IFP 
Branch Secretary for the Newcastle district or ANC MPP Meshack Radebe who 
served as Chairperson of Mpumalanga. Hence, in occupying such positions 
MPPs would have done campaigning, recruiting and organising within a defined 
local area. 
In addition to these standard party office bearer positions, a number of MPPs 
also served as office bearers for sectional groups. This is most evident in the 
women’s sections of the IFP and the ANC. All women party members auto-
matically become a member of the women’s section of the party with their party 
membership. Of the MPPs in the provincial legislature, some were significant 
sectional office bearers beforehand. For example, IFP MPP Faith Gasa served 
as IFP Women’s Brigade Chair and IFP MPP Abbie Mchunu as its President. In 
the ANC, Happy Blose served as ANC Women’s League Natal Midlands Chair. 
It is clear that in balancing the interests within the party, both the IFP and ANC 
have drawn in some sectional interests and office bearers to the legislature 
based upon gender. 
In the IFP, ANC and NP a total of 48 MPPs have party political experience 
in the formal senior decision-making structures. In the NNP, these constitute 
regional and/or national formal position-holding such as in the case of MPP 
Brian Edwards who was Natal Treasurer or MPP James Waugh who served as 
Provincial Secretary. In the IFP, the formal senior decision-making structures 
include 26 MPPs who served on the IFP Central Committee, the key decision-
making body. In addition, MPPs served in a range of other senior positions.11 In 
such positions, these MPPs displayed senior leadership characteristics. They 
were proven leaders with highly responsible party positions. Of these MPPs two 
thirds of those with formal senior leadership experiences in the party came to 
occupy senior roles in the provincial parliament.12  
                                                            
11  These include the three National Chairperson’s – Frank Mdlalose. Ben Ngubane and 
Lionel Mtshali, the Deputy-Secretary General – Inkosi Gumede, Senior Media 
Spokesperson – Ziba Jiyane, and the Head of the IFP Mission to Bonn – Senzo 
Mfayela, who was responsible for the IFPs external relations with Germany. 
12  These included, among others, IFP MEC Nyanga Ngubane who was a former IFP 
central committee member, as was MEC Vincent Zulu. IFP Chief Whip Inkosi 
Gumede who was a senior office bearer, MECs and Premier’s Mdlalose, Ngubane 
and Mtshali who were senior office bearers. 
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Likewise, in the ANC, more than half of the MPPs have party experience in 
the formal senior decision-making structures. For most MPPs this is on a 
regional level.13 For some ANC MPPs they also have party political experience 
in formal senior decision-making structures at a national level. For example 
MPP Cyril Xaba was Chairperson of the ANC Youth League, MPP Sipho 
Gcabashe was on the UDF COSATU Joint Working Committee and MPP Harry 
Gwala was in the most senior internal ANC structures of all – the Internal 
Leadership Core. The distinction between this group of MPPs and those in the 
IFP is that party experience in these internal and formal senior decision-making 
structures does not translate into the most senior positions in the provincial 
parliament. With the exception of MPP Gwala who served in the most senior 
internal role and became leader of the ANC in the provincial parliament from 
1994-1999, all other MPPs in internal leadership positions of this nature became 
members of the legislature, not the executive and they served in committee. 
Some became committee chairpersons. Hence, while such formal internal senior 
decision-making roles might provide sufficient capital for a legislative role, they 
do not in the ANC translate into sufficient status, and hence political capital for 
an executive position.  
A fourth category of political party experience in which a significant number 
of the political elite have gained experience is that of political party military 
structures. These political military structures may be divided into different 
forms. The first of these forms is that of experience within the “official” armed 
wing of the party. Eight MPPs (7 ANC MPPs and 1 PAC MPP) were directly 
involved in the official military wing of the political party to which they came 
to parliament with. PAC MPP Mkhwanazi, for example initially recruited 
APLA soldiers, and then joined the PAC military commission before becoming 
secretary general. In the ANC, of the seven MK veterans, three have focused 
experiences almost entirely in this arena (while the other four possess a com-
bination of other senior experiences as well) and were based in primarily in 
exile. MEC Dumisani Makhaye, for example, joined the ANC underground in 
1974 and then MK in 1976. After military and political training in exile he 
returned to South Africa as a political instructor in the first group of eight MK 
soldiers to register MK’s presence in the province in 1977. In 1978 he was sent 
to Cuba to study politics and then for political training in Angola. He was then 
appointed Commander of Specialised Units of MK in the GDR to train units to 
infiltrate other structures in Natal, and then in 1981 returned to South Africa as 
                                                            
13  It includes, among others, MPP Willies Mchunu who served as Regional Coordi-
nator for Northern Natal, MPP Senzo Mchunu as Regional Secretary for Northern 
Natal, MPP Inkosi Zibuse Mlaba as the Deputy-Chairperson of the Natal Midlands 
and MPP John Jeffrey as Deputy-Secretary of the Natal Midlands. 
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the Natal Provincial Commander of MK (Pers. ANC Interview 134). According 
to an ANC MPP, the work of the Natal Provincial Command included,  
‘infiltrating weapons, personnel into organisations, identifying targets, … establish-
ing revolutionary bases in Natal, training people in uprising, … propaganda machi-
nery … it was an entire political-military strategy’ (Pers. ANC Interview 134). 
Below the structure of MK existed a range of other political military forms. 
One such example is the Self-Defence Units created predominantly in the Natal 
Midlands within internal political military structures linked to MK. According 
to an ANC MPP, at least five further MPPs, including himself, were involved in 
establishing SDUs for the ANC. In the midlands region, for example, ANC 
MPP … (X) … was involved in establishing a range of SDUs from Dambuza to 
Greytown and acquiring weaponry for them from MK through the Transkei 
(Pers. ANC Interview 94). In addition, SDU proficiency led to further MK 
training. There were at least four training depots in the Natal Midlands. There 
was one under ANC MPP … (Y) … in Willowfontein with MK trainers and a 
military arsenal, another in Dambuza under former ANC MPP … (Z) … which 
had its own arsenal and a further one in Estcourt/Loskop staffed by MK trainers, 
and a final one under ANC MPP … (X) … in Richmond. ANC MPP (X) de-
scribed this training process as thus, 
‘people were brought in and went out … those who showed promise in the training 
depots would be sent to the Transkei to be trained further by the Transkei defence 
force under Holomisa and more MK. Many were taken out of the country then to be 
trained … mainly around 1992’ (Pers. ANC Interview 94). 
Another MPP was the leader of a SDU in Greytown. He describes his role in 
this way, ‘in 1984 the struggle took a dramatic shift. We were told to target soft 
targets, people. We were told who …’ (Pers. ANC Interview 124). Two MPPs 
involved in SDUs defected to the UDM, Sam Nxumalo before he came to 
parliament disillusioned with a lack of development in rural areas and Sifiso 
Nkabinde afterwards, claiming that the ANC were attempting to assassinate 
him. He was subsequently assassinated. The orchestrators of the assassination 
remain unknown. The IFP counterparts to the ANC SDUs were the Self-Pro-
tection Units (SPUs). At least three IFP MPPs were involved in the creation and 
training of SPUs. One IFP MPP was involved, for example in the conceptuali-
sation and establishment of Mlaba Camp, a training camp based on an earlier 
prototype in the midlands to train IFP members in weaponry as a shield against 
the ANC SDUs from 1991 onwards (Pers. IFP Interview 28). Another IFP MPP 
was involved in acquiring the finance for the camp and the training programme 
(Pers. IFP Interview 28). What is notable in these political military structures is 
that the political elite was primarily involved in leadership roles whether in MK 
in exile or in internal political military structures. None of them (with the ex-
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ception of Sam Nxumalo who did not come to power with a major party) were 
involved as a simple cell member of these units. 
In addition to coordinating and directing within these political military struc-
tures, a number of MPPs were also involved in informal frontline roles of a 
political military nature against the opposing political party within localised 
politics. These roles were on the ground IFP-ANC conflict in the context of the 
more official political-military struggles. Whereas it is not clear that such roles 
were formally sanctioned, they were until 1994 certainly tolerated within the 
movements. Such individuals came to be the representative of the party within 
certain geographical areas and they were afforded power and respect from the 
movements for their strong-arm roles. At least two ANC MPPs and two IFP 
MPPS could be said to fall into this category. 
A further category of party political experience is those MPPs who were 
formally sentenced to imprisonment on Robben Island. Four members of the 
ANC who went into the provincial parliament served sentences on Robben 
Island. A further ANC MPP – Ismail Meer was an accused at the 1956 Treason 
Trial along with Mandela before the charges were dropped. The four who 
served on Robben Island were Harry Gwala, Jacob Zuma, Sibusiso Ndebele and 
Bheki Cele. Zuma was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for conspiring to 
overthrow the government in 1963 after becoming a founder member of MK. 
Ndebele was arrested in 1976 after working under Thabo Mbeki converting 
black consciousness supporters to the ANC underground and recruiting them to 
MK. He served ten years. Bheki Cele was sentenced to six years on Robben 
Island in 1989 for having received military training abroad. He served one year 
before he was released in 1990. Harry Gwala served two terms of imprisonment 
on Robben Island. The first was in 1964 for sabotage and for recruiting for MK 
for a period of eight years. On release, he was restricted to the Pietermaritzburg 
area. He was sentenced again, this time to life imprisonment, under the Terror-
ism Act in 1976. On Robben Island he became known for his Marxist – Leninist 
teachings until his release in 1988 after being diagnosed with motor neuron 
illness.  
All MPPs who had experience of serving sentences on Robben Island 
acquired senior positions within the provincial parliament. Harry Gwala, Jacob 
Zuma and Sibusiso Ndebele all served consecutively as ANC leader in parlia-
ment. Bheki Cele served as Head of Committees and then an MEC. His rela-
tively short term on Robben Island in comparison to the other three correlates 
with his less senior role in parliament. In addition, although he topped the 
branch nomination list for the ANC in 1999, ahead of Ndebele he was then 
placed fourth by the ANC selectors proving the centralised nature of leadership 
appointments in the party. Nevertheless, considered veterans and old guard, 
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these ANC MPPs were considered to have earned their positions in parliament 
through tremendous loyalty and sacrifice for the movement. 
A number of roles played by MPPs do not fall directly into the category of 
political party experience, but because of the political climate and the collapse 
of clear distinctions between parties and other organisations they can be 
considered party aligned or at least party associates. The first of these are the 
civic organisations. Much of the MK internal organising took place within civic 
structures (see Chapter 2). At least ten MPPs have political experience within 
the civic structures. Of these one became an IFP MPP and the other nine ANC 
MPPs. In fact, the IFP MPP Vitus Mvelase was a founder member of Umlazi 
Residents Association in 1973 and then Vice-Chairman in the 1970s before the 
ANC merged UMRA into MK. The other nine MPPs all have experience in 
ANC aligned civics. These include, for example, Lungi Gcabashe in the Kwa-
Mashu Residents Association, Mjabulise Madondo who was central to the ANC 
aligned Msinga Peace and Development Committee, and Zweli Mkhize who 
headed the ANC front – the Willowfontein Community Committee, among 
others. Within these civics, MPPs actively recruited ANC members, and some 
MK members, organised protests and sowed the seeds of dissatisfaction against 
the state. 
A second political party aligned form of experiences is trade union work. At 
least ten MPPs were directly involved in trade union work, eight from the ANC 
and two from the IFP. In the case of the IFP MPPs, one was directly involved in 
the establishment of the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), the 
attempt to set up a union structure affiliated to the party to counteract the grow-
ing power of ANC aligned COSATU. The other MPP is IFP MPP Vitus Mve-
lase who was a member of SACTU before it became a shield for recruitment 
into MK. In terms of SACTU two ANC MPPs have direct political experience 
with the union. Harry Gwala was the brains behind the transformation of 
SACTU into a recruiting agency for MK and Ismail Meer served as its Natal 
President. Five further ANC MPPs were primarily involved in COSATU. These 
are Sipho Gcabashe, Mike Mabuyakhulu, John Jeffrey, Thami Mohlomi and 
Paulos Ngcobo. These MPPs served the unions, usually in senior positions. For 
example, Sipho Gcabashe began his experience in the union structures in the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in 1979 and became an affiliate 
to COSATU and then served COSATU in the COSATU-UDF Joint Working 
Committee as did Thami Mohlomi. Likewise, Paulos Ngcobo served in 
COSATU as the KwaZulu-Natal South Regional Secretary and the Provincial 
Secretary. Willies Mchunu gained extensive union experience in the Metal and 
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Allied Workers Union (MAWU)14 and then was part of the Mass Democratic 
Movement structures as Regional Education Officer for the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) in Northern Natal. In these eight ANC 
cases the boundaries of political party and trade union work were not clear. In 
some cases, recruitment into a union and organising on behalf of the union often 
meant recruitment into the ANC structures and organising on ANC initiated or 
aligned campaigns. In other cases, as in the distinctly workerist MAWU and 
NUMSA involvement in campaigns was in an attempt to promote a distinctly 
working class flavour to them while retaining independence. 
A number of other party related political experiences include a handful of 
MPPs. Indeed many of the ANC MPPs were also indirectly affiliated with the 
UDF and then the MDM, either through civic structures or trade unions. 
However, for some their role in the internal political movement was much more 
central. Sibusiso Ndebele, for example, on his release from Robben Island in 
1987 used the internal democratic structures to co-establish the ANC in South-
ern Natal. Another individual but very senior ANC party political role was that 
of intelligence. While many MPPs were directly involved in the transmission of 
intelligence information, Jacob Zuma became Head of ANC intelligence in 
1987 after serving on the ANC’s Political-Military Committee and heading up 
all underground structures. Less significant, but still important party related ex-
periences include serving as an editor of a party aligned publication. In the 
ANC, MEC Dumisani Makhaye served as editor of Mayibuye15 in exile and IFP 
MPP Konigkramer as editor of Ilanga,16 seeking to propagandise and display the 
views of the movements. Finally, five MPPs, all whom came to parliament with 
the IFP worked previously as researchers at the Inkatha Institute. Of these three 
are white and one Asian who had no previous political institutional experience 
beforehand. 
The political elite who came to parliament brought with them a diverse range 
of party and party related political experience. For the most part they were 
already a political elite in a very specific context. Of the two major parties, the 
IFP MPPs brought with them much more traditional forms of party political 
experiences. In contrast, the ANC MPPs, because of the hostile context in 
which the party operated brought less conventional experience to the legislature. 
ANC MPPs also differed in two other key ways. Firstly, the most senior ANC 
members in the provincial parliament demonstrate multiform political experi-
                                                            
14  MAWU was an affiliate of FOSATU which gave the organisation a distinctly work-
erist flavour. 
15  Mayibuye was the newspaper of the ANC from 1991 to 1998. 
16  Ilanga was founded as the first isiZulu language newspaper in 1903 by Reverend 
John Dube, first President of the ANC. It has been in continuous existence since 
then. In 1987 it was bought by Mandla Matla, an Inkatha owned company.  
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ences. The most senior members of parliament have party political experience 
from exile, were involved in senior party work either inside or outside of South 
Africa, or both. They recruited for the movement either ideologically or milita-
rily, they conceptualised policy and strategy and they implemented ANC direc-
tives. Several of the most senior were also imprisoned on Robben Island for a 
long period of time. They include, for example, Jacob Zuma, Harry Gwala, 
Sibusiso Ndebele and Dumisani Makhaye, leaders with a particular form of 
status within the province as a consequence of these combined experiences. 
Secondly, the type of party political experiences acquired by ANC MPPs 
who became senior in the provincial parliament is also region dependent and in 
turn, this has determined their longevity in parliament. For example, senior 
MPPs from Southern Natal are more likely to have been recruited into MK, 
and/or spent time in senior party work in exile and possibly served time on 
Robben Island. They include, for example, Jacob Zuma, Sibusiso Ndebele and 
Dumisani Makhaye. Their main political activities were either directed from 
exile or they themselves directed others from exile. They were linked into the 
broader strategies of liberation of the national movement of the ANC and they 
were involved in the conceptualisation of these strategies and their implement-
ation in Natal. They moved in and out of South Africa and directed others in the 
struggle locally. This demonstrates a particular form of political capital. As such 
the broader strategic views of these MPPs were linked with and coincided with 
the national movement (in the same way as within the earlier ANC). Over the 
two terms of parliament, these MPPs have continued to maintain their seniority 
in the parliament. In contrast, in another region – the Natal Midlands – MPPs 
shared different experiences to those from Southern Natal. These MPPs were 
more likely to have political experience gained from being at the frontline of 
political violence inside South Africa. They recruited for MK, were involved in 
transforming movements internally in a hands-on capacity, secured territory for 
the movement and were involved in the training of SDUs, the use of the 
weapons imported and some of the worst battles between the ANC and IFP. 
Furthermore, (again like in the earlier ANC) this group of parliamentarians did 
not always conform to national political imperatives and the midlands struggle 
sometimes took on a momentum and a character of its own. In the midlands 
some MPPs also received their political experience in association with these 
frontline struggles but not in the direct struggles themselves. This included 
violence monitors for example. In the provincial parliament, this group of MPPs 
have gradually diminished as the context of politics has changed in the new 
political dispensation. So while in 1994 politicians, such as Harry Gwala, Sifiso 
Nkabinde and Shakes Cele, had significant political capital as a result of those 
frontline struggles that capital gradually diminished as the spaces through which 
politics took place changed.  
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Different types of political experience lead to different forms of political 
capital. It is clear that for the formerly white only parties and Asian party, the 
political capital is primarily constituted from a previous institutional political 
experience or experiences. This shows that for those parties the role of a parlia-
mentarian is a professional career. To get into office, one must already have 
served in office. In the case of the other parties this is not the case.  
In the IFP, 33 out of 79 MPPs had prior political experience in a political 
institutional role. This constitutes the largest single bloc of MPPs in any one 
party. The remainder of these MPPs are drawn from a vast array of different 
political circumstances such as party political work in a research capacity or 
development work. The political experiences that such MPPs bring to parlia-
ment ranges from expertise in legislative work (in a parliament with no oppo-
sition party), policy formulation work, experience in research on policy issues 
and party mobilisation experience. Some bring local knowledge and some bring 
provincial knowledge. In contrast, in the ANC those who came to power in the 
provincial legislature bring virtually no policy or legislative skills with them. 
They are drawn from a political elite whose main experience is in political 
mobilisation and political strategy, some of which is military strategy, and the 
integration of these strategies into civil society. So the IFP and ANC MPPs 
bring very different experiences with them into the provincial parliament, some 
of which is useful for a parliamentary role but most of which, in democratic 
political institutions, has no bearing on parliamentary work. Not all of the roles 
previously held by the political elite bring the same level of political capital. 
The different experiences do not carry with them the same level of prestige but 
there is a level of continuity among some of the political elite in terms of 
seniority in the roles they previously held and those that they came to hold 
provincially. 
Patterns of party political identification 
The reasons and the circumstances by which the political elite came to identify 
with their party political home, and choose one party over another is a key 
factor in understanding their party and legislature affiliations. It in part explains 
alliances, coalition possibilities and fluidity in party caucuses and in the legis-
lature. In some cases the reasons that political elites chose their political home is 
grounded in the principles, policies and values that the party of choice is 
deemed to represent. In other cases, affiliations were a consequence of lack of 
choice and circumstances of chance. In some cases, the justification for choos-
ing a political home has diminished as a consequence of changing political 
contexts. In this section I explore the reasons for the choice of one political 
party over another by the political elite. 
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Current party political principles, values and policies 
Sixty eight percent of the political elite identified current party political 
principles, values and policies as the reason for their political affiliation with the 
party that they came to power with. The greatest concentration of these MPPs is 
found in the IFP, DP, PAC and ACDP, with the least concentration found in the 
ANC, NNP, MF and UDM. There are four different types of current party asso-
ciations that can be found. Firstly, of this 68%, 53% of the political elite iden-
tified socio-economic development objectives as the reason for their choice of 
political party. This, as the single biggest reason, is hardly surprising given the 
socio-economic needs that remain unaddressed in South Africa. However, this 
particular broad association does not provide any substantive differentiation 
between the parties as the development goals of parties are essentially the same. 
All want to address poverty in KwaZulu-Natal, and a wide range of public 
policy priorities were discussed. These include housing, unemployment, health 
care and education as well as poverty per se. Education as a method to address 
poverty was discussed as a key objective of almost all MPPs who chose the DP 
and the NNP and was a key priority for the lone PAC MPP, but was rarely 
discussed among IFP and ANC MPPs. What is surprising is that 47% of these 
MPPs did not identify socio-economic objectives as a key reason for choosing 
the political party they came to power with and many of those that did discuss 
broad socio-economic objectives also gave other reasons (see later discussion). 
Within the socio-economic development objectives that were identified, 76% 
of IFP MPPs identified rural poverty as a key reason for choosing the IFP as 
their political home. These MPPs firmly believed three factors. First, that only 
the IFP had the knowledge and understanding of rural issues in KwaZulu-Natal 
to address rural poverty. Second that only the IFP cared about rural poverty and, 
hence only with the IFP in power would rural poverty be addressed. Third that 
only the IFP had attempted to address rural poverty in the past. There was also a 
clear correlation in this grouping between rural poverty as their key public 
policy priority and the IFP as the only vehicle through which that aim would be 
addressed. In the ANC and other parties there was not the same level of 
specification. Only 30% percent of ANC MPPs discussed poverty at all, and 
those who did so discussed it in much broader terms than in the other parties. 
For example, one MPP stated that the reason he identified with the ANC is 
because, 
‘There is still unfinished business. People still live in poverty and it is worsening. 
The rate of unemployment has increased. Some of the people that I knew in the 
1980s were not fortunate enough to get into education. They are caught up in a web 
of poverty … only with the ANC in power will these things change’ (Pers. ANC 
Interview 57). 
  POLITICAL, ORGANISATIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 163 
 
Indeed, there were other MPPs who defected and who claimed that they had 
chosen their political home as a consequence of the ANC failing to address the 
socio-economic needs of the population. One MPP argued, 
‘In the community that I had been heavily involved in there had been casualties and 
no development. I said to the ANC that before the (1999) election there must be at 
least one tap of clean water in that area. There were no basic services … Nothing 
happened … I told the ANC that they had betrayed us and I will believe no more 
promises. I told them I was going over to the UDM’ (Pers. Interview 124). 
Indeed continued poverty, particularly rural poverty in KwaZulu-Natal, has 
been a mobilising tool at each election since 1994. In the recent 2009 elections 
highly visible fifteen metre posters in Ulundi of former ANC Minister (then 
Premier) Sibusiso Ndebele were complemented with similar ones of Zweli 
Mkhize and Bheki Cele advertising the work of key ANC ministries. Using 
government funds the ANC also held imbizos throughout rural KwaZulu-Natal 
and placed government funded newspaper adverts linking government poverty 
alleviation initiatives to the provincial ANC. In highly targeted service delivery 
initiatives, the incumbency of the ANC at the national level was utilized in 
specific areas of northern rural KwaZulu-Natal to target voters who have tra-
ditionally voted IFP. In Nkandla, Uthungulu (Jacob Zuma’s birthplace) water 
and electrification projects were underway and national energy minister accom-
panied Zuma to a grand opening of a substation to electrify 10,500 homes and 
nine schools. This is in addition, in the same area, to a pasture fencing project, 
the provision of computers to schools in Nkandla and a new service centre for 
the department of Home Affairs to provide better access to social development 
grants, identity documents and pensions (Francis 2009a: 156-157).  
The reality of this rural socio-economic development in KwaZulu-Natal is 
that it is highly targeted in the district of Uthungulu, Zuma’s birthplace and the 
place through which the provincial ANC has attempted to push into the tradi-
tional IFP voting community. It is not widespread throughout rural KwaZulu-
Natal. In Abaqulusi, one district away, 71% of people are still without potable 
water (a national government competence). Prior to the 2004 elections they 
were promised water in the ANC campaign. Large scale pipes were brought into 
the area. The electorate overwhelmingly voted for the IFP. The pipes were 
never hooked up (cf. Francis 2009a: 157). 
The new Zuma presidency in South Africa promises a refocus on rural 
development with the creation of a new national ministry specifically on this 
area. However, how much of this will be highly targeted service delivery at the 
behest of national rather than provincial elites is open to question. Zuma faces 
the challenge of providing basic services to less visible, structurally poor rural 
communities without neglecting the highly mobilised and visible urban voters 
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(predominantly ANC voters) who have high expectations of job creation in the 
near future. Whereas the concept of poverty alleviation in KwaZulu-Natal har-
nesses voters at election time, the fact that only 30% of ANC MPPs in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal discussed poverty at all does not translate into the political capacity 
to meet those expectations and to fulfil the Zuma promises through the policy 
portfolios in the legislature. This is all the more so given the low educational 
levels and professional skills of the ANC elite. In parts of KwaZulu-Natal 
where pre-election promises were made to address basic needs that did not then 
materialize, voters in local government bi-elections have withdrawn support 
from the ANC (cf. Francis 2009a: 161). Within the national ANC alliance, 
Zuma faces an increasingly nationalist, populist and militant rhetoric from the 
Youth League President – Julius Malema – offering direct intervention in the 
economy, increased transformation of the state through black economic em-
powerment and the abandonment of the free market economy as solutions to 
poverty. If the provincial elite fail to address poverty, the Zuma presidency 
faces severe populist challenges from its youth wing. 
The key socio-economic development objective that was identified by the 
majority of MPPs was the question of land. Almost 70% of IFP MPPs, a 
handful of ANC MPPs and the sole PAC MPP discussed land as a priority. 
However, it was discussed in different terms by ANC and IFP MPPs. ANC 
MPPs discussed land hunger more generally and associated this with the pro-
vision of houses and other resources such as water and sanitation. In the IFP, 
MPPs were clear that they supported the IFP because they believed that com-
munal land ownership was the best way in which to guard against abject 
poverty. One MEC stated, 
‘Our approach is a traditional African one … All resources should be shared by all 
members of society … (to) … guard against others from acquiring wealth to the 
detriment of others like in some capitalist societies. The poor are at the mercy of 
those with skills. This is best expressed in the distribution of land, our only fixed 
resource. Communal land is being held in trust for the generations to come and 
traditional leadership have a very important role to play here as trustees’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 66). 
A final area in which MPPs stressed the current prevalent socio-economic 
development objectives of the party in which they came to power with was in 
relation to the economy and what they perceived as the economic policy of the 
party they chose. Eight of the eleven DP MPPs stressed the importance of free 
market economic principles and practice as the best way through which to 
develop the province and as a foundational principle of the DP that they ascribe 
to. In the IFP approximately 30% of MPPs can be categorised as supportive of 
free market principles, but with a more nuanced vision of how links between 
business and politics can assist with development. One MPP said, for example,  
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‘I began the LEARN fund and I was involved in projects where I would assist 
business in KwaZulu-Natal to meet black chiefs and KLA members … I led industry 
to the Indaba in 1986 after I led a trade delegation to the UK. I invited the Durban 
Chamber of Commerce and we established good links … The Indaba was supported 
in the UK … The Nats were fools. They turned it down … Buthelezi was the only 
black leader who understood the economy … My main interests are the airport and 
the port of Durban. This province has every resource it needs to make it the most 
successful. The IFP understands that’ (Pers. IFP Interview 49).  
Linked to the socio-economic objectives in which they perceive their party 
to represent is another area of current party political associations; that is the 
perception held among MPPs of which socio-economic constituencies of people 
the party represents. Again, there was a substantial difference between the 
MPPs from the IFP and the ANC. ANC MPPs typically responded in broader 
terms pointing to the party as a ‘broad church’ (Pers. ANC Interview 109) of 
constituents and interests in which ‘all are accommodated’ (Pers. ANC Inter-
view 53). The few MPPs that did choose to be more specific, pointed to “the 
poor” more generally and claimed that there was no substantive difference be-
tween the constituencies of people that they, the ANC represented and that the 
IFP represented. For ANC MPPs, this was not then, a substantial reason as to 
why they chose their political home. In contrast, in the IFP the majority of 
MPPs clearly stressed that the party was the party of the rural poor. Those that 
did not stress this (15%) articulated their core business as concerned with the 
urban poor. These were primarily MPPs who had experienced urban poverty 
themselves and had come into contact with the party through their own experi-
ences of their development needs. For example, one MPP said, 
‘I represent the urban poor, but the two are not separated … In KwaMashu and Ntu-
zuma the issue was over houses. There were many people on the government list 
and no new houses. We occupied the land … We couldn’t wait … there were 18 in 
my family. There were no roads … in terms of water, there was none. It was very 
difficult for all the families. I contacted the Department of the Interior … they gave 
us KwaZulu government trucks to deliver water to the tanks we had built … they 
scraped the roads for us … KwaZulu was Inkatha. So you see, Inkatha did this for 
us’ (Pers. IFP Interview 60). 
Despite MPPs in the DP asserting that they represented all socio-economic 
and racial interests in South Africa, IFP MPPs perceived the DP as being the 
‘party of white business’ (Pers. IFP Interview 131). In terms of racial repre-
sentation, both ANC and NNP MPPs believed that a key reason for choosing 
their party was because of its multi-racial character. One ANC MPP, for ex-
ample, claimed that a key reason for his choice of political home was the 
‘tolerance expressed in the party for all race groups’ (Pers. ANC Interview 27). 
Another ANC MPP discussed in racial terms how ‘the real victors are generous’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 134) through their incorporation of all racial groups. 
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Similarly, MPPs in the NNP discussed how they were impressed with the party 
because of its reformist path in which it had opened its doors to all races. This 
was perceived by NNP MPPs across the racial spectrum as one of the most 
important reasons for their choice of affiliation, in both newer members and 
older members alike. Hence, questions of identity married with perceptions of 
constituency drive some associative patterns.  
A third area in which current party associations are the key reason for the 
choice of political home is in the principles that form the core basis of the party 
and the character which is deemed to constitute its core essence. In all cases, 
MPPs who pointed to the values that make up the party principles and character 
belonged either to the IFP, PAC or the DP. For example, in the DP nine out of 
eleven MPPs stressed the party principles of good governance, anti-corruption 
and the importance of a democratic opposition as key reasons for their choice of 
party political affiliation, all values upon which the DP took a position and 
campaigned on. Another key principle upon which DP MPPs agree draws them 
to their political home is that of federalism. Eight of eleven DP MPPs stressed 
the importance to them of the federal character of the party as opposed to a 
centralist party political structure. Federalism, as a concept, is also held dear by 
twenty percent of IFP MPPs, but the key distinction between those who asso-
ciate with the DP and the IFP is that the IFP MPPs see federalism as a value to 
be aspired to in the specific form of the state and not in terms of political party 
structure. In these cases, the majority of IFP MPPs who consider federalism as a 
key reason for their choice of political home are white or asian, indicating a 
racial division in interpretations of the party’s real core values. 
Two further intrinsically linked principles are central to IFP MPPs and the 
PAC MPP in choosing their political home. They are firstly, the concept of 
ubuntu-botho and secondly, the prevailing style of political etiquette in the 
party. At least 70% of IFP MPPs discussed the concept of ubuntu-botho17 as a 
core reason why they associate with the IFP as did the lone PAC MPP as to why 
he associates with the PAC. For example, one IFP MPP defined ubuntu-botho 
in the following classic terms and claimed them for the IFP:  
‘the IFP was founded on the principles of ubuntu, the principle of humanity. You 
must respect others, including your elders, as you would respect yourself. We only 
exist through others. These principles are carried through today. The IFP is a cos-
mopolitan party based on respect of each other’ (Pers. IFP Interview 51). 
Indeed, not only did the IFP MPPs see this principle as constituting the core 
character of the party but they believed that it was only the IFP that really had 
this as a value to be desired. For example, one IFP MPP stated, ‘so the principle 
                                                            
17  Ubuntu-Botho is a form of African humanism and the key idea in attempting to give 
an indigenous cast to South Africa’s emerging political culture. 
  POLITICAL, ORGANISATIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 167 
 
of ubuntu-botho is an ideology which the other parties are trying to copy, but 
they don’t, they can’t. They don’t understand it, it isn’t their essence’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 99). Similarly, another MPP claimed that ‘there has been a break-
down in morality. I believe in ubuntu. There must be respect for elders and for 
youth and society must be brought back to normality. I support the place of 
tradition. The respect for women has gone. The ANC made the country un-
governable, they have done this’ (Pers Interview 67). Linked to this is the 
concept of political etiquette and political style. Even MPPs who did not 
mention the concept of ubuntu-botho discussed the prevailing political style in 
the IFP as one of ‘respect for each other’ (Pers. IFP Interview 34), ‘dignity’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 18) and ‘very dignified’ (Pers. IFP Interview 131) and ‘dis-
ciplined’ (Pers. IFP Interview 106) referring to the way in which party business 
is conducted. There is no parallel discourse in any of the other political parties 
and this sets the IFP MPPs and the lone PAC MPP apart from others. However, 
the MPPs who discussed the concept of ubuntu-botho and political style are 
primarily black. Hence, it would seem that the associative value of this dis-
course is racially constructed and white IFP MPPs do not see it as a core value 
that determined their choice of party. 
The final type of current party political association held by MPPs is in 
ideology. Ideology was a core determining factor for MPPs in the DA, IFP and 
ANC. However, it was for most parties the least mentioned reason for choice of 
political home. In the DP, seven out of 11 MPPs described themselves as liberal 
and discussed the party in terms of its liberal principles. There was, however, 
one exception. That is Roger Burrows, provincial party leader, who specified 
his social democratic principles rather than liberal principles. Others who 
described themselves as liberal as a reason for the choice of political party were 
found in the ANC and the IFP. However, in the ANC, these individuals only 
served in the first term of parliament and constructed their discussion of liberal 
principles alongside the principles of multiracialism in the party. One such 
MPP, for example, is ANC MPP Ismail Meer who formed the Liberal Study 
Group at Sastri College and served only in the period of the first legislature, 
1994-1999.  
One set of ideological values that cuts across the IFP, ANC and PAC is the 
concept of black consciousness. For example, one ANC MPP described his 
choice of home thus, ‘I was mostly influenced by black consciousness. The 
basic message “black man, equal and proud” appealed. Through Griffiths 
Mxenge18 I began to understand the ANC, and the ANC leadership were more 
                                                            
18  Griffiths Mxenge was a lawyer and former ANC political prisoner who was assas-
sinated in 1981. In 1975 he was in communication with Steve Biko, Robert Sobu-
kwe and Zeth Mothopeng (the most senior PAC leader after Sobukwe) about the 
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well known than the PAC. I read more about Mandela than Sobukwe. The party 
accommodated our views’ (Pers. ANC Interview 87). In the IFP, the following 
sentiments are so widely held among black MPPs that they may be deemed as 
typical.  
‘I was one of the people in the old PAC. There is basically no big difference 
between the old PAC and the IFP … The old PAC was very African … The IFP 
represents African values and its core essence is very African, like the old PAC …’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 116). 
‘We wanted to revive the old ANC, the ANC before it joined with the com-
munists, the non-violent African organisation. Our constitution for Inkatha was the 
same. We all supported those values back then’ (Pers. IFP Interview 74). 
‘As a young man I was aligned to the ideas of black consciousness. I lived in a 
rural area and the IFP was very development driven. I subscribed to the ideas of 
Steve Biko and supported the IFP’ (Pers. IFP Interview 78). 
A key difference between the IFP and the ANC is in the way in which MPPs 
view the core ideological values of the party. In the IFP, the majority of black 
MPPs view the party as constituting definable and limited ideological values but 
in the ANC the majority of MPPs do not. For example, one ANC MPP dis-
cussing ideology claimed, 
‘There are signs in the broadness of the ANC of how far it has progressed. Its’ dis-
cerning quality is that it is a broad church and can thus accommodate trends within it 
… communist members, capitalist members … There are no problems within the 
ANC in these relationships. The ANC accepts everyone. It is essential to accommo-
date everyone’ (Pers. ANC Interview 87). 
Hence, those MPPs who set ideology as a core reason for their party political 
choice in the ANC do so in the belief that their core ideological position may 
not be the central ideology within the party, or on the basis that ideology as a 
construct and value to be held dear is less central to the ANC than to the IFP, 
DP and PAC with other reasons for their affiliation holding more importance to 
them. 
MPPs had multi-faceted reasons linked to current political values, principles 
and issues for their affiliations to the political parties that they came to power 
with. Despite this, two factors are clear which separate the political elite by 
party. The first is that only the majority of, but not all, IFP, DP and the lone 
PAC MPPs make clear and unwavering distinctions as to why they are affiliated 
with their political home. These reasons are based upon policies, values and 
ideology. Secondly, for the majority of ANC MPPs their political affiliation to 
                                                                                                                                                 
possibility of a unified resistance movement (p.149). He was also the instructing 
attorney in the PAC terrorism trial in Bethel in 1977 in which Mothopeng and 17 
others were tried for terrorism (cf. Karis ad Gerhart 1997: 286-289). 
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the party is not based upon clear distinctions of values, policies and ideology, 
but on other factors altogether. 
 
Past party political principles, values and policies 
Despite subscribing to current party political principles and values, at least 40% 
of MPPs associate with their political party on the basis of party political 
principles and values of the past. There are four forms of past principles which 
MPPs subscribe to. The first of these, and the most commonly held across the 
political elite from MPPs of different parties centre upon the form of the 
struggle adopted by the party during the apartheid period and the MPPs own 
allegiance with the strategy. In most cases, support for one party also correlates 
with a lack of support for another that was perceived to have followed a strategy 
in antithesis with that supported. IFP MPPs in this category most commonly 
pointed to the IFP position on sanctions, ungovernability and the armed struggle 
as a key reason for their political affiliation. Twenty-eight IFP MPPs did not 
support the sanctions and disinvestments strategies of other political parties. As 
one said, ‘I looked at the parties and I made my choice … I did not believe in 
sanctions because they would just make people suffer … Since we have been 
free we have suffered economically because most companies that left under 
sanctions have not returned’ (Pers. IFP Interview 60).  
In addition, 42 IFP MPPs did not believe in the armed struggles of the 
ANC/SACP and PAC. Instead, one of the key reasons for their associations 
with the IFP was as a consequence of the party strategy of non-violence. The 
following quotations are typical sentiments of IFP MPPs.  
‘When I joined Inkatha I was against the concept of achieving the liberation of this 
country through the armed struggle because I was aware that South Africa was 
armed to the teeth, and that no African country or even a combination thereof could 
ever take South Africa militarily … I also knew that if there was to be an armed 
struggle … everything would be destroyed … I also believe that the pen is mightier 
than the sword … and believed that, at the end of the day, the politics of negotiation 
as against the politics of armed struggle will at the end prevail, as was the case in 
South Africa. We were right … this country achieved its liberation and freedom out 
of the negotiated settlement’ (Pers. IFP Interview 51). 
‘We wanted to revive the ANC non-violent organisation’ (Pers IFP. MEC Inter-
view 74).  
‘When Dr. Buthelezi introduced Inkatha he said “non-violence”. I said, “let me 
be part of that organisation”. I was following a man against violence. In the armed 
struggle innocent people were killed. The UDF were putting tyres around people’s 
necks with petrol and burning them. The ANC supported the UDF in this’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 65). 
‘The armed struggle could not work in South Africa. Only negotiations could 
work … The IFP were talking about non-violence as an alternative’ (Pers. IFP Inter-
view 92). 
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In addition, to the strategy of non-violent liberation as a reason for their 
affinity to the IFP, at least 18 MPPs stressed that the ANC policy of un-
governability was a reason for their affiliation with the IFP. As one argued, 
‘The IFP was defending those harassed by the ANC … There were lots of boycotts 
and strikes in the midlands … so the unemployed would take a temporary job at the 
factories. They needed work so they could eat. The UDF killed those taking tempo-
rary jobs. They just needed to eat … I got involved … I would hire trucks to take 
workers into town if COSATU wanted to boycott and if people wanted to work …’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 65). 
Finally, there are a group of MPPs whose affiliation to the IFP is based upon 
their perceptions of a communist state that the ANC would usher in the post-
1990 period. The following statements are typical examples of these sentiments. 
‘I didn’t like the ANC because I suppose I was a victim of the communist bogey. I 
also had a profound fundamental problem with the armed struggle … I am not sorry 
that I left the DP … it was just touch and go as to which party to go to’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 16). 
‘When I joined the IFP Buthelezi had heard me in zulu, in full cry, speaking on 
the injustices of the previous regime and the imposed doctrine of socialism to come 
under the ANC’ (Pers. IFP Interview 43). 
These MPPs whose affiliations to the IFP are based upon non-violence, anti-
sanctions and lack of support for the ANC’s policy of ungovernability and 
communist tendencies may be divided into three groups. In the first group, are 
predominantly black MPPs who believed fundamentally that violence and un-
governability as any form of strategy was wrong and that sanctions and com-
munism would hurt the poor. They were either founder members of the IFP who 
sought an alternative strategy to that of the ANC or had very long affiliations 
with the party and their affiliations are based upon strategies that they con-
ceptualised and devised. In the second group, again made up of predominantly 
black MPPs, these individuals were at the frontline of black on black violence, 
sanctions and ungovernability in the province between the ANC and IFP and 
their views are as a direct consequence of their protracted critical experiences. 
Their affinity to the IFP is deep rooted and long lasting. For the most part, 
although this method of affiliation is based upon politics of the past, these 
MPPs are long time party veterans who have been assimilated into the party to 
such an extent that another political home would be inconceivable to them. In 
addition, most have other reasons for their affiliation to the party that locks 
them into the party in other ways. As veterans, many play a central role in the 
decision-making and direction of the party. So, while the debates over armed 
struggle or non-violent negotiations, sanctions or anti-sanctions, or govern-
ability and ungovernability are no longer central to the politics of the province, 
many MPPs possess a long memory of politics centred on these debates and the 
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conflicts surrounding them and have developed party loyalties on other levels 
and hence, remain deeply committed to their political party. In contrast, a third 
group of IFP MPPs who are predominantly white or asian are the newcomers to 
the IFP and were not sufficiently assimilated into the party to find affinity on a 
range of other levels. They have had no direct experience of the war in the 
province and do not specify current party political principles or values for 
reasons for their affinity. They chose the IFP because of the principles of the 
ANC in the past. When the armed struggle ended and the socialist doctrine was 
not implemented all that remained was their need to play a role in a black based 
political party in the provincial government. Hence, this third group constitute 
all of the defectors from the IFP to the ANC and the majority of the white and 
asian MPPs who left the party during the first term of office. In this group, eight 
white and asian IFP MPPs said that one of the key reasons that they chose the 
IFP was because they wanted to belong to a black-based political party in the 
post-1990 period. This indicates a concern for a legislative future, rather than a 
desire to promote party policies. 
While IFP MPPs stressed their allegiance to the party as a consequence of 
anti-ANC communist tendencies, some ANC MPPs discussed their allegiance 
to the ANC in terms of policies and principles of the Left Wing. For the most 
part, those who used the term “socialism”, however, did not serve after the first 
term of office. Instead, newer MPPs manage to equate past left wing policies of 
the ANC with a right of centre party, integrating outdated and outmoded poli-
cies in the discourse of the present as reasons for why they are affiliated to a 
party today. For example, one MPP claimed, 
‘When I actually look at the Freedom Charter it tells me that this covers everything, 
my whole life. I have a firm belief that the Freedom Charter is advancing and 
improving the life of the people. This is the party for me because it is clearly spelt 
out in the Freedom Charter that it addresses the needs of the people in everything’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 109). 
In 1996, the introduction of the Growth, Empoyment and Redistribution stra-
tegy (GEAR) as the primary policy of job creation and economic growth in 
South Africa indicated a demonstrable shift in public policy to the right. GEAR 
provided comfort to the market with an emphasis on privatization, tariff and 
deficit reduction and government “rightsizing”. GEAR was far removed from 
the socialist ideals of the Freedom Charter of 1955 which promised the resto-
ration, to the people, of national and mineral wealth, the ownership of banks and 
monopoly, the free occupation of land and the lowering of rents and house 
prices. Hence, these MPPs either believe their own rhetoric by not seeing that 
the party has shifted to the right politically, or are able to integrate the past as on 
a continuum with the present. In 1997 Peter Mokaba (now deceased former 
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member of the ANC Youth League) claimed that ‘the Freedom Charter had 
always aimed to build a capitalist South Africa (Cronin & Nzimande 1998 in 
Lodge 2002: 30). These tensions in the struggle for a socialist or nationalist 
vision of a future South Africa (articulated in chapter 2) have a long history and 
form a part of the present struggles as well as those of the past. Linked to this is 
the concept of the ANC as “the true” liberation movement, no matter what 
policy positions the party takes in the present. One MPP in KwaZulu-Natal 
justified his affiliation to the ANC by saying, ‘the ANC has a long history, 
longer than any party. It was first formed here as a provincial organisation. Our 
Kings belonged to the ANC … We liberated South Africa. To belong anywhere 
else would be a betrayal’ (Pers. ANC MEC Interview 134). Here, the inference 
is that the party demands loyalty and affinity in the present because of the past. 
Hence, despite the irrelevance of the Freedom Charter in current positions that 
the party takes, those who joined as a consequence of left wing aspirations are 
compelled to loyalty in the present because of the status of the party history. 
This is not an unusual feature of politics in Africa. Often the ideological 
discourse of socialism enabled the integration of a heterogenous political elite; 
that is, ‘its adoption as the unifying code of the political class usually happened 
when this class was highly divided’ (Bayart 1993: 173-174; cf. Decalo 1979, 
Jowitt 1979). 
Some MPPs chose their party affiliation in the past as a consequence of 
becoming inspired by the party leader or leadership. At least nine IFP MPPs and 
3 NNP MPPs and 1 ANC MPP were enthused by Buthelezi, De Klerk and 
Mandela respectively. In all cases, MPPs were impressed by what they saw as 
the courage of these leaders in standing up to other powerful constituencies that 
did not agree with their viewpoint. In the NNP, the three MPPs who were 
impressed with De Klerk are all non-white. Hence, they display a conservatism 
towards the ANC, did not hold sufficient political capital to be IFP and were 
able to equate a sense of racial forgiveness with the reformist path of De Klerk 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the IFP, the majority of MPPs that are 
white or asian are also strongly anti-sanctions or saw non-violence as the only 
liberation solution. In addition they are Christian. These MPPs interaction with 
the IFP prior to 1991 was predominantly limited to the speeches of the party 
leadership and the public policy stances that he made. Thus their early links to 
the party was through the man himself. 
A final reason for which MPPs chose the affiliation of their current political 
home is because they felt they had no other choice. Fifty two percent of ANC 
MPPs fall into this category with very few expressing other concurrent reasons. 
These ANC MPPs were not exposed to other organisations and so to be political 
meant to join what was available. Those organisations that were available in 
their geographical were either ANC or ANC affiliates which took these individ-
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uals on a road to greater involvement with the party. The following statements 
are typical. 
‘I became political through COSAS.19 Clermont was highly politicised. Maybe if I 
had lived in the north I would not necessarily have come to the ANC. There was no 
COSAS there’ (Pers. ANC Interview 57). 
‘There were no other political organisations. The first time I heard of the PAC 
was when I came back (from exile to implement MK operations) …’ (Pers. ANC 
MEC Interview 134). 
‘For students, there were very few organisations that were legal. For students, 
SASO was the only organisation that existed. So I took that path’ (Pers. ANC 
Interview 87).  
‘There were no other organisations then in KwaMashu. There was only the UDF, 
… then with the UDF I became involved in MDM structures’ (Pers. ANC Interview 
71). 
‘I became involved through my family … in Mozambique … there were no other 
organisations … we linked up with Mozambican youth and commemorated ANC 
campaigns’ (Pers. ANC Interview 113). 
Hence, chance is one of the key reasons for ANC MPPs choosing their 
political affiliation with the ANC. Such selection is limited by the structural 
consitions by which parties could organise and the occupation of political space 
by the ANC as it became institutionalized in the civic movements in the late 
1980s and 1990s. Without an alternative, these MPPs gradually became part of 
the dominant movement, rather than consciously choosing a movement with 
which they had a deeper ideological affinity. This is in stark contrast to IFP, DP 
and PAC MPPs whose key reasons for joining the party reflect the values, 
policies and ideology of their political home, rather than a need to be political, 
and this being the only way. As is indicated in the second quotation, these 
MPPs became bound more firmly into the party as time progressed, sometimes 
without being aware of alternative viewpoints or value systems. The potential 
implications of the need to be political are that these MPPs are less ideolo-
gically driven than others and potentially more firmly tied into the legislature 
than to the political party. 
Conclusion 
The political elite in KwaZulu-Natal were already an elite before they came to 
parliament but not solely and primarily in socio-economic terms. They are an 
activist elite of the electorate, of their political parties and of the political ex-
periences they hold. In countries that operate a party list system of proportional 
representation, the potential for the political elite to form a political class is 
                                                            
19  COSAS was affiliated to the UDF. 
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greatest as the lists are by-and-large established by the higher ranks that set the 
rules. In this case, one may speak of not one, but of many political classes. The 
political elite in KwaZulu-Natal are connected with political power, both in the 
past and in the present. The senior position holders have certain political ex-
periences, and those experience types are dependent upon the parties with which 
they came to office with. In this way, they monopolise the administration of 
political careers through party political knowledge. They coalesce with people 
in their own image, elites who have been “blooded” by sharing similar political 
experiences. These shared experiences contribute to a common identity. The 
senior political elites in parliament have recalibrated their status in the new 
parliament. The political classes in KwaZulu-Natal coalesce around parties, and 
these classes co-exist. However, the potential for the transformation of these 
fractured political classes into one political class exists. This is because the 
currencies of political capital are mainly symbolic. They are based upon poli-
tical experiences. In the ANC, they are further based upon a need to be political, 
rather than policy preferences, which in turn creates a need to live from politics. 
Because the political capital is predominantly symbolic, based on respect, val-
ues, experiences, shared identity, it also contributes to closing off power from 
other elites. Hence, their experience of a common income or of the increasing 
professionalisation of politics is not what contributes to the myriad of political 
classes. Rather, the political background of the political elite that is simulta-
neously shared, and yet distinct, originating as it did in the period of struggle 
politics and immediate post-war period in KwaZulu-Natal creates divisions 
among the elite that are somewhat and sometimes superficial, yet binds them to 
parties all the same. This indicates the possibility of increasing fluidity across 
parties (and may explain in some states the decline of multipartyism and 
dominance of one party) as time passes and the political elite interact in the new 
political institutions. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
5 
Intra-party dynamics and  
political elite circulation 
‘By the circulation of elites, the governing elite is in a state of continuous and slow 
transformation. It flows like a river and what it is today is different from what it was 
yesterday. Every so often, there are sudden and violent disturbances. The river 
floods and breaks its banks. Then, afterwards … the river returns to its bed and 
flows once more freely on’ (Pareto 1976: 250). 
‘History is the graveyard of elites’ (ibid.: 249). 
‘The governing class is … renovated … by recruiting to it families rising … (and) 
… also by the loss of its more degenerate elements’ (ibid.). 
Political elite theorists focus extensively upon the methods of political elite 
circulation, rather than its causes, consequences or characteristics. Mosca, ar-
gues that circulation takes place when organized interests actively seek power 
(Mosca 1939), and Pareto claims that this innovatory elite become conservative 
once entrenched, just like the elite that they replace or are assimilated into 
(Pareto 1935). Indeed, assimilation is a popular theme among classical and con-
temporary political elite theorists alike, with Michels focusing upon assimila-
tion into oligarchies (Michels 1915) and Dye and Zeigler contending that 
compromise between elites shields them from “the masses” (Dye & Zeigler 
1990). In contrast C. Wright-Mills suggests an almost absence of circulation, 
that the elite come to represent certain vested interests that become unchanging 
even if there is a circulation of personnel (Mills 1956). 
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Political elite circulation, if and when it occurs, does not take place in a 
vacuum. Rather than focusing upon the methods of circulation, it is more useful 
to examine the causes, characteristics and consequences of it. The party list 
system of representation which characterises the South African electoral system 
is important in shaping South African political elites and giving the provincial 
political elite its character. Party systems vary in the degree to which political 
parties determine who goes to the legislature. Even in constituency based sys-
tems like the Westminster model, parties can play the preponderant role. How-
ever the complete absence in national and provincial elections in South Africa 
of a territorial element of representation means the political party is entirely 
responsible for the placing of the political elite in the legislature and can dis-
count virtually entirely questions of electability (though not of course entirely 
the preferences of its own grass roots membership). Furthermore, in party-list 
systems, intra-party dynamics play a key role in the way in which elites are 
positioned, whether on a party list or in the allocation of portfolios in legis-
latures. This effect is seen to its greatest refinement in the ANC’s cadre deploy-
ment system, by which all party members, including elected representatives, 
serve where and how the party chooses, irrespective of the electorate. As such, 
elite circulation cannot be studied empirically without an understanding of the 
organizational dynamics and political culture within party caucuses. 
In this chapter I analyse political elite circulation within the provincial legis-
lature as it pertains to intra-party dynamics. As such, this chapter is divided into 
four parts. In the first part I explain the structure of opportunities for the poli-
tical elite through an exploration of the institutional context and the political 
party system including the party caucuses of the IFP and the ANC. These struc-
tures provide both boundaries and opportunities for movement. I then turn to an 
interrogation of the common and divergent patterns of intra-party political cul-
ture including conceptions of etiquette and leadership as they are present in the 
discourses of party caucuses. Thirdly, I examine political elite circulation within 
the legislature as it pertains to intra-party dynamics. Finally I explore volatility 
in the legislature as this pertains to democratic elite circulation in KwaZulu-
Natal. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the prevailing norms of political 
culture in intra-party dynamics in the IFP and the ANC are the main reasons for 
political elite circulation in KwaZulu-Natal. These political cultures are not 
identical. While the IFP has re-cast its political elite through political elite 
circulation to re-establish its core being within the prevailing political culture, 
the ANC’s hierarchical conceptions of leadership are the reasons for the circula-
tion of its political elite.  
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The structure of opportunities within the provincial legislature 
Political systems, including the institutional chances,1 electoral rules and system 
of party competition determine the spaces through which political elite circu-
lation takes place in legislatures. The institutional context of the structure of op-
portunities in KwaZulu-Natal is provided for in the South African Constitution 
(republic of South Africa 1996a) which sets out the separation of powers be-
tween legislative and executive authority as vested in the legislature and mem-
bers of executive councils and premier respectively. In addition, the legislature 
has the power to formulate its own rules, orders, procedures and internal ar-
rangements that include the prescription and provision of the powers, functions 
and procedures of parliamentary committees (Republic of South Africa 1996a: 
Section 116) and the duration of legislative sittings (Republic of South Africa 
1996a: Section 110). This provides for wide latitude in the way in which legis-
lative members construct committees including the career structure within the 
committees that are available, the manner in which they operate and the depth 
of scrutiny of the business before them. In the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legis-
lature elected MPPs each serve on at least one parliamentary committee which 
is substantively congruent to the corresponding ministerial portfolio.2 These 
committees provide the structure through which parliamentary activity takes 
place with a general legislative sitting of a few days per month taking place less 
than twelve times per annum.  
In addition to legislative committee offices and executive branch policy port-
folios, there are other offices within parliament. These include the roles of 
chairperson and deputy chairperson of committees, who through organizing the 
business of the committee upon which he or she serves, theoretically links the 
executive and legislative branches of government. In addition the role of 
                                                            
1  These are the opportunities for involvement within political institutions. 
2  The political elite in the Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal determined and 
established 22 committees. Of these, 17 deal with substantive policy matters. They 
consist of 11 portfolio committees (agriculture; conservation & environmental af-
fairs; education; finance & economic development; health; housing; local govern-
ment & traditional affairs; public accounts; public works; transport; and welfare and 
population development) which have corresponding provincial executive portfolios 
and 6 standing committees (arts, tourism & culture; national council of provinces; 
sport & recreation; premier & royal household; community safety & liaison; quality 
of life and status of women, children, youth and disabled persons) without a corres-
ponding provincial executive portfolio. Of the 22 committees there are also four 
management committees (chairpersons; rules; discipline & ethics; private members 
bills, petitions and pensions) that address management in the House, the conduct of 
business and the regulation of persons and benefits. One final committee is the Par-
liamentary Women’s Caucus which, although listed as a committee, has no formal 
status, funding or resources.  
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speaker and deputy-speaker who preside over the legislative sittings, and are 
theoretically neutral, cast deciding votes in debates in the House. Finally, the 
parliamentary whips who order the business on the parliamentary order paper 
link the legislature with political parties through parliamentary party caucuses 
from whom they receive instructions. The structure of opportunities within the 
Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal is thus wide ranging. The positions 
held by individual MPPs within this system are determined by and within 
political parties. 
Political parties have almost unfettered power in determining who gets into 
parliament. The South African Constitution provides for a party list system of 
proportional representation at both the national and provincial levels of 
government (cf. Republic of South Africa 1996a: Schedule 6) that, in effect, 
entrenches political parties as the key organizations that determine who gets 
into parliament. Potential parliamentarians must appeal to parties to be placed 
on their party electoral list. The party then arranges the list in order of prefer-
ence and may de-select and remove candidates from the list. If they wish to be 
re-selected by their party, parliamentarians once in parliament must abide by 
party discipline and party policy. This electoral system potentially produces 
centralized party control over MPPs in a manner described in other African 
states by Goran Hyden as a ‘suspended state’ (Hyden 1981: 7) because, unlike a 
constituency based electoral system, candidates key loyalty is to the party that 
selects them and not to the public. Hence, the political elite exists in a discon-
nected manner from the public that elected them. They have no geographically 
defined constituencies to be accountable to,3 nor do they need to seek consti-
tuency approval on any matter. The electoral system provides senior party mem-
bers with significant power in determining the composition of the elected and 
the structure of opportunities in a legislature with already wide latitude of 
powers. While it would be naïve to underestimate the power of parties in other 
democracies – Britain for instance – nevertheless, South Africa is an extreme 
example of party power. 
In 2002 the South African Constitution was amended by the national govern-
ment to enable parliamentarians to cross the floor to another party and to retain 
their parliamentary seat during specified annual window periods (cf. Republic 
of South Africa 1996a; 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d). This is the only context in 
the world in which floor-crossing has been introduced in a party-list system of 
proportional representation. Originally conceived of by the DP in the local 
government constituency based system to enable the Democratic Alliance of DP 
and NNP to come about, floor-crossing was introduced by the ANC in the 
                                                            
3  Parties do assign members to geographical areas for purposes of communicating 
with the electorate, but there is no formal or accountable link. 
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parliamentary list system to enable the NNP to join with the ANC at national 
and provincial levels. Schumpeter, in his discussion of minimalist forms of 
democracy, argues that the right to choose who governs is the only role that the 
electorate has in a democracy (Schumpeter 1954). Floor-crossing legislation, in 
removing the voter’s democratic right to select who governs through voting, 
further disconnects MPPs from the electorate. It also favours larger political 
parties because the rules of crossing stipulate that a minimum of 10% of elected 
MPPs in any party must cross the floor at the same time. Hence, the larger 
parties cannot easily fracture through floor-crossing whereas small parties are 
easily assimilated into the larger ones. Thus, the already extensive powers pro-
vided to party bosses through minimal connection to the electorate in the party-
list system of proportional representation are extended to the benefit of party 
bosses and selectors in the larger political parties through the floor-crossing 
legislation.4 
The key political party institutional space in the legislature is the parliament-
ary party caucus. Each political party with representation in the legislature has a 
party caucus consisting of all of its parliamentary members. The caucus coor-
dinates MPPs’ actions, determines policy to advocate in parliament and policy 
positions, decides on parliamentary strategies and tactics towards the opposition 
and in opposition to policy and selects members to serve in parliamentary 
institutional positions. As the key link to the party outside the legislature the 
caucus also serves as a peer group, providing support and discipline and 
grounding MPPs in the perspectives of the political party for which they were 
elected. 
In sum, the structure of opportunities within the Provincial Legislature of 
KwaZulu-Natal is for the most part determined by political parties. They select 
and place MPPs in institutional roles in committees, the constitution of and bu-
siness of which is determined by MPPs whose position and conduct is checked 
by the political party to which they are affiliated. The placement in these roles 
of individual MPPs is thus for the most part a product of intra-party dynamics. 
Intra-party dynamics in the IFP and ANC 
Intra-party dynamics in KwaZulu-Natal, as revealed through interviews, have 
their roots in intra-party political culture. The term intra-party political culture is 
defined as the prevailing conceptions of leadership held among the political 
                                                            
4  In April 2008 the South African Cabinet approved constitutional amendments to 
abolish floor-crossing at the national, provincial and municipal levels. These consti-
tutional amendments were tabled in the National Assembly in 2008. Since 2009, 
MPPs are longer be able to cross the floor and to retain their parliamentary seat, nor 
will MPPs from political parties that merge or become subdivided. 
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elite, their patterns of interaction and the manner in which the rules of discipline 
are applied to them.  
 
Conceptions of leadership and patterns of interaction 
In the ANC, the concept of leadership is tied to two interlinking factors. They 
are past party political experiences and institutional position held. These factors 
are not mutually exclusive, with past experiences often dictating the positions 
that are held institutionally within party structures, and within the political 
institutions in the province. That is, (as detailed in the previous chapter) the 
most senior institutional positions in the province are repeatedly occupied by 
individuals with extensive political party experiences. When asked who the 
leaders were, interviewees repeatedly pointed to a person followed by the 
rationale that they occupied a particular parliamentary institutional position. In 
fact, most MPPs also correlated the senior party members, with senior insti-
tutional roles in the legislature. For example, one MPP claimed, ‘The senior 
leadership of the party is the government’ (Pers. ANC Interview 71). Within 
these positions, executive portfolios were viewed as the most senior, and indiv-
iduals were considered leaders because they occupied these positions. The ANC 
political elite thus have structured conceptions of leadership with clear correla-
tions between seniority and institutional position.  
Informally, however, the concept of seniority is viewed by the ANC political 
elite as encompassing more than the designation of roles. Interviews showed 
that for a few MPPs, and particularly the ones who came into office in the 
second legislative term, seniority is also guided by perceptions of respect that 
provide informal hierarchies of interaction within the institutional context of 
leadership. For example, one MPP claimed of the ANC provincial leader, 
‘There is of course this other issue … I respect him because he is my elder 
brother. He is also senior which means that I respect his views and engage with 
him with respect’ (Pers. ANC Interview 57). In terms of how that translates into 
political interactions it holds a double meaning. By way of their institutional 
position leaders were to direct the content of discussions and opinions on them 
and by way of conceptions of respect were rarely challenged on this established 
way of interaction. For example, leaders were found to direct and frame the 
debates that take place in the provincial party caucus. The seating order estab-
lished the most senior leaders institutionally sat in a row separated from the 
other caucus members. The speaking order was established so that the most 
senior leader speaks first, followed by the next senior and so on. In 2003, the 
seating and speaking order was challenged by a group of newer ANC provincial 
MPPs. According to one MPP, ‘We said that this thing where the leadership all 
sit together … where S’bu speaks, then Zweli, then Dumisani … that must 
change. They must sit among everyone else. They must deploy themselves 
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among the rest of us’ (Pers. ANC Interview 57). However, the manner in which 
this was challenged was to raise it in caucus and then allow the senior MPPs to 
decide upon it, giving respect to the senior MPPs to whom it was directed to 
make the decision on whether it would be in the best interests of the caucus to 
change the manner and the method through which debate happened. Once the 
decision by the senior MPPs was taken, the caucus was to abide by it. Thus the 
cleavages in terms of intra-party political culture in the ANC are mutually 
reinforcing. Respect thus translates into recognition of hierarchy and the rein-
forcement of hierarchical distinctions between MPPs in the ANC.  
In contrast to the ANC, conceptions of leadership in the IFP are much more 
diverse and not directly related to the institutional position held by MPPs. Like 
the ANC, conceptions of leadership are based upon prior experiences, but those 
experiences are not necessarily related to party political institutional experi-
ences. Alongside the formal designated structure of party and parliamentary of-
fices, a parallel structure exists, that serves to provide political relationships 
with a procedure and boundaries. In the IFP respected “leaders” consist of a 
variety of individuals. There are members of the Amakhosi, who are the most 
respected. There are also individuals with other claims to leadership. These 
“other” leaders have achieved this status for a variety of reasons, but to become 
a respected leader takes time. In attempts to determine whether interviewees 
were considered leaders a discussion always ensued on the importance of two 
factors both premised on a conception of “greatness”. The first was who ones 
parents and grandparents were, whether they were great men, and what their 
role was in the wars against the British and the Boers. As one interviewee 
stated, ‘you cannot just emerge as a mushroom’ (Pers. IFP Interview 92). The 
second factor was whether one could be considered to have earned greatness 
through engaging in activities which tended to benefit ones community at a 
grass roots level. As one MPP said of another, ‘he has earned his greatness by 
defending the blood of our communities. He is hard but his motives are good 
and he deserves our respect’ (Pers. IFP Interview 128).5 In practice, respect was 
not found to translate into authority, nor into institutional position. Instead, 
respect was framed in terms of rules of etiquette characterised by a hierarchical 
system of interaction. 
This is not to suggest that authority is determined on this basis, but rather it 
is a collective procedure through which ideas are canvassed. For example, a 
non-leader with a good idea would approach a respected leader, who in turn 
would approach a more respected leader, until the most respected had the 
                                                            
5  The ‘defending the blood of our communities’ was a literal reference to paramilitary 
activities involving communal warfare. 
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opportunity to express a view. By the time an issue surfaces in the IFP party 
caucus it has been carefully canvassed through this method.  
Unlike in the ANC, the cleavages present in terms of who fits into the 
hierarchy are cross cutting rather than mutually reinforcing. Leaders can be 
leaders in more than one domain. An individual may be respected because of 
past party related work, also hold a senior parliamentary institutional position 
because of a degree in that particular policy area, be a member of the Amakhosi 
and have been involved in developmental related role. As such, the route to 
leadership can take a variety of forms, doesn’t dictate seniority in terms of 
debate and decisions and ties MPPs together across a whole range of cleavages. 
All MPPs follow these prevailing rules of political etiquette in their interactions 
with one another, so an idea can emerge from anyone, but is likely to be intro-
duced through a leader. 
 
Intra-party discipline 
A central feature of intra-party political culture is intra-party discipline. Dis-
cipline is a factor that clearly demonstrates the prevailing rules of interaction 
between the political elite within each party. In the ANC, discipline is predo-
minantly private, formalised and institutionalized. Central to party etiquette is 
the concept of democratic centralism. Although debate and discussion is ac-
cepted in caucus, MPPs are expected to abide by the decisions that are taken by 
party leadership. As an ANC MPP explained, ‘We are all on the same level 
when it comes to making contributions. Then somewhere decisions are made 
and checked to see they are not in conflict with party policies’ (Pers. ANC 
Interview 71). And as another said, ‘Everyone speaks, everyone is heard. Once 
a decision has been taken by leadership, caucus has no power to change it’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 113). Thus an individual is likely to be disciplined for 
deviating publicly from the official position presented by the party. As one 
ANC MPP stated, ‘We do not like dissidence. You must not renege on any 
agreement. You must not try to twist the hand of the party. This is seen as a 
form of treachery’ (Pers. ANC MEC Interview 134). There are very few exam-
ples of both formal and informal disciplinary measures that have been taken 
against members of the provincial parliamentary ANC. This absence of discip-
linary cases against MPPs is indicative that discipline is taken seriously by 
them. This is, in part, explained because the penalties for deviation are harsh. 
Internal dissidence, by those who have grassroots popularity in the parlia-
mentary party, is addressed by the party through the process of sidelining in-
dividuals. The consequences of failing to abide by leadership decisions can 
effectively mean expulsion or the end of a political career through the leaking 
of, or manipulation of information or misinformation to discredit the individual. 
The most obvious example is that of MPP Sifiso Nkabinde, who was expelled 
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by the ANC on unproven spying allegations. He was murdered in January 1999, 
after joining the UDM.6 He had been a charismatic, populist strong arm man in 
the Natal Midlands who had held turf for the ANC in the early 1990s in the 
townships around Richmond, in areas that saw some of the worst violence in the 
post-apartheid period. This area was also a depot for ANC arms into the region 
from the former Transkei. Two factors changed his position of importance for 
the ANC. The first was a concerted attempt to shift power from regions to the 
national parliament in an attempt to stop KwaZulu-Natal issues from dominat-
ing national discourses. In 1996 Nkabinde was asked not to stand for the 
position of ANC provincial secretary7 at the ANC Provincial Conference in 
December of that year. He chose to ignore that instruction and stood for the 
position claiming ‘I would not be blackmailed and denied my democratic right’ 
(Nkabinde in Jones 1997). The voting process was chaos and many of the 
delegates (including many of Nkabinde’s supporters) had left the hall before the 
vote, believing that there was not going to be a vote. He lost the vote in a 
chaotic situation but incurred the wrath of the party leadership for disobeying 
their instructions of not to stand. The second factor was the peace process in the 
province between the ANC and the IFP which led to a new discourse among 
some members of the ANC and IFP by May 1996. As the peace process 
between the ANC and IFP took shape in the province it could be argued that 
Nkabinde was no longer trusted by the ANC to be silent about knowledge he 
held of ANC arms caches, violence and the assassinations of IFP members in 
the provincial turf wars in the 1990s. A relationship did, however, begin to 
develop through the peace process between him and former adversaries David 
Ntombela and Philip Powell of the IFP and Sifiso Nkabinde even provided them 
with information about the assassination of some of the IFP aligned amakhosi in 
the 1990s. As the 1996 local government elections loomed, both Ntombela and 
Nkabinde were to put up election posters together and Nkabinde made an 
impassioned speech to the provincial legislature declaring an end to violence 
and urging others to do the same (Grimbeek 1996). By the time of his ex-
pulsion, Sifiso Nkabinde retained a large populist following, was openly dis-
cussing the war in the province with the ANC’s former adversary – the IFP 
(Pers. IFP Interviews 28, 120 and 43) – and had indicated that he would not be 
prepared to simply step aside at the call of national leadership. His expulsion, 
on the basis of unproven allegations, was almost inevitable. Such examples of 
                                                            
6  No-one has been charged with his murder and the perpetrators remain unknown. 
7  This instruction was presented to Nkabinde at a meeting he was called to with ANC 
Provincial Leader Jacob Zuma, Mpumulanga Premier Matthews Phosa and Walter 
Sisulu. 
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the consequences of ill discipline, for those with widespread popular follow-
ings, serve as a severe deterent to others in the party. 
In contrast to the ANC, discipline in the IFP, is frequently personal, public 
and related to conceptions of etiquette and respect through ubuntu-botho. With-
in ubuntu, an individual in the IFP is mainly valued because he/she forms a part 
of a greater collective. Thus, it follows that discipline is also a collective enter-
prise. Ordinarily an MPP would be disciplined for bringing the party into dis-
repute by going against the party line in the legislature, for making comments to 
the media that bring another MPP into disrepute or for engaging in an activity 
that is against the values of the ethics committee. Discipline is frank, open and 
personal with the disciplinary committee of the IFP levelling charges and the 
MPP expected to explain him or herself to the entire National Council. In 
accordance with IFP etiquette, however, all interviewees explained that a sig-
nificant part of the disciplinary process includes the essence of forgiveness. 
Once the MPP has apologised and asked for forgiveness for hurting the col-
lective they are forgiven. As one MPP argued, ‘Discipline is very important … 
A child needs to be disciplined. They are taught by their mother and father. 
Family values are very important. The party becomes the extended family’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 106). As another argued, ‘We have been taught to be 
honest. We have been taught to be disciplined. There are certain things that you 
just can’t do because then it takes away your self-respect’ (Pers. IFP Interview 
131). In essence, discipline in the IFP is about loyalty, loyalty to the party ethics 
located in ubuntu and to party etiquette.  
The clearest example of this is MPP Shabalala who was disciplined and then 
expelled by the party’s National Council for leading an unofficial and un-
approved march of hostel dwellers through the city. After taking the party to 
court, Shabalala was reinstated to the provincial legislature. Despite the serious 
nature of the matter, after seeking forgiveness within the party, Shabalala was 
appointed to the position of Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Housing 
in the legislature – a position of significant promotion in the party and within 
the legislature. 
Recruitment and circulation 
In KwaZulu-Natal, the primary impact of the prevailing intra-party political 
cultures is seen in the deployment of the political elite. Hence, recruitment and 
circulation among the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal is a product of intra-
party political culture. Table 5.1 illustrates recruitment and circulation in the 
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature organised by political party affiliation.  
 
   
 
Table 5.1 Recruitment and circulation by political party affiliationa 
Political 1994 Mid-term Mid-term End of 1999 1994  Mid-term New MPPs Mid-term Mid-term Totals  
party  elections  exits entries first elections  election entry sur- in 1999 exits B entries B 2004 
  A 1994-1999 A 1994-1999 term  survivors vivors from elections 1999-2004 1999-2004 
       in 1999 first term     
IFP 41 18b  19c  42 34 17 9 8 9 6 31 
ANC 26 5 7 28 32 17 3 12 8 10 34 
DP/DA 2 0 0 2 7d  2 0 5 4 4 7 
NNP 9 4 4 9 3 2 0 1 1 1 3 
MF 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 
ACDP 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
PAC 1 0 0 1 0 - - - - - 0 
UDM 0 - - - 1 - - 1 1 1 1 
IAMe  - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
TOTAL 81 28 31f  84 80 39 13 28 27 23 80 
Notes: 
a) The table has been constructed from interviews. No parliamentary or other record exists of this data. Numbers in the table represent the actual number of MPPs 
b) IFP MPP Thomas Shabalala has been counted only as a 1994 election entry, 1994 election survivor and 1999 election entry, although he qualifies as a mid-term 
exit A, mid-term entry A and mid-term entry survivor because he was elected in 1994, suspended in 1996, reinstated in 1999 and then re-elected in 1999. For a 
true representation of turnover, this would increase these figures by 1. 
c) The IFP was entitled to one extra entry between 1994 and 1999 but chose not to replace an MPP due to the proximity of the June 1999 elections. 
d) Belinda Scott has been counted as a new entry in 1999 on resigning from the IFP and then being placed in parliament for the DA because she represented a new 
member for another party. 
e) The Independent African Movement (IAM) was created in 2002 within the legislature by IFP MPP Theresa Millin during the floor-crossing period when she left 
the IFP. It won no seats in 2004. 
f) The Independent African Movement (IAM) was created in 2002 within the legislature by IFP MPP Theresa Millin during the floor-crossing period when she left 
the IFP. It won no seats in 2004. 
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As indicated in the table, circulation of the political elite has been significant 
both at election time and mid way through terms of office in both the first and 
second terms. This circulation will be explained in this section through a 
discussion of the two terms of office from 1994-1999 and from 1999-2004. This 
will show how intra-party political culture, including decision-making impacts 
upon recruitment and circulation in the province. 
 
Circulation in the first term 
Interviews show that the loss of the first provincial elections to the IFP came as 
a shock to the ANC. The provincial ANC did not, in 1994, take rural voting 
behaviour seriously (Johnson 1996a: 274-300). Johnson argues that even in 
those constituencies in which the ANC perceived its main strength lay (Durban, 
Pinetown, Inanda), ‘the ANC’s hegemony within its strongholds turned out to 
be far less complete than had been imagined’ (Johnson 1996b: 316).As is 
demonstrated in Table 5.1, there were high levels of turnover in the legislature 
and hence of political elite circulation in both the IFP and the ANC in the first 
term of office. In the IFP, of the 41 MPPs who were elected, there were 18 exits 
(43.9%) during the first term. In the ANC there were 5 exits (19.2%) from 26 
seats gained in the 1994 elections. The reasons for these exits are located in the 
internal party dynamics of the individual parties. 
 
     • Circulation in the IFP from 1994-1999 
The compilation of the party lists was a contested process in the IFP. The party 
relied on existing social and political capital in 1994 in order to hurriedly 
construct an electoral list a few days prior to the election. Entering the electoral 
contest only six days before the polls, this last minute entry meant that the party 
could not, as they would in 1999, use the party branch system for nominations 
for the party list. Instead, the National Council constructed a committee of 
senior party members in order to choose potential parliamentary candidates 
(Pers. IFP Interview 92). This committee had the monumental task of con-
structing a list from established party members, a multitude of KLA members 
from a legislative assembly that had 144 seats1 and new party members from the 
former white only parties. As a consequence, a hastily compiled electoral list 
excluded many potential IFP MPPs who would, in all likelihood, have been 
nominated to serve as MPPs through a proper branch based nomination system.2 
In addition, it included members who had no viable constituency support and 
                                                            
1  These were comprised of the Zulu King and his representative, 74 Amakhosi, 65 
elected representatives and 3 nominations by the Chief Minister. 
2  It excluded MPPs such as MPP Vezi, who had served in the KLA and through the 
branch system of nominations in 1999 were then elected. 
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had limited experience of the internal political culture of the IFP. Interviews 
show that of the 41 MPPs who went to parliament for the IFP in 1994, 19 of 
them had joined the IFP no more than two years before the first democratic 
election and 18 of them had no prior experience of internal party political 
culture prior to becoming an MPP. More than half of these MPPs were of the 
former white only political parties who joined the IFP en masse on the eve of 
the 1994 elections. As discussed in chapters three and four, many of these MPPs 
had extensive prior political experience in government institutions. They also 
knew each other and could vouch for each other. Social capital provided for 
them the basis of a new bloc within the party that they had joined. These 
organised interests sought and grasped significant power in the IFP in the way 
perhaps that Mosca suggests circulation exists. 
When the hastily constructed electoral committee put together the party list 
for the province, it included some, but not all of these MPPs. However, the 
person tasked with delivering the list3 to the Independent Electoral Commission 
for submission apparently substantially changed the list. More than two thirds 
of those interviewed who were elected in 1994 knew their designated position 
on the list after the committee had made its selections and of these, more than 
three quarters discovered that this position had changed after the list had been 
submitted. One MPP, for example, stated, ‘I knew that I was number 12 on the 
list three days after the committee met, but when it came back (from pub-
lication) I had been moved down the list more than 10 places’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 92). Instead, the new bloc that had joined the party on the eve of the 
elections was included en masse on the party list. Included because of the 
political capital they possessed and the social capital that they shared with each 
other, it was believed, that this bloc would deliver a crucial white racial vote for 
the party through the social capital that they shared with the white segment of 
the electorate in the first multi-racial elections. 
This intervention, made without the sanction of the party, was to cause 
significant turmoil within the IFP for the next two years. The list process for the 
1994 elections had excluded many of the IFP’s core constituency and instead 
included individuals who had no experience of intra-party political culture in 
the IFP. As Table 5.1 shows, during the first parliamentary term 18 IFP MPPs 
(almost half of those elected in 1994) exited parliament. Although on the 
surface this significantly high turnover appeared to be a racial division (with 
more than half of these MPPs non-african) it was not actually so. Instead, it was 
a realignment of the IFP political elite in congruence with the core political 
culture of the party. Of those who exited in this period, Patrick Cornell, David 
Durham, Charles Van Eck, David Watterson, Clive Wilkins and Hugh Lee had 
                                                            
3  IFP MPP Walter Felgate. 
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joined the party on the eve of the elections. The political etiquette of the party 
was alien to them, particularly the nature of internal party canvassing of opinion 
and decision-making which they could not reconcile with their own political 
experiences. This also applied to MPPs such as Belinda Scott who worked as a 
researcher for the party and had no experience of its internal workings and who 
left the party to join the DA in early 1999. The long National Council meetings 
in Ulundi in which the opinions of hundreds of amakhosi and local leaders were 
canvassed on crucial policy and legislative matters did not sit well with their 
own perceptions of westernised government. Their reasons for going to par-
liament were to retain a political tie to the legislature, not to serve the party’s 
core mandate through its particular style of etiquette. Thus their departure and 
replacement could be considered to be evidence of a reassertion of internal IFP 
democracy and a realignment of the party’s political elite with its core being.  
It was not only non-Africans who departed in this period, but all those who 
had not grown up within the traditions of the IFP. For example, MPP Robert 
Mzimela is an African who was deployed to the legislature in the wake of the 
realignment in 1996 and then departed in 1997. Mzimela is a clear example of 
someone who did not grow up within the political culture of the IFP, nor 
understand it, despite holding senior positions for the party. Originally an ANC 
member, Mzimela went into exile for the ANC in 1961 to Swaziland and then 
Tanzania from which he was sent to Czechoslovakia for education. It was 18 
months into this education when Mzimela became disenchanted with com-
munism in the ANC and he left to settle in what was then West Germany and 
trained as a priest. His priesthood took him to the USA where he wrote a book 
entitled ‘Marching to Slavery: South Africa’s Descent into Communism’ pub-
lished in America. Joining the IFP in 1990 because of his anti-communist stance 
and accepted by the party because of his criticism of the ANC, Mzimela had no 
prior experience of the branch structures or internal political culture of his new 
political home. When it seemed clear that the South African Communist Party 
and the Left in general were being marginalized in the ANC, he called for a 
merger between the IFP and ANC (Independent on Saturday, 27 February 
1999), which was anathema to the discourse of respect within the political 
culture of the IFP, whose memory of war with the ANC was still very fresh in 
their minds. It is hardly surprising, given that he did not grow up in the tra-
ditions of the party that he would find himself, like some of the white bloc that 
had joined just prior to the elections, an almost alien entity in a party that was 
premised on political etiquette. 
The departure of these MPPs forced a readjustment of the IFP MPPs that 
were deployed to the provincial and national legislatures from this point on-
wards. In essence, the party replaced each departing provincial member with a 
senior IFP member, some of whom had been excluded from the original party 
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list in 1994 and some of whom had been deployed to the national parliament in 
1994. These included MPPs Faith Gasa and Eileen kaNkosi-Shandu who had 
been negotiators for the party at CODESA; MPP Ziba Jiyane who was part of 
the National Coordinating Committee of the party; MPP Lionel Mtshali who 
became Party Chairman; MPPs Ellis Vezi, Mziwamandla Mzobe, Vitus Mve-
lase and Inkosi Bonginkosi Mdletshe from the former KLA who had been ex-
cluded from the 1994 list; MPPs Abbie Mchunu and Lauretta Ngcobo who 
worked in senior party structures; MPP Phillip Powell who had worked for a 
long period as an urban representative for the IFP and been involved in SDU 
training in the early 1990s and MPP Narend Singh who had worked alongside 
the Amakhosi in rural development before becoming an IFP MPP. Members of 
this core were predominantly well educated with prior political experience, but 
more importantly they were well versed in the political culture of the IFP, 
having been long serving IFP party members and understanding, and in fact 
maintaining, the system of political culture within the party. In addition, those 
who came to be replacement MPPs represented the circulation into power of 
those with constituencies of support through the party branch system and the 
validation of those who had been long serving ordinary members of the party 
and had worked hard for it. Hence, a different form of social and political 
capital was emerging over that which prevailed when the lists were put together, 
one which was much more reflective of the essence of the party’s internal 
dynamics, both in terms of political culture and through its branch organisation. 
Other departures in this period were as a consequence of death, old age or 
reallocation of members to the national parliament. For example, MPP Romlall 
Haripersaad died in a helicopter accident, MPP Thanda Dingila was assassin-
ated while working in the peace structures, MPP Nkanyiso Biyela (from a long 
line of Biyelas who served the KLA) retired citing old age and MPP John 
Bhengu was moved to the national parliament. However others, as discussed 
later, who were senior IFP party members retired from legislative politics al-
together for other areas of service tied to politics. 
IFP political elite circulation in the legislature during this period is partly in 
contrast with elite theory. The replacement of IFP MPPs in this period does not 
represent a new innovatory elite emerging, nor a fusion or coalition, but rather a 
recasting of the political elite in the legislature through the incorporation of 
individuals who understand the prevailing and established political culture of 
the party. Circulation in the IFP in this period may be seen as a process of 
rectification and amelioration of internal disharmony created by the grasping, 
through the 1994 list process, of significant power in the IFP by those from the 
crumbling white parties. At the same time, circulation represents, as in the work 
of Pareto, the ascendance of those with the attributes and characteristics that are 
most needed – those with the ability to perform in government who possess 
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both the social characteristics of education and professional experience, but who 
also claim as their own the prevailing style of political etiquette that glues the 
party together. 
 
     • Circulation in the ANC from 1994-1999 
There are three reasons for circulation of the ANC political elite during this 
period. They are, a growing trend of the use of the province by the political elite 
as a basis from which to enter national politics which began in late 1997, death, 
and the sidelining of the militant provincial core so that it has little impact upon 
national political imperatives. 
The compilation of the party lists in the ANC was a process that was as 
contested in the ANC as it was in the IFP, but not for the same reasons. In the 
ANC, the question was over leadership in the province, not the ordinary rank 
and file MPPs. Given the power that is provided to leadership through the 
decision-making processes of democratic centralism in the ANC, the recog-
nition of hierarchy and the respect afforded to those in institutional leadership 
positions within internal ANC political etiquette it is hardly surprising that the 
decisive battles between political elites in the party are at the leadership level. It 
is in this context that the militant provincial core located in the midlands region 
of the ANC was sidelined in the first period of office and it began with the 
question over who would be provincial leader.  
Militant midlands leader MPP Harry Gwala was the popular choice among 
the ANC branches for the leadership of the ANC in the province. Gwala was 
fiercely outspoken against the negotiation process from 1990-1994. He argued 
that the negotiation process should be subjected to the armed struggle and not 
visa versa. Gwala followed the trend of earlier midlands leadership (discussed 
in Chapter 2) in forcing what may be seen as provincially based issues up 
through the party to make them the central issues on a national agenda. Gwala 
had, by 1993, managed to pull behind him in his opposition to compromises 
made at the negotiating table, other party members from the internal structures 
of the other two ANC regions – South and North and the Southern Natal 
structures of COSATU, the ANC Youth League, the SACP and the Marxist 
Workers Tendency (cf. City Press, 21 February 1993). As the national political 
context changed and the ANC imperatives – predominantly of the exile elite – 
turned to questions of governance there was a concerted attempt to rein in this 
militant core of essentially internal elites so that provincial dynamics no longer 
drove national imperatives (as they had done through the century) and the es-
sentially exile elite could take power smoothly without challenge. This ac-
counted for the most crucial circulation in the provincial legislature in the ANC, 
where the national leadership of the ANC sidelined Harry Gwala and then his 
lieutenant Sifiso Nkabinde to force provincial obedience. 
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Despite Gwala’s popularity, the national leadership invoked an ANC consti-
tutional clause to prevent Gwala from standing as Midlands leader (which put 
him in line to stand as provincial leader) by arguing that he already served on 
the NEC and thus could not hold two positions consecutively. Gwala’s response 
was to offer to resign his NEC position and in late 1993 he was re-elected 
Midlands Leader. Instead, the ANC at the national level sidelined Gwala by 
parachuting Jacob Zuma into the region. This was effectively a coup that de-
posed the relatively weak Northern Natal leadership which supported Gwala 
and imposed Zuma. Zuma was born in the Northern Natal region at Nkandla, 
although he was essentially an exile figure and in fact served the ANC through 
its Southern Natal branch. The coup de grace in sidelining Gwala was the 
election of Jacob Zuma as ANC leader for the province. Harry Gwala’s death in 
1995 and MPP Sifiso Nkabinde’s expulsion in 1997 (discussed earlier) repre-
sent the breaking of the power not only of the midlands leadership, but more 
importantly, this particular formerly internally-based midlands leadership. 
Zuma’s credentials have been discussed in chapter three. The choice of 
Zuma represents a number of factors. Firstly, Zuma’s exile status provided the 
social and political capital for his acceptance as provincial leader by the South-
ern Natal region of the ANC, whose political elite were almost entirely from 
exile and whose leadership candidate – Jeff Radebe – knew him from exile. 
Secondly, with both his urban and rural credentials, Zuma was accepted by the 
IFP as a candidate not only of sufficient seniority to satisfy their need for 
demonstrable respect but someone who understood the more traditional ele-
ments of the party and had been delegated to make peace – something Gwala 
would not do. Thirdly, it required someone who possessed sufficient political 
capital to break the historic hold on power that the midlands had in the region 
and to enable those from exile to return to positions of power in Southern Natal 
and the Natal Midlands in a coup over the internal ANC. Fourthly, it was a 
priority among the returning ANC to break the power of the SACP by incorpo-
rating them into the ANC without conflict through the method of appeasement. 
Zuma did not renew his SACP membership in 1992 when ANC members were 
instructed to declare joint affiliations, but it was well known in the movement 
that he had been members of both organisations. His provincial candidacy was 
thus acceptable to both parties. Finally, and most importantly, in 1994 Zuma 
understood and practised the prevailing methods of political culture in the ANC, 
particularly in terms of political etiquette and the language of respect for 
hierarchical distinctions. His social and political capital made him trusted. The 
sidelining and provincialising of the province was thus complete by the end of 
1997 in a top-down manner that had begun before the elections and played itself 
out through elite circulation. 
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The only other dynamics of circulation for the ANC in this period were as a 
consequence of death – as in the case of MPP Bheki Mthembu who was 
assassinated in 1998 while working in the north coast peace structures – and 
through circulation of the elite from provincial government to the national level 
– as in the case of MPP Shakes Cele in 1998 and MPP Jacob Zuma in early 
1999 – in what became a growing ANC trend discussed later. Suffice to say, 
that in the first term of office, elite circulation in the ANC is directly related to 
intra-party political culture. Because of the political capital possessed by MPP 
Harry Gwala, it required someone of even more seniority to replace him and to 
be accepted and respected within the ANC provincially. Once Zuma was chosen 
that respect for his political and social capital trumped that of Gwala and the 
provincial elite complied with his leadership as he was inserted into the senior 
institutional role in the province. Hence, the intra-party political culture of 
democratic centralism is what explains the method of circulation but the ac-
ceptance of it is very much a part of the discourse of respect for seniority 
through social and political capital and the respect of institutional hierarchy in 
the ANC. 
 
Circulation in the second term 
As shown in Table 5.1, 17 MPPs in each of the IFP and the ANC who were 
elected in 1994 survived to be elected again in 1999. In total this represents 
51.5% of MPPs who were elected in 1994, or 69.7% of MPPs if one takes into 
account those who entered during the first parliamentary term. Given the 
reduction of seats for the IFP from 41 to 34, this represents continuity of 50% of 
the MPPs from the first election. If, however, one takes into account the MPPs 
who entered during the first term and survived into the second term, this figure 
rises to continuity of 73.5% or almost three-quarters of MPPs which is indi-
cative of no major intra-party turmoil since the realignment that was complete 
by 1997. In the ANC, continuity from the first election to the second election 
accounts for a much higher figure of 65.4% but because of the increase in seats 
from 26 to 32 in the second election this figure appears to be less so at 62.5% 
when one takes into account the mid-term entries from the first term who sur-
vived into the second election. 
 
     • Circulation in the IFP from 1999-2004 
The IFP newcomers to parliament in 1999 represented a predominantly young-
er, educated crop of individuals who, despite their relative youth, had for the 
most part grown up within the traditions of the party like those who were mid-
term replacements in the first term. Of the eight new MPPs, two (or 25%) held 
doctoral degrees – Usha Roopnarain and Nhlanhla Khubisa – a trend that has 
significantly increased. Five had held long term party affiliations and worked 
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extensively through the branch system – Inkosi Simon Gumede, Professor 
Nhlanhla Khubisa, Elias Mbatha, J.M.A. Ngcobo and Sibusiso Ngidi – with 
Khubisa even founding a branch. The trend established during the first term of 
replacing MPPs with those who understood and practised the internal political 
culture of the party thus continued into the second term. 
This process and pattern of placing emphasis on the social capital of political 
etiquette in selection of MPPs became a factor in the second parliamentary term 
that led to more circulation. Internally driven IFP circulation in positions and 
posts from 1999 onwards had the consequence of inter-party circulation in the 
legislature when floor-crossing legislation was introduced in 2002. In 2002, the 
ANC extended floor-crossing legislation operational at local government level 
to national and provincial legislatures. This enabled members of parliament to 
cross the floor, taking their parliamentary seats to the party to which they 
crossed. With the number of seats held by the ANC and IFP almost on a par (the 
IFP had 34 seats to the ANC’s 32) the IFP attempted to pre-empt any loss of 
parliamentary seats by a reshuffle of MPPs at the national and provincial levels. 
In effect this accounted for three exits from the provincial parliament to the 
national level4 to be replaced by three MPPs from the national to the provincial 
parliament.5 In effect, the IFP misread who the potential defectors were in the 
party. They were in fact to come from some of the remaining white bloc that 
had joined the party on the eve of the elections in 1994, who were aggrieved at 
internal circulation in the allocation of committee positions in the legislature by 
the IFP caucus. 
In mid-2002, IFP MPPs Tarr and Mackenzie crossed the floor to join the 
ANC along with UDM MPP Sam Nxumalo who was under internal party in-
vestigation, DA MPP Tim Jeebodh and DA MPP Belinda Scott who was an IFP 
MPP in the first term. This shifted the balance of power in the province to the 
ANC and gave them 37 seats leaving the IFP with 32 seats and the ANC 
prepared to take control of the provincial executive and premiership. As it 
happened, the Constitutional Court declared the floor-crossing unconstitutional 
at provincial and national level (cf. Madlala 2002), in what was its present form, 
but there was no going back for these five MPPs whose five seats were not 
added to the ANC tally.  
The reasons for the defection of Mike Tarr and Maurice Mackenzie can be 
found in IFP intra-party dynamics and specifically party etiquette. Both Tarr 
and Mackenzie had joined the IFP on the eve of the 1994 elections as part of the 
white bloc of members who were given significant legislative portfolios through 
their legislative membership. Tarr had served until 1999 as IFP Chief Whip in 
                                                            
4  They were MPPs Mzikayise Ngema, Ellis Vezi and Maria Xulu. 
5  They were MPPs Velaphi Ndlovu, Geoffrey Bhengu and Olaf Baloyi. 
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the legislature to be replaced by the IFP Caucus in the 1999 elections by MPP 
Ellis Vezi. Tarr in 1999 became an ordinary MPP. Vezi was a new MPP in 1999 
that had been excluded from the list in 1994, had extensive legislative ex-
perience in the KLA and had grown up through the branch system and within 
the traditions of etiquette within the party. While on the one hand the replace-
ment of the elite and replenishment through internal circulation into senior 
legislative positions represented the practicing of internal party democracy in 
the IFP, it is also indicative of the importance of a return to the prevailing 
norms of political etiquette. Tarr had no history of work for the party, did not 
come through the branch system and simply emerged, after joining the party in 
the post-apartheid period to take on a key institutional political leadership role 
for the party. But in IFP etiquette, Vezi was a leader in the broader scheme of 
IFP political culture. His long party service meant that in IFP etiquette he had 
earned the political institutional role of leadership that he came to occupy from 
1999 in the IFP realignment that had continued from 1996 onwards. 
Maurice Mackenzie’s defection to the ANC, for different reasons than Mike 
Tarr’s, was also as a product of the loss of a senior institutional role and the 
relegation to an ordinary MPP. Unlike Tarr, Mackenzie lost the position of 
Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture that he had occupied 
since 1994 to the ANC in the coalition between the IFP and ANC that was 
formed in 19996 and more importantly, was on the verge of being moved to the 
national parliament in Cape Town in an internal reshuffle meant to continue the 
pattern of incorporating provincially more of the IFP members versed in the 
historical traditions of service for the party. For Mackenzie, the impending 
relocation to Cape Town was to remove him from the core area that he had 
carved out for himself – that of land, agriculture and the environment in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal. In essence the ANC offered him the opportunity to stay in the 
province in a significant role. 
In both cases normalization in the party re-establishing its institutional 
leadership core of MPPs from the established party core who had grown up 
through the branch system and had been immersed in party political culture, had 
led to their defection to the ANC. There are no cases of IFP defections of 
individuals who have joined the party at the branch level and grown up through 
the branch system. Again, this pattern was continued in the later defections in 
2003 – when floor-crossing was legalized by the Constitutional Court – of the 
charismatic Gabriel Ndabandaba who had no long term history of involvement 
with the party and defected to the ANC, and Theresa Millin who joined on the 
eve of the 1994 elections and was later stripped of her Whip position and 
formed her own party in 2003.  
                                                            
6  For an extensive discussion of this coalition, see Chapter 6 of this book. 
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The re-establishment of internal IFP democracy by choosing candidates who 
represented the core political culture of the party was the catalyst for defection. 
In effect, by the end of the second term, the party had come full circle from the 
disastrous list system process in 1994 in which a new bloc was parachuted into 
power and the core party members were sidelined institutionally. As such, 
Pareto’s theory of circulation does not apply to this case. Rather than circulation 
providing renovation to the political elite, it provides a re-establishment of the 
core personnel and political culture within the IFP political elite. Nor does IFP 
elite circulation in the second term mean the ‘loss of its more degenerate 
elements’ (Pareto 1976: 249) in the legislature, as those who were circulated out 
of an IFP institutional position found a guaranteed home as an MPP in an ANC 
institutional position – or in the case of Millin created her own. As such, they 
came to tie their interests to the legislature, rather than the party, in an anti-
democratic act that was to guarantee their continued political elite status. 
 
     • Circulation in the ANC from 1999-2004 
The 1999 elections produced a consolidation in the ANC political elite through 
national level interventions, as was the case in the earlier installation of Zuma as 
provincial leader. As discussed in chapter four, the pattern of institutionalizing 
those with particular forms of political capital in senior institutional roles was 
entrenched by the second term – those from southern Natal, such as Fatima 
Nahara who became Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Conservation 
and the Environment, Nhlanhla Ngidi who became Chairperson for the Portfolio 
Committee on Social Welfare and Population Development, Cyril Xaba who 
became Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Finance, Dumisani Ma-
khaye who became MEC for Housing, and of course Sibusiso Ndebele who 
became Provincial Leader – the most senior with links to exile politics and/or 
imprisonment on Robben Island. But the interventions in 1999 went further and 
showed an increasingly top-down style of political culture. In 1999, the ANC 
branch system nominated MPP Bheki Cele as the most popular candidate for 
the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal (cf. Ngubane 1999c). Despite this, Cele was not 
afforded any executive position and the installation of Sibusiso Ndebele as 
ANC provincial leader was on the basis of an appointment from the national 
level, and not through the caucus or the branches. Ndebele’s nominations by the 
branches had placed him only fourth on the provincial list (cf. Ngubane 1999c). 
This was in the period after the province had been provincialised through the 
sidelining of the internal midlands leadership, so the need for a national inter-
vention was no longer pressing. However from 1999, president Mbeki was 
determined to centralise senior leadership appointments in his own hands on the 
grounds that factionalism in several provinces (including Gauteng and the Free 
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State) was weakening the ANC. As one interviewee put it (possibly with ironic 
intent):  
‘When we came to government we found that we were too democratic. So now the 
President with the NEC appoints the provincial leaders of government and the pro-
vincial leaders of government appoint cabinet’ (Pers. ANC MEC Interview 134).  
This is reflective of the top-down form of leadership that was consolidated 
and extended during the Mbeki presidency as the party political culture in the 
ANC. As a consequence of a respect for political institutional leadership posi-
tions in the emerging ANC political culture, it is almost guaranteed that ap-
pointments will be accepted by the lower levels in parliament. 
In the ANC, as Table 5.1 shows, 50% or 17 of the 34 MPPs that had come to 
power in 1994 were re-elected in 1999. Taking into consideration the first term 
mid-term replacements for those who were sidelined in the realignment of the 
province with national imperatives, this figure of continuity jumps to 26 of the 
34 or 76.4% of the political elite who retained their seats in 1999. The 8 ANC 
newcomers to parliament (shown in Table 5.1) or 33.6% of the total in 1999 
represented, like in the IFP, a predominantly younger crop of individuals. How-
ever, these ANC newcomers differed from their IFP counterparts in that they 
were not as highly educated. Moreover, they had neither experience of exile 
politics or the midlands-national internal struggle and they slotted in as ordinary 
MPPs holding their first institutional political role for the party. Recruitment in 
the second election in the case of the ANC reflected a replenishment of the elite 
through incorporation of post-struggle parliamentarians – but only at the lower 
levels of the party’s institutional political roles. 
In keeping with this pattern, all mid-term replacements from within the ANC 
party structures slotted into ordinary MPP roles and emerged through the ANC 
branch system. These three replacements do not, however, account for the 
majority of new additions to ANC MPPs who were in fact the product of de-
fections from other parties. Floor-crossing accounts for 8 out of 11 or 72% of 
the mid-term entrants to the ANC (shown in Table 2) in the 1999-2004 period. 
Five of these were the MPPs who jumped to cross the floor in 2002 ahead of the 
constitutional court ruling and subsequently lost their seats, which also accounts 
for five of the exits. The other three individuals crossed the floor in the 2003-
2004 period – two from the IFP as mentioned above and one – MPP Singh – 
from the DA. 
Volatility in political elite circulation 
Table 5.2 illustrates volatility in political elite circulation organized by political 
party affiliation. The figures shown in this table represent the turnover in actual 
seats and not individuals. Overall, less than one third or 31.2% of seats were 
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occupied for the entire two term period of 1994-2004 which at face value 
illustrates a high level of political elite circulation which is conducive to 
democracy as an innovatory elite come to replace established elites in a com-
petitive manner. However, this is not entirely the case. If one compares reten-
tion rates over the two periods of office there is greater volatility in seats during 
the first term than in the second term. In the first term 71.6% of MPPs retained 
their seats for the full term compared with a slightly higher figure of 75% in the 
second term. Considering the substantial circulation in the IFP in the first two 
years and the sidelining of the internal Midlands ANC leadership in the first 
term, the figures shown for the second term are low in comparison. Even more 
so when one considers that floor-crossing was the major form of circulation in 
the post 2002 period.  
Thus while intra-party circulation (which brings in a new elite into the legis-
lature) has decreased, inter-party circulation (which shuffles the same elite 
across the legislature) has increased over the two parliamentary terms from 
1994-2004. This is indicative on the one hand of an increasing trend among the 
political elite of identifying their own interests with the legislature and not with 
their party or democracy. So while the political elite may not form just one 
political class (as discussed in Chapter 4) and replicate the same types of 
personnel into office they increasingly identify their own perceived personal 
interests with it and prevent circulation to their own personal loss of power. 
Indeed, in one example, MPP Millin created her own political party within the 
legislature (in the absence of any election) in 2003 rather than give up her seat 
to another IFP candidate. This phenomenon has been replicated in the national 
parliament and in other provincial legislatures by other parliamentarians who 
created their own political party during the floor-crossing periods. 
Volatility in political elite circulation, however, is not the same in each 
political party. In the IFP less than a fifth or 19.5% of seats were constantly 
occupied from 1994-2004 illustrating a very high turnover of MPPs in com-
parison to the ANC who had much less circulation with 53.84% of seats 
constantly occupied. In the IFP, this represents a steady flow of recruitment and 
replacement of the political elite throughout the two terms of office. The major 
periods of replacement occurred in the 1995-1996 period (indicated by a re-
tention rate of 65.83% in the first term) and the 2002-2003 period (indicated by 
a retention rate of 67.64%) as explained above but also in the second election as 
MPPs were brought into the legislature for the first time from within party 
structures, the civil service or from the national legislature to the provincial 
legislature. This form of circulation is conducive to democracy in KwaZulu-
Natal as it precludes an association of an individual’s role as tied into particular  
 
  
Table 5.2 Volatility in circulation of seats by political partya 
Political 
party 
Seats 
gained 
1994 
elections 
Seats 
constantly 
occupied 
1994-1999 
Seats 
with 
turnover 
of 1 (2 
MPPs) 
1994-
1999 
Seats 
with 
turnover 
of 2 (3+ 
MPPs) 
1994-
1999 
Seats 
gained in 
1999 
elections 
Seats 
constantly 
occupied 
1999-2004 
Seats 
with 
turnover 
of 1 (2 
MPPs) 
1999-
2004 
Seats 
with 
turnover 
of 2 (3+ 
MPPs) 
1999-
2004 
Seats 
created 
floor 
crossing 
Seats 
constantly 
occupied 
1994-2004 
IFP 41 (43 in 
1997) 
27 + 2 
senate 
9b 5 34 23 11 1 0 8 
ANC 26 (28 in 
1997) 
22 + 2 
senate 
3 1 32 29 3 0 7 14 
DP/DA 2 2 0 0 7 3 4 0 0 1 
NNP 9 5 4 0 3 2 1 0 0 1 
MF 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 
ACDP 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
PAC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UDM 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
IAMc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
TOTAL 81 (85 in 
1997) 
58 + 4 
senated 
17 6 80 60 20 1 8 25 
Notes: 
a) The figures have been constructed from the data collected through interviews. No other record of this data exists. Numbers represent the actual 
number of seats held by each party and the volatility of turnover in those seats, not the number of MPPs. 
b) The IFP was entitled to one seat replacement between 1994 and 1999 but chose not to replace an MPP due to the proximity of the June 1999 elections. 
c) The Independent African Movement (IAM) was created in 2002 within the legislature by IFP MPP Theresa Millin during the floor-crossing period 
when she left the IFP. It won no seats in 2004. 
d) Following the ratification of the South African Constitution in December 1996, which established a National Council of Provinces to replace the 
Senate, the number of seats each held by the IFP and ANC was increased by 2 each in February 1997. This accommodated the returning members 
from the Senate. These figures have been counted as seats constantly occupied since they were new seats created in 1997 whose membership of them 
did not change. 
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legislative structures. In fact the career path of an MPP can be in almost any 
direction – from party to local government to national government to civil 
servant to party related work to provincial MPP and back again. 
Indeed, the question of where do MPPs go after they leave office supports 
this argument. In the IFP, MPPs who were not deceased or left office to defect 
to another party followed one of two main patterns. They either retired from 
politics altogether (often taking full retirement from any form of career) or they 
became involved in politically related work not tied to the legislature. For 
example, the two former IFP Premiers from the first term – Frank Mdlalose and 
Ben Ngubane went into the diplomatic service as South African Ambassadors. 
Likewise, former IFP Minister for Education Vincent Zulu took up an ambas-
sadorial posting to Jordan on leaving the legislature. In these typical cases of 
politically related service the MPPs concerned devoted their remaining poli-
tically active life outside of the realm of competition for power to a life of 
service to the whole country across partisan lines.  
Volatility in circulation in the ANC stands in contrast to that in the IFP. In 
the ANC 65.83% of seats were constantly occupied from 1994-1999, a figure 
that climbed to 90.62% from 1999-2004. More than half of ANC MPPs elected 
in 1994 retained their seats for the full ten-year period of this study. This high 
level of retention instead of recruitment and replacement is a challenge to 
democracy in the province.  
In comparison to the IFP, ANC MPPs who exit their seats do not retire from 
legislative politics or enter the diplomatic service. With the exception of those 
who retire from politics due to old age, there has been a steady but increasing 
pattern of ANC MPPs who leave the provincial parliament in order to take up 
other institutional roles. The first of these institutional role types is a political 
managerial role of significant status. Examples of this type include Michael Sut-
cliffe who departed from the legislature to take up the position of Chairperson 
of the Demarcation Board (organizing voting boundaries) and then became 
Municipal Manager of Ethekwini, Felix Dlamini who managed the City of 
Durban and Nhlanhla Ngidi who became Provincial Commissioner for the 
South African Police Services. This trend began in 1999 and has been steadily 
increasing over the two parliamentary terms. However, the most significant and 
increasing trend is that of ANC MPPs leaving provincial politics for the nati-
onal legislature. Examples of this kind include Roy Ainslie, Mildred Buthelezi, 
John Jeffrey and, of course Jacob Zuma who became Deputy-President and then 
President of South Africa. In all such cases, provincial MPPs served a full term 
in the provincial parliament prior to their departure to the national legislature. 
The provincial parliament has thus become for ANC MPPs a springboard to 
the national parliament and to senior political institutional managerial positions. 
It would seem that political institutional roles have become a career path for 
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ANC MPPs who use the province as a springboard to further career oppor-
tunities. This is a cadre deployment system in which extensive patronage is 
open to ANC MPPs at all levels of government, in the parastatals and even in 
the private sector. This is consistent with Bayart’s specific discussion on the 
civil service in Africa that acts as a, 
‘shock absorber which softens the blows of fluctuations in individual careers … the 
provider of ambassadorial posts, and also the posts of managing directors of national 
companies, of high level administrators and of delegates. It prevents disgraced peo-
ple from leaving the system, for they are always likely to stir up a dissident counter-
elite’ (Bayart 1993: 169). 
This is congruent with ANC political culture and, in particular, to concept-
ions of leadership among these MPPs. Political institutional seniority is viewed 
as a pathway to greater respect, influence and power with the most senior roles 
considered to be at the national level and the management of entire munici-
palities in an executive role. This argument is borne out if one considers the 
level of influence that the national level exerts over the provincial ANC since 
the removal of Harry Gwala and then Sifiso Nkabinde. 
If a political institutional role is seen as the most desirable form of leadership 
among ANC MPPs then this raises questions over the long-term impact of the 
prevailing norms of ANC political culture on democracy. Alongside these 
hierarchical conceptions of leadership within political institutional roles is a 
growing affiliation to the legislative structures in order to secure a political 
institutional role. The provincial ANC MPPs response to the floor-crossing 
provides evidence of this. In 2002, when the Constitutional Court declared that 
the first five floor-crossers had jumped too soon and would not be able to add 
their seats to the ANC provincial tally, the response of the ANC was to attempt 
to make the floor-crossing retrospective (see Chapter 6) rather than to respect 
the ruling. Ndebele was excluded from the discussions between the ANC and 
the IFP and the bid failed through national ANC interventions (see Chapter 6). 
This, however, had been a clear attempt to take control of the executive and to 
expand the number of ANC MPPs who occupied ministerial posts and chaired 
portfolio legislative committees. In effect the attempt to take control of the 
province was both an attempt to secure power for the party through the back 
door and to increase the institutional status of more than half of the MPPs 
overnight.  
Conclusion 
Political elite circulation and volatility in the occupation of seats in KwaZulu-
Natal is a product of intra-party political culture in the IFP and ANC. These 
political cultures are not the same, and as such, do not have the same conse-
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quences. In the IFP, elite circulation has been a product of a re-casting of the 
political elite to incorporate those who operate within the parameters of the 
prevailing norms of political etiquette. The concept of leadership within these 
prevailing norms, as a role not tied to any particular legislative structure, means 
that the rules of canvassing of ideas provide for broader leadership opportunities 
in the party and not necessarily in government. In effect, circulation has been a 
process that re-established the prevailing norms of political culture within the 
legislature. 
In contrast, in the ANC there exists a much more structured conception of 
leadership that correlates to hierarchical distinctions in institutional position 
held. The legislature, in these conceptions of leadership, provides a springboard 
to greater leadership positions. As such there is a growing affiliation to legis-
lative structures to secure a political institutional role that is tied to conceptions 
of leadership and respect. Circulation in the ANC is a product of these con-
ceptions of leadership. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
6 
Inter-party dynamics,  
coalition politics and  
cross-party elite bonding 
Governance based on attitudes and values may be seen as ‘a primordial carryover, a 
traditional or atavistic residue, to be cured or erased with the march of modernity’ 
(Mamdani 1996: 187). 
Literature that assesses the formal, procedural or institutional requirements of 
democracy emphasises the process whereby political elite conduct becomes 
increasingly governed by rules and procedures and elite political behaviour 
becomes structured by institutions. Some theorists emphasise the implications 
of specific forms of institutions. For example, Putnam’s empirical study of the 
political elite in Italy (cf. Putnam 1993; Putnam 1976) demonstrated how mod-
ern institutions of government led to ideological de-polarisation and more 
tolerance among the political elite. As parties entered parliament for the first 
time they brought with them a zero-sum conception of politics, which rapidly 
dissipated as the elite succumbed to the moderating effects of the institutions. 
Substantive changes in the formal institutional structures ‘gradually remoulded 
informal relations’ (Putnam 1993: 47). Moreover, Przeworski, highlights the 
submission of elite interests to competition, a process of transaction through 
which inter-group conflict is processed and resolved. Consequently, specific 
outcomes are not guaranteed by such arrangements and continual conflict is 
thought to become institutionalized (Przeworski 1986: 47-63; Przeworski 1991). 
Hence, ‘democratisation is an act of subjecting all interests to competition, of 
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institutionalizing uncertainty. The decisive step towards democracy is the de-
volution of power from a group of people to a set of rules’ (Przeworski 1991: 
14). A wealth of studies on developing countries has sought to probe the pattern 
of interaction between elites. Democratic elite theorists Reis and Chiebub, for 
example, explain the consequences of democracy as a result of elite values and 
attitudes. Inter-elite competition is explained through the way in which elites 
rank priorities (Reis & Cheibub 1997). Hence, implicit in democratic elite 
theory is the notion that institutions and elite values are intrinsically linked. In-
deed, changes in elite values and attitudes may have consequences for demo-
cracy. 
This chapter explores the patterns of interaction among the political elite in 
opposing political parties, primarily through an examination of the changing 
context in which a governing coalition between the IFP and ANC in KwaZulu-
Natal was formed, and for a period provided a framework for parliamentary 
politics, before breaking down. Following a brief profile of elite cooperation 
and competition in the first term, the discussion turns to an examination of the 
1999 coalition as well as the beliefs, conceptions and abstractions that comprise 
the parameters informing and motivating political action by elite sub-groups in 
parliament. The impact of the coalition on institutions and parties, since 1999, is 
then explored. Finally the breakdown of the coalition is investigated and the 
basis of syncretic elite bonding is examined. The purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how the development of a variety of alliances – based upon shared 
characteristics among segments of elites and symbolic socio-cultural norms – 
impacted upon the legislature, and in turn upon elites. Ultimately, political elite 
formation in KwaZulu-Natal is determined by the way in which the political 
elite members relate to one another, a factor in which socio-cultural norms 
penetrate the balance between issues and functions, a force that is not dimin-
ished in the new political institutions.  
The first term: Strengthening institutionalizing rules and procedures 
The 1994 negotiated electoral outcome was to condition the attitudes of parties 
to politics and to one another in the first parliamentary term by bringing into the 
parliamentary realm their hostility to one another. This negotiation of seats took 
place between nationally based ANC elites and provincially based IFP elites. 
The provincially based ANC was essentially excluded from the process. The 
antagonism between the IFP and ANC of the 1980s and early 1990s continued 
within the realm of parliamentary institutions. Structural conditions required for 
cooperation between the IFP and ANC were not present as both set their sights 
on conquest of the key arena of the state. 
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The first few years of the first parliamentary term signified a duality of 
political practice and was characterised by extensive criminal investigations into 
a few senior office holders (cf. Goodenough 1998: 15-17; Johnson 1998: 2-17; 
Claude 1997: 1-7). Formal political practice (policymaking, practical questions 
of administration and legislative scrutiny) took place within the confines of the 
newly established institutions of government, yet anti-institutional destabilising 
politics continued informally in a parallel party power structure and struggle 
outside the legislature. Although political violence had abated in general after 
the first election, various flashpoints around the province indicated that the war 
was not entirely over. The most publicised of these centred on the locations 
around Richmond (Nkobeni, Magoda, Ndaleni, Patheni, Simozomeni), an ANC 
stronghold reinforced by a military arsenal and SDUs under the command of 
Harry Gwala and then Sifiso Nkabinde who both became MPPs. During this 
violence, thousands of families fled the area, frequent massacres occurred and a 
complex web of political manoeuvring by both the ANC and IFP tried to stifle 
the investigation. Despite the findings of the Richmond Sub-Committee – a sub-
committee of the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security – that a Com-
mission of Inquiry should be authorised to probe the causes of the violence, no 
such commission was established. The sub-committee even included Sifiso 
Nkabinde who was under investigation for murder in the district. Despite 
questions addressed to parliament by the ACDP as to the reasons why the 
resolutions were never carried through, a public answer was not provided. The 
party received ‘only a private response from the Premier in which he said that 
the IFP caucus said “no” to a commission’ (Pers. Interview 31). Although the 
IFP feared the discovery of training camps that they had formerly established in 
the area to counteract the ANC, the ANC had much more to fear from a full 
inquiry. The result of the ANC’s push into the region in the period after 1990, 
not before, was highly organised intelligence and self-defence units with the 
backing of a military arsenal. An inquiry threatened to expose this and, with it, 
the full nature of Operation Vula (see chapter 2) including the implicit support 
of terror and violence by ANC elites to counteract the IFP. So while the IFP 
“said no” and the ANC tried to downplay the crisis by denouncing Nkabinde, in 
the usual manner,1 as a police spy, political elites simply went through the 
motions in parliament by appearing to address the situation without ever 
probing the reasons for the crisis. 
                                                            
1  It would appear that denouncing individuals in order to sideline them has become a 
popular method in some ANC circles. The use of misinformation has a long history 
in the ANC and was used as a method of denouncing the IFP in the 1980s. The 
recent Bulelani Ngcuka spy allegations are a case in point. 
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Notwithstanding that such examples of duality in political practice were a 
consequence of attempts to cover up the actions of the parties from inside par-
liament, violence in the province also claimed the lives of some of the political 
elite.2 These were individuals who had seen the need for both a peace process 
(discussed below) and the open and free competition of parties. The assassin-
ation of ANC MPP Bheki Mthembu3 while working (alongside IFP MPP 
Blessed Gwala) to restore peace in northern KwaZulu-Natal signified that the 
new framework within which parties were to compete was not fully accepted by 
communities as well as parliamentarians. Blessed Gwala and Bheki Mthembu 
had been working in the areas around Gingindlovu to try and bring IFP and 
ANC youth together to find an alternative way of resolving political differences 
when Mthembu was killed. These early initiatives among IFP and ANC MPPs 
were later, in the post 1999 period, to provide a foundation for other adversaries 
in the legislature to seek a transformation of their relationships in the ANC-IFP 
Coalition (see later discussion). A public commitment to peace by MPPs, who 
were previous adversaries, appearing together on a shared platform in some of 
the worst areas of political violence signified an attempt to reign in supporters 
and to transform conflict. However, in 1998, this new approach was not fully 
accepted by all. The response of an IFP MPP to the assassination was indicative 
of this. He said, 
‘We need people who are able to cross the party divide to restore peace in our 
communities. The IFP cannot comprehend how the ANC will replace Mr Mthembu. 
There are too few members of the ANC who are equally able to put aside their poli-
tical differences for the sake of peace’ (IFP MPP Blessed Gwala in: Inkatha Free-
dom Party 1998b). 
Within parliament the IFP and ANC sought to control the key positions from 
which their own involvement in political violence might be revealed. As such 
they made various attempts to control the parliamentary institutional arena of 
safety and security. In April 1999, the IFP ousted ANC MPP Bheki Cele from 
the role of Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security. The 
                                                            
2  These were ANC MPP Bheki Mthembu assassinated in July 1998 and IFP MPP 
Thanda Dingila assassinated in August 2000, as well as expelled ANC MPP Sifiso 
Nkabinde who was assassinated in January 1999 after joining the UDM. Later IFP 
MPP Thomas Shabalala was also assassinated in January 2005. 
3  An inquiry into the assassination has still not resolved who the perpetrators were. In 
2002 the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security called the Provincial Com-
missioner of Police before it to ask why nobody had been charged with the assassin-
ation of former ANC MPP Bheki Mthembu or with the assassination of former IFP 
MPP Thanda Dingila who was murdered in a separate incident. Today these assas-
sinations have still not been solved, nor have those of IFP MPP Thomas Shabalala 
and ANC MPP turned UDM MPP Sifiso Nkabinde. 
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ANC responded by claiming that the IFP could not do this and it signified a 
crisis that threatened peace (cf. Ngubane 1999a). On the surface, this decision, 
taken in a special sitting of the Parliamentary Rules Committee, seemed to be a 
direct result of Cele’s tense working relationship with IFP MEC for Safety and 
Security Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane. However, this tension signified a deeper 
power struggle over a key position. This suggests that as the IFP attempted to 
dominate policy and oversight in the portfolio that offered the most threat to 
both parties, the ANC endeavoured to retain the position that offered the most 
chance to restrict any probes into its own role in the political violence.4 
By the end of the first term, however, expulsions and suspensions through 
circulation of the political elite (discussed in Chapter 5) appeared to combine 
with more tolerance in legislative committees and the realisation that the elite 
were responsible and accountable for practical questions of administration to 
produce an institutionally ‘consensually unified’ (Field & Higley 1985: 1-44), 
‘pluralistic’ (Fleron 1969), or ‘competitive coalescent’ (Putnam 1976) political 
elite. Three tangible factors contributed to a gradual modification of attitudes 
among political elites from opposing parties. 
Firstly, the circulation of elites reduced the most militant core of the political 
elite to a much smaller cluster and changed the dynamics that co-existed within 
and outside the legislature. The internal ANC coup in 1994 which installed 
Jacob Zuma as the ANC provincial leader (see Chapter 5) in a bid to provin-
cialise and pacify the province – was the beginning of a process in which more 
militant elites in both the ANC and the IFP found themselves without the 
internal party support or freedom of action that they had enjoyed in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. If the method through which parties were to interact had now 
changed within the new institutional context, so had the composition of elites 
that were to carry out that interaction. In the ANC, although the coup of 1994 
was to indicate that changes in the method of interaction were underway the 
discrediting of the more militant core was the culmination of that process. One 
might also argue that the ANC had the confidence to play a long game, banking 
upon what it believed to be the natural attrition of IFP support in the long 
“modernizing” run (cf. Johnston 1996c: 11-15). Two cases in particular illu-
strate the changes that took place. In the first, the removal of former ANC 
midlands leader and militant Stalinist Harry Gwala aided in the reorientation in 
the focus of political elites. If the ANC’s concerns at national level were prac-
tical questions of administration, then reducing provincial concerns to provin-
cial boundaries and making peace with the IFP within those boundaries were 
                                                            
4  Control of key positions has been a continued feature since 1994. For example, in 
2009, ANC MPP Bheki Cele was promoted, by the ANC, to the role of National 
Police Commissioner. 
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priorities, two factor that were aided by Gwala’s departure. Fiercely outspoken 
on communism, issues of poverty and uncompromising towards the IFP, Gwala 
– ‘Robben Island’s Socrates’ (Worsnip 1998) but “grassroots” leader – inter-
jected and centred provincial political dynamics at the heart of national ANC 
priorities. This was a factor that earned him immense popularity. The extent of 
that popularity is well illustrated by Worsnip. He remembers, ‘… Harry Gwala 
arriving midway through an ANC meeting in the Pietermaritzburg City Hall 
which was being addressed by none other than Mbeki himself. It was fairly dry 
fare and the masses were a little restless. Then Gwala arrived. There was toyi-
toying in the aisles. The whole hall erupted and brought the speech of the future 
president to a standstill for a long time’ (Worsnip 1998). Gwala was deposed 
and then discredited in 1994 through a suspension from the SACP in which he 
was accused of operating hit squads against SACP rivals (a charge he denied). 
Gwala died in 1995 and was thus removed from the provincial equation. In the 
second case, the removal of populist midlands leader Sifiso Nkabinde from the 
legislature was one of the final stages in the ANC’s attempt to rein in its 
militant core. Expelled from the ANC in 1997 over allegations within ANC 
circles (that he denied) that he was an apartheid-era spy, charged with and 
acquitted of murder, Nkabinde was assassinated in 1999. Like Gwala, Nkabinde 
was prepared to use the most militant tactics in securing the Midlands for the 
party and himself, even if it meant disregarding national directives. According 
to an IFP MPP, 
‘There were more problems with Nkabinde than with any other ANC leader in the 
Midlands. It was very acute …he was prepared to get his hands dirty and work at the 
coalface. He was different to people like Mkhize and Nzimande – they were acad-
emics. He was a kind of operational commander … Up until the 1996 local govern-
ment elections, he was the ANC in the midlands.5 In the election campaign, I spoke 
at 48 public meetings. At every one of them I heard Nkabinde’s name’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 28). 
If Sifiso Nkabinde’s removal was part of the master plan of the national 
ANC to provincialise KwaZulu-Natal, it worked, but his demotion did not end 
his political career. Rather, Nkabinde’s removal from the ANC catapulted him 
into a relationship with his former adversaries in the IFP who used him to 
provide answers to questions about political violence. The IFP had rejected the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the basis that the commission was 
only established with a mandate to hear evidence of atrocities for and against 
the state. It did not include a framework in which evidence of violence between 
the IFP and ANC in KwaZulu-Natal could be presented (Francis 2010). Facing 
                                                            
5  The interviewee is referring to the growth of power by Nkabinde under Gwala and 
then the expansion of his influence on Gwala’s death. 
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a barrage of criticism over their rejection of the TRC process, the IFP sought to 
discover directly from Nkabinde an understanding of the context of the murder 
of IFP leaders in the Midlands that they could give to the TRC Nkabinde, 
rejected by the ANC, was willing to provide this (Pers. Interviews 43, 28 and 
120). As an IFP MPP stated, 
‘In Edendale between 1983-85 thirty seven IFP leaders were killed … between 
1987-90 approximately forty five were killed … In Ixopo all IFP leaders were killed 
… Nkabinde assisted in putting together a framework of names. For example, he 
explained that Ixopo was the logistical staging area for Transkei weapons into the 
province … The leaders were just in the wrong place …’ (Pers. IFP Interview 28). 
While Nkabinde’s departure from the legislature eased tensions between par-
ties in the House by instilling confidence that the ANC took peace seriously and 
could control its militant elite, it also provided some in the IFP with a measure 
of closure. Sifiso Nkabinde’s departure was symbolic of the end of an era of 
violent competition for many IFP MPPs. 
Although circulation was the answer to the militant core in the provincial 
ANC, the IFP addressed its own militant problem differently. This was partly 
because militancy took a different form in the IFP. In the ANC the struggle 
against the institutions of state (in which the militant core had been central) 
continued into the new order as synonymous with the struggle against the IFP 
(which now controlled the province). In contrast, the IFP’s militant core com-
bined populism and the capacity for direct action and physical force with con-
servatism and the party’s discourse of respect. While the form of politics may 
have taken on a militant stance, the elite were more willing to defer to the 
decision-making body of the party and the party was more willing to find 
creative solutions to retain their populist vote-bringing elite. The most obvious 
example was Thomas Shabalala who disregarded party directives forbidding 
him to lead a march of the National Hostel Residents Association in May 1996 
in protest against a ban on carrying traditional weapons by the National 
Assembly (controlled by the ANC). Although consequently suspended from the 
IFP in 1996 and then expelled, Shabalala sought the intervention of the courts. 
The judgement directed in 1998 that he be reinstated with all privileges, rights 
and offices held prior to his suspension (cf. Doonan 1997; Beukes 1998; Mchu-
nu 1998; Ngubane 1998; Msomi 1998; Madlala 1998; Ngubane 1999b; Arde 
1999). The IFP responded by awarding him a promotion as Chairperson of the 
Portfolio Committee on Housing in the legislature, not as a result of the court 
battle, but instead because of his apology to the party. In so doing, the IFP 
tamed Shabalala’s militant tendency by apportioning to him responsibility for 
oversight of the department in the policy area in which he was concerned which 
afforded him an increase in salary by way of occupying this position, yet re-
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tained his populist mobilising skills in Inanda, KwaMashu and Lindelani (cf. 
Vapi 1999) in the run up to the second national election.  
If circulation and reining-in of the militant core served to remove some of 
the barriers to a working relationship between parties in the legislature, the 
second factor that contributed to a modification of attitudes was the institutiona-
lization of a peace process between them. Alongside elite circulation, the Pro-
vincial Peace Committee – a sub-committee of the Portfolio Committee on 
Safety and Security – worked to establish peace in the province through regular 
appearances of former adversaries in communities that were designated as no-
go areas for one of the political parties. As one MPP described it, 
‘When Nkabinde and I were in the peace committee we worked to show people that 
we were not fighting and they must not be fighting … We drank tea together … We 
sometimes travelled together … At the end of each day we wanted to win the other 
over. We went to Escourt together and some IFP members there wanted to assault 
him. They said to him “now you are in an IFP stronghold you are not leaving”. I said 
to them “no-one will assault Nkabinde in my presence”. I put his wife in my car 
with my bodyguard and I drove in his car with him … Then at Port Shepstone I 
defended S’bu Ndebele. I gave him my overcoat and I put him in my car …’ (Pers. 
IFP Interview 65). 
Although it was not only former adversaries that came to work together 
through the Provincial Peace Committee6, the most acute aspects of the hostile 
relationships between adversaries were tempered through it. In institutionalizing 
a process through which former adversaries were compelled to interact within a 
formally designated framework, and publicly appear in no-go areas, the extra-
institutional and informal spaces in which each personified gradually became 
modified. Hence, the coalition did not come about simply because members of 
both parties were pro-peace. Rather, the modification of attitudes of MPPs who 
were former adversaries was a greater factor in enabling the coalition. The 
earlier attempts to institutionalize peace in communities through public appear-
ances (by MPPs such as Blessed Gwala and murdered Bheki Mthembu) were 
resurrected, but now by former adversaries. 
Finally, the third component that contributed to an incremental modification 
of attitudes was the gradual understanding that the political elite were respon-
sible and accountable for public policy in the province, a factor that demanded 
an element of cooperation between former adversaries. With the actions of the 
political elite now highlighted publicly, dual practices within and outside the 
legislature began to give way as the focus gradually shifted to carrying out their 
designated functions. The new institutional framework, however, also provided 
                                                            
6  For example ANC MPP Bheki Mthembu and IFP MPP Blessed Gwala worked to-
gether in peace initiatives on the north coast of the province yet neither was impli-
cated in violence and their relationship was not previously hostile. 
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a new arena for competition which parties readily seized, and for those who did 
not perform within it, the penalties were stiff. Within this new arena, individuals 
who proved less than competent found that their party’s support was withdrawn 
from them. For example, MEC for Education, Vincent Zulu was fired by the 
IFP following poor matriculation pass rates (cf. Mthetwa 1999). Zulu had been 
accused of being ‘uncaring, intolerant and inefficient’ (Naidoo 1999), encoun-
tered criticism from the South African Democratic Teachers Union over ‘deteri-
orating administrative capacity’ (Natal Witness, 15 July 1988) in the education 
department, faced protests by angry teachers who had not been paid by the de-
partment while “ghost” teachers collected salaries (Ayoob 1998), and collided 
with the Provincial Public Service Commission over civil service appointments 
in education (cf. Broughton 1995. With the focus of the elite shifting in order to 
survive in the new political terrain, and the media closely scrutinising the ac-
tions of MECs and legislators, dual practices had been greatly diminished by the 
end of the first parliamentary term. The second election, however, provided new 
challenges for a political elite whose conduct had gradually become modified. 
The 1999 IFP-ANC coalition: Institutionalizing certainty 
The second democratic election in 1999 produced a hung parliament in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal that led to a coalition government. The government that was formed 
represented a cluster of elites in both the IFP and the ANC whose shared value 
systems were to direct the form of the coalition that unfolded. Cooperation and 
accommodation emerged among elites to the extent that values impacted upon 
institutions. Cooperation led to another duality of political practice through an 
institutionalization of power beyond the domain of the state in extra-institu-
tional forums that circumvented the power of formal institutions. The legislature 
itself enforced this arrangement. A powerful cross-party hegemonic discourse, 
supportive of a parallel extra-institutional system of authority, tied elites into 
this arrangement. As such, former intra-party allies faced a decline in their 
relationship, some of whom became the new clients and were forced to enforce 
the position of the dominant faction. Consequently, the cross-party discourse 
and extra-institutional forums weakened the two signatories – the IFP and ANC 
– to the agreement, but not on an equal basis. One of the signatories, the ANC, 
faced a disruption in their organisational ties, a diminishing relationship with its 
core constituents and, to some extent, became the public relations arm of the 
state. In part, these factors (discussed later in this chapter) were as a result of 
unpopularity of the coalition at a grassroots level. The other signatory, the IFP, 
retained its links to its core constituencies through a parallel system of authority 
– traditional and chieftaincy structures – and informal rules of political eti-
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quette, the very processes that were supposed to give way in a democratic sys-
tem. 
 
The negotiations and the agreement 
The results of the June 1999 elections7 necessitated a search for a coalition 
partner by the IFP. Although they obtained the highest number of seats, their 
loss of an overall majority precluded them from governing alone. Their ex-
ploration of coalition options was hampered by a move by the MF to align itself 
with the ANC. Rajbansi’s decision to form an alliance with the ANC led to 
outrage among both voters and opposition parties because he had campaigned 
on the question ‘Are you angry with the ANC?’ (Independent on Saturday, 3 
July 1999). However Mr Rajbansi is not new to forming alliances. He aligned 
his party with the NP before 1994. This alliance, in 1999, was in exchange for 
the receipt of the position of Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Private 
Members Bills, Petitions and Pensions for the second term. This position would 
otherwise have gone to the ANC. While the MF became entrenched as the only 
minority party to hold a Chair, the ANC utilised this newfound alliance to claim 
that they had parity in seats with the IFP and hence an equal claim to the 
provincial Premiership. This was a position that was coveted by a segment of 
the ANC who believed that the only way to exercise real power was to control 
the province8 and whose failure to win an election in KwaZulu-Natal was an 
embarrassment to the provincial leadership. Since there was no national inter-
vention in 1999 to negotiate seats, the election results could logically be 
assumed to be a reflection of public opinion at that time. As such the provincial 
ANC could no longer claim that their support was greater than the seats they 
held. Consequently, in the few days that followed the second democratic elect-
ion, a series of coalition negotiations took place among segments of the IFP, 
ANC and DP that finally resulted in an IFP-ANC agreement to the exclusion of 
other parties.  
 
                                                            
7  The seats gained by political parties in the June 1999 elections were: IFP 34, ANC 
32, DP 7, NNP 3, MF 2, ACDP 1, UDM 1, PAC 0. 
8  In a personal interview with an ANC MPP he argued that it was a common belief in 
the provincial ANC that, ‘as long as the ANC is not in power things will not change 
… Only when the ANC is in power do things change … We need a change of pro-
vincial leadership’ (Pers. ANC Interview 57). See also Hlela & Rapoo 2002: 1-7. 
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     • Coalition negotiations between the ANC and the DP 
During three ANC-DP meetings a coalition format including up to four parties 
was discussed.9 This scenario set out a provincial cabinet consisting of 4 MEC 
positions for each of the ANC and IFP and one MEC post for each of the DP 
and NNP. However, the ANC proviso for offering posts to the DP and NNP was 
that the Premiership be held by the ANC, a position that the DP would not 
endorse. While the DP had campaigned on the basis that they would not serve in 
an alliance with the ANC, they were prepared to dilute these assertions in a 
broader coalition format to accommodate their own ministerial posts into any 
agreement so long as the premiership was not in ANC hands. According to a DP 
MEC, the problem with the negotiations was that ‘in the ANC camp … S’bu 
Ndebele genuinely believed that they could strike a deal with the DP despite 
national leader Tony Leon’s position’ (Pers. DP Interview 75). This position 
was that the DP had campaigned in opposition to the ANC and would not form 
an alliance now with them to the exclusion of other parties simply to be in 
government, nor would they support an ANC Premier. With the Premiership out 
of reach, the ANC recourse was to an arrangement with the IFP in which they 
could secure more ministerial posts with the exclusion of the DP and NNP. In 
the official election of the Premier that followed, the DP followed through with 
their rejection of both an IFP and ANC Premier by offering their own provincial 
leader – Roger Burrows – as an alternative candidate, a proposal that received 
only eight votes in the legislature, seven of which were by DP MPPs. 
 
     • Coalition negotiations between the IFP and the DP 
Given the necessity of coalition, the IFP was placed to enter an agreement with 
either the ANC or the DP in order to forge a governing majority. Party factions 
within the IFP competed in alliance-building in support of their preferred part-
ner. At first, the possibility of a coalition with the DP was explored but this 
failed due to a lack of consensus on political etiquette, the key method of intra-
party interaction as discussed in chapter five. In essence, the DP failed to 
comprehend the significance of political etiquette in the IFP or how it guided 
their perceptions of other parties. In three meetings the IFP explored the 
potential for an understanding with the DP. In the first of these, as one MPP 
stated, 
‘The brief we were given for the meeting was “how far and how ready is the DP 
willing to work with us?” It was a good meeting … we looked at common agree-
                                                            
9  Present at the discussions were ANC MECs S’bu Ndebele (also ANC Provincial 
Leader) and Zweli Mkhize, DP MPP Roger Burrows (also DP Provincial Leader) 
and DP member Mike Ellis. 
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ments …we moved towards the idea of building a stronger pressure group with the 
DP that we could use in other provinces too …’ (Pers. IFP Interview 99). 
While the first meeting indicated to the DP that a segment of the IFP had no 
particular desire to form a coalition with the ANC (Pers. DP Interview 75), one 
of a series of preconditions for an agreement attached by the DP, and discussed 
at later meeting, frustrated the potential for any arrangement between the two 
parties. First, the DP was unwilling to form a coalition with the IFP on a similar 
basis to that which the MF had entered into an agreement with the ANC. That 
is, they would not be a silent and dominated partner but would instead be 
willing to vote against the IFP when MPPs deemed it to be in their best party 
interests (Pers. DP Interview 75). Despite the discomfort in the IFP camp at this 
precondition, it was not a deal breaker as past experiences proved that the DP 
voted with the IFP on a significant number of occasions. 
Second, whereas the DP had already made clear to the ANC that it would not 
support an ANC Premier, their negotiators stressed to the IFP that they would 
not be party to a coalition that excluded either the ANC or the IFP. Hence any 
governing arrangement had to include the ANC. Although this precondition 
precluded any two-party governing arrangement from emerging from the 
meetings, it was not this precondition that frustrated a deal. In fact, a three-way 
coalition would have suited the IFP as a measure in which to appease different 
fragments of the party. IFP negotiators could not at this stage negotiate the IFP 
into any arrangement that would threaten the perceived interests of party Afri-
canists that desired a closer relationship with the ANC. On the other hand, a 
three-way agreement had the potential to provide assurances to IFP MPPs who 
favoured a coalition with the DP over and above any arrangement with the ANC 
and who had in fact become IFP MPPs in opposition to ANC policies (see 
chapter 4). The assistance of anti-communist IFP MPPs who retained anti-ANC 
values and social and cultural links to elites in the DP bolstered the potential for 
understanding, as the meetings between the IFP and DP demonstrated. 
Thirdly, although the DP supported an IFP Premier, it was with the precon-
dition that it could not be the current incumbent, Lionel Mtshali. While internal 
party dynamics within the IFP might have occasioned a change in leadership, 
prevailing rules of political etiquette within the IFP necessitated the rejection of 
this demand. Instead of approaching the Premier privately, this precondition 
was stated openly in the presence of a full negotiating team10 and was 
subsequently considered by the IFP to be a sign of rudeness on the part of the 
DP. If the DP could not work within the limits of customary good manners then 
                                                            
10  On the first occasion the team included DP members Roger Burrows, Wessel Nel 
and Mike Ellis and IFP members Premier Lionel Mtshali, Prince Gideon Zulu and 
Faith Gasa. On the last occasion, the team included ten members from each party. 
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it was thought that they could not hope to govern a province jointly with a party 
whose entire being was premised upon a political culture of respect. In the IFP, 
the form of politics is as influential as the content. In this light, the rules of 
political etiquette prescribing political relationships determined that the DP, the 
third largest party in the KwaZulu-Natal government, provided a more credible 
threat to the IFP’s very spirit as an organisation than its traditional adversary the 
ANC. 
The rules of etiquette in the IFP premised on respect refer to a hierarchical 
system of interaction, a parallel structure through which leaders are consulted 
(see chapter five). It has three key features. Firstly, it provides a process through 
which ideas are canvassed among the political elite. As such, it provides po-
litical relationships with both boundaries and procedures. Ignoring someone 
who is respected within this process is considered to be bad manners. Secondly, 
this process draws boundaries, not merely in enabling and restricting inter-
action, but also in the form of that interaction. Finally, respect is a central 
feature and condition of ubuntu-botho. The individual is valued because (s)he is 
part of a greater collective. Insulting a leader in this context would therefore be 
an offence to the whole, and in this case the party. Hence, etiquette for IFP 
MPPs is more than a form of interaction within the IFP (as discussed in Chapter 
5). It is also applied in the interaction of the IFP with others outside of the IFP. 
Bayart suggests that African politics in the post-colonial state is ‘comprised 
an ethic that is more complicated than that of lucre. A man of power who is able 
to amass and redistribute wealth becomes a man of honour’ (Bayart 1993: 242). 
But the example of KwaZulu-Natal demonstrates that wealth is not the only 
route to honour in African politics, and not the only organising feature in the 
African state. Rather, if honour is a central virtue in African politics the practise 
of respectful etiquette is a key organising factor. 
In the IFP camp, these prevailing rules of political etiquette provided the key 
factor in the particular form of coalition. An IFP discourse of “respect” that 
embodied a variety of cultural practices informed the party’s choice of coalition 
partner. The failure of the DP to approach the issue of the Premier privately 
proved to the IFP that its discourse was effectively foreign to the DP, which was 
thereby excluded from any arrangement. Whereas the “non-Africanists” in the 
IFP realised the fundamental blunder of the DP and the consequences of this for 
a coalition with the DP, Africanists were provided with good reason to pursue 
the shared values they held with a cluster of ANC MPPs through a coalition 
with the ANC. Although these practices of political etiquette ran counter to the 
modernist discourse of the ANC, elite brokers within the ANC were able to 
relate to the discourse at a sufficient level to broker a collation agreement. As 
one IFP MEC stated,  
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‘There are ways of being polite … Whites have been here hundreds of years and 
they still have not learned how to approach an African. They expect the African to 
approach them they way they approach each other because Africans had to do so in 
the past’ (Pers. IFP MEC Interview 74). 
The equation of an IFP discourse of respect with a broader discourse of race 
set the scene for the negotiation of a coalition agreement with the ANC which 
had as its basis, a shared discourse of Africanism between clusters of elites in 
both parties. 
 
     • Coalition negotiations between the IFP and the ANC 
In failing to secure the premiership through a proposed four-way coalition, the 
ANC provincial elite drew on the resources of their national counterparts in an 
attempt to secure the province and shift the balance of power away from the 
IFP. A presidential intervention to offer IFP President Dr. Buthelezi the position 
of South African Deputy-President in exchange for an ANC provincial premier-
ship demonstrated the first sign of a failure, by the ANC, to grasp the dynamics 
of internal IFP politics, a factor that was to lead to the later breakdown of the 
coalition. The offer was rejected by the IFP National Council, The rejection 
reflected Buthelezi’s very limited interventionist role in the allocation of posi-
tions and the centrality of the IFP National Council in deciding on critical pro-
vincial and local matters. Instead Dr. Buthelezi retained the position of Minister 
of Home Affairs and former ANC KwaZulu-Natal provincial leader, Jacob 
Zuma, became Deputy-President. Interviews show that even if senior IFP party 
members had embraced the offer, the large amakhosi component of national 
council would not have endorsed an ANC led coalition (which intended to 
restrict their powers and functions) and the IFP would not have risked an in-
ternal fracture to the degree that this would have caused (Pers. IFP Interviews 
127 and 116). 
Devoid of other options and despite this rejection over positions to be held, 
negotiations between the IFP and ANC concluded an agreement that could only 
have been achieved as a consequence of a shift in the dominant ideological 
stance of the ANC. In the course of this dominant ideological shift, the former 
allies of African nationalists – advocates of a socialist state and liberal demo-
crats – and their political ideals were suppressed. The two stage revolutionary 
project that coalesced socialists and nationalists in exile in the former Revo-
lutionary Council and Politico-Military Council terminated at the end of the first 
stage – the realisation of the African nationalist project. Frequent ANC public 
reference to a “patriotic bourgeoisie” – an African bourgeoisie remaining 
patriotic to the two-stage revolution – served simply as a source of symbolic 
empowerment for former comrades lacking influence in the new political dis-
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course. The concept of a two-stage revolutionary project existed now only in 
rhetoric, as African nationalists talked “left” but acted “right”. 
As discussed in chapter four, more that 80% of IFP respondents who joined 
the IFP prior to 1994, when asked in the interviews for this study why they 
chose to join the IFP, as opposed to the ANC, chose anti-communism as one of 
their three top reasons. They viewed the ANC as unacceptable because they saw 
it as SACP dominated. In addition, interviewees expressed a view that the ANC 
“policy” of ungovernability led to more poverty, as citizens attempting to earn a 
living was prevented from so doing through coercion into strikes and stay-
aways. Ungovernability was equated with the socialist revolution to come. By 
1997 all elite advocates of a socialist state in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
Legislature had resigned or had been removed from office. A substantial pro-
portion of IFP elites in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature now viewed the ANC as 
‘speaking our African language’ (Pers. IFP Interview 116) and as ‘the old ANC, 
before it joined with the communists. Our constitution for Inkatha was the same 
… so we are reviving our relations, our oneness with the ANC’ Pers. IFP Inter-
view 74). Likewise the influence of liberal democrats within the provincial 
ANC had dissipated. An examination of the political background of MPPs has 
revealed that all but one11 of the most senior governmental posts including those 
in the executive branch, held by ANC elites are occupied by former exile com-
rades. None of these posts are occupied by former political elites in the United 
Democratic Front – an umbrella body for a wide range of civic groups, trade 
unions, rent payers associations, church groups and others within a tradition of 
community based popular politics. Significantly, the ANC’s ideological posi-
tion has continued to reflect the values of the African middle classes and dis-
carded the political ideas of former internal and external partners whose main 
contribution to the post-apartheid state can now be seen as providing organisa-
tional and mobilising skills for its very creation. 
As a consequence, the modernising discourse of the ANC, albeit alien to 
segments of the IFP, reflected the language of respect but was articulated 
through a discourse of Africanism. This discourse resonated within the African-
ist cluster of the IFP elite. As one MPP stated, ‘African politics is very different 
to a Western political style. There is an umbilical cord between the IFP and the 
ANC. You can differ in politics, but there is no way you can divide us’ (Pers. 
IFP Interview 92). Hence on a very real level, once some of the policy prefer-
ences of the previous decade were stripped away and peace was secured, a 
segment of the IFP and ANC saw that they had some key values in common. 
 
 
                                                            
11  The exception is ANC MEC Mike Mabuyakhulu. 
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The nature of the IFP-ANC agreement 
The particular form in which the governing coalition manifested itself is 
important to an understanding of the relationships between groups of elites. The 
agreement between the IFP and ANC consisted of a number of interdependent 
parts, only some of which were set out in a Record of Understanding tabled in 
the legislature and which specified a two-thirds legislative majority to overturn 
it. The name of the document is ironic given that this replicates the name of a 
document first used by the ANC and the NP for a national agreement in 
September 1992 that excluded the IFP. The September 1992 document set out 
certain sunset clauses where the ANC and the NP were prepared to commit to 
concessions that shaped the framework of Codesa II, to the detriment of the IFP 
and their negotiating stance. The new use for this title can be interpreted as a 
subtle indication of recognition by the ANC of the need to confer at least some 
measure of respect on the IFP.  
In the new Record of Understanding it was agreed and tabled by both parties 
that they would use the coalition to address the contentious issue of a provincial 
constitution and the position of traditional leaders, issues on which the parties 
were polarised, and to establish a “balance” in executive position holding. The 
five-a-side committees were tasked to facilitate the formation of the coalition 
but a stalemate was reached over the distribution of portfolios. The question 
was whether equity (the premise that guided the ANC) meant equal distribution. 
An amendment changed the term to balance to translate into seats actually won, 
rather than equal distribution. This was referred to the three-a-side committee 
that met in Johannesburg which was in existence to look after national relations 
between the IFP and the ANC (Pers. ANC Interview 56). Excluded from the 
tabled document, but central to the untabled agreement12 were two interlinked 
factors. They were the method in which the concerns were to be addressed and 
the way in which balance was to be interpreted. It was agreed that the question 
of executive balance would be addressed only once a provincial constitution had 
been agreed and that the constitution had to address the powers and functions of 
traditional leaders. In terms of balance, it was agreed that once the question of 
traditional leadership had been addressed and a provincial constitution estab-
lished, the provincial executive would be expanded from 10 to 12 ministerial 
positions (requiring an amendment to the South African constitution) that would 
effectively provide the ANC with two additional ministerial posts (Pers. IFP 
MEC Interview 74 and Pers. ANC MPP Interview 87). Immediately, however, 
legislative committee positions were redistributed equally among IFP and ANC 
                                                            
12  That there was an extra untabled agreement was confirmed in personal interviews 
(Pers. IFP MEC Interview 74; Pers. ANC MEC Interview 56; Pers. ANC MPP Inter-
view 87). 
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MPPs and these positions were expanded to include the new post of Deputy-
Chairperson for every committee, effectively increasing senior posts in the 80 
seat legislature by almost twenty percent.  
The basis on which the agreement was forged was reflected in the manner in 
which committee posts were redistributed. The newfound alliance of elite 
clusters, across the two parties, came to dominate the legislature as committee 
chairs were reallocated tipping the balance of power and control in the direction 
of the new alliance. The equilibrium that existed in functions across elite seg-
ments gave way, as many MPPs who did not support the coalition were suc-
ceeded by others and relocated to other legislative roles.  
In addition, 3-a-side, 5-a-side and 10-a-side forums were developed to pro-
vide an arena in which those in the IFP and ANC that were formerly involved in 
the war between parties could address the issues that divided them (Pers. ANC 
Interview 78, Pers IFP MEC Interview 41; Pers IFP MPP Interviews 60 and 65). 
The idea for these forums was rooted in the earlier, but quite different, 1992 
National Peace Accord. In this earlier accord, dispute resolution committees 
were established throughout South Africa as instruments of conflict transforma-
tion within communities. However, in 1994 these peace committees disappear-
ed, while political violence continued to ravage KwaZulu-Natal. The immediate 
reason for this was that the ANC national government discontinued their fund-
ing. The ANC government no longer needed the peace committees to mediate 
conflict and smooth the negotiation process for the new form of the state. The 
ANC was the unrivalled party in power at the national level, constitutional 
principles which were to bind the final constitution-making body had been de-
cided and the transfer of power was complete. The peace committees were now 
in tension with the ANC because decision-making within them comprised other 
political parties and civil society groups (Francis 2010). Parliament – in which 
the ANC was dominant – was now to assume the role of processing conflict. 
The creation, in KwaZulu-Natal, of the 3-a-side, 5-a-side and 10-a-side com-
mittees in 1999 was thus a highly symbolic act. First, in the creation of these 
committees it was implicit that parliament did not serve as an arena in which 
tension between the parties could be resolved once and for all. Second, the cre-
ation of these committees signified a shift away from community-based strate-
gies for peace towards an acknowledgement that the political elite were respon-
sible for driving that peaceful co-existence. Third, these forums were the first in 
which the IFP and ANC were equal partners in the form and content of the 
committees. Although the committees had no formal or institutional powers and 
functions, they were conceptualised as forums through which the IFP and ANC 
could address the barriers to cooperation in the provincial legislature. As such, 
they had a dual role. First, the committees were arenas in which individual 
members involved in the war between the parties could talk and transform their 
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relationships. Second, the committees performed a monitoring function to en-
sure that neither of the parties acted in a manner that would undermine their 
peaceful co-existence. Hence, these committees were created by agreement 
between the IFP and ANC and had no formal institutional powers or functions 
yet they were to become (as discussed later) the main forum through which 
politics and public policy took place in the legislature. 
 
Inter-party dynamics as a consequence of the coalition: Selling the agreement 
The coalition was a point of discord in both parties. In the ANC camp, a cluster 
of MPPs believed that they had the right to control the province and unless the 
IFP was defeated a true victory had not been realised. In the IFP camp, a cluster 
of MPPs could not reconcile their traditional cultural values with the modernist 
language of the ANC, but they were prepared to endorse the coalition because 
of the agreement to define the powers and functions of traditional leadership. 
However a further cluster could not harmonise their anti-socialist values with 
the ANC although, in fact, it was discarding much of its revolutionary and 
socialist baggage. Their frustrations at the thwarted opportunity for an alliance 
with the DP were temporarily quelled, but then resurfaced in 2002 and in such a 
manner that a later alliance with the DA13 was too late to appease some of them. 
The concerns of these elite clusters were restrained by the manner in which 
the coalition was endorsed in the legislature. It was assented to on the basis of 
two factors. These were that this form of coalition would finally lead to peace in 
KwaZulu-Natal and that this would further enable development to take place.14 
The following sentiments were typical among MPPs. 
‘I support the coalition because of the bloodbath in the past. It is bringing stability in 
the province’ (Pers. IFP Interview 106). 
‘It is a good start to ending the conflict and the killing of people. We come and 
talk ... We have an open chest ... So far, the talks have been helpful …’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 65). 
‘I am not privy to the ... meetings ... because I am not part of the history of 
conflict between the IFP and ANC. This allows those who were hurt to talk to one 
another in the face’ (Pers. IFP MEC Interview 41). 
‘The ANC and IFP share the same constituency. We want peace and stability. 
The committees were established to look into the violence. We are looking at the 
                                                            
13  The Democratic Alliance (DA) was formed ahead of the 2000 local government 
elections through an alliance between the DP and NNP. However, until the period 
after the floor crossing legislation was effected, MPPs in KwaZulu-Natal retained 
the title DP / NNP. To change their title before then would have meant a loss of 
seats as they were not elected on a DA ticket in 1999. 
14  Even the parties that were excluded from the coalition agreement congratulated the 
IFP and ANC on reaching an agreement based upon peace and development. 
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entire province and the damage done by political violence. They have worked very 
well’ (Pers. ANC MEC Interview 113). 
Because it emphasized peace, none of the political elite could challenge the 
form of the coalition (Pers. IFP Interviews 41, 131, 68, 92 and ANC Interviews 
126, 57, 87), but the same did not apply to development. As the basis for 
development provision could be interpreted on a range of levels, from techno-
cratic capacity to political will, the key discourse that came to be used to ratify 
the coalition was “representation”. As the IFP and the ANC both claimed to be 
the authentic representatives of the urban and rural poor, the coalition would 
thus favour the constituents that were most in need. As this became articulated 
within the parties it translated into a justification for why the DP could not be an 
alliance partner. In the words of one MPP, ‘... in no uncertain terms could we 
enter a coalition with the DP. Their policies represent white business’ (Pers. IFP 
Interview 131). As another MPP contended, ‘If there was to be progress in the 
province it was better that the two parties, the ANC and the IFP, that represent 
the majority of the formerly oppressed govern’ (Pers. ANC Interview 87). With 
the coalition justified to all, it became the dominant factor in the KwaZulu-
Natal Legislature. 
 
Cross-party political elite bonding 
Coalition accommodation developed beyond an alliance of necessity, into a 
dominant set of political ideas at provincial government level. An examination 
of interviewees’ fundamental beliefs, conceptions and abstractions which served 
as a “social construction of reality” and which motivated political action sug-
gests that a powerful cross-party hegemonic discourse developed during the 
coalition. This discourse is multi-faceted. Table 6.1 shows the elite clusters of 
political ideas by party affiliation. Interviewees are categorised into clusters of 
political ideas, which were identified during the interview process as driving 
action and, in the case of the IFP and ANC sustaining the coalition. The cate-
gories are not exclusive. Interviewees were categorised by dominant value sets, 
notwithstanding that they may display values that cut across categories used. 
Interviewees have been placed in up to two groupings. 
As the table indicates, multiple clusters of political ideas were found to exist 
among the political elite. These ideas cut across the two main political parties. 
 
     • Rewardist nationalists 
Rewardist nationalism refers to a belief that the key positions of power and 
authority in society should be held by those who subscribe to Africanism. In its 
militant form, interviewees stressed that the African nationalist movement was 
the vanguard of change and the true defender of the rights of the poor. As one 
interviewee said, 
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Table 6.1 The total number of MPPs by party and political ideas* (N=128) 
Value systems** Number of IFP MPPs 
Number of 
ANC MPPs 
Rewardist nationalists 9 16 
African consciousness (cultural communitarian) 23 18 
Ethno-linguistically bounded communitarians 10 1 
Traditionalists 7 0 
Cosmopolitan modernizers 35 9 
Pragmatic political pluralists     11 13 
Individualists 8 5 
Notes: 
* The categories used are “ideal” types employed as heuristic devices as an exercise in ideal 
typification. The methodological approach used was semi-structured interviews in which inter-
viewees were asked a series of questions on democracy and institution building, their most im-
portant beliefs and the representation of those beliefs within past and present political institu-
tions, and their rationales for political action. These results were then analysed to produce six 
ideal types. 
** Interviewees were asked a range of questions about their values, attitudes and belief systems. 
The answers to these questions were then grouped according to patterns and trends and then cate-
gories of value systems were drawn up in which these groupings were placed. 
 
 
‘Without us there will be no development. We (the African nationalist movement) 
are guided by a deep philosophical outlook, some might say arrogance. We have a 
right to impose our wishes ... We have a right to the role to lead everybody ... we are 
the true victors. Some say that the victors are generous’ (Pers. ANC MEC Interview 
134). 
At its most extreme, suitable candidates were those considered leaders by 
way of their role in the former liberation movements. Hence, representation was 
determined in terms of recognition through former political position. As one 
ANC MPP stated, 
‘I have been involved right from my school days ... I could not finish my studies 
then, we had to fight soldiers and those who tried to oppress us, I worked tirelessly 
leading my community ... I now have my own house. I drive a Mercedes Benz. 
Through participation I have benefited. This is my reward’ (Pers. ANC Interview 
57). 
This suggestive of a system of social capital, of networks of trust and 
reciprocity established through past political action. These values expressed are 
not underpinned by any substantial substantive programme of action, but on 
notions of the state as the key arena of privilege or reward. Herewith, among 
this group of MPPs, Bayart’s politics of the belly may hold true, but not for 
MPPs categorised otherwise. Legislative office, in this context, reflects the 
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loyalties of the former period as retained in the present along a value system 
based on status. One particular example supports this. One MPP argued, 
‘This is not about viable government, about development based on representing the 
disenfranchised ... it is about jobs for pals ... It is a reward, not a public service ... it 
is about deployment, the maximum salary range, luxury cars ... I don’t need the 
hassle’ (Pers. ANC Interview 53). 
In the context of the IFP this category of value system has come to mean a 
portion of “respected leaders”. Within this category there are no Amakhosi 
whose value systems were not found to correlate with this. In the ANC, this 
translates into “leaders” from the former struggle. An IFP-ANC cross party 
identification with these beliefs was found, although as table one suggests, a 
larger proportion of ANC MPPs than IFP MPPs subscribed to them. 
 
     • African consciousness (cultural communitarian) 
Cultural communitarians were found to subscribe to a substantial belief system 
of values. This cluster of elites recognized that a varied value system existed 
among the population, but considered the democratic project as an exercise in 
transformation. This transformation was to change the basis of coexistence so 
that citizens may be invited to participate in relations with Africans on terms 
which do not subordinate Africans to the cultural constraints of “western peo-
ples”. In this context, there was room within the democratic project for a style 
of politics based on African values and discourse. One interviewee articulated 
her most central values. She said, 
‘I represent African values and my core essence is very African, like the old PAC. 
We have looked to create room for African involvement on a wider scale with 
African values being central. If one looks at the role of traditional leadership, it is 
very African. Traditional leadership is our central core. You cannot be an African 
and look down to destroy the very institutions that are our Africanness ... If you do, 
you are working to some other home’ (Pers. IFP Interview 116). 
This discourse and values are not necessarily sectarian and are very broad 
based. Interviewees in this category – across the ANC and IFP – indicated 
knowledge of, and substantial support for, the views of Steve Biko, the former 
Black Consciousness movement, Anton Lembede, John Dube, Kenneth Kaunda 
and Kwame Nkrumah, although knowledge was present in diverse and varied 
strengths.15 At its most emphatic, these values emphasise the rejection of for-
eign leadership in Africa, defined as “not of Africa” in anti-colonial terms. The 
idea of the creation of a new set of African values extends to the state – the state 
                                                            
15  A small percentage knew of the writings of Franz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Stokely 
Carmichael, Charles Hamilton, Malcom X and Eldridge Cleaver, most notably 
among those members of the IFP who were former PAC members. 
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must reflect indigenous values. Interviewees in this category elicited a view of 
individual man as a part of a wider collective of values, customs and needs. 
These interviewees were opposed to what they see as South African liberalism, 
in which they equated liberalism with individualism and a system that means 
that those who were once oppressed will still be unable to participate on equal 
terms with the former oppressor. Further, liberalism among these interviewees 
was likened to a patronising attitude of superiority towards anything not Eng-
lish, and liberal attitudes as manifested in the expectation that the population 
should assimilate into a system of behaviour, values and codes of conduct 
favoured by liberals. As the table shows, these beliefs were found among a sig-
nificant proportion of interviewees from both the IFP and ANC. 
 
     • Ethno-linguistically bounded communitarians 
Ethno-linguistically bounded communitarians articulated their beliefs as a dis-
tinct “Zuluness” as opposed to a wider Africanism. As one MPP articulated, 
‘I am first and foremost a Zulu ... My grandfathers and their fathers were involved in 
battles, in wars. I will live and die believing in my people, fighting for them …’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 66). 
Interviewees in this category stressed the uniqueness of what they perceived 
to be the Zulu nation and in some cases talked about separatism based on this 
perceived Zulu uniqueness. The core value is nationalism, the belief in a distinct 
nation and programme to protect what is viewed as Zulu. There is negligible 
IFP-ANC cross party support for these beliefs. As Table 4 suggests, IFP inter-
viewees were found to be the main subscribers to these values. 
 
     • Traditionalists 
Interviewees categorised as traditionalists did not explicitly support the insti-
tutional structures established in 1994, which were viewed as contributing to a 
breakdown in an already “ordered society” and as undermining parallel struc-
tures of authority which have more value. These parallel structures of authority 
were overwhelmingly referred to as a respect for elders and tribal leadership, 
the payment of tribute to the system of ubuKhosi as being the most appropriate 
structures in which people should be governed. The system of ubuKhosi is both 
an institution and a practice. It is the institution of the kingship and chieftaincy 
system as well as an adherence and loyalty to its principles.One MPP stated 
emphatically, 
‘If a man has a higher stature, a higher authority, you cannot say to him “no you are 
wrong”. These youths, they cannot approach me without respect ... African politics 
is very different to a western political style ... this system has functioned for hun-
dreds of years ... it has lived on through wars, colonisation, even when the last 
government attempted to impose their own chiefs ... We created the erstwhile Kwa-
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Zulu government to protect it ... and now it will live on through this structure too ... 
it (new political institutions) is just a hollow shell’ (Pers. IFP Interview 65). 
These MPPs did not associate parliament with any particular value and did 
not overwhelmingly support the new institutions. Their participation in them 
was in recognition that it is necessary to be part of any particular system in 
order to maintain stature. Participation provides a means through which in-
dividuals may access resources that provide status.16 There is no cross-party 
support for these belief systems. Although patriarchical beliefs do cut across all 
political parties, they are not formulated into a belief system. All interviewees 
that were found to hold these traditionalist value systems were from the IFP. 
 
     • Cosmopolitan modernisers 
Cosmopolitan modernisers embraced the modernity that the new institutions 
brought, but sought to encapsulate it in a particular form of social structure. A 
core aim was to acquaint communities with the opportunities and resources 
from the wider world, and to maintain but to modernise the institution of the 
Amakhosi. Interviewees in this category overwhelmingly stressed the importan-
ce of traditional leadership and traditional structures, as well as the importance 
of specific national traits in the political system. However, most importantly, 
interviewees stressed the importance of “building bridges” between the parallel 
structures of the tribal authorities and other world values, without sacrificing or 
undermining the very foundations of those traditional structures. As one MPP 
said, 
‘ideology cannot change ... our life and blood is the rural communities ... The tradi-
tional leaders are pivotal, they are the key to development. You may see me in west-
ern clothes, but I Mrs (X) ... I support ubuntu, africanism, traditional leadership ... 
We simply provided skills ... We can negotiate ... We have technological under-
standing ... We have built remarkable support in the business community ... As 
graduates we provide the bridge. We are using the elite to bring to the outside world 
that which they don’t understand …. a black elite who had grown up in the historical 
tradition of the Zulu …’ (Pers. IFP Interview 99). 
Whereas this may be supportive of a parallel system of authority within and 
outside the structures of parliament, it demonstrated a commitment to develop-
ment. Almost half of the IFP interviewees were placed in this category. In 
                                                            
16  Access to, and allocation of, land was one of the key abilities that sustained and 
strengthened the system of traditional leadership in KwaZulu-Natal. Since 1994, 
national government has attempted to legislate on matters to do with land. Through 
the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the second legislative house at national 
level, the provincial legislature may input on this legislation through its permanent 
delegation to the House. 
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contrast, only a small proportion of ANC interviewees were found to subscribe 
to these views. 
 
     • Pragmatic political pluralists 
Central to the value system of pragmatic political pluralists is the belief that 
varied value and cultural systems can and should exist within society and each 
such system has a contribution to make to the form of the state and the practise 
of politics. As one MPP stated, 
‘We have faced in our party an identification problem. One of our weaknesses is that 
we didn’t make inroads into other communities … We had a knee jerk reaction to 
oppose others … Now in government it is essential to accommodate everyone … 
These are signs at how far we have progressed … It’s (the legislature’s) discerning 
quality is that it is a broad church and can accommodate and accept everyone …’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 104). 
Consequently, interviewees in this cluster exhibited two different perspec-
tives. Firstly, that the state should reflect the values, codes and systems of 
behaviour of all who live in it, irrespective of value. Second, that the values, 
codes and behavioural systems reflected by the state should be in the best 
interests of all who live in it. A small number of members of both the IFP and 
ANC were found to hold these values. Significantly, when combined, this con-
stituted the third largest category for both parties.  
 
     • Individualists 
The final cluster of political elites could be termed individualists. They stressed 
the individual as being supremely important and maintained that the rights of 
the individual should not be subordinated to the rights of groups or peoples. The 
state’s role should be one of cultivating and protecting individual rights. Inter-
viewees in this category stressed opposition to traditional structures of autho-
rity, which were equated with feudalism, africanisation of the state, which was 
equated with skills flight and the promotion of an indigenous style of politics as 
subjugating talented individuals and producing an inefficient state. One MPP 
described his particular set of values. He said, 
‘I am a liberal, I cannot identify with the amakhosi, I don’t believe in affirmative 
action either, only merit’ (Pers Interview 83). 
A very small number of MPPs were found to hold these views. Significantly, 
however, they were found in both the IFP and ANC. Indeed an MPP who ex-
pressed these views did so in the extreme. In speaking about his own views, he 
shared his perception of other views. He said, 
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‘the hard line … is made up of two things. Firstly, the communalist … and secondly, 
the nationalist. In European terms that makes national socialist. In the South African 
situation that makes up black fascist’ (Pers. IFP Interview 128). 
This clearly demonstrates distinctions in value systems and, in addition, how 
MPPs set themselves apart from other MPPs.  
Notwithstanding that cross-party clusters were found to exist for all but one 
category, an examination of elite circulation demonstrates that certain clusters 
of political ideas were found to be evident in different strengths at different 
points in time. Most significantly, over the two terms of office, there was an 
overall decline in the number of traditionalists, ethno-linguistically bound com-
munitarians and individualists. Furthermore, the number of MPPs who could be 
described as rewardist nationalists, cosmopolitan modernisers or cultural com-
munitarians increased. This correlates with the patterns of political culture dis-
cussed in chapter five where the conceptions of leadership, particularly in the 
ANC is supportive of these discourses. 
Clusters that have undergone significant decline include traditionalists in 
their most overtly anti-institutional form and ethno-linguistically bounded com-
munitarians who supported separatism. This, however, may have occurred 
through elite circulation and not attitudinal change as in Putnam’s study. It may, 
for example, demonstrate that incumbents who hold particular values, had some 
control over recruitment and deployment, rather than attitudinal change as a re-
sult of the moderating effects of institutional frameworks. The party list system 
of proportional representation that is employed in KwaZulu-Natal makes this 
possibility even more likely in this context. The factor of declining numbers 
who subscribe to these beliefs can be understood as supportive of democratisa-
tion as conventionally understood. By contrast, however, the decline of another 
cluster, that of individualists runs counter to the development of liberal demo-
cracy, again as conventionally understood. These clusters – traditionalists, 
ethno-linguistically bound communitarians and individualists – were most 
numerous during the first term of government, and have been eclipsed by MPPs 
subscribing to other belief systems since the coalition. Conversely, increasing 
numbers of MPPs have come to support their own role within the state without 
any substantive supporting ideology except to legitimise their positions as lead-
ers in the struggle. This has been accompanied by rapid moves in some depart-
ments to transform the civil service. Another cluster that became prominent is 
that of cultural communitarians, who reject liberalism and seek to impart to the 
state indigenous value and belief systems. The final cluster that became more 
pronounced is that of cosmopolitan modernisers, in which one of the core 
values includes the preservation of a parallel structure of authority. 
The new dominant cross-party clusters that developed have formed around 
questions of leadership. For IFP modernisers, this is directed towards establish-
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ing legally and institutionally the position of traditional structures, and of pro-
tecting socio-cultural systems within the institutional framework. As such a 
significant proportion of MPPs aimed to secure institutional approval for the 
chieftaincy system, which has survived for over a century17 and ensure that the 
role played by the system was not eclipsed by the new institutions. This is 
central to ensuring that parallel structures of authority are retained in the 
present, but that new institutions may provide certain benefits to that which is 
traditional. For such members, the provincial institutions of government provide 
both a recognised infrastructure through which development is ensured in the 
province, and a framework through which a parallel structure of authority is 
legitimised. In terms of cultural communitarians, a substantial proportion of 
MPPs believed that the provincial institutions should more greatly reflect indi-
genous values. One area in which this was discussed was in terms of “con-
sensus”. A criticism leveled at new institutions is that ‘they force an adversarial 
style of politics that is not in keeping with our African style’ (Pers. IFP Inter-
view 92). In terms of rewardist nationalists, the question of leadership centres 
on legitimisation of their positions as leaders, as the African elite who fought in 
the struggle. This is, perhaps, significantly similar to Barnes’ discussion of 
Lagos in which he found that, ‘rivals and factional struggles have been publicly 
subordinated to the task of gaining a larger place in the world of political re-
wards’ (Barnes 1986: 143). 
The significance of this particular trend is that intra-party ideologies, that 
sustained the form of relationship that existed between the IFP and ANC, were 
to some extent supplanted. All three perspectives of elites described as – re-
wardist nationalists, cosmopolitan modernisers and cultural communitarians – 
can be seen and were accommodated in the coalition where interaction provided 
repeated opportunities for the exchange of ideas, and a common political 
outlook was forged along the ideas of Africanism. Coalitions exclude as well as 
include. In this particular format, a political network consisting of a dominant 
discourse supplanted the intra-party ideologies and created a new hierarchy 
within the legislature. To some extent it could be argued that the included MPPs 
promulgated an ideology in which they saw themselves as owners of the arena. 
Justifying their rights in this manner provided a basis for solidarity in the 
coalition and the exclusion of other discourses. 
A variety of authors have claimed that African politics is both disordered 
and uninstitutionalized (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 162; Diamond 1994: 14; Wil-
                                                            
17  This “institution” has been subject to some manipulation under white minority rule. 
However a significant proportion of chiefs command significant respect and legiti-
macy. For a discussion and analysis of the transformation and legitimacy of traditi-
onal leadership in KwaZulu-Natal, see Williams 2001. 
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liams 2002: 11). Yet the KwaZulu-Natal case does not demonstrate this. Rather, 
the range of African political ideologies in which the African political elite 
expound produces a greater degree of flexibility (cf. Bayart 1993: 230-234). 
This flexibility is both ordered through the politics of etiquette and institution-
alized as a value within the state. It is rooted in the politics of cooperation and 
accommodation. 
 
Impact of the coalition on institutions 
Evidence from interviews suggests that the institutions of government, during 
the coalition formed, did not function to process or resolve conflict. Instead, 
accommodation and compromise prevailed in a manner that sheltered political 
elites from scrutiny and secured autonomy for elites to function in particular 
spheres of influence. This is evident in both the executive and legislative bran-
ches as well as in their relationships to one another. For example, it is alleged 
by some interviewees that the development programme of the IFP MEC for 
Agriculture focused predominantly upon development in the rural areas of 
Zululand, an area in which the majority of voters support the IFP (Pers. DP 
MEC Interview 75). It is further claimed that the ANC MEC for Housing chose 
to spend the annual housing allocation for 2001 by pledging it to the Durban 
City Council for their distribution in housing projects in the city of Durban, 
where the ANC’s majority of constituents are located (Pers. DP MEC Interview 
75 and Pers. IFP MEC Interview 128).  
Moreover, the clearest indication of this accommodation is the failure of 
legislative committees to perform their institutionally designated oversight and 
watchdog functions. One MPP articulated her perceptions of the problem. She 
said, 
‘It is unthinkable. It neutralises the IFP, not the ANC. Every time we stand up and 
say something in support of IFP policy we are told “you are threatening the coali-
tion”. It is a liability to the party. The ANC are trying to finish us off ... We have 
prostituted ourselves … for what?’ (Pers. IFP Interview 68). 
Although the interviewee couched her impression in terms of an attack on 
the party, a conscious obstruction by elites of their own oversight role was 
found to be evident. The construction of the system of oversight was informed 
by coalition party political balance in the allocation of MECs and committee 
chairpersons. Where an ANC MEC sat an IFP committee chair was allocated to 
the corresponding portfolio committee and vice versa. Yet the committee chairs 
were found to be preventing scrutiny of executive roles. This was clearly ap-
parent in a number of forms. For example, the ANC Minister of Health pro-
duced no departmental “reports” to the Portfolio Committee on Health, and 
when members of the committees raised questions about this, the IFP Commit-
tee Chair closed off the subject (Pers. IFP Interview 131). The IFP MEC for 
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Traditional Affairs provided no accounts of spending to the committee since the 
coalition was formed in 1999 so the financial affairs of the department were not 
scrutinised (Pers. NNP Interview 24). Furthermore, committees became a forum 
in which difficult issues were no longer raised. This is evident by the constant 
deferral of difficult issues and the failure, in some instances, to even meet as a 
committee. For example, the Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee met on 
only one occasion since 1999. When questioned about this by a member of the 
DP, the response of the committee chair was that he was ‘waiting for the exe-
cutive to tell him to call a meeting’ (Pers. IFP Interview 138), the very body 
over which the committee has oversight. Instead, only non-political issues are 
dealt with by the committees, issues of a technical and organisational nature. In 
some instances, MPPs travelled to committee meetings simply to sign a register 
of attendance and confirm the minutes of the former meeting.18 
A feature of this institutional weakness was the development of the 5-a-side 
and 10-a-side committees into extra-institutional forums where politics began to 
take place. Despite circumventing the role of formal institutions, these forums 
were justified on the basis that development in the province could not take place 
unless there was peace. Interviews show, however, that these forums went be-
yond institutionalizing peace and facilitating development. For example, the 
Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs waited for a 
mandate from the 10-a-side committee before calling a meeting. While the 
political elite became locked into these extra-institutional forums and proceeded 
in parliament on the basis of discussions and decisions taken within them, the 
deliberations of these extra-parliamentary committees were not open to scru-
tiny, produced no minutes for distribution and they did not report to parliament. 
Thus, these parallel structures provided a venue for the parties to confine their 
discussions and deliberations to an inner sanctum. Instead of the institutions of 
government providing an arena in which elite attitudes become gradually modi-
fied in a process that locks them in to a system of competition and negotiation, 
accommodationist politics produced an extra-institutional forum in KwaZulu-
Natal that limited scrutiny in parliament. 
Accommodation and compromise, while ensuring elite autonomy by provid-
ing opportunities in which they are shielded from the public and enabling 
governance to occur within autonomous spheres of influence (cf. Dye & Zeigler 
1996), tie elites to the process of patronage. If accommodation and compromise 
is one of the prevailing methods in which elite interaction takes place then this 
                                                            
18  This was confirmed by numerous interviews of MPPs from across the political spec-
trum. 
230 CHAPTER 6 
 
would support a clientelist system of relationships. Clientelism19 enables new 
alliances to be formed and older contracts to be terminated. According to 
Bayart, through the state the political elite establishes clients by dispensing 
favours and rewards. Patronage systems can thus establish vertical integration 
and factions within the state (Bayart 1989). Its key element is that it organises 
elites in their relationships with one another. Moreover, elites are able to use the 
institutions and the institutional roles to enforce a patron-client relationship. The 
party list system enabled the dominant elites / strongest party faction to man-
oeuvre problematic elites into positions which did not challenge the coalition. In 
this context, the dominant elites consisted of those positioned in the extra-
institutional forums, all of whom subscribe to one of the three dominant sets of 
political ideas – rewardist nationalists, cultural communitarians and cosmopo-
litan modernisers. The insularity of the coalition provided for some elites the 
identification of their interests with it. These included interests of both a 
material and ideological nature. Material interests included careerist aspirations 
as tied to the expansion of the executive and increased legislative positions. The 
most powerful incentive to remain in the coalition is patronage in the form of 
provincial government posts. Notwithstanding clauses that state that there may 
be a maximum of 10 MECs, an agreement to amend the constitution to create 
room for an additional two ANC MPPs was agreed upon, to take effect once the 
powers and functions of traditional leaders was resolved. However, other sub-
stantial posts were also created in 1999 without the sanction of parliament. 
These included the position of Deputy-Chairperson for every committee in the 
legislature, an act that substantially increased the salary of more than 15 (predo-
minantly ANC) MPPs overnight. Ideological interests included political values 
and policy preferences based upon them, dominated through the control of the 
agenda. 
An analysis of elite circulation based upon value systems shows that “prob-
lematic” MPPs were moved out of offices, where they would be in an institu-
tional position to scrutinise actions or challenge positions, and moved into other 
roles. These include positions in the legislature such as Whips, or in the party 
such as Chairperson. In these positions elites are forced to enforce the position 
of the dominant faction. In so doing, the role of individuals in party positions 
became that of blocking dissent20 to the coalition without engaging substan-
                                                            
19  A reciprocal but uneven relationship between two or more people. The term is 
adopted from Roman law that enabled Plebs to become Cliens under the legal and 
social protection of a Patronus in return for political, financial or other obligation. 
For a contemporary definition, see Bayart 1989. 
20  Interviews show that dissent stems mainly from MPPs that have not grown up with-
in the tradition of political culture of the parties as they are currently formed. See 
Chapter 5 for further discussion of this. 
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tively in any coalition discussions, a factor that is further enforced by the insti-
tutionalization of the coalition. In formalising the coalition, the parties tabled it 
in the legislature to last until the 2004 elections. The only way the deal could be 
broken was by a vote two thirds of the legislature. This meant that the coalition 
became anchored across parties and no faction within the party had the power to 
overthrow another. 
 
Impact of the coalition on parties 
Ideological consensus by the coalition partners resulted in partial fragmentation 
of the party system in KwaZulu-Natal, but not on the same basis for each of the 
two main ones. 
 
     • Disruption of organisational ties 
In the first place, specific features of the coalition constituted an informal 
hierarchy, which disrupted the existing organisational ties of parties. The extent 
of the impact in each party was dependent on existing party cleavages and 
informal structures within the party. In the ANC hierarchy a layer emerged that 
consisted predominantly, of former exile politicians with ties to the national 
rather than local level. In practice, these MPPs disciplined their party colleagues 
by using the conception of the potential threat to the interests of the coalition as 
a means to limit discourse. Consequently, this reinforced party cleavages and 
widened the divide between party members who fought in exile with strong ties 
to the national organisation and those with historically strong constituencies at 
the local level. As a result, the organisational hierarchy in the party was main-
tained and strengthened in provincial – national relationships, but in provincial 
ties and provincial – local level relationships the organisational ties were sup-
planted. The new clients in this arrangement adopted the role of explaining and 
justifying the course of action taken by the patrons, not reasoning why.  
Conversely, the complexity of organisational structures in the IFP meant that 
a new level on the party ladder impacted less critically on party organisation. 
Although the extra-institutional forums disrupted former organisational ties 
through a process of inclusion and exclusion, party cleavages remained cross-
cutting as MPPs in the 10-a-side committee continued to follow patterns of 
party etiquette inside and outside these forums. Hence, if the formal patterns of 
organisation in the IFP are sacrificed, invisible patterns of etiquette mean that 
the party continues to organise and canvass through its organisational structures, 
and through these it locks in all members. The IFP patron-client relationship is 
reciprocally more equal in that clients can be appeased through relationships at 
other levels of government. For example, at local government level the IFP was 
in 2000, able to enter into an agreement of support with another party (the 
Democratic Party) because the structures of etiquette meant that party leaders 
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with strong political roots can advise the party to change course mid-stream if 
the local political climate changes.  
 
     • Impact on the relationship between party and constituencies 
The coalition had an impact on the relationship parties have with voters, their 
core constituencies. In the case of the ANC, levels of membership declined and 
the degree of liaison with the voters diminished. In terms of membership levels, 
figures for the early 1990’s demonstrated a national membership of 521,181 and 
provincial membership of 79,497 (Report of the Secretary General to the ANC 
National Conference in 1991, in Rantete 1998: 15). By 2002, national member-
ship stood at a mere 89,000 (African National Congress 2002b) although pro-
vincial membership figures remained undisclosed as a result of the closure of 
branches. The decision making centre of the ANC (the National Executive 
Committee) consists of a fixed body in which half of the 10-a-side committee 
were represented as well as those holding provincial ministerial posts. Two 
opposing trends were evident. The first was continuity in, and entrenchment of, 
political leadership since the coalition formed. Seniority in local politics was 
not a guarantee of incorporation into the decision-making bodies in the party 
and many of the former charismatic leadership elite, that were represented in 
KwaZulu-Natal, were sidelined from the party (see Chapter 5). Indeed, the con-
ceptions of leadership among the ANC political elite (as discussed in Chapter 5) 
is supportive of a top-down style and recruitment entrenched Southern Natal 
exile politicians without mass-based branch support. For example, even Bheki 
Cele, most preferred ANC MPP on the 1999 parliamentary lists, which were 
compiled by branch nominations, was neither offered a cabinet position, not a 
senior substantive committee post in the legislature. His location in the provin-
cial parliament, in the immediate period after the 1999 elections, as Head of 
Committees was in an administrative capacity, not a substantive one. In explain-
ing this, one MPP said, ‘the issue is not about the voters … From the previous 
provincial government, those who were committee heads are now in cabinet’ 
(Pers. ANC Interview 57). Hence, this progression in already institutionalized 
leadership is what drives deployment. The second factor is related to the first. 
That is, changes that have occurred in the balance of power, mean ideas also 
emanate from those located institutionally, in the national decision-making 
body – the NEC – and in the extra-institutional bodies in the province. These 
bodies are not always in agreement with one another, but they organise ideas in 
a top-down political style to the exclusion of the lower levels. 
Interviews revealed that the experience of the IFP is different. Its main 
decision making body – the National Council – is made up of both a fixed mem-
bership of formal office holders who are members of the parliamentary party 
and formally recognised party posts, and a fluid body of “leadership” drawn 
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from the local level. These “leaders” comprise of Amakhosi (traditional leaders) 
and others considered respected and can be invited to participate in decision-
making at any point for any period of time. Consequently, the party retains 
strong links to its core constituents, through a parallel structure of authority, 
whose voice is heard in the central decision making body. These strong links 
remain, despite the IFP losing seats in 2009. The party in later elections did not 
reach out to constituencies that were in contradiction with its core values (as 
they had in previous elections) which made it internally more cohensive, yet 
less able to garner wider voter support as in previous elections (cf. Francis 
2009a). IFP membership has been less affected than that in the ANC because of 
local roots, which tie into the chiefly structure. It is through these invisible 
structures again that the IFP is provided with a method of interaction with its 
constituents, and is able to lead and enforce decisions made in the coalition, as 
the formal structures break apart, in a two-way stream of idea flows. 
As a consequence of this, the IFP election campaigns in subsequent elections 
took on the form of local canvassing, often on a door to door basis by local 
MPs. This is in sharp contrast to the ANC campaigns (which the voters res-
ponded to) which were highly visible, sophisticated, expensive affairs that 
parachuted the ANC leadership into the region and emphasized the national 
power of the organization. The responsiveness of the voters to these sophisti-
cated national campaigns is demonstrated in KwaZulu-Natal by 55,000 voters 
who split their tickets in 2009. They voted for the IFP provincially and the ANC 
nationally (cf. Francis 2009a). 
 
     • Subordination of the party to other projects 
The third consequence of the coalition was the subordination of the provincial 
party to other projects. An examination of the circulation of MPPs demonstrated 
that in the ANC, key policy and strategy specialists increasingly abandoned the 
province for either the national level or senior managerial posts in the civil 
service. In some instances, economic managers and advisors were drawn from 
the ranks of the party and the party caucus MPPs rather than from the civil 
service21. Party members, rather than a technocratic elite, increasingly replaced 
executive departmental managers. Consequently, ‘the party is run down in fav-
our of the burgeoning state machine’ (Tordoff 1993: 118) and the requirements 
of national governance. Tordoff argues that one of the key features that has 
characterised African states since independence from colonial rule is a loss of 
key personnel from the party to the state. This, he shows, prevented the political 
                                                            
21  See the discussion in Chapter 5 where I provide the examples of MPP Mike Sut-
cliffe, MPP Felix Dlamini and MPP Nhlanhla Ngidi who went into senior manage-
rial roles after serving one term of office as a provincial MPP. 
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party from playing a regulatory role over government so that the party becomes 
the public relations arm of the state (Tordoff 1997: 119). In KwaZulu-Natal the 
impact of this is even more critical than Tordoff suggests for two reasons. First, 
as circulation is upwards from the provincial to national levels, it strips the pro-
vincial party of the abilility to retain a supervisory role and the provincial 
government of the technical ability required within provincial state structures. 
This has further consequences as those circulated into power (as shown in 
Chapter 3) in KwaZulu-Natal, have increasingly less educational and profes-
sional skills to manage the necessities of governance. The provinces thus be-
come devoid of policy expertise and the capacity to fulfil their constitutional 
roles, just as the party becomes devoid of expertise. Secondly, developing 
Tordoff’s claims further about African states in the post-colonial independence 
era, well qualified manpower become lost not only to the party, but also to the 
state. As the cycle of upwards circulation and replacement continues, the initial 
recruitment and selection criteria that brought the political elite into power 
begin to have an impact through the cycle. Political questions of loyalty and 
types of party political experience (discussed in chapter four) are replicate and 
reproduced so that as the party loses expertise to the state, and new recruits do 
not possess that expertise, the state eventually comes to lose that expertise too. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial party became the public relations arm of the 
state for both the provincial and the national level and, further, at the provincial 
level an appendage of the coalition. 
By comparison, the IFP derived its key strategists and policy advisors from a 
broad pool which included former executive departmental heads in the civil 
service, strategists, and policy specialists who became employed either solely 
within party structures or as MPPs.22 For example, the key party policy advisor 
was drawn from the national department of home affairs.23 Interviews have 
shown that the IFP utilised, as MPPs in the provincial government, those party 
members who were deemed to possess the skills necessary to compete in a 
westernised negotiation setting.24 Hence the new IFP clients in the coalition 
were restricted to minimal input on substantive matters but provided a cultural 
appendage to the party that can justify party policy in the legislature. This has 
no parallel in the ANC and is not a key feature of other African states. 
                                                            
22  One such example is E.T. Vezi who was employed as a civil servant before becom-
ing an MPP. 
23  MPP Olaf Baloyi. Another example is MPP Mziwamandla Mzobe from the Depart-
ment of Welfare. 
24  Interviews revealed that this involves two types of “skills”. These are firstly, techni-
cal expertise such as accounting ability, document drafting and policy analysis 
skills. Secondly, these are communication skills such as debating abilities, ability to 
construct an argument and to speak in public. 
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     • Impact on ideological coherence 
The final outcome of the coalition was the level of impact on the clarity of 
political orientation and ideological coherence. All parties in the provincial 
government aimed to spend the provincial budget by improving the living 
conditions and life chances of the provincial population. Instead of coming to 
rest on a firmer ideological base, like other African states, the ANC abandoned 
the ideological base from the 1980’s and party members could be said to 
support a combination of a form of social democracy and a larger Africanisation 
project although in varied degrees and formats.25 This is in contrast to the IFP 
whose ideological basis consolidated on principles which were evident in its 
founding, and became more coherent. These principles are based upon 
communalism explicated by members as a form of African democracy. 
 
The balance sheet: The IFP-ANC coalition 
Although in the context of the new institutions more tolerance among the 
political elite was evident in KwaZulu-Natal, a suggested by Putnam, this may 
have been through a circulation of elites, and not a change in attitudes as in his 
study. Whereas competition between elites was still evident, it was manifested 
in particular sub-groups excluded from the extra-institutional forums in a cross-
party manner. Conflict processing through institutions, as suggested by Prze-
worski, has in this context, given way to accommodation and compromise. This 
particular elite configuration persisted because through it, elites were able to 
pursue their interests in relative security. It is on this basis that its principles 
may be valued (cf. Burton & Ryu 1997). The manifestation of this has been a 
division of the province into spheres of influence supported by a dominant set 
of political ideas. As a result, politics was centred outside of the formal insti-
tutions of government in extra-institutional forums not open to scrutiny by the 
public, minority parties or sub-groups of elites that do not subscribe to the 
dominant clusters of ideas. In using these forums elites were able to lock away 
each other’s secrets to the detriment of open and accountable government in the 
province. 
This process led to an increasingly centralized, yet divided ANC. Specific-
ally, there was a disruption of organizational ties, a diminishing relationship 
with core constituencies and subordination of the provincial party to national 
government and a burgeoning state machine. In contrast, because of a parallel 
structure of authority and a system of political etiquette, the IFP survived 
through reliance on these very principles that, by all accounts are supposed to 
                                                            
25  The new mobilizing word became the less threatening and charismatic term “trans-
formation” as opposed to “revolution” which is used for internal ANC constituen-
cies. 
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give way. Rather than formal institutions leading to changes in informal be-
haviour, informal behaviour became strengthened within formal political insti-
tutions. The reasons for this anomaly may be located in the historical basis of 
the liberation movements as they existed before 1994. Both the IFP and the 
ANC were nationalist movements. The democratic modernisation project sug-
gests that people are ‘simultaneously pre-social and yet fully made, capable of 
assessing social options from the outside’ (Gellner 1994: 185). Yet in KwaZulu-
Natal the cultural penetration of the state by evolving and changing socio-
cultural norms was the dominant manifestation. Indeed this may be a key 
feature of the state in Africa. Bayart, for example, claims that Africans did not 
simply adopt western political ideologies, but rather combine these with indi-
genous components and in so doing, ‘suggest a real ideological interiority 
which is capable of inspiring institutional or administrative innovations …’ 
(Bayart 1993: 244). What this resulted in in KwaZulu-Natal is in conceptions of 
leadership and status that are not necessarily congruent with the new institutions 
of government. Moreover, the balance that existed between issues and functions 
was controlled through the way in which the IFP and ANC related to one 
another in the province, a factor that new political institutions did not diminish. 
The dominance of three values based elite clusters correlating around similar 
concepts of status and power, and the decline of other value based clusters was 
the culmination of this process. 
The IFP-DA alliance: Syncretic relationships 
In November 2003, the IFP and DA launched a Coalition for Change with 
which the two parties were to contest the 2004 elections in KwaZulu-Natal. 
While the IFP remained in a coalition with the ANC at national level and in 
principle in the province, this was now balanced with an equally important 
alliance with the DA at provincial and local level. 
 
Breakdown of the IFP-ANC coalition 
If the 1999 coalition arrangement was forged as a result of failure by the DP to 
work within the bounds of customary good manners – as defined by the IFP – 
then the breakdown of the coalition reflected a similar mistake on the part of the 
ANC. Three factors contributed to the effective collapse of the coalition. First a 
failure on the part of the ANC to address the powers and functions of traditional 
leadership eroded the basis of trust upon which IFP elites were mandated to 
form and consolidate their alliance with ANC elites. In October 2000, IFP 
National Council stressed that the party, 
‘praises President T.M. Mbeki for the commitment he made to traditional leadership 
... We pray that this time around South Africa may cleanse its image and honour by 
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proving that the word of its Head of State and Head of Government can always be 
relied on’ (Inkatha Freedom Party 2000b). 
In November 2000 the IFP National Council resolved that, 
‘we are extremely concerned that matters flowing from the clash of powers and 
functions of traditional authorities and municipalities have not been resolved before 
the local government elections in spite of promises and assurances that such conflict 
would be eliminated and the powers of traditional authorities protected and restored’ 
(Inkatha Freedom Party 2000a). 
By May 2001, the IFP stressed that despite, 
‘... two years of negotiations and ... the many promises made, the issue of the clash 
of powers and functions of municipalities with those of traditional authorities still 
remain unresolved ... (and) ... unless the issue ... is resolved, it will be impossible to 
carry out the function of councils operating in traditional areas ... (and) ... all 
KwaZulu-Natal municipalities in areas of amaKhosi will have no alternative but to 
stop all their activities’ (Inkatha Freedom Party 2001).  
While the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal claimed that the IFP had reneged upon 
the coalition agreement because a “balance” in executive positions had not been 
forthcoming, IFP elites argued that a redistribution of executive positions was 
only warranted once the question of traditional leadership had been addressed. 
Notwithstanding that both parties felt aggrieved, the IFP beneficiaries of the 
coalition (whether through the promotion of shared values or occupation of 
legislative committee posts) could not claim that the coalition assisted peace 
and development, since both were now at stake. 
If trust was undermined by the first factor, then a second factor – that of 
HIV/AIDS – provided a clash over power and status between the IFP and ANC. 
It also provided evidence to ANC rewardist nationalists that they should govern 
alone and anti-coalitionists in the IFP with a basis upon which to claim that the 
coalition prevented development. While traditional leaders in the IFP National 
Council urged the provision of anti-retrovirals to the most highly infected 
provincial population – that of KwaZulu-Natal – national ANC leaders denied 
that HIV caused AIDS (cf. Good 2002: 130-133). The ANC national cabinet's 
position on the provision of anti-retroviral drugs created a fracture between 
provincial coalition partners caught in the crossfire. The application of the 
Treatment Action Campaign to force national government to provide anti-
retroviral drugs was accompanied by the IFP Premier’s26 signature as party to 
the application. Although essentially a policy division that raised questions 
about national and provincial competencies (between the national ANC and the 
provincial IFP), the ANC provincial leader27 attempted to prevent the Premier 
                                                            
26  IFP Premier Lionel Mtshali. 
27  Sibusiso Ndebele. 
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from forcing the provincial minister of health28 to provide anti-retroviral drugs, 
by openly and publicly challenging the Premier's authority to intervene in the 
Health Ministry. Whereas the coalition had prevented legislative committees 
from performing their institutionally designated watchdog and oversight func-
tions, its confines had not extended to the executive committee and thus not to 
policy making per se. In fact, shielded from the scrutiny of the legislature, the 
coalition had provided autonomy for MECs to act within spheres of influence. 
Now, however, the Premier had exercised his constitutionally designated man-
date29 to override ANC policy that was in direct violation of the directives of 
their national counterparts. 
Sibusiso Ndebele's intervention can be interpreted as a desire for respect 
from his national ANC counterparts (whose perspective he was defending 
through his intervention) and in accordance with his own perception of equal 
status with Mtshali. As ANC provincial leader, Ndebele saw himself as co-con-
venor of cabinet in the coalition which was a position that demanded consulta-
tion by Mtshali and implied parity in functions and authority between the two 
elites. However, the direct and open intervention by Sibusiso Ndebele on the 
basis of status was to clash with the perceptions of status held by the IFP. This 
was, in fact, a triple challenge. Despite the coalition government, the IFP 
perceived that their right to the premiership was based upon their having won 
the election. To directly challenge the prerogative of the premier, to then carry 
out his constitutionally designated functions, was to challenge the legitimacy of 
the party’s position – that it had a public mandate. In effect, the ANC chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the election results that conferred status, through of-
fice, upon the IFP. As if this lack of respect in terms of legitimacy was not bad 
enough, Ndebele challenged Mtshali publicly. The inference was that Ndebele 
expected to be consulted. While the IFP considered this a sign of rudeness by 
the ANC (in the same manner as the DP during the 1999 coalition negotiations) 
this act further challenged the basis of internal canvassing within the IFP. With 
the wishes of traditional leadership vested in Mtshali (as party chairman) 
through the internal parallel system of canvassing, Ndebele (without ancestral 
greatness) had challenged the wisdom of great leaders in the IFP, and done so 
                                                            
28  ANC MEC Zweli Mkhize. 
29  Provision for the Premier’s executive intervention was provided for in the South 
African Constitution which states that ‘the executive authority of a province is 
vested in the Premier’ (RSA 1996a: Section 125) and ‘the Premier of a province 
appoints the members of the Executive Council, assigns their powers and functions 
and may dismiss them’ (RSA 1996a: Section 132) and ‘the Premier … may transfer 
to a member of the Executive Council (of which he is also a member) the admini-
stration of any legislation entrusted to another member; or any power or function 
entrusted … to another member’ (RSA 1996a: Section 137). 
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publicly. Finally, Ndebele removed from the IFP elite the justification for a 
continued coalition. If Mtshali could not carry out the wishes of National 
Council, then the IFP elite could not justify to co-opted elites the benefits of 
coalition. Instead, the IFP appeared to only be able to serve traditional leaders if 
the ANC at national level dictated it. Caught up in the discourse of status and 
power that operated, in the ANC through position holding and in the IFP 
through etiquette, the coalition was beginning to take serious strain. While the 
predominant perceptions of status and leadership held among the political elite 
did not correlate with the new institutions of government they were not con-
ducive to a coalition on this basis either. 
The third factor was legislation to allow elected representatives to cross the 
floor and retain their seats.30 This was the final act of disrespect that effectively 
thrust the IFP into an agreement with another party. Although the legislation 
was put in place primarily to effect change at the municipal level (which had a 
constituency based electoral system), the interventions of a cluster of ANC 
elites in KwaZulu-Natal ensured that its impact was felt provincially within the 
coalition. While the legislation was enacted at national level, ANC provincial 
leader and MEC Sibusiso Ndebele announced that ‘the ANC will take control of 
the province after the floor-crossing legislation comes into effect’ (Mail and 
Guardian, January 2003: 3) and in a political programme adopted by the ANC 
spoke of ‘excitement ... about the possibility of the ANC to lead the KwaZulu-
Natal government’ (African National Congress 2002a). The legislation came 
into effect almost immediately after an IFP-ANC 15-a-side committee meeting 
had produced an agreement in which national ANC members were present. The 
agreement concluded that the IFP would ‘immediately search for avenues (to 
fulfil the original coalition agreement) through the relocation of functions to 
ANC Ministers’ (Inkatha Freedom Party – African National Congress 2002) 
and the ANC would ‘suspend the implementation of the decision taken on the 
KwaZulu-Natal legislature (i.e. its relocation to Pietermaritzburg)’ (Inkatha 
Freedom Party – African National Congress 2002). Although an agreement that 
was intended to address outstanding coalition issues and keep the government 
on track, a group of provincial ANC members simultaneously approached 
                                                            
30  The floor-crossing legislation was initially supported by the DP, but only at the local 
government level where a constituency based ward system of elections is in place. It 
was then introduced by the ANC at the levels of national and provincial government 
in a party-list system of proportional representation. This was primarily because of 
the split of the DA and the desire of political elites in the NNP to join the ANC 
without losing their parliamentary seats, a move which substantially increased the 
ANC majority without an election ever being called. 
240 CHAPTER 6 
 
MPPs in three other parties in order to take control of the province.31 The events 
that then unfolded demand explication in some detail for the impact they had on 
the relationship between elites in the IFP and ANC, the IFP and the DA and the 
national and provincial ANC. 
On coming into effect in June 2002, the floor-crossing legislation encour-
aged five provincial MPPs32 to cross to the ANC. This effectively shifted the 
legislative majority to the ANC.33 The five MPPs were immediately fired and 
replaced by their respective parties and the Cape High Court ruled in favour of 
the suspension of the legislation until it had been considered by the Consti-
tutional Court, a ruling that applied equally to KwaZulu Natal.34 The ruling of 
the Constitutional Court was that ‘the legislation had procedural flaws at 
provincial and national level’ (cf. The Mercury, 3 April 2003; 16 December 
2002) and they had defected prematurely. Despite this, a faction of the 
provincial ANC continued with its bid to control the province. This new bid 
was in the form of a clause providing for retrospective validity that was to be 
included in the revised legislation tabled to go before the National Assembly in 
February 2003. It effectively ensured, if implemented, that the five would be 
reinstated and the ANC could take control of the legislature and executive. 
Three factors effectively brought national level ANC elites in to override their 
provincial counterparts (discussed in later detail in this chapter) and averted the 
complete breakdown of the relationship between the parties. These factors were, 
firstly, IFP President Buthelezi's offer to resign from cabinet (cf. Sunday Times, 
8 December 2002) in national government which, had he done so, would have 
signified the end of the coalition in November 2002. The second factor was the 
dismissal, by Premier Mtshali, of two of the four ANC MECs35 in the provincial 
cabinet to be replaced by two DA MECs36 in December 2002. The third factor 
was the announcement by the Premier of a special sitting in January 2003 in 
                                                            
31  In three personal interviews of IFP MPPs it was alleged by them that the ANC of-
fered to pay their mortgages if they crossed the floor from the IFP to the ANC. 
Although it is impossible to check the accuracy of such allegations, or whether such 
practices occurred in other cases, the allegations are indicative of the atmosphere of 
parliament and the perceived fragility of allegiance. The MPPs wish to remain ano-
nymous, and one has since crossed the floor to the ANC. 
32  These were Mike Tarr and Maurice Mackenzie from the IFP, Belinda Scott and Tim 
Jeebodh from the DA and Sam Nxumalo from the UDM. 
33  The ANC legislative majority depended upon the two-seat alliance with the MF and 
a new alliance with the NNP after their breakaway from the DA, which consisted of 
a further three seats. 
34  The DA also applied for and was granted an interdict to suspend the two MPPs that 
crossed the floor to the ANC. 
35  These were MECs Makhaye and Mabuyakhulu. 
36  These were MECs Burrows and Ngcobo. 
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which he intended to dissolve the legislature and hold an election (KwaZulu-
Natal Legislature 2003). Although in principle the coalition continued to exist, 
it did so from this point onwards only alongside an additional alliance that the 
IFP made with the DA. 
In excluding fractions of elites from the coalition by making their positions 
futile, the coalition had increased the circulation of MPPs. Although citing 
individual reasons of conscience, the two IFP MPPs37 had been sidelined by the 
way in which the coalition was manifested. Neither had supported it, yet had 
directly felt its effects having been removed from their chairperson positions to 
be replaced by "Africanists". In crossing the floor, three38 of the five had traded 
upon the social capital that they shared with the ANC Chief Whip39 and the 
Chief Whip had in turn traded upon that same capital to assure them of their 
future in the ANC. In terms of the other two that crossed, one40 had grown up in 
the ANC civic tradition but was not senior enough to be on the ANC provincial 
list, although an attractive non-white candidate for the former DP. The floor-
crossing window provided him with a means of jumping the queue. The other41 
faced suspension from his party and the opportunity to cross was his only means 
by which to stay in the legislature. The very basis upon which the IFP and ANC 
secured the coalition had served to undermine it. Rewardist nationalists thrust 
into a position of dominance through a coalition based upon Africanism desired 
a greater number of executive positions. While the coalition coalesced around 
questions of leadership and status, there were not enough executive positions to 
satisfy the ambitions of this cluster without taking control of government itself. 
Although those ambitions were thwarted by the national intervention, the ani-
mosity that this created strengthened the position of anti-coalitionists in the IFP. 
 
Building an alliance with the DA 
The exclusion of the DP from any meaningful role in provincial politics, and the 
loss of a potentially significant role in government through a coalition with the 
IFP, had forced the party in 1999 to re-examine the way in which its strategic 
position correlated with its aims and objectives. In addition to the weakening of 
the IFP – ANC coalition which persuaded the IFP to seek an alternative 
combination of partners, two factors provided the opportunity for the party to 
gain a stronger position in the provincial government. 
The first was provided by a cluster of IFP elites that had been either ex-
cluded from a meaningful role in the legislature because of the basis of the 
                                                            
37  MPPs Mike Tarr and Maurice Mackenzie. 
38  MPPs Mike Tarr, Maurice Mackenzie and Belinda Scott. 
39  MPP Ina Cronje. 
40  MPP Tim Jeebodh. 
41  MPP Sam Nxumalo. 
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coalition or had been disillusioned by the failure of ANC etiquette. They re-
quested that the DA ‘tone it down’ (Pers. IFP Interview 68) and begin to realise 
‘that it is not what they say, but rather how they say it’ (Pers. IFP MEC Inter-
view 128). In adopting the etiquette of their party but in sharing the social back-
ground of their formerly DP and now DA counterparts, these IFP MPPs served 
as brokers in the same way that the ANC Chief Whip had persuaded MPPs to 
cross the floor. As the DA began to take a softer tone with the IFP, Buthelezi's 
2002 speech to the National Assembly sent a firm message to both the ANC and 
IFP. Whilst criticising the ANC over HIV-AIDS policy, Buthelezi suggested to 
the IFP that the party should try to listen to the content of the DA criticisms 
even if their style of delivery was abrasive (Buthelezi 2002). As the DA tried to 
please their potential allies, they began to set aside some of the decisions that 
had offended the IFP earlier. These included the issue of the provincial capital 
in which they now no longer demanded should be in Pietermaritzburg and a 
recognition that the ‘Premier Mtshali is incredibly honest and actually wishes to 
do the right thing for the province. He probably does have the best interests of 
the province at heart’ (Pers. DP Interview 75). In acting as brokers, IFP elites 
precipitated a new style of interaction between the IFP and DA. 
The second factor that paved the way for a stronger position in the provincial 
government was a change in the composition of the former DP. In 2000, after 
the IFP-ANC provincial coalition was established, a merger was established 
between the DP and the Federal Alliance42. Following this, an agreement was 
reached between the NNP and DP at the national level. This established the 
Democratic Alliance. In essence, the DP and NNP did not officially merge at 
the provincial and national levels because the electoral system in 2000 pre-
cluded them from forming a new party and retaining their parliamentary seats. 
However, all decisions were made as if they were one party and in December 
2000 they contested the local government elections, under a constituency based 
electoral system, as the new party. In October 2001 this unity agreement col-
lapsed and Marthinus van Schalkwyk43 took the NNP (which was still officially 
a political party at provincial and national level) into an alliance with the ANC. 
In 2003, after the floor-crossing was legalised van Schalkwyk merged the NNP 
into the ANC. 
The outcome in KwaZulu-Natal was different from the fallout at national 
level, where the majority of NNP members had walked across to join the ANC. 
In contrast, in KwaZulu-Natal, in 2003 when the floor crossing was legalised, 
all NNP MPPs remained with the DA and the only person to merge with the 
                                                            
42  This was a political party on the right of the political spectrum under the leadership 
of Dr. Louis Luyt. 
43  Leader of the NNP. 
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ANC had originally come from the DP.44 In KwaZulu-Natal, elites in the DA 
consisted of some from the former NNP who had been representatives at the 
local government level. As consequence, the DA position on certain issues from 
2000 onwards came to identify more closely with those of the IFP. In terms of 
the powers and status of traditional leadership the DP moved from a position in 
which they ‘could not identify with the Amakhosi’ (Pers. DP MEC Interview 
75) to one in which the DA came to ‘acknowledge the status of cultural leader-
ship’ (Pers. DP Interview 9). Shifts on both etiquette and issues by the new DA 
were to provide the IFP with a tempting alternative, which indeed they seized. 
 
The basis of the IFP – DA agreement to establish the Coalition for Change 
In January 2003, IFP Premier Lionel Mtshali convened a special sitting of 
parliament with the explicit intention of dissolving parliament and holding a 
general election. This was as a direct consequence of an attempt by the pro-
vincial ANC to make the floor-crossing legislation retrospective in order to 
keep the seats of the five MPPs that had crossed early, and to snatch power in 
the province without an election. This special sitting of parliament provided the 
first real indicator of the basis of a newfound provincial alliance between the 
IFP and the DA. Rather than focusing upon issues, as in the 1999 elections, the 
two parties focused upon principles. The key principle upon which the IFP and 
DA coalesced was that of the restoration of democracy and a key precondition 
for the DA of an alliance with the IFP. This was to be in the form of the dis-
solving of parliament and holding of an election to test voter’s support for each 
party in the wake of the ANC attempts to make floor crossing retrospective. In 
Mtshali’s speech to the special session he said, 
The calling of an early election became necessary to protect democracy ... The nati-
onal government is considering legislation which will have the obvious and auto-
matic implication of establishing in this Province a new parliamentary majority and 
a new government which will rest not on the will of the people, but on a legislative 
edict ... there is provision in the Constitutional amendment being considered by the 
Portfolio Committee of Justice ... (which is an) ... immoral and effectively retro-
specttive constitutional provision which operates in respect of five pre-identified 
individuals ... Were it not for the political dynamics playing out in this parliament, at 
the institutional level South Africa would be much closer to the consolidation of a 
one-party state ... (The ANC) sought to prevent our democratic right to hold an 
election by resorting to pressures, erroneous readings of the Constitution and by 
raising the spectre of violence...Drawing the equation that any expression of dissent 
leads to violence carries the implication that in order to curtail violence, one must 
silence dissent. It is our duty to continue to preserve the capacity of this parliament 
... to dissent whenever it is necessary ... to ensure ... the promise of democracy’ 
(Mtshali 2003a).  
                                                            
44  MPP Omie Singh. 
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This crisis in democracy, brought about by the provincial ANC’s desire to 
take power through illegitimate means was the final straw that ended the IFP-
ANC coalition. Not only did ANC MPPs attempt to introduce a retrospective 
constitutional clause, but they also attempted to prevent Mtshali from dissolving 
parliament as was his constitutionally designated mandate. This is referred to in 
Mtshali’s statement above and was through two means. The first was by mis-
interpretations of the constitution. The second was by suggesting that to do so, 
and to end the IFP-ANC coalition, would lead to violence in the province. The 
inference by the ANC was that only by ignoring the crisis of democracy and 
allowing the ANC to snatch power could violence be averted. Although un-
likely that violence would occur to anything approaching the extent of the early 
1990s, the fact that this was used as a bargaining tool with the IFP indicates 
how important peace was to the original coalition. 
In choosing democracy as the first principle upon which to base the new 
alliance, Mtshali sent a message to both the provincial ANC and pro-coali-
tionists in the IFP that the ANC’s quest for power through illegitimate means 
was not to be tolerated. If the principle of democracy was to be protected, so 
was good governance, the rule of law and a strong opposition, key themes in 
later speeches and statements to the legislature in 2003 (cf. Mtshali 2003b; 
Inkatha Freedom Party – Democratic Alliance 2003). This new set of principles 
came to dominate provincial speeches and debates up until the election in 2004. 
The principle of democracy was not the only theme however. The DA and 
IFP shared certain organising principles such as federalism, and specific policy 
preferences in the areas of HIV/AIDS, education, crime, unemployment and 
poverty reduction strategies. If the IFP-ANC coalition integrated shared values 
on the nature of leadership and status in a unity project the IFP-DA alliance 
reconciled principles of self-help in a project that was based upon opposition to 
domination. The IFP-DA coalition that came into effect in 2003 existed in both 
the legislative and executive branches. In the executive, the IFP Premier Lionel 
Mtshali fired two ANC MECs and awarded those positions to two DA MPPs. In 
the legislature, the emphasis upon democratic principles and the rule of law 
began to produce some healthy debate for the first time in almost four years. 
 
The response of the ANC to the IFP-DA coalition 
In the few days prior to the special session of parliament the IFP-ANC coalition 
crisis had grown in momentum. The ANC provincial leader was publicly 
preparing himself to be premier and MPPs were openly discussing the cabinet 
positions that they would hold. This culminated in the offer of a withdrawal 
from cabinet at the national level by Buthelezi, the dismissal of two ANC 
MECs by Mtshali and finally the prospect of a provincial election called for in 
the special sitting. The actions of provincial elites – in their insistence of the 
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inclusion of a retrospectivity clause in the floor-crossing legislation, in order to 
snatch power, was reminiscent of the early part of the decade (see chapter two) 
and the late 1980s early 1990s in which provincial ANC elites dictated the 
relationship between the two parties and national strategy within the province. 
These events brought forth a national intervention by the ANC. By 2003 the 
concerns of the ANC at national level had changed. Their concerns were not to 
crush the IFP, but to pacify them so that provincial concerns were not central to 
national strategies. Furthermore, the national ANC were alert to the danger of 
the DA reaching an understanding with a credible black-based political party. In 
order to pacify the IFP, the ANC in the province had to be “provincialised”, 
which meant putting the elite it in its place by overriding its actions and 
publicly restoring the respect towards the IFP that had been broken. To do this, 
the ANC sent Jacob Zuma, by now Deputy-President of South Africa, back to 
the province, the diplomatic emissary of respected Zulu descent who understood 
the bigger picture and who could relate to the IFP’s most central concerns. 
In the negotiations that followed, the provincial ANC was excluded by its 
national counterparts and Zuma negotiated directly with IFP MEC Celani Mte-
twa, an advocate of the IFP-ANC coalition and respected leader of traditional 
descent (Pers. ANC MEC Interview 56; Pers. ANC MPP 87; Pers. IFP MEC 
Interview 74). In so doing, the ANC tried to bestow a sense of restored status 
and respect upon the IFP by showing that Zuma recognised the importance of 
the place of traditional leadership in the IFP (through Mtetwa) and that the con-
cerns of the IFP were of national importance (through Zuma's own role). In 
excluding the provincial ANC from any decision-making in the negotiations, 
Zuma simultaneously indicated that the “disrespectful” ANC provincial leader-
ship would not dictate the IFP-ANC relationship and went some way to over-
coming residual sentiments among the IFP leadership that the ANC had not 
treated them with respect in the past. The open and public letter that followed 
from Zuma to Buthelezi reinforced the mission. It said, 
‘Shenge, 
Following my meeting with the Honourable CJ Mtetwa, Minister of Public Works in 
KwaZulu-Natal, I have been instructed by the President to write to Ndabezitha 
uMntwana waKwaPhindangene45 with regard to the specific part of the crossing of 
the floor bill ... President Mbeki ... agreed ... that the retrospective part will no 
longer form part of the Bill ...  
Yours sincerely,  
Jacob G Zuma  
Deputy President’ (Zuma 2003). 
                                                            
45  A term of utmost respect, referring to the royal status of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 
President of the IFP to whom, of course, the letter is addressed (emphasis added). 
246 CHAPTER 6 
 
The national intervention managed to avert an election, by removing the 
retrospectivity clause, thus restoring the principles of democracy that were to 
guide the province. The two ANC MECs that had been fired by Mtshali were 
awarded, by the IFP, two of their own cabinet posts to accommodate them back 
into the executive. Despite this, the intervention that was intended to show 
respect towards the IFP came too late to avert the new alliance between the IFP 
and the DA. The response of the IFP to Jacob Zuma's letter is indicative of this. 
It said that the IFP has, 
‘experienced many instances in which undertakings made by ANC leaders at the 
highest level were then overturned by ANC structures ... (These include) ... the 
undertaking by former President Mandela to hold joint meetings with me in violence 
torn areas ... frustrated by the Midlands ANC leadership ... the undertaking made by 
President Mbeki to appoint me as Deputy-President ... vetoed by the ANC Kwa-
Zulu-Natal provincial leadership which requested the Premiership ... your undertak-
ing to traditional leaders ... was never implemented ... I would therefore appreciate it 
if you could enable me to reassure our National Council that this time around the 
IFP ... can rely on the ANC's undertaking’ (Buthelezi 2003). 
The recurrent theme of the letter is that of the ANC undermining the status 
of IFP elites despite repeated undertakings that, if followed through, would have 
acknowledged and recognised the IFP as equals and therein conferred respect 
upon them. In this way, the collapse of trust is directly linked to the failure to 
bestow status on the IFP. 
 
The impact of the IFP-DA Coalition for Change 
Effectively quietened by the intervention of the national ANC structures, re-
wardist nationalists in the ANC were forced to satisfy themselves for now with 
the existing party political balance of positions in the province and to work to 
re-establish trust through the 5-a-side committee. Even when the technicalities 
of the floor crossing legislation were resolved and other MPPs crossed to the 
ANC.46 the Premiership remained in IFP hands. Within the provincial ANC, a 
trickle of MPPs exited parliament as a consequence of the actions of their ANC 
colleagues in attempting to snatch power, removing from parliament some of 
the pro-coalitionist MPPs47 disillusioned with the realities of institutional demo-
cracy. 
In the IFP, the two coalitions, in which the party was now a central part, 
spoke to different clusters of elites within the party. These syncretic alliances – 
                                                            
46  Two further MPPs crossed to the ANC on 24 March 2003. They were DA MPP 
Omie Singh and IFP MEC Gabriel Ndabandaba. 
47  One such example is ANC MPP Nhanhla Ngidi, a former exile comrade who left 
parliament and took up a position as a Commissioner in the South African Police 
Services. 
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one based upon values and conceptions of leadership and the other based on 
organisational and policy principles – were mirrored by syncretic committees. 
While the IFP 5-a-side committee was reformulated to include a stronger Afri-
can Consciousness flavour, the permanent standing committee with the DA in-
cluded MPPs that had formerly been excluded from the committees that 
supported the IFP-ANC coalition. Predominantly pragmatic political pluralists, 
who had been placed to enforce the position of the dominant faction, now dis-
cussed policy preferences and democratic principles. 
If the hegemony of the dominant faction had waned, it now faced usurpation. 
Anchored across the legislature, through its tabling in parliament, the IFP-ANC 
coalition existed in little more than name only and through the efforts of the IFP 
5-a-side committee which hung on to the possibility of resurrecting the unity 
project. Less than 6 months after the Special Sitting of Parliament, IFP strategy 
indicated a change in the impact of the 5-a-side committees in parliament which 
demonstrated the influence of the new elite cluster. In March 2003, IFP strategy 
dictated, 
‘...our committees on transport and health need to be hard-hitting generally. They 
must leave no stone unturned to weaken the image of Ndebele and Mkhize ... the 
role of the Chairperson in particular, is pivotal in illuminating and exploiting the 
many weaknesses and deficiencies of Minister's Ndebele and Mkhize …’ (Inkatha 
Freedom Party 2003b: 5). 
While the IFP cluster that coalesced with clusters of ANC elites sought to 
cloak the inadequacies in governance, the clusters of elites that coalesced in the 
IFP-DA alliance sought to expose them. In May 2003, the provincial organising 
committee of the IFP produced an exit strategy (Inkatha Freedom Party 2003a) 
to prepare the party for negative publicity they were certain to receive on 
withdrawing from the IFP-ANC Coalition to fight the elections in an IFP-DA 
alliance. If elites in the IFP-ANC committees had coalesced around unity and 
accommodation, they now harmonised around competition. 
Conclusion 
In working within a new institutional space, the political elite gradually came to 
abandon a duality of political practice and focus their energies within the new 
framework of legislative politics. However, the second election became a 
catalyst for the interaction of elites based upon their shared value systems and 
the hegemony of elite clusters that coalesced around africanism. As the collapse 
of the IFP – ANC coalition demonstrated, however, the relative dominance of 
elite clusters was in turn bounded by the discourse of political etiquette that 
parties adopted. While “respect” in the ANC camp led to more direct attempts 
to control the legislature, this clashed with the IFP's discourse which ultimately 
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led to their withdrawal. What is most certainly apparent is that the clash over 
“respect”, sometimes manifested through positions and wealth, but mostly 
through status and etiquette, came to define the delicate balance between dif-
ferent forms of alliance and the place of elite sub-groups within them. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
7 
The development of 
institutional capacity 
‘Public policy does not reflect demands of the people so much as it reflects the 
interests and values of elites. Changes and innovations in public policies come about 
when elites redefine their own values’ (Dye & Zeigler 1997: 156). 
 ‘So we live in a traffic jam, … characterized by low governing capability, to wit, by 
low resistance to demands and low capability to take and carry through decisions’ 
(Sartori 1997: 172). 
‘The first condition (of democracy) is that the human material of politics – the 
people who man the party machines, are elected to serve in parliament, rise to 
cabinet office – should be of sufficiently high quality’ (Schumpeter 1997: 82).  
Political power in parliament is exercised fundamentally in the formulation of 
public policy, framed by the mandates that define executive and legislative 
authority and limited by the relative strengths of political parties. Any particular 
outcome in which the exercise of political power is manifest is ultimately de-
pendent upon the institutional capacity of political elites. Classical elite theorists 
concerned with the capacity of political elites take one of two approaches. 
Firstly, Mosca posits that the primary concern of any ruling elite is to perpetuate 
itself in power. In this framework elites are able to exploit the system to 
maintain their positions of privilege. Within this paradigm, elites do not need to 
be extraordinary people because the bureaucratization of the system of govern-
ment provides the means by which elites carry out their roles (Mosca 1939: 
chapters 2, 12 and 15). In contrast, Pareto distinguishes between a nominal elite 
group and an upper stratum of that elite group which possesses particular 
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qualities that best allow for effective rule. It is members of this grouping that 
have made the best use of their attributes and capacity to be where they are. 
While agreeing with Mosca that the elite often rule in their own best interests, 
Pareto contends that the elite strata use a variety of methods to perpetuate that 
power, from coercion or force to negotiations and agreements (Pareto 1997). 
In this study, the definitions of institutional capacity that have been em-
ployed draw upon classical elite theory. Institutional capacity is defined here as 
a twofold concept.1 In the first place it refers to the ability of political elites to 
comprehend the political and parliamentary environment in which they are 
located – including their own role within it – so that the possibility for them to 
exercise power to the benefit of the provincial population is present. In this 
case, the institutional capacity of political elites is influenced by their previous 
political experience, educational levels, occupational types and other forms of 
institutional abilities. However, the possibility of exercising political power 
further depends on the support systems provided within parliament and the 
availability of appropriate institutional and policy training to enable MPPs to 
choose to participate effectively. Hence, institutional capacity is also defined as 
the active power of political elites to use their knowledge of these environments 
and the political position that they possess in order to influence the policy 
agenda and its outcomes. As such, the level of active participation of elites, 
types of issues that elites prioritise and their ability to carry through a policy 
agenda is further bounded by their ability to navigate the political environment. 
This environment includes the political context in which parties operate and the 
policy agendas that prevail. 
In developing countries ‘legislatures have yet to prove themselves as impor-
tant institutions’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 82). With the exception of former commu-
nist states, democratising states have opted for a reformed presidential system 
which ‘in Latin America … has allowed for a considerable shift of power in 
favour of the president at the expense of the legislature’ (ibid.: 81). In compari-
son, in Africa, ‘African legislatures remain weak in relation to the executive’ 
(Barkan et al. 2004: 211).2  
In this chapter the developing institutional capacity of political elites is inter-
rogated for its relevance to political elite formation. Firstly, the institutional 
factors that limit the capacity of the political elite are explored. Secondly, the 
level of understanding of the roles that MPPs undertake are evaluated and their 
levels of participation within these roles are investigated. Finally, the types of 
                                                            
1  For heuristic purposes both frameworks have been employed simultaneously. 
2  Barkan et al. claim that literature on emerging legislatures in developing countries is 
surprisingly thin. They provide the example of Legislative Studies Quarterly in the 
years 1995-2002 in which none of the articles examined African legislatures (cf. 
Barkan et al. 2004: 212, footnote 1).  
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issues that are prioritized within the legislature are explored as a consequence of 
the institutional capacity of political elites.  
The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to a number of factors which 
contribute to the dynamics of provincial politics. Firstly, there has been the 
development of a small cross-party technocratic sub-group in the legislature 
whose longevity is guaranteed as a consequence of its relative dominance in 
capacity. Moreover, as parliamentary business and policy-making is dominated 
by this sub-group, its members are offered an additional guarantee in the 
legislature across party lines, a factor that has the potential to increase fluidity 
of policy-making not only across parties but also within them. Secondly, the 
relative incapacity of a larger sub-group of legislature members has resulted in 
particular issues dominating the provincial agenda. As the elite fail to ade-
quately address public policy concerns, their own attention has turned to poli-
tical issues rather than public policy issues – matters that are not the crucial 
business of the parliament. The result of this is twofold. Firstly, there is security 
for political elites that lack capacity as the provincial agenda comes to mirror 
their own incapacity. Secondly, those with capacity are in demand by all parties 
and can virtually choose their political home. The longevity in the legislature of 
different groupings of the political elite is thus in part a product of their differ-
ent levels of institutional capacity. 
Institutional factors that define the institutional capacity 
of political elites 
The institutional capacity of political elites is defined by three institutional 
factors. They are institutional powers and functions, operational style and insti-
tutional provisions. 
 
Institutional powers and functions 
The legislative authority of the province is vested in its provincial legislature, 
limited by the national Constitution. The Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-
Natal has the power to pass legislation on any policy areas listed as Schedule 4 
or Schedule 5 in the constitution and to pass its own constitution for the 
province. Under the constitution, the key role of a provincial legislature is to 
maintain accountability and oversight of the provincial executive (Republic of 
South Africa 1996a: chaper 6, point 11). In addition, a provincial legislature has 
the power to make rules to order its own business, procedures and proceedings 
(republic of South Africa 1996a: chapter 6, point 11). The executive authority 
of the province is vested in the Premier and the MECs to prepare, initiate and to 
implement legislation and to develop and implement policy (Republic of South 
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Africa 1996a: chapter 6, point 125). The provincial executive is responsible and 
accountable to the provincial legislature. 
 
Operational style 
For all MPPs the provincial legislature was a new political arena. However 
some had previous experience of a formal legislative assembly while many – 
especially in the ANC – had not. Sat facing their previous political (and in some 
cases personal) enemies – now transformed in theory at least into collegial 
opponents – their role had changed from political mobilization, extra-legal 
action, and the construction of broad ideological and policy statements into real, 
substantive legislative agendas with tangible developmental outcomes. Al-
though interviews had shown that at least 23 IFP MPPs had experienced the 
KLA, this new institutional arena was very different to it. For the first time 
there was an opposition with a very different political culture. The style of 
meetings differed and there were formal legislative systems – such as the com-
mittee system – through which politics operated. The parliamentary chamber in 
Pietermaritzburg, designed along Westminster lines was far removed from the 
circular chamber in Ulundi that had encouraged consensus, in what was in any 
case a one-party mini-state, rather than adversarial politics. 
The system through which a parliament operates was also far removed from 
the practice of politics within political parties. The methods of mobilizing 
supporters, political recruitment and issue identification differ greatly from the 
work of a legislature. In parliament the translation of policy agendas into prac-
tice within a structured setting of rules and procedures involves grappling with 
many new skills. Firstly, MPPs must read and understand voluminous technical 
documents, committee agendas and specialized reports and assessments. Most 
documentation of this type is written in English which is the second language of 
the majority of MPPs. In their study of Senegal, Benin, Ghana and Kenya, 
Barkan etc al found that the capacity of these legislatures was limited by MPPs 
who were not fluent in the language used. Such MPPs are effectively ‘second-
class members. Their presence limits the capacity of the legislature to perform 
its policymaking and oversight functions’ (Barkan et al. 2004: 240).Once par-
liamentary reports have been read and understood, MPPs have to assess them in 
relation to their party political position and address them in a competitive 
setting. Secondly, MPPs interact frequently with members of the public service 
– from civil servants called before committees to deliver executive and tech-
nical reports to police commissioners explaining progress on particular investi-
gations to minute takers recording their meetings. In order to carry out their 
responsibilities, MPPs must interact effectively with a whole range of such 
individuals that possess technical and specialized knowledge on a wide range of 
public policy matters. They must digest and evaluate reports quickly in order to 
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be able to ask questions and fulfil their oversight role as full participants within 
the committee system (Pers. IFP Interview 123). Moreover, many public serv-
ants have wide experience as governmental officials and MPPs must be know-
ledgeable to ensure that the intent and purpose of what they enact is carried 
through (Pers. IFP Interview 51). Thus MPPs must be sufficiently confident to 
take control of the public policy decisions within the political environment. 
Thirdly, MPPs must be able to manage a style of debate and discussion that 
differs from street politics, that is governed by time limits, discipline and policy 
agendas. All of these factors take place within a framework that is structured by 
rules and procedures that MPPs did not themselves define. 
 
Institutional provisions 
MPPs have only limited support in equipping themselves to carry out this 
formidable array of tasks. In terms of administrative resources, each centre – 
Pietermaritzburg and Ulundi – has a small library for use by parliamentarians 
which houses a small range of parliamentary documents and press clippings. 
Documentation from the committees, including the minutes of the portfolio and 
standing committees, is not housed in any systematic system of records. MPPs 
must keep their own records and no provision exists for an MP to look at 
records from a committee of which he or she is not currently a member. Al-
though each committee is allocated a secretary to type up agendas and minutes, 
in 2003 (almost 10 years after the first election) not all secretaries had com-
puters, office furniture was limited and many administrative support staff did 
not have a desk or chair at which to sit. Computers and computer training were 
promised through European Union funding, but the computers themselves have 
not materialised.  
At the Pietermaritzburg centre there are too few offices for MPPs. Conse-
quently, some MPPs are housed in rented offices outside the parliamentary 
complex and others make use of a communal area in the party offices. In 2001, 
many MPPs did not have a computer (approximately 30% did not know how to 
use one) and none were provided with secretarial assistance by parliament. In 
1994, a typing pool was housed in the administrative building in the parlia-
mentary complex. By 2001, this was phased out, for no justifiable reason, and 
MPPs without executive functions were forced to employ their own assistants. 
Those MPPs who do have administrative or secretarial assistance fund it them-
selves or have it provided for them by their party. Although MECs are provided 
with a range of technical and legal experts in their departments and Heads of 
Committees are provided with policy technical expertise upon request, little is 
provided to MPPs by way of such support. Instead, they often rely on librarians 
to locate substantive information. In addition, resources are also in short supply 
for the inspection of developmental programmes over which they have an over-
254 CHAPTER 7 
 
sight role. For example, in order to properly evaluate some of these projects in 
the rural areas, MPPs need to visit the location where the project is being 
carried out. Yet according to one interviewee, MPPs have access to ‘sedans, 
chicos and corollas, but they can only access local areas. There are no 4 x 4s for 
the project visits’ (Pers. Interview 140). During the ten year period of this study, 
there were no plans to upgrade the vehicles to accommodate the needs of the 
legislative committees (Pers. Interview 140). 
Parliamentary training in terms of addressing the needs of MPPs and admini-
strative staff has been limited. Administrative staff receive training in broad 
areas – such as human resources, labour relations and staff supervision but not 
in specialised areas and roles related to the purposes of the legislature. As for 
MPPs there is scant training in the formal institutional procedures and the roles 
of the specific positions that they hold. As one interviewee put it, 
‘there are too few service providers for this kind of training. Individuals are not pro-
vided with training on the workings of parliament … Where do you send someone to 
understand the rules and the role of the Speaker? What about the parliamentary 
rules?’ (Pers. Interview 140). 
This type of procedural training is essentially on an ad hoc basis with 
individual MPPs showing newer members the ropes. As for substantive training 
in policy areas, workshops do sometimes take place. Interviews, however, re-
vealed that these often follow one of three formats. Firstly, they are sessions on 
national agendas whereby national level representatives simply report the party 
position on a particular policy area, the expectation being that provincial MPPs 
will follow this line. Secondly, there are meetings of the Intergovernmental 
Relations Committee of Ministers and Members of Provincial Councils 
(MINMEC) in which provincial MPPs meet their national counterparts and 
matters of concurrent national and provincial policy are discussed. The Inter-
governmental Relations Committee of Ministers and Members of Provincial 
Councils (MINMEC) gives effect to the principles of cooperative government 
and the intergovernmental nature of the South African policy environment. The 
national minister for a policy sector and the nine corresponding provincial 
MECs meet on a regular basis in this sectoral forum to discuss policy and 
legislation within that particular policy sector. Thirdly, there are sessions 
organized by a particular provincial ministry in which departmental officials 
simply explain policy to members of the relevant portfolio committee. In all 
three cases, the workshops tend to provide information only, rather than be 
sessions where substantive policy is discussed and engaged upon.  
The lack of resources for parliamentarians in KwaZulu-Natal is a common 
feature in other post-colonial, democratising and developing states. Legisla-
tures, 
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‘lack resources for in-house work on policies. Archives are poorly organised, if they 
exist at all. Elected representatives lack their own staff. Research capacity is most 
likely non-existent. This limits the role that the legislature can play in shaping poli-
cy’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 92). 
Resources do matter – at the provincial and local levels as well as at the 
national level. The South African national parliament is resourced much more 
extensively than many other African states and South African provincial parlia-
ments. The national parliament, for example, ‘has an extensive and qualified 
staff to facilitate the operations’ (Barkan 2009: 221). Legislative members ‘are 
provided with a personal assistant, as well as a private office with internet 
access’ (ibid.: 220). This is in striking contrast to resources provided to the 
KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature. The reasons for this can be found in the 
preference by the governing party for a centralised rather than federal system of 
government (where there are no challenges to the hegemony of the ANC at the 
national level) and the belief in some quarters that provinces should not exist. 
Given the operational style of the provincial parliament and the limitations 
of institutional resources and training provided to MPPs there are only two 
resources which MPPs can fall back on to enable them to carry out their tasks. 
Firstly, the party rather than the legislature is the arena through which parlia-
mentary support is provided to MPPs. In KwaZulu-Natal this is either through 
the party caucus meetings before each legislative sitting whereby the party 
position on substantive matters is deliberated or by one-on-one training by one 
caucus member to another on an ad hoc basis. Secondly, for the majority of 
MPPs their prior skills and experiences are what they use to define their own 
capacity within parliament. These either serve as enabling or disabling factors 
in the parliamentary setting. 
The provincial legislature and the committee system 
The Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal functions through the Parliamen-
tary Committee System, with the relative strength of party representation on 
each committee determined by the number of seats each party holds in the 
legislature. Legislative sessions occur less than twelve times per year and some-
times as few as three times per year. Each session lasts for a few days in 
duration with the actual work of the legislature taking place in portfolio and 
standing committees. The relative balance of seats held by the IFP and ANC in 
the legislature over the period covered by this study meant that, unlike the 
committee system in other provincial legislatures, the committee system in 
KwaZulu-Natal has had the potential to be a true watchdog of the executive 
branch of government as no single party dominated a committee. That potential 
256 CHAPTER 7 
 
however required that MPPs to fully understand their roles and functions in 
committees and to participate effectively in them. 
 
Comprehension of roles and functions 
There is a clear correlation between the perceptions of the impact that political 
elites have in their committee functions and whether or not they serve in a 
majority or minority party. The majority of IFP and ANC MPPs see themselves 
and the system as performing well. Conversely, most DA and other minority 
party members see the committee system in parliament as ineffective. For 
example, as one minority MPP stated, ‘decisions are ministerial decisions and 
power is through the party structure to the cabinet. There is no monitoring role 
in committee. Those skills are basically non-existent’ (Pers. DA Interview 09). 
Indeed, interviews have revealed that part of the problem lies in the way in 
which MPPs define their powers and functions within the parliamentary com-
mittee system. According to the national constitution a provincial legislature 
may ‘consider, pass, amend or reject any Bill before the legislature … ensure 
that all provincial executive organs within the state are accountable to it … 
(and) … maintain oversight of the exercise of provincial executive authority in 
the province, including the implementation of legislation …’ (Republic of South 
Africa 1996a: chapter 6, point 114). In addition to these powers and functions, 
the portfolio committees of a provincial legislature may ‘summon any person to 
appear before it to give evidence … or to produce documents … compel any 
person to comply with a summons … receive petitions, representations or sub-
missions from any … persons or institutions’ (Republic of South Africa 1996a: 
chapter 6, point 115). Clearly the mandate of the portfolio committees is suf-
ficiently wide to enable them to act with real power. 
According to Barkan capacitated committees comprise the following 
attributes. They are chaired by a knowledgable and motivated MP, there is a 
critical mass of members who share an interest in the committee’s work, the 
committee has a small knowledgeable staff to facilitate it’s work, possesses a 
budget, has an assigned meeting place and is respected by other legislators 
(Barkan 2009: 217). However, despite the committees in KwaZulu-Natal pos-
sessing some of these attributes and clear constitutional provisions providing 
extensive powers and functions, there is a general lack of understanding among 
MPPs of the roles that they are to fulfil in committee. Approximately half of 
MPPs do not define their roles as committee members as laid down in their 
constitutional mandate. There is however, a much higher proportion of minority 
party MPPs who see their role as one of monitoring, scrutiny and oversight than 
MPPs in the IFP and ANC. The following quotation by an IFP Chairperson of a 
committee is a typical example, which demonstrates a lack of understanding of 
the role and function of the committee. He said, 
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‘I feel that if the Minister is ANC then the Chairman should be ANC and vice versa. 
This would enable us to do something good’ (Pers. IFP Interview 60). 
In this case, the Chairperson demonstrated no understanding of the need for 
any separation of power, scrutiny and oversight of departmental work. Instead, 
he understood his role as to foster consensus between the committee and the 
department. Effectively he saw provincial institutions in terms of power shar-
ing. Parties should have their own portfolios and could expect cooperation and 
even deference in committee in “their own” given policy area. In many ways 
this is reflective of the way in which the ANC and IFP carved up the province 
in the 1980s and 1990s seeking spheres of influence in which there was recog-
nised supremacy. It would appear that these sentiments have carried over into 
the new political institutions. 
Other MPPs have also defined their roles as primarily maintaining cordial 
relationships with the respective department. For example, an ANC Chairperson 
of a committee said, 
‘I am fortunate … the committee and the department have good relations including 
with the Minister3. He comes to the committee and briefs us on all that they are 
doing’ (Pers. ANC Interview 133). 
In this case, the role was understood to be that of being informed of policy, 
in this case by an IFP MEC, rather than actively informing policy through 
scrutiny and oversight. In both cited cases, a passive role that maintained good 
relationships was valued over any more robust conception of the committee sys-
tem. 
Indeed, most MPPs were primarily concerned with consensus-building in 
committee. The key reason for this was the way in which political etiquette had 
become a key priority in their practical responsibilities. MPPs described their 
successes as committee members in terms of ‘ensuring warm cooperation’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 106), ‘good relations with the Minister’ (Pers. ANC Inter-
view 113), ‘dignified meetings’ (Pers. IFP Interview 100), ‘decision-making by 
consensus’ (Pers. DP Interview 79) and ‘where we come together as one’(Pers. 
ANC Interview 71). As such MPPs did not see themselves as initiators of 
change and did not focus on political action. 
MPPs further indicated that they themselves did not feel that they had the 
capacity to effectively carry out their committee roles. Frequently, in interviews 
that took place during the second parliamentary term, MPPs referred to work-
shops that they were participating in to gain clarity on their roles and respon-
sibilities. The following quotation is typical:  
                                                            
3  Heads of provincial departments are habitually referred to as Ministers although this 
is incorrect. Their correct title is MEC as in Member of the Executive Council. 
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‘We are having a workshop … together with the Department of Transport to get a 
better understanding, to eliminate misunderstandings and altercations … Some 
members did not understand their different roles … There is not conflict over policy. 
The department and the committee agree on the needs to be met. The conflict is over 
role’ (Pers. ANC Interview 106). 
In this case, the Department of Transport had organized a workshop to assist 
the very committee that was supposed to perform oversight and scrutiny of 
transport policy produced by it. And in the words of an MEC, 
‘I just need to show the committee respect without diversion from my main work. 
The committee has no technical skills … In monitoring, the question is not just a 
matter of numbers, it is whether good service was provided with the money. They 
don’t look at these things. I am too honest. I have held two workshops to empower 
them. I point out things to them. They should discover those things on their own’ 
(Pers. ANC MEC Interview 134). 
Lack of understanding by MPPs of the roles and functions that they are sup-
posed to perform in committee is not the only problem that MPPs face, although 
it does somewhat compound other capacity problems, such as effective partici-
pation. 
 
Participation in the committee system 
The level of participation in parliamentary committees is poor. Less than 50% 
of MPPs effectively and actively participate in the work of the parliamentary 
committees to which they have been assigned. In many committees, MPPs 
arrive carrying the documents that they were to scrutinize for the meeting in 
unopened envelopes, less than 50% speak during a meeting, agendas are vague 
and general and the level of debate and discussion that ensues is lacking. In the 
first parliamentary term there were problems with attendance at committee 
meetings. Although attendance improved in the second parliamentary term there 
is a limited grasp of key issues among MPPs. As one MPP argued, ‘there is a 
tendency to debate from a position of ignorance’ (Pers. DP Interview 79) and 
according to the Head of Committees, 
‘Many are coming into the committee not knowing much and when they go out they 
are still blank’ (Pers. Interview 140). 
Limited participation in committee can be explained by a number of factors. 
Firstly, for many MPPs parliament is an intimidating environment that, in itself, 
contributes to a general malaise. In this environment MPPs are limited by what 
they, as individuals, can do and the debates and discussions are in turn framed 
by their capacity. According to one interviewee, ‘it is a brave MP to say “I need 
training” … They are lacking information and they do not ask questions. They 
are afraid to ask’ (Pers. Interview 140). In this environment the channels of 
communication are now written, and for many the official language is not their 
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first language of communication. In committee, the majority of MPPs are still 
digesting and then converting to the language of debate before they can res-
pond. As well as new rules, procedures and politicking, the pressure upon MPPs 
to perform is immense. Reporters may be present at committee meetings as are 
scholars wishing to analyse debates and discussions (Pers. Obs). In addition, 
MPPs face pressure from their respective political parties to compete with 
opposition MPPs, to defend the position of their own party while simultane-
ously promoting development in the province for the poorest of the poor.  
These factors are also compounded by the nature of committee work. The 
majority of MPPs attend at least three different committees, some of which have 
sub-committees, and manage a workload for each. According to one MPP, ‘it 
takes time to get to grips with the work. It takes three years to learn about all the 
people in the parliament, who is doing what and who to contact. I often travel 
800 kilometres to find out that a committee meeting has been cancelled. Some-
times not working well is a result of sheer overload’ (Pers. IFP Interview 123). 
For each portfolio committee, MPPs should read a wealth of voluminous tech-
nical documentation. For MPPs struggling with expression this is particularly 
difficult. Moreover, the nature of the policy environment means that without the 
ability to develop technical policy skills many MPPs simply cannot perform 
their duties effectively. According to one interviewee, 
‘… Conservation is specialized. You have to be exposed to the issues. They are 
talking about technical issues like the way you cut trees and why. Many MPs cannot 
manage … Then there is finance. Most MPs are not exposed to accountancy and 
cannot participate without such abilities … In health there is medical language and 
medical issues’ (Pers. IFP Interview 43). 
Thus, not only do most MPPs struggle without technical capacity but, in this 
context, deal with too many diverse policy areas to ever really master one, 
which further compounds the development of institutional capacity in the legis-
lature over time. 
Linked to this is the factor that recruitment and selection on to parliamentary 
committees often fails to take into account the nature of the work of that 
committee. In all parties MPPs have the ability to submit their preference of the 
policy areas in which they are to specialize. However, frequently MPPs are 
placed on a committee because of their perceived proximity to a policy area 
rather than because of their ability to perform effectively. For example, one 
MPP cast his membership of one committee in terms of his lineage. He is the 
grandson of King Solomon. He said, 
‘I am a member of the Household Committee which deals with the budget of the 
king. I am a member because of my background with the royal family (Pers. NNP 
Interview 24). 
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And as the chairperson of committees stated, 
‘If we look at the health committee the defining feature for selection is whether the 
member has been a nurse. This is seen as the most important factor by the parties’ 
(Pers. Interview 140). 
Instead of the committees consisting of individuals with a variety of per-
spectives who can monitor effectively, there is the tendency for committees to 
consist of groups of the same types of people. For example, all the accountants 
serve on the Portfolio Committee on Public Accounts, all the nurses serve on 
the Portfolio Committee for Health, all the strong-arm men in parliament serve 
on the Portfolio Committee for Safety and Security. Hence, the level of active 
participation and effective monitoring on these committees by MPPs are 
bounded by their experiences and particular experiential capacity of these policy 
areas.  
Another factor that limits active participation is the way in which the role of 
the Chairperson is perceived by the political elite. Frequently, MPPs discussed 
the success or failure of the committee as a direct result of the Chairperson’s 
efficiency, strength and personality. For example, according to one MPP, ‘some 
chairpersons are totally lost and on some committees you get nowhere very fast 
… where what should be a one hour discussion becomes three hours and people 
are talking over each other and returning to items that have already been 
discussed and decided on’ (Pers. NNP Interview 37). As another contended, ‘so 
much depends upon the chairperson … if he knows what he is doing … if he 
has prepared himself. One used to come to a committee I was on without even 
an agenda’ (Pers. NNP Interview 25). Finally, ‘the committees function accord-
ing to the chairperson. They operate within a certain framework but so much 
depends on the chairperson … whether they get information … The health com-
mittee has a really super person who is head, but is not strong enough because 
nothing ever gets uncovered in health’ (Pers. Interview 31). Hence, rather than 
taking a proactive role as individuals, many MPPs see their role as essentially 
reactive in a process whereby the chairperson sets an agenda, raises issues and 
provides information. In some cases, rather than contributing to a better func-
tioning committee, committee members have by-passed the chairperson alto-
gether. For example, one MPP claimed, 
‘I conducted a naughty but essential act. I presented a paper to the committee and I 
moved into a higher mode. I talked about integrated rural development and it simply 
went right over their heads. Now I talk only to Minister (X) and the Department and 
I say to him, “will you emphasise this area etc when you come to the committee?”’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 43). 
In this case, the committee was almost a vacant space. The MPP concerned 
had established a chain of communication between himself and the MEC for 
  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 261 
   
Agriculture where they worked in tandem and undermined any potential moni-
toring role that the committee may have developed. 
Research that focuses upon the perceptions of the effectiveness of the com-
mittee systems in Kenya, Malawi, Namibia and Mozambique reports that parlia-
mentarians perceive that they are improving as a consequence of the educational 
and institutional capacity of committee chairs and members (Barkan et al. 2010: 
21) This is in contrast to my findings KwaZulu-Natal where capacity has 
declined in the ANC and increased in the IFP. This also paints a bleak picture of 
the South African national parliament which is overwhelmingly dominated by 
the ANC and as such, ‘the overall membership of most committees is mediocre 
given the presence of many MPs of the ruling party whose educational back-
grounds are significantly lower than the chairs of the committees to which they 
belong’ (ibid.). Hence, the one-party national dominance limits institutional 
capacity in the national parliament even more than in the two provinces (Kwa-
Zulu-Natal and the Western Cape) where there is competition from other parties 
(the IFP and DP) who have recruited well educated MPPs. Yet, where some 
capacity as demonstrated in educational levels does exist alongside competition 
with the ANC, these provincial parliaments remain less resourced than the 
national parliament. 
A further factor that limited effective participation was the elite coalition 
between the IFP and the ANC (see Chapter 6). The coalition manifested in the 
active prevention of scrutiny of the executive branch of government. As one 
MPP said, describing her interaction through the Portfolio Committee on Health 
with the MEC for Health, 
‘If I asked Zweli anything, such as on abortion – “How many? Did they get counsel-
ling? How was it funded?”etc etc, the chairperson would cut me down and it would 
not go forward. There was that incident of rodents in King Edward Hospital. He said 
I was sensationalizing. He would say, “you will see when you get the report” but a 
report would never materialise. There was that time during the cholera outbreak 
when the chairperson began, “we need to compliment the Minister on containing the 
cholera outbreak …” It was ridiculous. We would begin a line of questioning and 
then they would just shut us up’ (Pers. IFP Interview 131). 
In this case the ANC MEC was protected by the IFP chairperson who closed 
down questioning by the IFP MPP. In terms of institutional capacity, the cones-
quences of this were threefold. Firstly, MPPs were already failing to fulfil their 
oversight and monitoring roles effectively but the way in which the coalition 
manifested itself in committees further silenced committee members who were 
already struggling with their role. As one MPP stated, ‘the fish that doesn’t 
open its mouth doesn’t get caught’ (Pers. ANC Interview 71). Intrinsically 
linked to this was the second consequence. That is, MPPs were even more 
confused about their parliamentary role as the party hierarchy to maintain the 
262 CHAPTER 7 
 
coalition was translated into the legislature. Within parliamentary committees, 
MPPs that had operated on a level playing field with one another now res-
ponded to party seniority to frame their discourse. Chairpersons took their cue, 
not from the committee members but from the party hierarchy. Committee 
members responded not to the chairpersons, but to their senior party members 
so that a system of leaders and followers developed within committees to com-
pound further the problems of their understanding and participation. The third 
consequence for institutional capacity of the manifestation of the coalition was 
that it increased the potential for fluidity of the elite. This was for two reasons. 
Firstly, MPPs from the two main parties now actively worked together to 
maintain the coalition by preventing their own oversight of the executive. In so 
doing, they became tied together in new relationships with a common goal, in 
some cases making the opposition seem less threatening than before. Secondly, 
for those with technical and policy skills the coalition provided a way in which 
they could showcase these skills. Most continued with their scrutiny and over-
sight functions in a non-political manner, framed in developmental terms, which 
made them a good catch for parties looking for new members to cross the floor. 
Although the collapse of the IFP-ANC coalition substantially reversed some of 
the consequences of the coalition, it took time in order for the effects of that to 
be felt in committee as MPPs had become familiar with the new methods in 
which they were now to operate. It did not, however, reverse the fluidity of the 
political elite who possessed technical policy skills. 
The active and effective participation of MPPs is further compromised by a 
sense that the overwhelming majority of MPPs are intimidated by the confi-
dence and superior expertise of a technocratic group of political elites – those 
that can understand the documents, those that have technical and policy skills, 
those that can debate and promote and defend an argument, and those that do so 
confidently. One is reminded of Weber’s warning that ‘the growing complexity 
of the administrative tasks and the sheer expansion of scope increasingly result 
in the technical superiority of those who have had training and experience’ 
(Weber 1986: 951). Indeed, in the provincial legislature a small but influential 
segment of the political elite dominates the core work of the legislative com-
mittees. According to the one interviewee, 
‘Because some MPs are advantaged they get to be a Mr. Know it All. They get allo-
cated to too many committees. For example, look at Scott, Tarr and Cronje. They are 
almost everywhere. They are on the executive board, rules, finance, budget, public 
accounts, constitutional affairs … These people become too big. If they move on, 
the party has a problem. They will grind to a halt. It is the same for the other parties’ 
(Pers. Interview 140). 
In essence, two groups of political elites have developed. They consist of 
those who have parliamentary capacity and those that do not. Those with skills 
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dominate the legislative business and can choose any political home that they 
desire, substantially increasing the potential fluidity in the legislature. Those 
that do not have such capacity rarely speak and focus upon issues that are not 
central to the current parliamentary policy and developmental debates, such as 
the question over where the provincial capital should be located (see later 
discussion). 
Part of the problem that the second category of the political elite face is that 
their past social and political experiences have not adequately prepared them for 
life as a parliamentarian. According to one interviewee, 
‘Most members are in parliament because of their involvement in parties … Some 
members lack qualifications. Even reports analysis takes a level of qualification. 
Even those that are educated have difficulty … Many are street kids … just commu-
nity leaders … There is the non-existence of relevant training’ (Pers. Interview 140). 
While there is not an educational pre-requisite for parliamentary work it is 
apparent that the ability to read and comprehend documentation of a technical 
and policy nature and to be able to debate, present and defend a logical policy 
based argument is necessary. Of the MPPs classified by educational level in 
chapter three, almost 20% did not complete high school. Only 30% completed a 
degree or a professional qualification. This suggests that up to 70% of MPPs 
would probably find it difficult to excel in the parliamentary environment with-
out assistance from elsewhere. In comparison to legislators in less economically 
resourced African states, these figures are shocking. In Benin, Ghana and 
Kenya, for example, more than 60% of parliamentarians have a university 
degree and in Ghana and Kenya virtually none have only primary education 
(Barkan et al. 2004: 239).  
In addition, the professional experience of MPPs does not make up for the 
lack of educational qualifications that they possess. For example, of the 22% of 
MPPs that are small business owners, 90% of them were not formerly exposed 
to any of the skills that are necessary in parliament. This is in contrast to the 
claims of Barkan et al that in Senegal, Benin, Ghana and Kenya those who have 
run businesses are more likely to be reformers committed to democratisation 
and the strengthening of a legislature (Barkan et al. 2004: 235). Why this should 
be so is not clear. Apart from some expectations of efficiency it is difficult to 
see how the skills set required for public sector committee work is congruent 
with private sector business ownership. The implications for parliamentary 
capacity are even more serious if one considers the nature of experience held by 
those who have only had a political occupation. Of all the ANC MPPs, the 
overwhelming majority had no experience of government before coming to 
power and their skills base has been predominantly in political mobilization 
work. Of the IFP MPPs, although a significant proportion were formerly in the 
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KLA (see chapter four), they were the only party in this former legislature and it 
was without a committee system. The nature of monitoring and oversight was 
clearly not of the same nature. Where some practical experience of legislative 
work does exist is primarily among the MPPs of the minority parties who were 
former members of the NPA, local government or the chambers of the Trica-
meral Parliament. 
The significance of these factors in KwaZulu-Natal is an increasing incapa-
city in policy and developmental monitoring among the majority of MPPs. If as 
Mosca claims increasing bureaucratisation makes the attributes that the elite 
possess less relevant, what happens in a system where there is limited parlia-
mentary support for parliamentarians? In this case, there is neither well-capa-
citated parliamentary elite nor a parliamentary support and training system for 
them to fall back on. The implication of this in KwaZulu-Natal is that each 
party provincial caucus acts as a back up for those lacking capacity. It is from 
the party caucus that MPPs receive direction and instruction that is followed 
through in the legislature. As a consequence, MPPs frequently revert to party 
political concerns over political power, loyalty and influence rather than over 
questions of governance, monitoring and scrutiny. Parliamentary debates be-
come bogged down by debates of a party nature rather than a provincial one by 
the majority of MPPs. Such questions as to where the provincial capital should 
be located are clear indications of this. 
Case study – The National Council of Provinces Standing  
Committee in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature 
A more detailed examination of the work of a single committee – the National 
Council of Provinces4 Standing Committee (NCOPSC) – illustrates three main 
                                                            
4  The South African parliament consists of two houses – The National Assembly 
(NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), which is comprised of a ten 
member delegation from each of South Africa’s nine provinces. The purpose of the 
NCOP is to ‘ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national 
sphere of government’ (RSA 1996a: section 42, chapter 4). The NCOP has the 
power to ‘consider, pass, amend, propose amendments to or reject any legislation 
before (it) … (and) initiate or prepare legislation falling within a functional area 
listed in Schedule 4 … or referred to in Section 76 …’ (RSA 1996a: section 68, 
chapter 4). Schedule 4 provides a list of concurrent functional areas for national and 
provincial legislatures. Section 76 provides for legislation affecting the provinces. 
However, neither the NA nor NCOP can legislate in terms of the functional areas 
listed in Schedule 5 which are those of exclusive provincial competence. In the 
exercise of NCOP powers, legislation passed, amended or rejected by the house 
must also be ratified by the NA and visa versa. If it is not ratified, it is referred to a 
Mediation Committee, the decision of which must be ratified by the House that 
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features of the impact of institutional capacity upon political elite formation. 
Firstly, it demonstrates how the institutional capacity of the political elite is 
shaped by the characteristics that they possess. Secondly, it shows how the 
legislature is dominated by a few members. Thirdly, it illustrates how party 
competition has become an arena through which elites may guarantee their 
longevity. 
The NCOPSC in KwaZulu-Natal is the only portfolio committee in which 
decisions are regularly taken by a vote. It is the key mechanism in the legis-
lature through which provincial political elites are able to influence, scrutinize 
and also initiate national policy that affects the provinces of South Africa. This 
committee coordinates provincial voting mandates. It receives portfolio com-
mittee reports and breakdowns on bills pertaining to its policy area that are 
before the NCOP and approves the negotiating and final voting mandates to be 
delivered by the provincial delegation5 to the NCOP. In addition through the 
NCOPSC the political elite, in the portfolio committees of the provincial legis-
lature, may also initiate legislation that is within the competencies of the NCOP 
and send it upwards to the national legislative institutions to be considered as a 
Bill on a national basis. 
 
Scrutiny and oversight of national legislation 
The NCOPSC has a mixed record of successes and failures in its role of 
scrutiny and oversight of national level legislation. Institutional capacity has, 
however, been clearly demonstrated in two main ways by the political elite who 
sit on the NCOPSC. Firstly, political elites have demonstrated a comprehension 
of their role in scrutinizing national policy – which differs from other com-
mittees – and have used their ability to influence legislation. This is clearly 
shown when, on occasion, provincial MPPs have proposed significant amend-
ments to national Bills that have come before them. For example in September 
1997, the report of the Premier’s Portfolio Committee to the NCOPSC on the 
Public Service Commission Bill (BB31-97) detailed proposed amendments 
                                                                                                                                                 
rejected it. If it is not ratified by the NCOP, the bill may still pass providing that the 
NA supports the bill by a 2/3 majority. If it is not ratified by the NA then the bill 
lapses. Procedures relating to constitutional amendments differ. 
5  The NCOP consists of one delegation from each province. Each delegation is com-
prised of six permanent delegates and four special delegates, one of which is the 
Premier of the province or his/her representative. The six permanent delegates must 
be eligible to be provincial MPPs, but if they are MPPs then they cease to be so 
when they become a delegate to the NCOP. The four special delegates are drawn 
from the provincial legislature and, with the exception of the Premier, rotate accord-
ing to the needs of the province and the policy areas under discussion (cf. RSA 
1996a: chapter 4, section 60-62). 
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aimed at strengthening the independence of the Public Service Commission (cf. 
Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1997a: negotiating mandates item 5). 
In September 1998, the Local Government Portfolio Committee rejected Clause 
1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment 
Bill (B85-98) (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1998b: item 7.2). 
In November 1999 the Portfolio Committee on Housing was commended by the 
NCOPSC on amendments that they had made to the Rental Housing Bill 
(B92D-99) (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1999b: final mandate 
item 6). Clearly in all these cases MPPs understood enough about their respon-
sibilities, the process of institutionalizing legislative change and the impact of 
the proposed legislation in order to scrutinize these Bills. 
Secondly, the voting divisions in the first parliamentary term reflect an 
understanding by political elites of their party political position on key policy 
issues. For example a split vote on the Tobacco Products Amendment Bill 
(B117B-98) in October 1998, prior to the formation of the IFP-ANC coalition, 
illustrated the policy divisions among parties. Despite the fact that the Depart-
ment of Health fell under the jurisdiction of an ANC MEC, the voting mandate 
of the Portfolio Committee on Health reflected the relative strength of parties in 
the legislature. In effect, the Portfolio Committee on Health rejected the Bill by 
five votes to two after IFP MPPs changed their position and voted against the 
Bill with the minority parties. The only party left supporting the bill was the 
ANC (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1998a: item 7.5). During 
the second parliamentary term however, party divisions in the voting record 
reflect provincial coalitions and alliances. For example, in November 1999, the 
NCOPSC vote on a negotiating mandate for the Pharmacy Amendment Bill 
(B51-99) resulted in the IFP, ANC and MF supporting the Bill in accordance 
with the national level ANC’s position and the DP opposing it (cf. Provincial 
Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1999b: item 5.1) . In the same month the same 
voting divisions were evident on the final voting mandate on The World 
Heritage Convention Bill (B42-D-99) (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-
Natal 1999b: item 6.3). The same voting divisions are evident throughout the 
coalition period. So although MPPs demonstrated a commitment to the role that 
they had been designated within the institutions of parliament in the first term, 
they showed an equal understanding in the second term that their performance 
and position was now mandated by the coalition. 
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Initiation of legislation 
The NCOPSC has demonstrated a poor record in the second of its key roles – 
that of the initiation of legislation. In the years since the NCOP was formed,6 
the NCOPSC has managed to send only one prospective piece of legislation – 
The Children’s Commissioner Bill – through to the NCOP. The Children’s 
Commissioner Bill was initiated and framed by the ACDP, a minority party, 
and only received provincial support when it was agreed that the credit for the 
Bill would be shared by all parties in the legislature (Pers. Interview 31). No 
prospective legislation has been initiated by any other party in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The role of the NCOPSC in forwarding this Bill to the NCOP also illustrates 
a key lack of capacity in carrying out the functions of the committee and is 
deserving of further attention. In September 1997 the NCOPSC was briefed by 
a government official, Advocate E. M. Khoza, on the mandate of the committee 
to initiate legislation and the procedures to be followed in so doing (cf. 
Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1997a: item 6.4). Despite this, when 
the Children’s Commissioner Bill became an item on the NCOPSC agenda in 
January 1998, more than one year since the committee was formed and three 
months after the committee was briefed on its mandate, the committee needed 
to be re-briefed on the procedures to initiate legislation for the NCOP. 
Moreover, despite the briefing MPPs were still unsure whether or not “welfare”, 
under which the Children’s Commissioner Bill fell, was a section 76 compe-
tency or not. As a result of this much time was spent deliberating this factor 
before resolving to proceed with an informal discussion with the Chairperson of 
the NCOP and an informal discussion with the legal advisors in the national 
legislature in an attempt to clarify whether the Bill fell within the NCOP 
competency or not (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1998e: item 
10). By August 1998, seven months later, a minority party MPP, ‘expressed 
concern’ (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1998c: item 10.3) that 
the Bill had still not been tabled in the NCOP. In October 1998 the Bill was 
finally referred for legal opinion at the national level to clarify amongst other 
factors whether it was indeed a provincial competence. It was further noted that 
it was unlikely that the Bill would be addressed in the NCOP that parliamentary 
session (cf. Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 1998a: item 5.4).  
In the second term, in an attempt to clear the way for this Bill, a new 
NCOPSC Chairperson7 in 2000 attempted to find a way to address the difficul-
ties of sending legislation upwards to the national level. In January 2000, the 
                                                            
6  The NCOP was formed following the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa at the end of 1996. Prior to this, the second legislative house at the 
national level was the Senate. 
7  IFP MPP Lauretta Ngcobo replaced another IFP MPP Phillip Powell as Chairperson. 
268 CHAPTER 7 
 
NCOPSC requested a meeting with the Deputy-Chairperson8 of the NCOP (cf. 
Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal 2000b: item 4.1). Although the 
merits of a meeting were agreed to in principle, the date for a meeting was not 
quickly established. By 2001, the necessity of a meeting and workshop were 
explained by an IFP MPP as follows, 
‘There is that side of the constitution where Bills come from the departments to the 
National assembly and then to the NCOP. Then under Section 76 they come to pro-
vince … that was working okay. Then there is the other side of the constitution 
where Bills go from the province to the NCOP and to the National Assembly. This is 
not working. We don’t find a way to take provincial issues through the NCOP and 
into the heart of parliament …’ (Pers. IFP Interview 116). 
Thus more than four years since the committee was first briefed on its role 
and functions, it was still struggling to fulfil this key aspect of its responsibility. 
However, the inability to fulfil this core function was found to be as much a 
result of national level dynamics as it was provincial incapacity. As an IFP MPP 
argued, 
‘… Even the provinces with ANC leaders are still not sending legislation upwards. 
The structure is not working. That part of the constitution to send legislation up 
through the NCOP does not work. The ANC wants to control the upward thrust’ 
(Pers. IFP Interview 116). 
Certainly, national level dynamics were found to impact significantly on the 
ability of provincial political elites to carry out their functions. 
 
Restrictions on the developing institutional capacity of provincial MPPs  
by national NCOP dynamics 
In some cases, the difficulty that provincial political elites face in developing 
their institutional capacity is compounded by three national level factors. The 
first of these factors is national level institutional incapacity. The second is the 
national provincial chain of command among ANC political elites. The third 
factor is a general malaise in regard to provincial input. This is a product of 
some provincial political elites circumventing rules and processes and appealing 
directly to their national counterparts. Each of these will be discussed in turn in 
the committee where this is most evident, the NCOPSC. 
 
     • National level institutional incapacity 
Frequent administrative deficiencies at the national level impact negatively on 
the ability of provincial political elites to carry out their duties. These include 
such factors as the late advancement of NCOP funding to the legislature (cf. 
Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1998f: item 11.1), the late distribution 
                                                            
8  Ms Pandor. 
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to the provinces of minutes and provisional agendas for NCOP meetings (cf. 
Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1998c: item 10.2), little thought for 
provincial responsibilities in NCOP scheduling (cf. Provincial Legslature of 
KwaZulu-Natal 1998c: item 5.2), failure by the NCOP to ensure delivery of 
green and white papers to the NCOPSC (cf. Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-
Natal 1997b: item 9.2), and insufficient provision of details on the scheduling of 
meetings by the NCOP (cf. Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1997b: 
item 9.3). Such inefficiencies resulted in delays and the inability of the 
NCOPSC to be properly prepared in the preparation of their voting mandates 
and for meetings. Such occurrences were found in this study to be rife during 
the first parliamentary term but gradually began to diminish in the second 
parliamentary term. 
A more serious problem and a key institutional weakness that impacts 
acutely upon the legislative capacity of provincial MPPs in KwaZulu-Natal is 
the reliance upon delegates to the NCOP to act as provincial representatives in 
tabling voting mandates and in reporting back to the province. As early as 1997, 
the NCOPSC approached the Rules Committee in an attempt to formally struc-
ture the relationship between delegates and the legislature. This was a conse-
quence of concerns in the province that delegates were failing to provide 
information to the legislature (cf. Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 
1997c: item 5.4). Just one month later the NCOPSC debated whether the 
capacity of the delegates in the NCOP extended to understanding the merits of 
the Bills and the amendments proposed which they were to deliver (cf. Pro-
vincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1997b: item 5.1.2). Such weaknesses 
extended in to the second parliamentary term becoming more and more acute in 
their impact on the work of the NCOPSC. In November 1999, for example, a 
special workshop was arranged after it was revealed by special delegates to the 
NCOP (who remain provincial MPPs) that permanent delegates to the NCOP 
were not even attending NCOP meetings (cf. Provincial Legslature of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal 1999b: item 7.1). The impact of this meeting was however short 
lived as in March 2000 the NCOPSC was forced to abstain on producing a 
voting mandate on joint committee rules as a direct consequence of the failure 
of delegates to produce a briefing report to them. In the same month amend-
ments that were proposed by the NCOPSC to the Tourism Amendment Bill 
were not tabled in the NCOP due to absences by delegates in the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Land and Environmental Affairs (cf. Provincial Legslature 
of KwaZulu-Natal 2000a: items 5 and 6).  
A third limitation for provincial MPPs seeking to carry out their mandate is a 
general malaise at the national level regarding provincial policy input. Provin-
cial elites are limited by the composition of the very institutions that are sup-
posed to regulate national and provincial competencies. The Joint Tagging 
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Mechanism (JTM) was vested with the mandate of establishing whether a Bill 
introduced at the national level required provincial input. The Bill is then tagged 
as a Section 75 or Section 76 Bill, the latter requiring provincial input. There 
are clear examples of incorrectly tagged Bills (cf. Provincial Legslature of 
KwaZulu-Natal 1997c and 1997a). One such example is the Higher Education 
Bill that was tagged as a Section 75 Bill, despite it affecting the Provincial 
Tertiary Education Act. However, the JTM is not composed of any provincial 
representatives and there is no procedure for appealing against the tagging 
decisions of the JTM. In effect the composition of the JTM and procedure of 
Bill tagging removed from KwaZulu-Natal political elites the ability to make 
their input if the Bill was tagged incorrectly. 
 
     • National-provincial political dynamics impeding provincial capacity 
Unilateral changes by national political elites have frequently prevented provin-
cial elites from inputting on policy in the NCOP. The most serious cases include 
amendments made in KwaZulu-Natal that were not processed or tabled and the 
fast-tracking of legislation at the national level to exclude provincial input. For 
example, as a consequence of a scheduled meeting being changed unilaterally at 
the national level, KwaZulu-Natal’s amendments to the World Heritage Bill 
were never processed (Pers. IFP Interview 43 and cf. Provincial Legslature of 
KwaZulu-Natal 1999b). Many other Bills have been fast-tracked with disastrous 
consequences for provincial input. For example, a series of Transport Bills and 
the Adjustments Appropriation Bill were pushed forward without the proper 
delivery of notification to select committees (cf. Provincial Legslature of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal 1998d: items 6d, 6e, 9a and 9b). In a further case, the late tabling at 
the national level of the Road Transport Appeal Matters Amendment Bill and 
then a failure to clarify whether the Bill was a Section 75 or Section 76 com-
petency resulted in an impossible deadline for provincial voting mandates (cf. 
Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1998b: item 7.4). In another example, 
provisional provincial voting mandates were excluded from the agenda of the 
Select Committee on Land, Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. In this case, 
the committee meeting was then delayed and provinces were provided with an 
impossible turnaround period in which to produce a final voting mandate (cf. 
Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1997b: item 5.2). In all cases, unila-
teral action at the national level effectively removed from the provincial parlia-
ment their powers of oversight and undermined their powers of scrutiny. 
Party competition in KwaZulu-Natal is influenced by national level party 
strengths and the way in which the national political elite intersects with the 
provincial. An examination of the periods in which legislation was fast-tracked 
at the national level shows that it was non-ANC MPPs who chaired the corres-
ponding provincial portfolio committees and were tasked with oversight of that 
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legislation. ANC provincial MPPs fell into line with their national counterparts 
and enabled legislation to pass through the process without scrutiny. It would 
appear that MPPs worked in tandem at the national and provincial levels to 
ensure this. In effect, the fast-tracking secured autonomy for the ANC at the 
national level. They were able to act independently of the institutions of over-
sight in the province. Simultaneously, the policy programmes of the ANC in the 
provincial executive were protected and the powers of scrutiny and oversight of 
the committees headed by non-ANC MPPs were undermined.  
Indeed a key aspect of the continued longevity of provincial ANC elites has 
been their adherence to national ANC directives. This is in stark contrast to the 
pre-1994 period whereby provincial elites and their ideological and political 
objectives dominated the national agenda (see Chapter 2). In part, this may be 
explained by the view held among certain circles of the ANC that,  
‘a lot of people at national think that provincial parliament should not exist. But if it 
did not exist, many issues would not be raised because national parliament doesn’t 
ever focus on the performance of departments … If they know that there is a port-
folio committee that is really on the ball and is going to investigate … then it puts 
them on their toes and makes them do their job better’ (Pers. Interview 31).  
Although seemingly a contradiction in terms, that ANC MPPs would under-
mine their own powers of scrutiny and the institutions of provincial government 
in which they have power, they have frequently done so. A clear example of 
this is the manoeuvring that occurred on the Tobacco Products Amendment Bill 
(B117B-98). Introduced into the National Assembly by an ANC Minister, the 
party indicated that they would prefer the Bill to be passed in its original format, 
without amendments. As a Section 76 Bill, it was referred to the provincial 
legislatures for their voting mandate in the NCOP. On its initial reading in 
KwaZulu-Natal both the ANC and IFP supported the Bill. However, the IFP 
subsequently shifted their position and the Portfolio Committee on Health re-
jected the Bill (Pers. IFP Interview 131). When the NCOPSC voted on the Bill 
in KwaZulu-Natal, the Bill was rejected by five members to two. The Bill was 
subsequently referred back to the legislature for a final vote in order to enable 
the NCOPSC to prepare a final voting mandate for the NCOP. At this point, and 
facing a rejection of the Bill by all provincial institutions, the ANC NCOPSC 
members argued that the Bill should not be referred back to the legislature for 
the final mandate (cf. Provincial Legslature of KwaZulu-Natal 1998a). When 
this strategy to prevent the rejection of the Bill failed, the ANC attempted to 
disrupt the second reading (Pers. Interview 67). As the Bill was read in the 
parliamentary chamber the ANC Caucus got up from their seats, left the cham-
ber and tried to persuade the minority parties to do the same (Pers. Interview 03, 
37 and 67). This was clearly an attempt to force no quorum and prevent the 
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initial position of the parties from being overturned. Having received a directive 
from the national ANC Minister, the provincial ANC did all that they could to 
prevent the position of the provincial legislature of Kwa-Zulu Natal from being 
officially recorded. This demonstrates that the rewards of adhering to the de-
cisions of national political elites in the ANC are a greater motivator for some 
elites than ensuring the sanctity of the democratic provincial institutions. 
 
The NCOPSC and the longevity of the political elite 
Primarily, the social composition of the NCOPSC consists of political elites 
who have attained high educational levels and professional qualifications. For 
example, during the second parliamentary term 75% of the NCOPSC were 
qualified to bachelor’s degree level or higher. Of these, four had trained in the 
field of law, one was a chartered accountant and another was undertaking post-
graduate study in finance. Despite this unusual concentration of highly educated 
and professional political elites within one committee, the minutes and inter-
views reveal that it is still dominated by a few members. The political elite that 
initiates, drives and contributes to the discussions and deliberations are consist-
ently the same group of people, while the majority of committee members 
remain silent. Even on this committee, tension between capacity and democracy 
is evident. It would appear that in terms of participation a technocratic dominan-
ce prevails within the committee. According to one interviewee,  
‘You have to be specialized. They are talking about technical issues. There is no 
formal training for MPPs that give them the needed skills. If you don’t know what 
you are doing, you are never going to catch up’ (Pers. Interview 140). 
As the legislature becomes the established arena for competition between 
political parties, the capacity that MPPs possess and the functions that they 
carry out, begin to matter more to those parties. Both the seniority and skills of 
the MPPs on the NCOPSC would appear to indicate that all parties consider the 
NCOPSC to be one of the most important committees for their attention. It pro-
vides, for the ANC, hostile terrain that can be circumvented through national-
provincial elite alliances. For the IFP, it is a terrain through which the party can 
potentially influence national policy debates and from which to defend against 
the national government (and by implication the ANC) imposing its political 
will on the province. Not surprisingly, the background and skills of the MPPs 
on the NCOPSC correlates with the broader expectations that the parties have of 
the role of the committee. 
The NCOPSC is also an example of an arena of party competition for poli-
tical elites on a careerist path. According to one interviewee, ‘some MPPs are 
advantaged and their parties have come to rely on them … if they don’t make it 
back, their parties have a problem’ (Pers. Interview 140). MPPs with skills that 
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enable them to read, understand and challenge legislation have an additional 
political party and institutional guarantee. In the highly contested political ter-
rain of KwaZulu-Natal politics, their party and institutional longevity is guaran-
teed by way of their technocratic abilities. The very reason that some MPPs 
make it on to party lists and into parliament is because of their institutional 
capabilities. In many cases, these individuals are those that have no natural 
constituency base and a limited historical experience of turf politics between the 
ANC and IFP. Instead their longevity is dependent upon the fact that they 
possess skills that make them useful in the competition between parties in this 
institutional setting. These skills include the way in which they are able to per-
form in committee and outmanoeuvre the competition.  
For example, as a consequence of the NCOPSC struggling with its ability to 
send legislation to the national level an IFP MPP attempted to arrange a work-
shop for delegates and committee members. Her description of the process illu-
minates the way in which provincial ANC elites serve national interests and the 
ensured advancement and continued longevity of technocratic elites who out-
manoeuvre the competition. She said, 
‘I called all delegates and I requested a workshop. While preparing I discussed this 
with (ANC MPP X) and she supported my proposal. I wanted a workshop in the 
break but I was told that I wasn’t allowed to hold it in the holidays. Then suddenly I 
received a letter from the national ANC saying that we will be having a workshop in 
the Cape … and (ANC MPP X), like it or not, would be delivering two papers. She 
saw that something important was happening and wouldn’t let it happen from me in 
the province so she conferred with the national ANC and they made it a national 
stamp’ (Pers. IFP Interview 116). 
And, 
‘After my invite to the USA Council of Legislatures where all states come together 
to discuss common approaches, I suggested something similar in South Africa. I 
said, “how about working together? We could form a forum like MINMEC where 
provincial legislatures could discuss their common interests”. I was told that there 
would be no such forum’ (Pers. IFP Interview 116). 
In this case, the technocratic abilities of the ANC MPP to outmanoeuvre the 
competition and to organise and plan a workshop were pivotal. As a conse-
quence of this MPP’s actions the mandate of the workshop was restricted to 
those discussion areas that the national ANC would tolerate. In using her tech-
nocratic skills to secure a pivotal role within the workshop, ensure that the ANC 
would direct the deliberations of it and set boundaries around any further 
development of provincial cooperation, this provincial ANC MPP was awarded 
a prestigious position in the executive following the 2004 elections, the first 
woman ANC MPP to be awarded such in KwaZulu-Natal. 
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The case study of the NCOPSC demonstrates that legislative scrutiny and 
oversight is the domain of a few elites, and through this domain, party compe-
tition has found a new arena.  
Streams of political elites: Policy, politics and institutional capacity 
The institutional capacity and incapacity of political elites has a direct bearing 
upon the types of sub-groupings of political elites, their longevity in the 
legislature and the dominance of the provincial agenda by political rather than 
policy matters. Two sub-groupings of elites have been identified. They are, 
firstly, those with extensive capacity in policy matters who are provided with an 
additional guarantee of longevity in the legislature. Secondly, there is a sub-
group who are unable to grasp policy skills and have re-orientated their roles as 
politically orientated rather than policy orientated, forcing a political agenda 
rather than a policy orientated one. The following two case studies on provincial 
finances and the provincial capital issue demonstrate these sub-group types. 
 
Case study: The provincial finances and institutional capacity 
The clearest example of the continued longevity of a technocratic sub-group of 
elites is provided in the case study of an acute provincial financial crisis and the 
management of it by the MEC Peter Miller. Finance is the key provincial port-
folio and the department became managed by a member of the legislature 
whose very characteristics and etiquette were the anathema of all that the domi-
nant political party the IFP – of which he was nonetheless a member – repre-
sented. Despite this, in his role as the MEC for finance, Miller was provided 
with complete and unfettered party support as well as support from across the 
political spectrum. 
In March 1998 the national government exercised its constitutional mandate 
to impose financial restrictions on the Provincial Government of KwaZulu-
Natal under Section 100(a) of the Constitution as a result of the province being 
in debt to the amount of R2.3 billion. The debt was a consequence of two 
factors. The first was irresponsible government spending by provincial govern-
ment departments (primarily education, health and social welfare) in the 1996-
1997 and 1997-1998 financial years. For example, R400 million was spent 
between 1996-1997 on providing voluntary severance packages to teachers who 
then had to be re-hired because of a teacher shortage. The second factor was the 
collapse of financial controls in the provincial Ministry of Finance and the 
provincial Treasury. This collapse was so critical that it was not known in the 
provincial Ministry of Finance that the province had overspent in 1997 until 
three-quarters of the way through 1998. So dire was the financial position of the 
province that the provincial bankers had refused to honour any more cheques. 
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The result of this financial catastrophe was that the national government contri-
buted R1 billion towards paying off the debt in exchange for the IFP Premier 
signing an agreement that, should the province not rectify its financial position, 
Section 100(b) of the constitution would be enforced and national government 
would exercise its constitutional right to take over the provincial finances. 
In April 1998, IFP MPP Peter Miller9 was appointed MEC for Finance by 
the IFP, replacing MEC Senezele Mhlungu, and by March 2001 the province 
was debt free. In 1999, the Public Finance Management Act and the Public Fi-
nance Amendment Act were passed10 to regulate financial management. These 
Acts provided for internal financial controls and responsible financial manage-
ment by all persons in the provincial government and set out serious consequen-
ces for those failing to adhere to the provisions in the Acts. In addition, as MEC 
for Finance, the Acts provided Miller with wide powers to ‘confirm, vary or 
revoke any decision taken by the head of a department … or a provincial 
treasury’ (Republic of South Africa 1999b: chapter 2, section 10.3). Miller’s 
debt reduction strategy consisted of massive spending that cuts across all pro-
vincial departments to generate funds for debt reduction. This resulted in 
hostility towards him from within those departments. In addition, Miller imple-
mented a Strategic Review of the Ministry of Finance and reduced the staff 
complement from 750 mainly clerical and administrative staff to 300 highly 
qualified numerate chartered accountants and economists. He put in place a 
system whereby the Chief Accountant from each department was required to 
check everything that was spent against their allocated budget and Miller pro-
vided weekly financial reports to the provincial cabinet on the progress of debt 
reduction. Prior to this, no MEC had ever received a financial report from the 
MEC for Finance. 
The intervention by the national sphere of government and the Acts that 
were passed to regulate financial management threatened the position of poli-
tical elites in the province. Overspending had occurred across the political 
spectrum in Departments headed by both ANC and IFP MECs. The position of 
the IFP as the government in the provincial legislature was particularly at risk. 
The party’s ability to carry out all aspects of its policy agenda became de-
pendent upon Miller’s capacity to reverse the provincial financial crisis and to 
put in place a system of checks and balances within each department, otherwise 
their power to act in policy matters would be controlled by the ANC at the 
                                                            
9  For a discussion of Miller’s biographical background and his route into politics and 
past political experience see the discussion later in this section. 
10  The Public Finance Management Act (No.1 of 1999) applies to the national sphere 
of government and the Public Finance Management Amendment Act (No.29 of 
1999) extended this to the provincial sphere of government. 
276 CHAPTER 7 
 
national level. This was a question of autonomy for the provincial ANC as 
much as for the IFP. 
Miller’s combination of educational, professional and political background 
demonstrate his capacity to excel in a policy environment. For example, he 
speaks fluent English, isiZulu, Xhosa and Afrikaans. He graduated with a BSc 
and an MSc, both cum laude and then served as a managing director of finance 
in two companies. Prior to entering the Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-
Natal he served in politics for more than 20 years beginning when he was 
elected to the position of Vice-Chairperson of the United Party11 in 1973, then 
served as a Member of the Natal Provincial Council from 1979 and as a Chief 
Whip and active member of many standing committees from 1981-1986. He 
then served for seven years as a member of the Executive Council of the Natal 
Provincial Administration, in effect switching roles from that of policy over-
sight and policy scrutiny to that of policy-making until 1993. In 1994 he joined 
the IFP and was allocated the portfolio of local government and housing in the 
legislature before becoming MEC for Finance. Clearly, his skills and experience 
prove his potential to perform as an active member of the political elite in a 
number of roles, whether in a monitoring capacity or policy-making environ-
ment. 
Despite this, Miller was not a good fit in the IFP. Without his skills it is 
highly unlikely that he would have been chosen by the IFP to serve the party in 
the provincial government. He repeatedly clashed with the party leadership in a 
manner that suggests that he neither shares the vision of, nor conforms to, the 
political etiquette in the party. This is evident in a number of core areas. Firstly, 
he does not share the party perspective upon the position of traditional leader-
ship as a concept nor in reality. For example, in his previous portfolio of local 
government he repeatedly clashed with the IFP leadership over the range of 
powers and functions of traditional leadership at the local government level. So 
serious was this clash that other party members entered his office and compre-
hensively changed the document that he was to submit for discussion after 
Miller refused to do so (Pers. IFP Interview 46). Miller was stripped of the port-
folio in 1996 by the IFP president, Mangosuthu Buthelezi who, in a candid 
outburst on the local radio station Ukhozi FM condemned Miller in no uncertain 
                                                            
11  The United Party was formed by a merger between Barry Hertzog’s National Party 
and Jan Smuts’ South African Party and was South Africa’s ruling party from 1934-
1948. The party has a chequered history of divisions between conservatives and 
liberals. In 1975, the United Party was renamed the New Republic Party, but a 
significant number of parliamentarians did not remain with it and joined the anti-
apartheid Progressive Federal Party instead. In the 1977 elections, the New Republic 
Party returned with only 10 seats out of the 41 the United Party had previously held. 
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terms. He said, ‘he can tell us whether it is just because we are kaffirs that he 
will not heed what we have decided’ (Buthelezi in: Khumalo 1999).  
Secondly, Miller repeatedly argued with the party leadership in public, a 
factor that would not be tolerated if he was not useful to the party in the 
legislature. For example, when he headed the gambling portfolio (as part of the 
finance portfolio) he did not agree with the party over the favoured applicants 
for casino licenses, nor the merits of the gambling industry for the province per 
se. Rather than expressing this privately, his comments were openly reported by 
the media. So damaging was this to the party that IFP party chairman and 
provincial Premier Lionel Mtshali, who had taken over the portfolio from 
Miller, was forced to repudiate Miller’s sentiments in a letter to the press (cf. 
Mtshali 2001).  
As if that was not enough in terms of “disrespectful” political etiquette (a 
factor that, as we have seen, forced the IFP into a coalition with the ANC 
instead of the DA), he did not support Ulundi as the preferred seat of the 
provincial capital, and even when the party suggested that a referendum should 
be held to let the provincial electorate decide over the capital issue, Miller 
speculated in the media about the issue and the impact that this would have on 
the IFP coalition with the DA (cf. Kockott 2004). Clearly, Miller’s value sys-
tem, political etiquette and policy positions are contrary to the majority of those 
held in the party. Despite this he was, in the crucial moment of crisis, placed in 
the key portfolio of finance and provided with a free rein. Although epitomizing 
the tensions within the party, between those who had grown up within the 
traditions of the party and those who had not, the Miller IFP case is one of co-
dependence. Hence, despite Miller’s non-conformity, the party utilizes his skills 
and it is these skills that guarantee his longevity as a member of the provincial 
political elite. 
Miller’s case is also an example of guaranteed longevity of a technocratic 
sub-group who are able to hold their parties hostage through fear that they 
might cross the floor and join the competition to the benefit of another political 
party. In 1999 he did not originally appear on the IFP list for the provincial 
elections but was added at number 45 and then moved to number 10 on the 
candidate list at the intervention of the party president (Pers. IFP Interview 
128). In Miller’s case, his characteristics demonstrate that he is a desirable 
candidate to all parties in the legislature. He has been repeatedly and openly 
praised by other parties, not least during MINMEC12 meetings by ANC national 
                                                            
12  MINMEC (Intergovernmental Relations Committee of Ministers and Members of 
Provincial Councils) gives effect to the principles of cooperative government and 
the intergovernmental nature of the South African policy environment. The national 
minister for a policy sector and the nine corresponding provincial MECs meet on a 
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Finance Minister Trevor Manuel for his competence in the finance portfolio. 
Miller is also not new to political defections. For example, during his political 
career he has been a serving member of four political parties – the United Party, 
the New Republic Party,13 the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party. A 
career politician, Miller defected from the NRP to the NP when the NRP lost its 
official opposition status to the Conservative Party. He defected again in 1993 
from the NP to the IFP when he clashed with the Con. Botha administration 
over health policy in the province. In both cases he crossed the political spec-
trum from a position of lesser to greater influence. In this case, Miller’s con-
servative ideology alienates him from many of the ANC provincial elite. 
Despite sharing social capital with members of the DA and NNP, many of 
whom were former colleagues in the Natal Provincial Administration, Miller’s 
career aspirations tie him to one of the major parties which, in effect, leaves 
only the IFP. The potential for crossing the floor to the competition reinforces 
the position of technocratic elites in the legislative and executive. 
However, the reinforcement of positions in government and the guaranteed 
longevity also increases the potential fluidity among this sub-group of the poli-
tical elite. Miller is one of many examples within the parliamentary setting of a 
technocratic political elite whose members chose their political homes as a 
consequence of prior political beliefs and experiences and have since utilized 
their institutional capacity to cross the floor to the opposition. Other examples 
include Maurice Mackenzie, Gabriel Nadabandaba, Mike Tarr and Belinda 
Scott. Belinda Scott, for example, became an IFP MPP after completing an 
MSC and working in the Inkatha Institute as a political analyst. She was 
Director of the National Housing Forum in 1992 and then a Director of the 
Provincial Housing Forum whereby she did substantial housing policy work. 
She came into conflict in the policy arena with another IFP elite member, MEC 
Narend Singh and took the opportunity to cross the floor to the DA where she 
became Whip. Working closely alongside Ina Cronje, then ANC Chief Whip, 
she crossed again to the ANC. 
Within this technocratic sub-group of elites that demonstrate policy capacity 
and chose their home as a consequence of past rather than present political 
perspectives none grew up in the history of the party. All are competent at 
negotiating the political environment and their skills base and positions in 
parliament has placed them in a superior position to negotiate new terms of 
                                                                                                                                                 
regular basis in this sectoral forum to discuss policy and legislation within that parti-
cular policy sector. 
13  The New Republic Party was formed out of the United Party in 1977. Most parlia-
mentarians, however, did not stay with the new party and joined the anti-apartheid 
Progressive Federal Party instead. In the 1977 elections the New Republic Party re-
turned only 10 seats. 
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office with the opposition. Hence, the capacity of some, within a parliament 
where low capacity is the norm, enables an additional guarantee of longevity for 
these MPPs and consequently increases fluidity and instability among the elite 
and the governing party in office. 
 
Institutional incapacity and the provincial capital issue 
The provincial capital issue is a clear example of the incapacity of a sub-group 
of the political elite in policy-making and of an agenda that is promoted and 
dominated by political and personal concerns rather than by policy concerns. 
The legacy of a dual capital for KwaZulu-Natal in both Ulundi and Pieter-
maritzburg14 came to an end at the end of the second parliamentary term in 2004 
when the new ANC provincial executive moved the Executive Council to 
Pietermaritzburg, leaving the Ulundi parliament redundant. Until this point, the 
Provincial Government had used both centres, alternating legislative sittings 
and committee meetings between the two, with the executive choosing which 
centre in which to locate itself. The IFP supported Ulundi as the seat of the 
legislative assembly15 and the ANC and DA Pietermaritzburg where their pat-
terns of regional identification are dominant. Although differences in perspec-
tive over where the seat of the legislative assembly should be was an issue of 
contention between the ANC and IFP, the coalition between the two parties 
meant that it was set aside. That was until the IFP moved into a coalition with 
the DA when the ANC used the opportunity to try and force a wedge between 
this alliance. The ANC 2004 victory resulted in a unilateral move of the exe-
cutive, ending the matter for this parliamentary term. 
The resolution of the provincial capital issue by the move of the Provincial 
Executive Committee to Pietermaritzburg is, in four main ways, one of the 
clearest examples of incapacity in public policy-making and scrutiny First, the 
move of the seat of the legislature to Pietermaritzburg was conducted without 
any feasibility study on the merits of the relocation. No consideration was given 
to the amount of space, accommodation of offices or even parking facilities. 
The Ulundi legislative complex was built in 1984 at a cost of R60 million to 
house the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (cf. Mbanjwa 2006). Its main parlia-
mentary chamber and galleries accommodate up to 460 people (cf. Mbanjwa 
2006). There are 150 individual offices in the complex and many more cham-
bers and conference rooms (cf. Mbanjwa 2006). There is sufficient overnight 
accommodation to house all MPPs and MECs for the, on average, three legis-
                                                            
14  See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the perspectives of the significance of the capitals 
at Ulundi and Pietermaritzburg. 
15  See Chapter 3 for a discussion on the reasons for the IFP preference of Ulundi as the 
provincial capital. 
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lative sittings per annum. The complex reflects an African influence with a cir-
cular legislative chamber thought to increase consensus, the outer wall covered 
in tapestries depicting the history of the Zulu and a life size bronze statue of 
Shaka Zulu just outside the entrance to the complex. In contrast, in the Pieter-
maritzburg parliamentary complex MPPs and MECs are squashed into a parlia-
mentary chamber that is not big enough, the public gallery is restricted to 50 
people. It does not have enough office space to accommodate even the MPPs of 
the majority party. The majority are housed in rented spaces outside the com-
plex. The executive branch is located in Natalia House, a 15 minute walk away 
from the complex in rented offices. There is only parking for approximately 20 
cars. There is no overnight accommodation in the complex so the administration 
books hotel accommodation for MPPs for the legislative sittings. On more than 
one occasion this meant booking hotel accommodation in Durban because there 
were not enough hotel rooms in Pietermaritzburg (Pers. Interview 140). The 
complex reflects a Westminster style influence with government and opposition 
facing each other in the chamber and there is a life size statue of Queen Victoria 
just outside the entrance to the complex. Instead of conducting a feasibility 
study on the merits of relocation prior to moving the legislature, a group of 
consultants16 conducted a feasibility study of the Pietermaritzburg complex 
three years after the fact, and then suggested that the Pietermaritzburg complex 
in the central business district was too small and the legislature should move to 
an entirely new site at the Town Hill Hospital (cf. Alberts 2007). Hence, a 
feasibility study prior to the move would have shown that Ulundi was the only 
one of the two sites that could accommodate the needs of the legislature. 
Secondly, the move was conducted without any economic assessment of the 
cost implications of the move. It was assumed that the move to Pietermaritzburg 
made economic sense and that the site of Ulundi was ‘prohibitively expensive 
for staff and members of the provincial parliament to attend sittings’ (Mbanjwa 
2006). In fact, the majority of parliamentarians do not live in or around Pieter-
maritzburg and have to travel to parliamentary sittings and committee meetings 
anyway. If the legislature was located in Ulundi they could stay overnight at no 
cost for the entire duration of the sitting, thus mitigating the costs of petrol and 
the costs of hotel accommodation for week long sittings. The legislature pays 
for these costs anyway. Even if the legislature did not pay for these costs, they 
would not be prohibitive. For example, in 2005, the basic remuneration of an 
MPP at the lowest end of the salary scale was R373,678 per annum, for a 
committee chairperson at the lowest end of the scale it was R454,488 and for an 
MEC at the lowest end of the scale it was R618,326 per annum (Provincial 
Government of KwaZulu-Natal 2005: 3145). These are substantial salaries in 
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the South African economy. Barkan et al claim that ‘the single most important 
resource is the provision of appropriate salaries for members and staff’ (Barkan 
et al. 2004: 229). Widely believed to be a method through which to attract high 
calibre MPPs and to avoid corruption and nepotism, salaries at the national, 
provincial and local level in South Africa are amongst the highest in Africa. 
Yet, as this research shows, substantial salaries are not a guarantee of 
institutional capacity among MPPs. Whereas poor salaries in relation to 
constituency expenses in Senegal, Benin and Ghana might result in personal 
financial pressures on the families of legislators (cf. Barkan et al. 2004: 229-
230) this is not the case in KwaZulu-Natal. Perhaps rather than considering 
substantial salaries as a method of attracting high calibre MPPs, one might 
consider the claim of Bayart, that ‘material prosperity is one of the chief 
political virtues’ (Bayart 1993: 242) in African politics. As such substantial 
salaries serve as an expectation in the road to respect and has little bearing on 
the calibre of MPPs. 
In KwaZulu-Natal the entire Ulundi parliamentary complex is owned by the 
government with no ongoing rental cost implications. In contrast, in Pieter-
maritzburg the only parts of the complex which is owned by the government is 
the main building which houses the chamber and the offices where the majority 
party is located (which does not even accommodate all the majority party 
members). All other buildings are rented at a significant cost. This includes the 
building that houses the library, the administration, and the offices for all other 
party caucus members. In addition, the legislature has since the move purchased 
another building in Pietermaritzburg at a significant cost and is currently reno-
vating it at a further cost (Mbanjwa 2006). A move to a new site at the Town 
Hill Hospital would mean further significant costs. Hence, in reality, the move 
has resulted in significant cost implications that were not considered, and that 
reflect poor policy choices, and a lack of monitoring and scrutiny of decisions 
that have policy implications. In this case, a portion of the provincial budget 
that could have been spent on significant development needs has been channel-
led into an unnecessary and costly endeavour. 
Thirdly, the move was conducted without any economic assessment of the 
impact that it would have upon the region in which Ulundi was located. It was 
assumed that the move made ‘economic and developmental sense’ (Kockett 
2004). In fact, the move makes very little economic and developmental sense. 
The Ulundi complex is located in the Zululand District Municipality, an area of 
15,307km squared with a population of just under 1 million people with a life 
expectancy of 48 years (Zululand District Municipality 2006). Within this dis-
trict is the Ulundi local municipality. In the Ulundi local municipality only 
12.5% of the population are formally employed, 40% of households have no 
income whatsoever and the primary employer is the public sector which em-
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ploys more than 60% of those employed (Ulundi Local Municipality 2007). 
Key economic activities revolved around Ulundi as the seat of the provincial 
capital. It served as an economic development node for businesses in the north-
ern KwaZulu-Natal area, attracted by the proximity to the legislature and with a 
fully functional airstrip for daily flights to Johannesburg. Zululand is today 
almost entirely rural and poor and made up predominantly of women headed 
households whose partners have migrated south to the cities such as Pieter-
maritzburg or north to the mines to find employment and of children. Just south 
of Zululand District Municipality is Uthungulu District Municipality encom-
passsing the local municipality of Nkandla. Today Nkandla suffers from 93% 
unemployment, 49% of the population live on social grants and it is the fourth 
poorest area in South Africa (Nkandla Local Municipality 2007). Ulundi was 
the closest economic node to Nkandla, providing employment for the majority 
of those employed before the legislature was relocated. Hence, the move of the 
parliament has direct and severe consequences for the poor in northern Kwa-
Zulu-Natal and for private economic development in this region more generally. 
In contrast to the economic conditions in the area surrounding Ulundi, in the 
local municipality of Msunduzi (which encompasses the city of Pietermaritz-
burg) there 60% of the population was employed in the formal economy in 2002 
(Msunduzi Municipality 2002). This was mainly in social services, manufac-
turing and institutions. This was prior to the relocation of the legislature to 
Pietermaritzburg which evidently did not require the legislative seat as a drawer 
of economic development to the area. 
Finally, the interests that were allowed to dominate the decision of the move 
of the provincial legislature are not those that the legislature should primarily 
represent. The rural poor who are predominantly women headed households and 
carry a double burden of poverty were not represented. They were not repre-
sented in the economic impact that moving the legislature has on the region and 
they are not represented in the substantial transfer of funds away from devel-
opment to build and renovate a new legislative assembly. Instead, three other 
sets of interests have dominated this decision. The first is business interests, and 
particularly property developers, in the city of Pietermaritzburg. Prior to the 
2004 election Pietermaritzburg property developer Russell Collins, supported 
by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, launched a campaign to con-
vince voters to vote ANC so that the legislature was moved to Pietermaritzburg 
(Kockott 2004). His business partner, Lance Hackney then coordinated the 
Capital Coalition Campaign printing glossy news supplements and flyers to 
publicise their view (Kockott 2004). This was not supported by the Durban 
Chamber of Business who believed that the capital issue was a politicized 
matter. Clearly, business in the city of Pietermaritzburg was to benefit from the 
parliamentary move. With the new proposal to move again to a new Town Hill 
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site Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Business Chief Executive Andrew Layman 
complained that property values in the central business district would fall if the 
new move went ahead (cf. Alberts 2007). Clearly organized business was one of 
the main beneficiaries and interests represented in the parliamentary move to 
Pietermaritzburg. The ANC as a political party also benefited from the move, 
which located the provincial parliament within one of its key electoral support 
bases closer (than Ulundi) to the city of Durban which is another. In fact DA 
representative Radley Keys argued that the ANC had very close links to the 
business interests that organized the Capital Coalition Campaign (Kockott 
2004). The party has little representation in the legislature or voting support 
from northern KwaZulu-Natal. In fact, many MPPs were the direct beneficiaries 
of the move to Pietermaritzburg, but for personal not policy reasons. It would 
appear that the location of the legislature in Pietermaritzburg supports a prefer-
red lifestyle among some MPPs. For example, interviews revealed that when 
parliament is in session in Pietermaritzburg, many MPPs preferred to be booked 
into hotel accommodation in Durban (a 50 minute drive away) because the 
hotels were of a high quality standard and the social life in the evenings was 
good (Pers. ANC Interview 134 and Pers. IFP Interview 30). This was sup-
ported by one interviewee. He said,  
‘I must put this person into a hotel. There is nowhere for him to stay. He wants to be 
in Umhlanga … The restaurants are good … There are no good restaurants in Ulundi 
… There is a good jazz club in Durban … and it is just 45 minutes from (Pieter-
maritzburg) … they are going there tonight’ (Pers. Interview 140).  
The incapacity of the political elite in the legislature in policy-making, over-
sight, scrutiny and monitoring enabled the decision on the provincial capital 
issue to be made. They used their power as MPPs and their knowledge of the 
parliamentary environment to the benefit of personal and political interests in-
stead of developmental ones and not to the benefit of the majority of the pro-
vincial population. This is a clear case of MPPs falling back upon the skills that 
they have in the absence of institutional training and institutional provisions to 
enable them to make better policy decisions. Hence, in the absence of capacity 
they revert to party political concerns and personal interests and the provincial 
agenda comes to mirror the incapacity of the elite. As it does so, the elite move 
the agenda farther from the real policy concerns of the province. Until, a poli-
tical agenda becomes the norm. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are two sub-groups of political elites in the provincial 
legislature of KwaZulu-Natal. There is a technocratic sub-group which mirrors 
Pareto’s “upper stratum”; an elite that possess the qualities that enable them to 
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rule and have made the best use of their qualities and attributes. Their skill 
provides the method through which they maintain themselves in power. The 
legislature is the new arena of competition where the upper strata use their skill. 
The other sub-group of the political elite maintain themselves in power through 
Mosca’s exploitation of the system. Their ability to develop capacity is depen-
dent upon the support system and training that is absent from the legislature. 
While they may possess substantial salaries, they are not supported with insti-
tutional resources. In this absence, this sub-group utilizes its ability to under-
stand political rather than policy issues to re-focus the provincial agenda so that 
their incapacity in policy areas no longer matters. Through this, the longevity in 
office of its members is guaranteed. Hence, the provincial business comes to 
mirror the capacity of MPPs, a consequence of the impact of political elite for-
mation and political party interaction in the legislature. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
The political elite of KwaZulu-Natal 
This book is a study of the agents that construct, define and bring about change 
through the exercise of institutionalized power; it is a study of political elite 
formation in the context of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature. The roots 
of political elite formation are located within the contested contexts of contested 
political ideas and shifting political institutional spaces through three political 
periods: early political movements, political elite formation during the struggle 
period and political elite formation during the democratic transition. The 
political elite that came to parliament in 1994 was ideologically divided into 
increasingly entrenched camps of contradictory and internally fragmented alli-
ances. A range of ideological discourses competed throughout these periods in 
which I focused. Yet, despite this competition with other discourses, Africanist 
discourses were contained in the ideology of both the IFP and the ANC elites.  
Secondly, the political parties represented in the legislature had prior ex-
perience of institutionalized power through one of three legitimate systems of 
authority. These were formal political legislative institutions, informal institu-
tions of authority created through the merging of various struggle components 
and, finally, through the institution of traditional leadership. In the course of 
these experiences, political parties claimed these institutional spaces as their 
own, and in many cases elites operated within a charismatic form of politics by 
personalizing their positions. The political elite thus came to be seen as the in-
stitution in which they were located.  
The political elite in the territory that made up KwaZulu and Natal existed 
historically with a large degree of autonomy from national political party dyna-
mics. This theme can be traced throughout the three periods of history that I 
considered. As a consequence of this degree of autonomy, provincial political 
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discourses came to dominate national political dynamics, both in terms of 
political ideas and in terms of political spaces prior to 1994. 
Since 1994, political elite formation in the Provincial Legislature of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal has consisted of a number of characteristics based on key themes. In 
the first of these themes, the social composition of the political elite, I cate-
gorized the political elite by race, gender, age, regional identification, family 
and lineage ties, religion, education, professional occupation and community 
related activities. Although heterogeneous, the political elite is not representa-
tive of the provincial population and, in most individual cases, already pos-
sessed elite status both prior to entering the legislature and prior to initial 
political involvement. This is most clear in gender terms. The political elite is 
overwhelmingly male. Parliamentary women are mostly extraordinary in com-
parison to their male counterparts, have gender specific experiences and possess 
support from the women’s sections of their parties. To be in parliament they 
have overcome normative assumptions about their roles in society. That the 
political elite is not representative of the provincial population is further borne 
out in educational levels and family and lineage ties. MPPs have a strong family 
connection to politics. In the IFP, ancestral and lineage ties created patterns of 
respect. In occupational class, the political elite were found to be drawn from 
flexible careers – the “chattering classes” and small business owners. As the 
political spaces available to individuals narrowed in 1994, so did the range of 
elites that became parliamentarians. That the political elite is not representative 
of the provincial population is in keeping with the findings of Norris in research 
on legislatures in advanced democratic states where those who make themselves 
available for political office are a-typical of the electorate. This is possibly also 
indicative of a deferential political culture in KwaZulu-Natal as the population 
seek to choose their “betters” to represent them.  
Although already established as an elite prior to taking office, the political 
elite in KwaZulu-Natal does not share the profile of a typical social background. 
This is in contrast with both Pareto’s argument that the political elite share a 
common social background and with Mosca’s contention that a political elite is 
an organized grouping formed on the basis of common material interests. In-
stead, in this context there are some clear divisions in the social characteristics 
of the political elite based upon party political lines. In terms of racial com-
position, the IFP elite was found to be the most diverse grouping followed by 
the NNP. The ANC and DA consisted of almost entirely one racial group. Since 
1994, these profiles have begun to change. This is in the NNP and DA as a con-
sequence of poor electoral chances, and in the IFP as a consequence of internal 
party political culture. In the DA and NNP race offers an additional guarantee to 
selection as the parties attempt to shed their non-black profiles. In terms of 
regional identification, the IFP is the only party in which its MPPs are drawn 
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from all thirteen districts which comprise both rural and urban settings. In ad-
dition, these MPPs syncretised their urban and rural affiliations in their patterns 
of regional identification. This is in sharp contrast to the ANC whose MPPs are 
overwhelmingly drawn from two districts that are overwhelmingly urban and 
whose urban MPPs from these two districts dominate in the legislature. Hence, 
the IFP elite is much more representative than previously thought and the ANC 
is distinctly urban. In terms of other differences, it was found that the IFP MPPs 
are more likely to have been involved in community-based developmental roles 
and the ANC in mobilization and protest type politics which provide clear dis-
tinctions in the experiences they bring to the legislature and the way they view 
their larger role. In terms of occupational experience, IFP, DA and NNP parlia-
mentarians had a range of skills to fall back on, unlike many of their ANC 
counterparts where politics is most likely to be their only career. 
While remaining socially fractured, in the distinctions between elites from 
different political parties, there is a slight trend in that the political elite has 
become more socially homogenous since 1994. This indicates that some social 
bias is present in elite formation and some measure of self-selection exists 
among the political elite. In addition, there are discernible clusters of political 
elites both within and across party political lines. In some cases, elites from 
different political parties share very similar social characteristics, a key factor in 
that makes fluidity and fragility in allegiance possible. Syncretic affiliations 
have served to integrate elites into a series of discernible clusters and to knit 
those clusters together. 
The social characteristics of the political elite have enabled social networks 
and, in turn, social capital. Patterns of association among the political elite, 
based upon one or more shared social characteristic, have served to bind them 
in relationships of trust. Such patterns of association serve as reliability markers 
that connect elites and similarly structure some of their relationships to one 
another. This in turn has contributed somewhat to the patterns of recruitment 
and circulation that were found. Some elites were able to draw upon social net-
works, based upon shared social characteristics, to guarantee a place in the 
legislature. This was particularly so in 1994 in the IFP, where a substantial 
white bloc of MPPs was included on the electoral list. However, these social 
networks also exist across political party lines. The key element in most poli-
tical parties is an elite that has become, in the post-1994 period, both fluid and 
fragile in political party allegiance. 
The political elite in KwaZulu-Natal was already an elite before they came 
to parliament but not solely and primarily in terms of their social composition. 
They are an elite of the electorate, of the political experiences that they hold and 
of their political parties. The overwhelming majority held senior service roles 
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within their political parties prior to becoming parliamentarians. Hence, they are 
connected with political power, both in the present and in the past. 
Specific political experiences provided an additional guarantee of a place in 
the provincial legislature to clusters of the political elite. These specific experi-
ences were dependent upon political party affiliation. Hence, political capital is 
present in political elite formation in KwaZulu-Natal and is a product of shared 
political experiences. The political elite to some extent monopolise the admi-
nistration of political careers through party political knowledge. The senior 
position holders have recalibrated their status in the new parliament based upon 
certain political experiences, and those experience types are dependent upon the 
parties with which they came to office with. They coalesce with people in their 
own image, elites who have been “blooded” by sharing similar political experi-
ences and such shared experiences contribute to a common identity.  
Despite developing connections to power, the reasons for the affiliations of 
the political elite were not based primarily upon the grand political context, but 
rather upon local contexts and personal circumstances and sometimes on 
chance. A limited choice and a desire for political involvement led individuals 
in some cases into their political affiliations. This is most common among the 
ANC elite. These limited choices were often as a consequence of fractious party 
politics and the control of turf. Such routes into politics injected a multiform 
dimension to political parties, explains the formation of particular political 
clusters within parties and means that for many, the reasons for their particular 
political party affiliations are not pertinent in the post 1994 period. For some, an 
alternative political home is now inconceivable as a consequence of their 
assimilation into political party structures. For others, their affinity to their poli-
tical party is tenuous. This lack of affinity has two consequences. Firstly, some 
have come to identify their interests to the legislature, rather than their political 
party. Secondly, the potential for increased circulation within the legislature is 
present, adding increased uncertainty to the maintenance of democracy through 
competitive elections, as elites struggle to redefine their present day affiliations. 
In countries in which a party list system of proportional representation is in 
operation, the potential for the political elite to form a political class is greatest 
as the parliamentary lists are by-and-large established by the higher ranks that 
set the rules and now have the potential to self-select. However, in KwaZulu-
Natal the political elite does not constitute one self-conscious political class that 
transcends party affiliations, nor does the vast array of political experiences 
indicate that those in power determine their own composition, or act in unity. 
However, the ANC political elite in particular are frequently now living from 
politics. 
While in KwaZulu-Natal there is not one political class, one may speak of 
many classes. These political classes in KwaZulu-Natal coalesce around parties, 
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and these classes co-exist. This is a consequence of the form of political capital 
that exists. However, the potential for the transformation of these fractured poli-
tical classes into one political class exists because the currencies of political 
capital are mainly symbolic and includes respect, values, shared identity and 
shared experiences. This symbolism is based upon past, rather than present, 
political experiences. In the ANC, they are further based upon a need to be 
political, rather than policy preferences, which in turn creates a need to live 
from politics.  
Elite theorists – Pareto, Mosca and Mills – and democratic elite theorists 
alike frequently focus upon the methods of circulation and they posit that elite 
recruitment and circulation is a key method of democratic replacement as new 
interests seek power. Unlike them, I added two further dimensions to the con-
cept of political elite recruitment and circulation, that of the causes, character-
istics and consequences of elite circulation and the impact of the context of 
political parties. Thus, I explored political elite recruitment in the party list pro-
cesses in 1994 and 1999 and political elite circulation in the floor crossing pro-
cesses within the legislature, locating these firmly within political party political 
culture and social and political capital as it has emerged within political parties 
in the legislature. As a result of this approach I found that in KwaZulu-Natal, 
while social and political composition often provide the currencies through 
which political elite recruitment and circulation often takes place within the 
legislature, prevailing norms of intra-party political culture provide the main 
reasons.  
These political cultures are not identical in the ANC and IFP. In the ANC 
conceptions of etiquette including notions of respect and leadership are clearly 
related to past party political experiences and institutional positions held within 
the party and the legislature. In contrast, in the IFP, the prevailing norms of 
political etiquette mean that these conceptions are much more diverse and, 
although related to prior experiences have no direct relationship to the in-
stitutional position held by MPPs. Instead, leaders can emerge from almost 
anywhere and alongside the formal institutionalized structures of party and 
parliamentary offices, a parallel structure of leadership exists that serves to 
provide political relationships and the canvassing of ideas with a procedure and 
boundaries. Unlike in the ANC, the cleavages present in terms of who fits into 
the hierarchy are cross cutting rather than mutually reinforcing. Leaders can be 
leaders in more than one domain. As such, the route to leadership can take a 
variety of forms, does not dictate seniority in terms of debate and decisions and 
ties MPPs together across a whole range of cleavages. All MPPs follow these 
prevailing rules of political etiquette in their interactions with one another, so an 
idea can emerge from anyone, but is likely to be introduced through a leader. 
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A central feature of intra-party political culture is intra-party discipline, a 
factor that clearly demonstrates the prevailing rules of interaction between the 
political elite within each party. Central to party etiquette in the ANC is the 
concept of democratic centralism and discipline is thus predominantly private, 
formalised and institutionalized. Although debate and discussion is accepted in 
caucus, MPPs are expected to abide by the decisions that are taken by party 
leadership. Should they not, discipline is conclusive and MPPs are sidelined. In 
contrast to the ANC, discipline in the IFP, is frequently personal, public and 
related to conceptions of etiquette and respect through ubuntu-botho. Within 
these conceptions an individual is valued because he/she forms a part of a 
greater collective. Thus, it follows that discipline is also a collective enterprise 
and is frank, open and personal followed by a process of forgiveness and back 
reconciliation into the “collective”. 
Political elite circulation and volatility in the occupation of seats in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal is a product of intra-party political culture in the IFP and ANC. 
Because these political cultures are not the same, they do not have the same 
consequences. In the IFP, elite circulation in the legislature has been a product 
of a re-casting of the political elite to incorporate those into the legislature who 
operate within the parameters of the prevailing norms of political etiquette, and 
the circulation out of the legislature of those who do not. The concept of 
leadership within these prevailing norms, as a role not tied to any particular 
legislative structure, means that the rules of canvassing of ideas provide for 
broader leadership opportunities in the party and not necessarily in government. 
As such the political elite do not extensively hold on to legislative opportunities. 
In contrast, in the ANC a more structured conception of leadership correlates to 
hierarchical distinctions in institutional position held. Circulation is a product of 
these conceptions as the legislature, provides a springboard to greater leadership 
positions in the national parliament and in other institutional managerial roles 
within the state. As such there is a growing affiliation to legislative structures to 
secure a political institutional role that is tied to conceptions of leadership and 
respect. Hence, the prevailing norms of political party culture means that poli-
tical elite circulation in KwaZulu-Natal is not always a democratic indicator, 
and not on the same indicator for the elite in each party.  
In addition, there has been increased volatility in political elite circulation in 
KwaZulu-Natal since 1994, which at face value appears to consist of a steady 
flow of recruitment and replacement. It is not so. This volatility is primarily a 
consequence of turnover in the IFP. In the IFP the high turnover of MPPs is a 
consequence of both replacement – as elites leave office for a range of alter-
natives – which is democratic, and floor crossing to the ANC in which case they 
tie their interests to the legislature and not democracy. In the ANC there are 
high levels of parliamentary retention and a growing affiliation to legislative 
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structures to secure a political institutional role as a springboard to greater 
positions.  
While intra-party political culture has had a direct impact upon recruitment 
and circulation in KwaZulu-Natal, the attitudes and values of the political elite 
has had an impact upon political institutions. In the first parliamentary term 
from 1994-1999 the political elite gradually came to abandon a duality of 
political practice and focus their energies within the new framework of legis-
lative politics. This was in line with Putnam’s contention that the institutionali-
zation of modern institutions of government is a central factor in moderating the 
behaviour of the political elite. There were three key reasons for the moderation 
of behaviour. Firstly, political elite circulation and a reining in of a militant core 
within parties removed the barrier to a working relationship among parties in 
the legislature. Secondly, the institutionalization of a peace process between the 
IFP and ANC contributed to a modification of attitudes. Thirdly, the under-
standing that the political elite were responsible for public policy in the pro-
vince demanded an element of some cooperation between political parties. 
However, the second election became a catalyst for the interaction of elites 
based upon their shared value systems and the hegemony of elite clusters that 
coalesced around Africanism. The equation of an IFP discourse of respect with 
a broader discourse of race set the scene for the negotiation of a coalition agree-
ment with the ANC which had as its basis, this shared discourse between 
clusters of elites in both parties. Overall, the political elite, was found to display 
value systems in a range of categories. As such they were categorised as re-
wardist nationalists, cultural communitarians (African consciousness), tradition-
alists, ethno-linguistically bounded communitarians, cosmopolitan modernisers, 
individualists and pragmatic political pluralists. 
It was found that clusters of the political elite based upon the value systems 
of rewardist nationalists, cosmopolitan modernisers and cultural communita-
rians were present in the coalition. The dynamics of interaction in the coalition 
provided for a political network consisting of a dominant cross-party discourse 
forged along the ideas of Africanism that supplanted the intra-party ideologies, 
excluded other discourses and created a new hierarchy within the legislature. At 
the same time other clusters of the political elite – ethno-linguistically bounded 
communitarians and traditionalists in their most anti-institutional form declined. 
Unlike Putnam’s study it would appear that this simultaneous decline was 
through elite circulation and replacement and not the modification of behaviour 
and values through the effects of institutional frameworks. 
This raises the question what is the impact institutionally when the attitudes 
and values of the political elite change? Can established values and attitudes re-
mould political institutions? The ANC-IFP coalition brought together a set of 
value and belief systems that was not congruent with the new institutions and, 
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in fact, began to undermine them. In this case, modern political institutions 
proved themselves to be fragile in the face of a coalition of value systems and 
the political elite claimed the institutions as their space. This is congruent with 
the work of Bloch in that deeper not explicitly political traditions or values may 
have an impact institutionally.  
Institutionally speaking, the most important result of the coalition was that it 
prevailed in such a manner that the institutions of government stopped function-
ing as they were supposed to – to process and to resolve conflict. The com-
mittee system that is supposed to provide scrutiny, monitoring and oversight of 
executive decisions stopped functioning to any real effect and the executive 
branch operated with impunity. The penetration of institutions by the value sys-
tems embodied in the coalition provided for accommodation and compromise. 
In so doing, it sheltered the political elite from scrutiny and enabled them to 
function autonomously in particular spheres of influence. 
If democracy is as Przeworski contends – the act of subjecting interests to 
competition, structuring and processing conflict through rules, procedures and 
institutions and ensuring that uncertainty is institutionalized – the penetration of 
the political institutions by the value systems embodied in the coalition and the 
fragility of those institutions in the face of deeper not explicitly political tra-
ditions was the most serious threat to democracy the province has faced since 
1994.  
As the formation of the IFP – ANC coalition and its subsequent collapse 
demonstrated, the relative dominance of elite clusters was in turn bounded by 
the prevailing political party discourse of political etiquette within political 
culture. The primary reason for a coalition between the IFP and ANC, and not 
the IFP and DP in 1999 was because of a failure of the political elite in the DP 
to comprehend the prevailing rules of political etiquette in the IFP – a factor 
that led them to insult the collective through a lack of “respect” to a “leader”. 
The prevailing conception of respect as it is tied to leadership and advancement 
in the ANC led to direct attempts to control the legislature, through floor-cross-
ing and this clash with the IFP's discourse ultimately led to the withdrawal of 
the IFP.  
Hence, the clash over “respect” as it is embodied in the political culture of 
the IFP and ANC, and the DP’s ability to work within the political culture of 
other parties came to define the balance between different forms of alliances 
and the place of clusters of the political elite within them. Thus in KwaZulu-
Natal, the value systems of an Africanist ideology of the IFP-ANC coalition 
were to penetrate political institutions, but another form of value system – that 
of political etiquette was found to compete with ideology in the legislature. In 
both cases, value systems shaped the behaviour of the political elite. Ultimately, 
in KwaZulu-Natal, the institutions of government do not diminish the way in 
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which members of the political elite relate to one another, as the value systems 
that they possess determine the balance between values and functions. In Kwa-
Zulu-Natal, values and attitudes remoulded these political institutions. 
If value systems can penetrate modern political institutions and determine 
their functioning this also speaks to the levels of institutional capacity held by 
the political elite. The concept of institutional capacity is not a major theme in 
elite theory, yet the question of whether the political elite understand their role 
and can carry it out is a key means to evaluate inter-elite relationships. Institu-
tional capacity is defined as the active power of political elites to use their 
knowledge of the institutional environment including the mandate of the 
position that they occupy to influence the policy agenda and its outcomes and 
thus any particular outcome in which the exercise of political power manifests 
is ultimately dependent upon the institutional capacity of political elites. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, the institutional capacity of the political elite was found 
to be influenced primarily by their social and political characteristics. Unlike 
Mosca’s claim that increasing bureaucratization makes the skills of the political 
elite less relevant, in KwaZulu-Natal the absence of parliamentary training and 
support systems means that these skills are the primary resources that the 
political elite possess. On the whole, in KwaZulu-Natal, the political elite was 
found to have a limited understanding of their parliamentary roles and responsi-
bilities and was bounded by their understanding of the institutional environ-
ment, comprehension of their role within it, and ability to navigate the parlia-
mentary environment effectively. 
This lack of understanding was felt in all parties, but most acutely by the 
political elite in the ANC whose previous political experience – political mo-
bilezation, extra-legal action, and the construction of broad ideological and 
policy statements – did not provide the political elite with any resources to 
provide for real, substantive legislative agendas with tangible developmental 
outcomes. This is the more so, given conceptions of leadership in the party and 
the increasing trend of MPPs who choose to live from politics and who are not 
members of the “chattering classes”.  
In terms of institutional capacity in KwaZulu-Natal, there were found to be 
two sub-groups of the political elite in the provincial legislature. Firstly, there is 
a technocratic sub-group that mirrors Pareto’s upper stratum; an elite that 
possess the qualities such as institutional capacity that enables them to rule. 
This grouping have, according to Pareto, made the best use of their qualities and 
attributes. The legislature is the new arena of competition where the upper stra-
tum uses their skill. This grouping influences political institutions in important 
ways. Firstly, they are able to use their key skills of education, past occupa-
tional experience and past political institutional experience to influence the sub-
stantive debates within the committee system of the legislature and within the 
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executive branch. In this way they become the policy experts in the province. In 
a context in which values penetrates political institutions their own political 
opinions become incorporated into policy. Secondly, their “skills” become the 
way that they maintain themselves in power. The case of provincial institutional 
finances demonstrated that despite clear evidence of violations of party etiquette 
and discipline, the skills of a member of this sub-group is considered valued by 
the party. The result is that this sub-group is offered an “additional guarantee” 
across party lines in the legislature as a consequence of its dominance in 
capacity. In this context of acute party competition this has the added potential 
of increasing affiliation to the legislature and not the party, increasing fluidity 
within the legislature and subverting the procedures of democracy. 
Secondly, there is a sub-group that lacks capacity who maintain itself in 
power through Mosca’s exploitation of the system. Their ability to develop 
capacity is dependent upon support systems and training that is absent from the 
legislature. In this absence, this sub-group fall back on their ability to under-
stand political rather than policy issues. The implication of this in KwaZulu-
Natal is that each party provincial caucus acts as a back up for the incapacitated. 
It is from the party caucus that MPPs receive direction and instruction that is 
followed through in the legislature. As a consequence, MPPs frequently revert 
to party political concerns over political power, loyalty and influence rather 
than over questions of governance, monitoring and scrutiny. Parliamentary de-
bates become bogged down by debates of a party nature rather than a provincial 
one by the majority of MPPs. Such questions as to where the provincial capital 
should be located are clear indications of this – the subsequent move of the 
provincial capital to Pietermaritzburg without any form of provincial assess-
ment of the impact of that move or whether the move could be accommodated 
is a clear manifestation of this. The result is a re-focused provincial agenda. As 
such, in refocusing the agenda, the lack of capacity in policy areas of this sub-
group no longer matters. In refocusing the provincial agenda, the potential 
exists in this context of acute party competition for more security for political 
elites that lack capacity as the provincial agenda comes to mirror the incapacity 
of elites.  
I claim that political elite formation in KwaZulu-Natal remains guided by the 
history of party fracture lines that existed in the province, and the new insti-
tutional context within which the political elite are located has provided for 
greater fluidity rather than stability among the elite. Social and political capital 
provides the currencies of political elite formation of a bifurcated political elite, 
most of which lacks institutional capacity. This elite has been able to change the 
content of provincial business as a direct consequence of institutional incapa-
city. Whether the values and attitudes of the political elite coalesce across party 
lines in the future or not, what is clear is that the influences of older ideologies 
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and political culture persist and form the basis of political elite interactions. 
These values frequently impact upon the new institutions of government in this 
context. As such, both now and in the future, the essential components of power 
accumulation by the political elite have the potential to conflict with the 
political party system and to influence the institutions of government that form 
the very basis of democracy in the province.  
Theoretical development 
Theories of political elites have thus far consisted of fractured and fragmented 
approaches to the problematic of political elites and have failed to provide a 
comprehensive framework through which political elites may be studied. This 
study expands and redefines the study of political elites in two key ways. 
Firstly, it provides a new theoretical framework through which the power and 
agency of political elites and their relationship to political institutions may be 
studied. This framework encompasses the elements of social and political com-
position, recruitment and circulation, values and attitudes and institutional capa-
city to demonstrate that political elite formation encompasses all of these 
factors, these factors influence each other, and for a true reflection of political 
elite formation cannot be studied independently of one another.  
Secondly, any interrogation into political elite formation should exist within 
the context of the way in which those elites negotiate, exercise and accumulate 
power; that is, within the confines of institutionalized power – within the insti-
tutions of power in which they are located in the legislature and within political 
parties. Hence, the character and constraints of parties and political institutions 
and their relationship to political elites is a key component in political elite 
formation. Without the state, the agency of political elites is meaningless. 
Methodologically, this study shows that political elite theory should be 
guided by three criteria. First, that it draws together the characteristics of social 
and political composition, recruitment and circulation, values and attitudes and 
institutional capacity as a complete framework for understanding political elite 
formation. Second, that political elite formation is investigated within the con-
text of institutionalized power. In countries undergoing transitions a broader 
definition of institution and institutional power is needed to encompass the 
shadow institutions often created by opposition movements (in this case the 
ANCs state outside of a state). Indeed, it is the relationship of the political elite 
to those institutions that provides power. Third, studies of political elites must 
explore any hypothesis through an extensive empirical method of investigation. 
The values and attitudes of the political elite cannot be ascertained through an 
examination only of political party membership or policy choices measured 
through elite voting patterns in contexts where acute political fractures made 
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free political choice difficult and hardened political camps existed. Only 
through a process of extensive interviewing will the complexity of political 
affiliations be revealed. 
The first ten years of newly created democratic institutions in KwaZulu-
Natal provide a few key developments for scholars in African political contexts 
in transition and in which there has been a history of acute political fractures. 
First, it is clear that the agency of political elites is the key factor in shaping, 
enabling, undermining or destroying political institutions. That political agency 
is dependent upon a multiplicity of currencies and commodities that range from 
social and political capital to patterns of culture, respect and institutional ca-
pacity. Political party membership may not be the only factor in identifying 
political attitudes and value systems. Yet in countries entering a democratic 
arrangement for the first time, hardened political camps may still endure despite 
the emergence of new cross-party value systems. Political elites possess multi-
ple roles of representation and responsibility that overlap, fuse and straddle. 
Hence, the way in which political elites relate to one another is a primary point 
of departure in political analysis of them.  
Second, whereas ideology is often thought to be a key indicator of values 
and attitudes among elites, patterns of political etiquette may also frequently 
permeate political relationships between elites. In this case, patterns of respect 
overwhelmingly influenced the substance of political life. If the form of poli-
tical power influences the substance of that power then it needs to be given 
accordance in any studies of elites. Institutional incapacity among large sub-
sections of a political elite makes values and attitudes and political etiquette the 
key determining factors in how those elites relate to one another and to how 
they relate to the political institutions through which they exercise political 
power. 
To consider that constitutions and the political institutions created at a spe-
cific point in time via one implicit process of elite pacting will last unchanged 
for a lifetime is a fallicy. The key question for the development of theory is not 
whether a political elite drawn together in a new institutional arrangement will 
succumb to the moderating effects of those political institutions. Studies of 
elites must now begin to consider, not whether elite values, attitudes and pat-
terns of political etiquette penetrate institutions, but rather how they do so. 
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